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While authoritarian presidents prevail under heavily president-oriented constitutions throughout the post-Soviet region, democracy along parliamentary lines triumphs in Central Europe. This article discusses the constitutional pattern among the post-communist countries on the basis of two general questions: First, how can we explain why strong presidential constitutions dominate throughout the post-Soviet region whereas constrained presidencies and governments anchored in parliament have become the prevailing option in Central Europe? Second, and interlinked with the first question, why have so many post-communist countries (in the post-Soviet region as well as in Central Europe) chosen neither parliamentarism nor presidentialism, but instead semi-presidential arrangements whereby a directly elected president is provided with considerable powers and coexists with a prime minister? The analysis indicates that both historical-institutional and actor-oriented factors are relevant here. Key factors have been regime transition, pre-communist era constitutions and leaders, as well as short-term economic and political considerations. With differing strengths and in partly different ways, these factors seem to have affected the actors' preferences and final constitutional compromises.

This thesis is about the conflict between participation and bureaucracy. This conflict is illustrated by a case study within the Swedish Armed Forces under the activity that preceded the 1996 Resolution on Defence. More closely it focuses on the decision-making process that led to the Swedish Armed Forces report that were handed over to the Government in March 1996. In this decision-making process the Supreme Commander tried different ways to create participation among all the high- ranking officers, from local up to Headquarters level, to make them participate in the process. The thesis answers the question if it is possible to create participation in a bureau­cratic organisation such as the Swedish Armed Forces, and the conclusion that I draw is that participation is hard to establish. First there is a conflict within the bureaucratic form itself, since a bureaucracy implies a diversification of assignments and responsibilities in different functions and at different levels in a hierarchy. Every level has its own task to fulfil and this states how reality is to be understood. In the Swedish Armed Forces the bureaucratic structure is reinforced by the fact that the officer is promoted to a higher rank after his or her military training. Both the bureaucratic structure and the military training will lead to a differentiation between individuals, and they will be placed in different skills and status levels within the organisation. Besides this, individuals will gather information mostly from their own level, which will further fortify the difference between the levels. Furthermore there are also individual factors connected to the bureaucratic structure that have shown to complicate participation. For example individuals choose not to participate since they experience that they lack necessary competens for the task, that they do not have time, that they have not been consulted or that they consider the task to be solved at a higher level. So even if the military decision-making model encourages and advocates partici­pation, there is a big difficulty to break the bureaucratic design. Leaders often show inability to go from a bureaucratic leadership style to a democratic one. At the same time the subordinate support their leaders when they act as a traditional leader. ; digitalisering@umu

Rysslands doktrinella hierarki fungerar utan arenaspecifika doktriner. Det finns ett övergripande säkerhetsstrategiskt dokument, direkt underställt detta dokument finns den militära doktrinen. Ändå utformades 2001 en maritim doktrin som skall behandla det maritima läget och rysslands ekonomiska intressen på haven fram till år 2020. Varför denna doktrin utformades kan ha sitt svar i Rysslands ökade maritima intresse i och kring ryskt havsterritorium, men det kan även vara ett sätt att visa sina officiella ställningstaganden, intressen och intentioner öppet för världssamfundet. 2010 publicerades ett nytt säkerhetsstrategiskt dokument och samma år offentliggjordes även den nya militäradoktrinen. Det utformades i samma veva även en strategisk Arktisk doktrin som tillkännagav Rysslands intentioner och intressen i denna nya och oexploaterade region som tack vare jordens förhöjda medeltemperatur de senare åren har öppnat upp nya områden. Många nationer har blivit intresserade av detta nya område, bland annat USA, Kanada, Danmark och Norge. Detta har i sin tur skapat en grogrund, för tvister om gränsdragningar och om vem som har rätten till resursextraheringen i området. Det som detta arbete kommer att avhandla är, vad den äldre ryska maritima doktrinen har haft för inverkan påde senare utvecklade doktrinerna. Vad finns det för skillnader, likheter och vilka punkter har höjts till en merbeslutad nivå? Utifrån dessa kriterier kommer sedermera en estimering, om vad dessa variabler kan ha förinverkan, på ryska marinstridskrafters uppträdande i Arktis regionen i ett framtidsperspektiv. ; Russian doctrine on set hierarchy works without specific arena doctrines. There is a comprehensive security strategy document, and as a direct subordinate to this document is the military doctrine. Yet in the year of 2001 a maritime doctrine was developed to deal with the maritime situation and Russia's economic interests in the seas until 2020. Why this doctrine was designed might have its answer in Russia's increased interest in maritime ...