Suchergebnisse

"To remain masters of their destiny, six European countries agreed to establish among themselves a European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. To remain masters of their creation, the national governments devised a rather unique institutional system whose fundamental features can only be amended by unanimity. In fact, to enter into force, any amendment made to the European founding treaties has always required ratification by all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. Remarkably, this demanding procedural requirement has not precluded a spectacular 'widening' of the membership of what is now known as the European Union (EU) as well as a considerable 'deepening' of the competences conferred on the EU by its Member States. Indeed, from an organisation originally consisting of six countries with a narrow focus on economic matters, the EU has grown beyond recognition. Its 27 Member States now pursue an extensive and diverse set of objectives amongst which one may mention the promotion of balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, the implementation of a common foreign and security policy and the tackling of cross-border crime. In order to effectively pursue these objectives, the EU has also gradually gained the power to legislate in the areas of monetary policy, social policy, environment, consumer protection, asylum and immigration, amongst other things"--Provided by publisher

AbstractCalls to ratify the Lisbon Treaty by referendum have been countered with arguments about the Treaty's 'non‐constitutional' nature. Against this backdrop, this article asks how much 'constitution' is left in the new document. To answer this question, I assert that little is gained by classifying the Treaty in toto as a 'European constitution' or as the epitome of its failure. Instead, I develop an analytical framework that disaggregates the concept of constitution into its formal, material and symbolic functions, and systematically assess how far Lisbon would strengthen (or weaken) Europe's constitutional quality. The article suggests that, rather than transferring new competences to Brussels or making a constitutional saut qualitatif, Lisbon moderately bolsters the Treaties' formal functions; yet, in contrast to the Constitutional Treaty it adds little in material terms and is a decisive setback symbolically. Calls for ratification by referendum justified by the reform's extent are therefore ill‐founded.