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Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- WAYS IN TO THE TEXT -- Who Was John Rawls? -- What Does A Theory of Justice Say? -- Why Does A Theory of Justice Matter? -- SECTION 1: INFLUENCES -- Module 1: The Author and the Historical Context -- Module 2: Academic Context -- Module 3: The Problem -- Module 4: The Author's Contribution -- SECTION 2: IDEAS -- Module 5: Main Ideas -- Module 6: Secondary Ideas -- Module 7: Achievement -- Module 8: Place in the Author's Work -- SECTION 3: IMPACT -- Module 9: The First Responses -- Module 10: The Evolving Debate -- Module 11: Impact and Influence Today -- Module 12: Where Next? -- Glossary of Terms -- People Mentioned in the Text -- Works Cited

In A Theory of Justice John Rawls constructs a comprehensive social contract theory of justice to stand as a substantive alternative to utilitarianism. This work combines and develops the ideas of earlier essays, such as "Justice as Fairness" (1958), "The Sense of Justice" (1963), "Constitutional Liberty" (1963) and "Civil Disobedience" (1966), into a systematic moral and political philosophy of astonishing power and subtlety. I shall sketch its main principles, their derivation and justification, and then raise some questions about the supposed opposition between the standards of justice and utility.

John Rawls's theory of justice is best understood as an attempt to adapt Rousseau's theory of the general will to the modern liberal democratic state. Central to the theory is a belief in the rationality of human nature and dynamics. In a well-ordered society men's natural sentiments will prove to be both unified and stable, and they will not permit morally arbitrary advantages to influence their social arrangements. Rawls's theory offers a rational accommodation of freedom and equality. His philosophical perspective opens him to the charge that his theory slights the historical dimension of human justice. His conception of human personality is somewhat ambiguous. There is incongruity between his ethical theory and the realities of democratic politics. Nevertheless, Rawls's formulation of the moral and political principles of liberalism is a major achievement and entirely worthy of his intellectual ancestry

Introduction : Kant as a political philosopher -- 1. The limits of freedom -- 2. The justification of freedom -- 3. Types of rights, duties, and laws -- 4. Political legitimacy, obedience, and revolution -- 5. Justice and social welfare -- Conclusion : The continuing significance of Kant's political philosophy

ABSTRACT. SOME RECENT MARXOLOGISTS (NOTABLY ALLEN BUCHANAN, RICHARD MILLER AND ALLEN WOOD) HAVE DENIED THAT THE IDEA OF JUSTICE CAN PLAY ANY SIGNIFICANT ROLE WITHIN MARXIST THOUGHT. THIS ARTICLE MAINTAINS, ON THE CONTRARY, THAT THE VERY LOGIC OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM, NOTABLY THE CONCEPT OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN NEEDS, NECESSITATES A CONCEPT OF JUSTICE EVEN IN THE HIGHER PHASE OF COMMUNISM. FURTHERMORE, THE "ANTI-JURIDICAL" INTERPRETATION OF MARX FAILS TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE ACCOUNT OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST VALUES OF SELF-REALIZATION AND COMMUNITY. IT THEREFORE OBSCURES THE CONCERNS ADDRESSED BY A NOTION OF JUSTICE. THE EARLY MARX'S CONCEPT OF SPECIES-BEING (GATTUNGSWESEN) EXPRESSES THE RELATION BETWEEN SELF-REALIZATION AND COMMUNITY IN HISTORICAL TERMS. THUS IT PROVIDES AN APPROPRIATE CONTEXT FOR A MARXIST THEORY OF JUSTICE.

Ronald Dworkin - one of the greatest contemporary political and legal philosophers - started developing his comprehensiveliberal theory of a central position of the concept of equality firstly in a field of philosophy of law1 (he turned back to a fieldof jurisprudence with his book Justice in Robes, published in 2006), then followed liberal political theory of justice/politicalmorality (based on "equality of resources" account of justice2), and finally he attempted to clarify philosophical foundations3of this theory of political morality. His last book Justice for Hedgehogs4 has had an ambition to complete philosophicalfoundations of his theory, and especially to illustrate a unity of ethical and moral values.Dworkin has developed his theory of justice in a referental framewok of liberal theoretical attempts – initiated by JohnRawls in the 70s of the XX century – to redeem political philosophy and theory of justice, in order that political legitimacyof liberal political and economic order be reconsidered and rearticulated as based on justice, i.e. just redistribution ofreources.»Equality of resources« account of justice represents a central point of Dworkin`s attempt to present egalitarian face ofliberalism, to defend unity of values of equality and liberty, and to affirm value of equality as the central value of liberalism.He wants to keep individualism and value of liberty as an essence of liberalism, but also wants to demonstrate that equalityhas been even prior value in relation to liberty, that value of equality has been embeded in individuals and theirinterrelations through basic principles of humanism – equal concern/respect for the human life as such and specialresponsibility of each individual for his/her own life. He wants to approve that justice has been a sovereign virtue of apolitical power, as well as that individuals do not have only egoistic interests, but have been inherently also committed to a common good; that justice represents a parameter also of individual ethics; that there exists continuity (»strategy ofcontinuity«) between pluralism of individual value orientations and common sharing of basic principles of humanism,between individualism and common good, between pluralism and neutrality of the state.This article will be primarily focused on Dworkin's theory of justice, called »equality of resources« account of justice,because, firstly, it is a central focus of Dworkin`s still being produced and productive theoretical legacy; secondly, itrepresents a very complex theoretical endeavour which needs to be particularly analized; and, thirdly, Dworkin`s conceptionof law (law as integrity) and of morality (philosophical foundations of his theory of justiice), as well as his specificconception of liberalism (»liberal equality«) cannot be fully understood without understanding his »equality of resources«account of justice.

Justice is the first virtue of social institutions as truth is of systems ofthought. So John Rawls famously proclaimed in the beginning of hismasterwork, A Theory of Justice. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if untrue. Laws and institutions no matterhow efficient and well arranged must be reformed or abolished if unjust.Justice, perhaps unlike some other values, was not something we mightreadily trade a little of in exchange for other benefits.1In his critique ofRawls, Rescuing Justice and Equality, G. A. Cohen proposes to take justicemore seriously while at the same time conceding that justice might justifiably be traded off against other goods.2 His objection to Rawls is that hehas, without warrant, presented justice as quite compatible with extensive social inequality when inequalities serve to improve the condition ofthe worst off or least advantaged in society. If a departure from equality is what is necessary to improve the condition of the least fortunatethen departing from equality may have to be countenanced; but such adeparture is unjust. If Rawls truly takes justice to be as important as heproclaims, he must not present justice as a notion whose meaning mustbe revised to take into account the feasibility of sustaining some kinds ofsocial institutions. In particular, he must not build into the conceptionof justice he defends the idea that very unequal rewards for the talentedare just when they induce them to produce more – even if this is to thebenefit of all.

AbstractSome recent Marxologists (notably Allen Buchanan, Richard Miller and Allen Wood) have denied that the idea of justice can play any significant role within Marxist thought. This article maintains, on the contrary, that the very logic of historical materialism, notably the concept of the historical development of human needs, necessitates a concept of justice even in the higher phase of communism. Furthermore, the "anti-juridical" interpretation of Marx fails to provide an adequate account of the connection between the communist values of self-realization and community. It therefore obscures the concerns addressed by a notion of justice. The early Marx's concept of species-being (Gattungswesen) expresses the relation between self-realization and community in historical terms. Thus it provides an appropriate context for a Marxist theory of justice.