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All treaties, akin to contracts between nations, formalize the promises of their parties. Yet the contents of those promises differ, with important consequences. One particular difference is underappreciated and divides treaties into two fundamentally different categories. In one category of treaty, nations agree that they themselves will act, or refrain from acting, in certain ways. For convenience, I call these "resolution" treaties because they demand that states resolve to act. In the second category, nations make promises they can only keep if nonstate third parties also act or refrain from acting. These are what I term "persuasion" treaties because they require states to persuade third parties to do something differently, through regulatory or other means. Significantly, each type of treaty carries a unique set of execution and compliance problems. Persuasion treaties are both distinctly important and distinctly challenged. Identifying the difference between these types of treaty commitment provides conceptual clarity that organizes treaty critiques, clarifies conditions for treaty success, and helps resolve critical persuasion treaty pathologies. This Article seeks to unearth the execution and compliance problems that drive the privatization critique, analyze the nature of those problems, and identify means of ameliorating them. I propose that the answers turn on identifying and understanding the class of treaties to which the problems inhere. Part I outlines the privatization critique and explains why it merits our attention; Part II constructs and defends the persuasion treaty theory; Part III illustrates the theory with preliminary empirical support; and Part IV shows how the theory frames problems and identifies possible solutions.

In recent years, the treaties and strategies promoting global investment have changed dramatically. The widespread liberalization of economic policy has effectively spurred an increase in foreign direct investment (FDI). By encouraging foreign investors to enter international markets, many countries are witnessing exponential growth within their economies and local industries. The surge of FDI not only brings capital for emerging or growing industries, but it is also capable of boosting the country's economy by creating greater access to financing, more job opportunities, and potential knowledge and technology spillovers. The basic purpose of concluding bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and double taxation treaties (DTTs) is to signal to investors that investments will be legally protected under international law in case of political turmoil and to mitigate the possibility of double taxation of foreign entities. But the actual effect of BITs and DTTs on the flows of foreign direct investment is debatable. The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows is a comprehensive assessment of the performance of these treaties, and presents the most recent literature on BITs and DTTs and their impact on foreign investments. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/sustainable_investment_books/1005/thumbnail.jpg

This article presents the situation of 'Missing Investment Treaties' (MITs), defined as those International Investment Agreements (IIAs) that have been concluded by States, but their texts (and in some cases their existence) are not publicly available or incomplete. In order to determine the number of MITs, we examined the text and language availability of IIAs concluded by countries, that are publicly available, and we complemented that information with country-specific searches from international, governmental and private sources. In turn, the article explores possible explanations to this State's behaviour, using the following questions as guidelines: Why would countries sign agreements that are supposedly negotiated to promote, protect or liberalise foreign investment without making those texts available? If a text of an IIA is publicly available, does it correspond to the language of both contracting parties, only one of them, or of a third country? Is it possible to achieve IIAs' objectives if the text of the treaty is not available, or is it available only in one language? Might there be other reasons to sign these agreements?

6 pages, Issued by the American Committee for Fair Play in China ; https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/moore/1007/thumbnail.jpg

Governments are pursuing substantive and procedural reform of the international investment regime in recognition that there are fundamental, systemic, and interrelated concerns about current approaches to investment governance, and that current approaches have failed to meet their purported objectives. A vast majority of the 1,023 publicly-known treaty-based claims have been brought under "old-generation" treaties. In 2018, for example, 60% of such claims were brought under treaties originally concluded in the 1990s or earlier, and all but one was filed under a pre-2011 treaty. These old-generation treaties include vague and far-reaching obligations for states, generally do not include any reference to investor responsibilities (even in non-binding terms) or obligations, and rarely include provisions that seek to meaningfully reaffirm and protect the ability of states to regulate without having to pay compensation for adoption or enforcement of legitimate regulatory measures. Effective environmental, human rights, gender, health, labor, and other public interest provisions are generally absent from these agreements. Without provisions that effectively protect regulatory space and flexibility, and meaningfully advance sustainable development objectives of states parties, respondent host states have been left exposed to costly investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) proceedings and claims challenging public interest measures. Investor claimants have also relied on investment treaties and ISDS to make threats of claims in order to distort government measures or conduct in foreign investors' favor. In the context of COVID-19, for example, some law firms seized on the pandemic to advise multinationals on strategies for relying on investment treaties and ISDS to bring claims against governments on the basis of COVID-related measures.

"First published in April 1918, reprinted June 1918." ; Bibliography: 1 p. at end. ; Mode of access: Internet.

In regard to the implementation of treaties in municipal courts, treaty is divided into self-executing and non-self-executing. A self-executing treaty is defined as a treaty that its implementation does not need an implementing legislation. However, a nonself- executing treaty needs an implementing legislation to have it enforced in national courts.Terkait dengan implementasinya di pengadilan nasional suatu negara, perjanjian internasional digolongkan menjadi perjanjian internasional self-executing dan non-self-executing. Perjanjian internasional self-executing adalah perjanjian internasional yang dapat diimplementasikan secara langsung di pengadilan tanpa implementing legislation, dan perjanjian non-self-executing adalah perjanjian internasional yang tidak dapat langsung dimplementasikan di pengadilan tanpa adanya implementing legislation.

92 p. ; (12mo) ; The Diary was published by Samuel Loudon, Jun. until his death in Sept. 1795.

Given its strategic interest in the Canal, it might well be asked why the United States would sign a Treaty which does not give an unambiguous right of intervention. Under the Treaty, the United States has at best only a weak legal justification for intervention, which will be useful in domestic politics should the popular opposition to "giving the Canal away" become critical, but which will be much less convincing elsewhere. World opinion is suspicious of the reliance of any great power on intervention, regardless of the legal rationale. The justification will be least persuasive in Latin America where there is deep resentment against the United States for past intervention in the area. On the other hand, this resentment is another reason the United States did not secure an unambiguous right to intervene--after the 1964 riots and the 1967 coup, no Panamanian leader could have agreed to such a provision. A political realist would suggest that the United States will probably take whatever action it deems necessary for national security regardless of legal ramifications, hence the failure to secure the right to intervene should not prevent ratification if the Treaty serves other national interests. Indeed, there are good foreign policy reasons for ratifying it. In view of the mounting popular resentment in Panama over the United States presence in the isthmus, it may be wise for the United States to withdraw gradually. The Treaties allow the United States to do so without losing face. Therefore, good diplomacy may be reason enough for the United States to agree to terms which severely restrict its legal rights. If the United States can avoid possible military entanglement in Panama and begin to clear the way, after years of ill will, for a genuine "new relationship," the new Treaties should be ratified.

In international politics, intergovernmental treaties provide the rules of the game. Similar to private law, treaty designers face a trade-off between flexibility to adjust to unforeseen contingencies and the danger that the binding nature of the treaty and hence, the level of commitment by treaty members, is being undermined if the treaty can be amended too easily. In this paper, we address this problem in the analytical framework of institutional economics, drawing in particular on the incomplete contracts literature. Furthermore, we derive preliminary hypotheses and operational concepts for the measurement of flexibility in international treaties. Based on 400 treaties and supplementary agreements from the field of international environmental law, we provide new insights into the combined application of rules for adoption and entry into force of amendments, as well as provisions for conflict resolution and interpretative development. Using correspondence analysis, we show that treaty provisions can be represented in a two-dimensional property space, where treaties can be arrayed according to the degree of institutionalisation as well as along a flexibility dimension.

We introduce an international technology treaty that couples the funding of research for a more advanced abatement technology with an international emissions permit market. Under the treaty, each country decides on the amount of permits for its domestic industries, but a fraction of these permits is auctioned on the permit market, and the revenues are used to scale up license revenues for the innovators of abatement technologies. We discuss the conditions under which such a technology treaty can slow down climate change through technological innovations and whether it creates complementary incentives for countries to tighten permit issuance. Finally, we discuss how participation in Tech Treaties can be fostered and how such treaties might be implemented.

The first bilateral investment treaties addresses the processes by which, and the purposes for which, the State Department, during the years of the Truman administration, reconceptualized as bilateral investment treaties the friendship, commerce and navigation (FCN) treaties that the United States had negotiated since its independence, originally as treaties to establish trade and maritime relations. It argues that, at the end of the Second World War, to ensure peace and prosperity the United States sought to project New Deal liberalism onto the international plane and for that reason urged the creation of multilateral institutions to foster full employment worldwide. U.S. officials believed that full employment required the promotion, but also the regulation, of international capital movements. To promote capital movements, State Department officials acceded to the demands of the business community that it seek treaty protection for U.S. foreign investment. After efforts to incorporate investment protections into a multilateral International Trade Organization failed, the State Department turned to bilateral FCN treaties to obtain the protections it sought. In devising these treaty protections, U.S. officials incorporated into the FCN treaties four U.S. constitutional law principles - security, reasonableness, nondiscrimination and due process -- largely as these principles were understood by the New Deal Supreme Court, thereby providing U.S. investors abroad with protections similar to those enjoyed in the United States. Other FCN treaty provisions sought to facilitate the movement of capital across borders, while permitting host states to regulate such movements. This account uncovers the origins and purposes of a set of provisions that would create a legal framework for global capitalism in the late twentieth century. It demonstrates that U.S. foreign investment policy during the Truman years is best understood as a projection of New Deal liberalism, including ideas of liberal legality, onto the international plane, rather than as an instrument of Cold War containment or a capitulation to the demands of U.S. capitalists

AbstractThis article discusses the enforceability of treaties under Indonesian legal system. The purpose of this article is to explore and provide answers to the following questions: (i) whether or not international law may be directly invoked and enforceable under domestic legal system (ii) how and to what extent Indonesian courts are using international law especially the treaties. In providing analysis to the above questions, this article discusses the notion of courts and judicial competence and judicial attitude towards treaties. This article suggests that there is no doubt that the courts may apply treaty provisions to the case at hand without and by virtue of national legislations. However, the attitude of the courts towards treaties as demonstrated in a number of cases above does not reveal any clear indication on the question of the status of treaties under domestic law especially with regard to the method on how the legal system incorporates treaties under domestic law. The Court decision has therefore not yet contributed to the attempt for seeking a legal determination of the domestic status of a treaty as well as the mode for granting its domestic validity.Keywords: domestic validity, Indonesian perspective, monism and dualism, status of treaties and treaty practices.AbstrakArtikel ini membahas mengenai pemberlakuan perjanjian internasional dalam sistem hukum Indonesia. Tujuan dari artikel ini adalah untuk mengkaji dan memberikan jawaban atas pertanyaan-pertanyaan berikut ini: (i) apakah hukum internasional dapat secara langsung dijadikan rujukan dan berlaku dalam sistem hukum domestik (ii) bagaimana dan sampai mana pengadilan Indonesia menggunakan hukum internasional khususnya perjanjian internasional. Dalam memberikan analisis terhadap pertanyaan-pertanyaan diatas, artikel ini membahas perihal pengadilan dengan kompetensi yudisialnya, dan perilaku yudisial terhadap perjanjian internasional. Artikel ini berkesimpulan bahwa pengadilan dapat menerapkan langsung perjanjian internasional terhadap perkara. Namun demikian praktik pengadilan dalam beberapa perkara yang terkait dengan perjanjian internasional belum memberikan indikasi yang jelas tentang kedudukan hukum perjanjian. Putusan Pengadilan oleh karena itu belum berkontribusi dalam upaya untuk mencari determinasi hukum terkait status domestik dari suatu perjanjian internasional dan cara pemberlakuan suatu perjanjian internasional dalam hukum domestik.Kata kunci: monisme dan dualisme, praktek perjanjian internasional, perspektif Indonesia, status perjanjian internasional, validitas domestik.

Over roughly the past four decades, government officials from around the world have been erecting a framework of economic governance with major – but under-appreciated – implications for intra-national inequality. The components of this framework are thousands of bilateral and multilateral treaties designed to protect international investment. In many jurisdictions, the treaties have been concluded without public awareness or scrutiny or even much discussion or analysis by government officials – including those officials responsible for negotiating the agreements(Poulsen 2015) – and without an adequate understanding of how these agreements could affect intra-national inequality. Long imperceptible, the size and power of this framework for economic governance has increasingly become apparent. And governments continue to expand and entrench the framework through the negotiation of several new bilateral and multilateral agreements, including the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the United States, the agreements China is negotiating with the United States and European Union, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement being negotiated by sixteen countries throughout Asia and the Pacific.

This essay proposes a matrix for understanding the dynamics of investment treaty reform. It tracks incremental, systemic, and paradigmatic reform options as applied across procedure, substance, and form. Although stylized and thus unable to capture all the nuances of individual positions, the reform matrix creates a framework for understanding some of the main debates about investment treaty reforms and offers a template for locating and comparing the approaches of key international actors, including the United States, the European Union, and Japan, together with Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the BRICS).