Suchergebnisse

"One of the most important issues in the design of national work injury compensation systems is how the two main possible routes of liability relate: on the one hand, the non-tort compensation (social security) model and, on the other, the tort compensation (employers' liability under civil or labour law) model.
In the Hungarian system of accident compensation in labour law, the employee is primarily entitled to certain benefits within the framework of social insurance and may claim damages in excess of this in damages lawsuits.
Employers' liability schemes can be supplemented by voluntary liability insurance solutions. Liability insurance contracts protect both parties: employers are protected against unplanned payments, possibly large amounts of compensation, and the outcome of potentially unpredictable compensation lawsuits, while it means guaranteed coverage for the employee in case of damage.
The introduction of compulsory liability insurance for employers is an issue that arises from time to time. In some countries, employers are required to take out liability insurance, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Austria. In insurance-based models, the route of compensation plays a marginal role. In Hungary, the penetration of liability insurance is low; however, there is currently no legislative intention to make liability insurance more extensive or mandatory for employers.
In general, however, there is no universal model for accident compensation in labour law. There is no such benchmark at the European Union level either, and it can be said that there is no explicit intention to fully harmonize Member State regulations.
In this study, I examine the consequences of the mandatory or wider application of liability insurance, the regulatory concepts that exist, and the role that the European Union plays in regulating the issue."

"Employers' liability for damages is an extremely strict, no-fault liability. In practically all cases, employers are liable for employment-related damages suffered by employees. Rules on employers' liability for damages has been changed in many aspects by the Hungarian code of labour law in the private sector, Act I of 2012 on the Labour Code (hereinafter referred to as Labour Code). These changes have introduced some, generally private law institutions into the assessment of liability, such as the foreseeability clause.
The application of these rules raises a lot of questions even in typical employment relationships, while for atypical employment relationships it is especially true. We must realize that the system of the employers' liability for damages has been designed for conventional employment relationships.
The purpose of this presentation and study is to review to what extent the rules governing employers' liability for damages may be applied for atypical employment relationships unobjectionably, e.g. remote working, or for atypical elements of typical employment such as home office."

Ferenc Finkey gave his inauguration speech at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, entitled Injustice as a Criterion of Punishable Acts. This inauguration speech can also be paralleled with problems today such as the issue of criminal liability for self-driving vehicles. In the case of offences caused by self-driving vehicles, the issue of illegality depends on the degree of automation. For vehicles with higher automation, it is already questionable who is responsible for the accident at all (the manufacturer, the programmer, the owner/operator, the user, or the car as a digital person), and the issue of injustice may vary depending on this. According to Finkey, it is not necessary to define the concept of injustice in the Criminal Code. At the same time, it states that lawful action is not punishable, and this should be the guiding principle in determining criminal liability for self-driving vehicles.

The author of the following study presents the institution of unauthorized agency in Romanian civil law. The conditions and possible cases unauthorized agency are presented, as well as the facts which, although similar, cannot be considered as unauthorized agency. The author analyzes the legal nature of the contract concluded by the unauthorized agent, the legal consequences of the ratification by the principal and discusses in detail the unauthorized agent's liability to both the principal and the third party. Finally, the study examines the conditions and consequences of the apparent authority, with special regard to the protection of the interests of the parties involved.