Suchergebnisse

"Can foreign rule ever be morally justified? At first glance, the answer to this question seems clear: in Abraham Lincoln's famous words, foreign rule is neither a government of the people, nor a government by the people. But can it nonetheless be a government for the people? Ever since the end of the First World War, international transitional administrations have replaced dysfunctional state governments to create the conditions for lasting peace and democracy. Recent examples of this practice are Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Iraq. The question of whether foreign rule can be morally justified thus remains a question of pressing practical concern. In response to extreme state failure, the author argues, international transitional administration as a particular form of foreign rule is not only morally justified, but indeed a requirement of justice"--

Can foreign rule ever be morally justified? At first glance, the answer to this question seems clear: in Abraham Lincoln's famous words, foreign rule is neither a government of the people, nor a government by the people. But can it nonetheless be a government for the people? Ever since the end of the First World War, international transitional administrations have replaced dysfunctional state governments to create the conditions for lasting peace and democracy. Recent examples of this practice are Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Iraq. The question of whether foreign rule can be morally justified thus remains a question of pressing practical concern. In response to extreme state failure, the author argues, international transitional administration as a particular form of foreign rule is not only morally justified, but indeed a requirement of justice.

While the impact of norms on post-conflict statebuilding operations has been well-explored in the literature, the ways in which the same normative frameworks affect the exit practices of such operations has so far remained unaddressed. To fill this gap, this paper examines the impact of the liberal-democratic norms governing statebuilding operations on the timing and process of exit of post-conflict international transitional administrations. To that end, it first examines the concept of exit, arguing that exit is best considered as a process rather than an event. The second section outlines the normative framework that has shaped postconflict statebuilding activities since the end of the cold war, and proposes three ways in which norms can affect exit: first, that norms act as blueprints for statebuilding and can thereby shape benchmarks for exit; second, that norms create "zones of permissibility" that explicitly commit statebuilders to a transitional presence and make exit central to the legitimacy of statebuilding operations; and third, that local actors strategically use norms, in particular those of self-determination and the taboo of permanent control of a territory, to push for an early exit of statebuilding operations. The third section explores both the scope and limitations of the three functions of norms with regard to exit in the context of a brief case study of UNMIK's exit from Kosovo. The article concludes with some observations about the impact of the findings for exit strategies of international actors from statebuilding operations.

Questions concerning whether United Nations transitional administrations should consult local authorities in crafting transitional plans & should be legally or politically accountable for its actions during transition periods are considered. Scrutiny of United Nations transitional administrations consultation practices with local actors in the Balkans, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia, East Timor, & Kosovo is conducted to illustrate the difficulties arising from transitional authorities negotiations with local authorities & to indicate that prior agreement amongst international actors facilitated political transformation. Two aspects of the accountability of United Nations transitional administrations are then explored -- whether transitional governments are willing to acknowledge the military nature of its operations & how such administrations disregard of normative democratic principles hinder post-transition governance; cases involving the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo & the United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor are studied to illuminate the legal & political accountability of transitional governments. It is concluded that the success of international intervention is contingent upon several factors, particularly the creation of military operations designed to properly transfer political authority to local actors. J. W. Parker