Suchergebnisse

The maxim that the people is the agent of the constituent power has, since the French revolution, been a universally accepted answer to the issue of the origin and the degree of validity of constitutional law which, as the ultimate norm of a state's legal order has no other higher positive law norm. But that maxim disregards political reality. Neither is it convincing from the point of view of the theory of state. The people is not the subject of activity but onl of reference. The maxim on the constituent power of the people is a democratic myth. As such it is polyvalent: the reinforcement of revolution or its prohibition determine whether the existing constitutional regime is to be overthrown or legitimised. The doctrine of the constituent power of the people is not cognitively rewarding as a theory of legitimation, either, since the effectiveness of a constitution does not depend on its provenance but on the reception it gets here and now from its addressees: state agencies and citizens. (SOI : PM: S. 63)

The author deals with the possibility of the application of the formalized mod in the study of the public administration issue in the federally structured American administration. The theory of American federalism has taught us that the expenses of the implementation of political decisions are inversely proportionate to the administrative level of their application: the expenses are bigger if the implementation is done at lower administrative levels, i.e. state or local instead federal authorities. On the other hand, that theory claims that the decision-making expenses are proportionate to the level of decision-making: the lower the decision-making level, the smaller the expenses. The American experience in the arena of the policy of oil and gas exploitation confirms the model's rationale, and is applicable to other fields: the optimal effect and the minimal expenses have been achieved in the situation in which political regulations are decided upon at the state level, while their implementation lies within the domain of federal government. (SOI : PM: S. 162)

The author poses the question: what makes Francois Mitterrand the "classic" type of ruler i.e. what makes him above-the-average contemporary politician. Following the well-documented analysis of the entire period of his rule, the author concludes: history will reveal Mitterrand's various masks, but never his true face. He exploited the classical mise en scene of power, so his true persona should be sought in the interplay of his numerous disguises. Mitterrand stands out among the contemporary political figures in the ability to use his power to ward off all attempts at its usurpation, th transforming his own power into the memory of the coming generations. (SOI : S. 178)

The author gives a short account of his broadly-based studies on the theory of public choice and the financing of the public sector in the industrialised countries of the world. In this context, first the definition of the theory of choice an relation to the financing of the public sector is given. Then there is a short review of the evolution of the theory of public choice in the history of human development, with special focus on the latest trends. Then the author explores fundamental principles of public choice in the functioning of the contemporary state and its consequences for the economic and social development of the developed countries. In the end, the author lists the essential requirements regarding the possibility of the implementation of the theory of public choice in the Croatian theory and practice when making the collective decisions regarding the financing of public needs. (SOI : PM: S. 178)

The author analyses the possibilities of a symbiosis of the democratic and the constitutional principle, the expression of the strain between the desire for popular sovereignty and the wish to establish the fundamental rules of political life as permanently as possible. Sieyes' distinction between the constituting and the constituted power can easily link the idea of popular sovereignty with the idea of constitutional state, but cannot answer the question of the constituting power's right to restrain the constituted power. Since its inception, the democratic constitutional state has been a dyadic entity i.e. a democratic and constitutional state. The dilemma is whether to respect the existing constitution and follow the procedure envisioned for amending it, or to make amendments following a revolutionary breach with the existing situation i.e. a direct manoeuvre of the constituting power. The author is in favour of separating what the constituting power may decide upon and what the constituted power may decide upon, since this maintains the balance of both types of powers in a constitutional state. (SOI : PM: S. 28)

Häberle claims constitutional law is a comparative experiential science closely linked with political science with which it shares the research subject. The constitutional state has been going through a permanent process of changes; the central question is who is the prime mover of constitutional changes: constitutional/legal institutions, constitutional/lega science and political science or public opinion and political culture of citizens? By analysing the recent history of the changes of the German constitutions he suggests that all these factors contribute to constitutional changes. Nevertheless, as an expert for law and political science, who considers himself as belonging to the wider European scientific community, Häberle thinks that the decisive influences in constitutional changes stem from legal and political sciences and concludes: Sine qua (scientia) mortalium vita non regitur liberaliter. (Without science, mortals do not command their life freely). (SOI : PM: S. 186)