The philosophical bases of Theism
In: Routledge library editions. Philosophy of religion, 17
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In: Routledge library editions. Philosophy of religion, 17
Annotation
In: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Band 10, Heft 4, S. 55-78
In this paper, I argue that Islamic theism is best explained by the hypothesis of Divine Commission (HDC), whereby Muhammad is viewed as being divinely commissioned to serve the overall salvific purposes of God. To this end, I present three observation reports relating to Islamic theism and evaluate HDC against an alternative hypothesis, the hypothesis of Non-Commission (NC) whereby Muhammad is not viewed as being divinely commissioned. I argue that the probability of the observation reports is greater on the assumption that HDC is true than on the assumption that NC is true. Accordingly, this gives us reason to prefer HDC as a better explanation of Islamic theism.
In: Modern intellectual history: MIH, Band 10, Heft 3, S. 519-542
ISSN: 1479-2451
Scholars have hitherto found little to no place for natural philosophy in the intellectual makeup of the Enlightened historian William Robertson, overlooking his significant contacts with that province and its central relevance to the controversy surrounding David Hume and Lord Kames in the 1750s. Here I reexamine Robertson's Situation of the World at the Time of Christ's Appearance (1755) in light of these contexts. I argue that his foundational sermon drew upon the scientific theism of such thinkers as Joseph Butler, Edmund Law, and Colin Maclaurin to counter the autonomous figurations of the universe associated with Hume and Kames, and to develop a historical account of progress based around Christian progressivism rather than the stadial theory of Adam Smith. Robertson conceived of history neither in secular terms nor in those of traditional religion, but sought instead to update the language of providentialism by naturalizing the sacred within a framework of general laws.
In: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Band 10, Heft 4, S. 97-118
Analytic philosophers of religion typically take God to be 'the personal omniGod' – a (supernatural, immaterial) person who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, and who creates and sustains all else that exists. Analytic philosophers also tend to assume that the personal omniGod is the God of 'classical' theism. Arguably, this is a mistake. To be consistent, a classical theist or her supporter must deny that God is literally a person. They need not, however, deny the aptness of using personal language, or of thinking of God as a person or personal at the level of religious psychology.
In: New Studies in Critical Realism and Spirituality
Critical Realism and Spirituality contextualizes, delineates, explores and critiques the turn to spirituality and religion in critical realism, which has been under way since the mid-1990s, as well as telling its story. It provides incisive discussion and anaysis of the following broad questions: How does critical realism allow and facilitate the resolution of problems in the area of comparative religion? Can it help you to justify your own faith or belief? What are the implications of the new philosophy of meta-Reality for traditional religious studies and how we organize and conduct our live
In: Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska. Sectio I, Philosophia - sociologia, Band 37, Heft 1
ISSN: 2300-7540
In: Voprosy filosofii: naučno-teoretičeskij žurnal, Heft 12, S. 43-55
One of the most interesting and widely discussed trends in modern epistemology is the so-called intellectual ethics, normative in its essence, centered around the concept of epistemic virtue, based on the idea of metaphysical anthropology, supplemented by elements of theology. The last consists in the idea of a certain "gift" to a person from the side of the Supreme Being, which is God – and this gift lies in the epistemic virtues inherent in the individual. This subject-centered concept emphasizes the intellectual and epistemic qualities of the cognizing subject that guarantee the truth of their beliefs. However, if is God the true guarantor of their "epistemic reliability" and the possibility of thus identifying justified belief with knowledge? The reliability of the cognitive human ability is seen in the realization of virtus as "perfection in being for the good", in this case epistemic, the only guarantee of which can only be divine will. Is it so? This article attempts to answer this question in the course of reconstruction and analysis of the epistemological-theistic approach to defining one of the key epistemic virtues of the cognizing subject – intellectual responsibility.
In: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Band 4, Heft 1, S. 197-218
I argue that Traditional Christian Theism is inconsistent with the conjunction of Truthmaker Necessitation and Truthmaker Maximalism, the thesis that all truths have truthmakers. Though this original formulation requires extensive revision, the gist of the argument is as follows. Suppose for reductio Traditional Christian Theism and the sort of Truthmaker Theory that embraces Truthmaker Maximalism are both true. By Traditional Christian Theism, there is a world in which God, and only God, exists. There are no animals in such a world. Thus, it is true in such a world that there are no zebras. That there are no zebras must have a truthmaker, given Truthmaker Maximalism. God is the only existing object in such a world, and so God must be the truthmaker for this truth, given that it has a truthmaker. But truthmakers necessitate the truths they make true. So, for any world, at any time at which God exists, God makes that there are no zebras true. According to Traditional Christian Theism, God exists in our world. In our world, then, it is true: there are no zebras. But there are zebras. Contradiction! Thus, the conjunction of Traditional Christian Theism with Truthmaker Necessitation and Truthmaker Maximalism is inconsistent.
In: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 409-426
This paper argues that (1) richard Swinburne's general account of the simplicity of empirical hypotheses fails because it involves a deeply problematic notion of postulating a property, while there is a wide range of hypotheses where the assessment of simplicity rests entirely on the number and kinds of postulated properties (2) Swinburne's main argument in The Christian God for the simplicity of theism, the one based on considerations about pure limitless intentional power, is significantly weaker than he seems to believe. The paper does not draw a conclusion about whether theism is simple.
In: Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai. Philosophia, Band 66, Heft 2, S. 103-126
ISSN: 2065-9407
"The purpose of the present essay is to present a version of the evidential argument from evil and to propose a 'skeptical theistic' response from a phenomenological point of view. In a word, the problem with the evidential argument from evil is that it attempts to put forth as justified an interpretation of the moral significance of historical events which actually exceeds the limits of human knowledge and which is based on a misinterpretation of experience. The essay also corrects certain analytic-philosophical notions regarding the nature of appearance, terminating with a discussion of the familiar critiques of analytic skeptical theism and the question of whether the belief in the existence of God might not be affected by the apparent skepticism implied by the phenomenological approach to knowledge in general.
Keywords: existence of God, argument from evil, skeptical theism, phenomenology, analytic philosophy
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In: Vestnik Permskogo universiteta: Perm University Herald. Seriya Filosofia Psikhologiya Sotsiologiya = Series "Philosophy, psychologie, sociology", Heft 4, S. 560-568
ISSN: 2686-7532
The epistemological study of the features of theistic and atheistic thinking outside the axiological and cultural-historical opposition of the corresponding worldview positions reveals the interaction and moments of identity of theism and atheism. The principle of academic objectivism minimizes the axiological dependence of the oppositions of theism and atheism. In the epistemological aspect, it allows for determining the interreliance between theism and atheism, identical anthropomorphic cognitive components in theistic and atheistic thinking, identical development of the oppositions of the general and singular to the extent of the original concepts of theistic and atheistic explanations of the world. The man's existential demand for the certainty of absolute being also leads to a similar process of rational expression of the theism and atheism principles. In this expression, a significant role is played by symbols that form the semantic field of rationalization of these principles. The moments of epistemological coincidence of the theism and atheism identity allow us to draw a conclusion about the possibility of positive productive interaction between the subjects of virtual communication on the Internet and global interaction of cultures. Moreover, the rapidly increasing religiosity in Russia after the era of atheization is largely explained by the epistemological components of the identity and coincidence of theism and atheism. Epistemological features of theistic and atheistic thinking in the aspect of their relationship allow us to reconcile different worldview positions of the educational process subjects, especially the teaching of social disciplines and humanities.
In: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Band 10, Heft 1, S. 163-187
The free will theodicy (a standard theistic response to the problem of evil) places significant value on free will: free will is of such substantial value, that God's gift of free will to humans was justified, even though this gift foreseeably (and regularly) results in the most monstrous of evils. I will argue that when a state criminalizes sin (by punishing producers of sinful materials such as illicit drugs, or punishing consumers), it can restrict or eliminate citizens' exercise of metaphysical free will with respect to choosing to partake in or refrain from these activities. Given the value placed on free will in the free will theodicy, theists who endorse this theodicy should thus oppose the criminalization of what I will call Millian sins—that is, actions which are immoral, but which do not directly harm another person. In other words, such theists should oppose legal moralism.
In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Band 32, Heft 3-4, S. 150-161
ISSN: 1613-0650
In: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
This paper considers whether theism is compatible with moral error theory. This issue is neglected, perhaps because it is widely assumed that these views are incompatible. I argue that this is mistaken. In so doing, I articulate the best argument for thinking that theism and moral error theory are incompatible. According to it, these views are incompatible because theism entails that God is morally good, and moral error theory entails that God is not. I reject this argument. Since it is the best argument for thinking that theism and moral error theory are incompatible, I conclude that these views are compatible: one can coherently accept both views.