This article provides an overview of the author's efforts, together with those of colleagues, to help institutionalize the teaching and practice of conflict resolution in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe. These include his institute's university-based programs in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey funded primarily by the U.S. Institute of Peace, and his work, in conjunction with Partners for Democratic Change, in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. The article concludes by locating these activities within the context of the author's model for a new European peace and security system.
Draws on personal experience to present an overview of efforts to help institutionalize the teaching & practice of conflict resolution in the newly independent states of the former USSR & Eastern & Central Europe. Such efforts include George Mason U's (Fairfax, VA) Instit of Conflict Analysis & Resolution's programs in Armenia, Azerbaijan, & Turkey (funded primarily by the US Instit of Peace), & the author's work, in conjunction with Partners for Democratic Change, in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, & the Slovak Republic. These activities are located in the context of a model for a new European peace & security system. Adapted from the source document.
The author presents his conception of the evolution of Russia's geopolitical interests in Transcaucasia (the Central and part of the Southern Caucasus) caused by a gradual transformation of the military-strategic, political, ideological (including religious) ideas of the Russian elites at different periods. The author relies on a wide range of recent historical and political scientific studies, as well as historiographic surveys and scholarly works of the imperial and Soviet periods, to clarify his conclusions. The very fact of the changes that took place in the past and are still going on today and their vector confirms that Russia's top political leaders have been acting and are acting consistently and logically when dealing with the sovereign countries and other Transcaucasian territories. The well-substantiated and conceptually novel conclusions can be described as extremely relevant: they are based on an analysis of the processes of the last two centuries (rather than the last two decades). This means that the author has successfully avoided the political biases suggested by the current situation. Many of his colleagues fell into this trap: they naively believed that state independence of the Central Caucasian countries robbed Russia of its traditional geopolitical presence in the region. The present author is out to demonstrate beyond any doubt that revision by Russia of its geopolitical priorities in Transcaucasia will strengthen the position it lost in the 1990s. In the near future, the regional elites and other power centers will prove unable to stem Russia's mounting influence. In fact, Russia's geopolitical domination in Transcaucasia will merely shift from the military-state to the economic sphere, while Russia's real clout among the local elites and its influence on the electoral preferences of the local population and local economies will remain as prominent as ever.
"June 2000." ; Not distributed to depository libraries in a physical form. ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 35-43). ; Mode of access: Internet.
The Caucasus is perhaps best described as a mosaic of peoples ancient and modern intertwined across a complex, often inaccessible geography that has made it a crossroads linking not only east and west but equally north and south. The aim of this paper is to enhance the understanding of future Iran and Russia challenges in Transcaucasia. Russian post-Soviet geopolitics invokes Eurasianism as its inner rationale and meaning, as a greater good that imbues pragmatic, interest based politics with a sense of mission. Although Russia remains a strong regional power with firm position on international level it is still hard for Moscow to accept loss of the position of great power. The methodology of this research is descriptive-analytical and it attempts to give a geopolitical answer to the question that how Iran can gains a hegemony in the Transcaucasia region?
The benign neglect of the 'national question' under Brezhnev ended with the mass-mobilisation of non-Russian ethnic groups in 1988. Gorbachev, whose initial response was to reduce the national to the economic, is now forced to restructure the union fundamentally. The peoples of Transcaucasia--Armenians, Azerbaijanis and Georgians--are stronger in ethnopolitical consciousness than ever before. (SJK)
The article aims to present generally the dynamics of political and economic systems on the territory of Transcaucasia in the period from the second millennium BC to the present. This dynamics is seen as reflecting the historical experience of the Transcaucasian societies, whih is successively preserved at the present time. Institutional aspects are studied of public-private partnership projects currently being implemented by the South-Caucasian member states of the Eastern Partnership integration association.
Introduction. The Transcaucasian states waged war with each other and desperately wanted to find some disinterested party to resolve their territorial disputes in 1918–1921. The territory was first occupied by the countries of the Triple Alliance, then by the Entente countries, and each of them contributed to the formation or resolution of territorial disputes. Methods and materials. Based on the historical-systemic and historical-genetic approaches, the author determines which territorial changes were proposed in the region by representatives of the United States and why. The documents collected in the State Archive of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Archive of Political Documents of the Office of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and the National Archive of Armenia were involved for analysis. Analysis. The influence of the United States on the solution of territorial issues was determined by the general approach to the territory as passing into a mandate state. During the discussion of this issue, the understanding of the American representatives about the borders of this zone expanded first from Armenia in a general sense to Transcaucasia, and then narrowed to the borders of Turkish Armenia, which brought them back to the issue of the borders of the Republic of Armenia. At the same time, representatives working in the region proposed a plan for interstate disengagement, different from the British plan, and tried to introduce a governor-general in the disputed territory. Results. The remoteness from the region, the presence of a single channel of information about it through the Armenian Diaspora in the United States affected the narrow perception of the situation in the region by American representatives. The issue of the adoption of a mandate over Armenia or Transcaucasia and Armenia somehow got connected with the issue of costs for its effective implementation. The failed attempt to create an American governor-general in the disputed territories recorded a lack of understanding of the situation in the region and the possibilities of its control and provoked more conflicts between Armenians and Azerbaijani.
In: Iran and the Caucasus: research papers from the Caucasian Centre for Iranian Studies = Iran i kavkaz : trudy Kavkazskogo e͏̈tìsentra iranistiki, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 287-301
AbstractThe article examines security issues of the Transcaucasian region with the focus on nonmilitary and trans-border security threats and a regional security community that also includes non-state security actors of the region, such as not-recognised autonomous entities, nations, ethnic groups, minorities, etc.This approach to regional security shifts the focus of policies from balance of power to closer regional integration and cooperation, as well as joint provision of regional security. Despite many objectives and existing obstacles to this scenario of regional development, the author sees it to be the only way toward a stable and long-term security in the region. The article argues that closer regional cooperation and integration would allow to accommodate interests and security concerns of non-state actors of the region and would bring the fate of regional issues back in the hands of the regional powers and create bases for sustainable and lasting peace in the region.