Suchergebnisse

9-0.

The Yurok Tribe is one of the few California tribes whose members still reside on a portion of their ancestral lands, including a 44-mile stretch bordering the Klamath River. The Yurok are deeply involved with efforts to protect the river's watershed, so we asked one of the Tribe's lawyers to tell us more about what they're doing—and what challenges they face.

3/27/1996: Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida decided.

Justices Gorsuch and Alito have diametrically opposite perspectives on Indian Tribes

Global Voices interviewed Delhi-based tattoo artist Arjel, who has dedicated himself to researching and compiling the tattoo motifs of Indian Indigenous tribes.

More than 180 people have died, and 400 others have been injured in the conflict between the majority Meitei community and the minority Kuki tribe in the Indian state of Manipur.

Kevin K. Washburn (University of Iowa College of Law) has posted The March of Co-Management - The Biden-Harris Administration's Expanding Work with Tribes on SSRN. Here is the abstract: In response to a request from the Foundation of Natural Resources...

Fifty years ago, Axel Leijonhufvud wrote “Life among the Econ,” an essay of satirical truth-telling in a style that is so often attempted and so seldom successful (Western Economic Journal, September 1973, 11:3, 327-337, available many places online with a quick search). The opening paragraph gives the flavor of what follows: The Econ tribe occupies … Continue reading Life Among the Econ: Fifty Years Later
The post Life Among the Econ: Fifty Years Later first appeared on Conversable Economist.

Walter Olson


The Supreme Court today decided Haaland v. Brackeen, a challenge to the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. It did not reach vital underlying Constitutional issues of equal protection and individual rights for children and families, and these remain to be resolved another day. Instead, the Court addressed important structural issues concerning the relationship between federal, state, and tribal governments. It interpreted the Constitution as giving robust powers to Congress to regulate Indian matters, while sharply limiting the underlying authority of state governments. It also found the doctrine of "commandeering" inapplicable to the facts here and denied some claims of standing. The 7–2 decision was written by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, with Justices Clarence Thomas and Sam Alito writing dissents and Justice Brett Kavanaugh a concurrence.
Future cases may frame more sharply than this one did such questions as whether children and parents who have never lived in tribal relations or in Indian country may nonetheless be subjected to tribal sovereignty and special custody presumptions because of blood descent alone. Cato raised some of these issues in its brief.
Everyone interested in these issues should read Justice Neil Gorsuch's eloquent concurrence, joined in part by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson, in which he lays out the grim history of government intervention in Indian family life to which ICWA was a reaction. It is a history in which agents of the state intervened to take children away from the only families they had ever known, very much against those families' will, to place them with complete strangers in pursuit of vague remedial goals. Some will see in this history above all an assault on Indian tribes as collective entities. Others — I am one — will be moved to horror above all by the flagrant violations of individual and family rights. We should take care not to repeat such violations in pursuit of new remedial objectives.

Yemen faces a drone doom loop that is a harbinger of things to come for many countries.The increasingly rapid diffusion of drone technology offers endless new opportunities for non-state, near-state, and terrorist groups to attack governments, rivals, infrastructure, and commercial interests. While Yemen's Houthi rebels currently field more advanced drones than any of their domestic rivals, that is slowly changing as the technology and know-how spreads among their rivals. The Houthis, therefore, are going to soon find it harder to defend against drone attacks by their rivals. They and, sadly Yemeni civilians, are going to be stuck in an escalating drone doom loop. The capabilities of commercially available drones increase every month. The development of military grade drones proceeds even faster. The war in Ukraine has further spurred the development and rapid deployment of cheap and deadly drones. Yet these advances and their diffusion come at a time when states across much of the world, especially in the global south, are being hollowed out by corruption, environmental degradation, and the concomitant rise of armed groups who fill the voids. Yemen was a hollow state long before the Houthis seized the Yemeni capital in 2014. The Sana'a-based government of Yemen's longtime president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, never fully controlled Yemen. Instead, it relied on non-state groups, namely tribes and militias, to help it maintain security and keep its enemies off-balance. And as is typical in hollow states, a circle of elites based in the capital were the primary beneficiaries of Yemen's post-1990 oil wealth. After the 2010 "Arab Spring," Yemen transitioned from a hollow state to a failed state, a status from which it is unlikely to emerge any time soon. The Houthis control most of northwest Yemen and are now the foremost military and political power there. Yet dozens of other armed groups hold sway in other parts of the country. Almost all of these groups are, at a minimum, using off the shelf drones for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Militias and armed units with the backing of either Saudi Arabia or the UAE use military-grade armed and surveillance drones to target their enemies. On any given day, the skies above Yemen's larger cities and those above contested areas like the besieged city of Taiz are crisscrossed by surveillance drones of all sizes. The drones range from military grade UAVs equipped with wide angle lenses and thermal imaging, to stripped down commercial drones with upgraded batteries for added range. Armed gangs, which target commercial transport on Yemen's roads, use drones to track and assess valuable cargoes before seizing them. They use the same drones to then make sure their escape routes are clear. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula has used drones to carry out multiple attacks and locate and track individuals targeted for assassination. Meanwhile, the Houthis have incorporated drones into almost every aspect of their security services and armed forces, even to track individuals and gather evidence that is later used to blackmail persons of interest. Individuals with experience modifying, building, programming, and operating drones are a hot commodity in Yemen where they command high salaries. Many of these men are happy to freelance and work for whichever group pays the most. In Yemen's thriving arms markets, high-end drones are the most sought after military gear.For the Houthis, their drone and missile programs, both of which are aided by the Iranians, are their foremost military priority. The armed drones and missiles helped provide the Houthis with the needed leverage to bring their external rivals to the negotiating table.It is this ability to target vital infrastructure in Saudi Arabia that has encouraged the Kingdom to enter into bi-lateral negotiations with the Houthis. Saudi Arabia cannot implement its ambitious 2030 agenda if there is an ongoing threat of aerial attack from its populous southern neighbor. While Saudi Arabia is upgrading its air defenses, the Kingdom is reluctant to continue to spend billions trying to defend its airspace against armed drones and missiles that cost a tiny fraction of what it costs to defend against them. The militants 'expanding drone and missile capabilities not only give them leverage abroad but also at home where they have succeeded at stopping Yemen's internationally-recognized government (IRG) from exporting oil. They have targeted oil handling infrastructure and threatened to target tankers that attempt to dock at oil terminals located in areas outside of Houthi control. They want their cut of the revenue and are happy to starve the IRG and southern separatists of funds. The collateral damage is the Yemeni economy and increasingly impoverished Yemeni citizens.However, the Houthis' rivals are rapidly developing their own drone capabilities. In the case of those armed groups backed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, they are also beginning to deploy counter-drone systems to protect vital installations.But the counter-drone measures, even the most sophisticated, will fail to keep up with the production of cheaper and harder to detect drones. The advent of 3D printing — which the Houthis already use for some parts for their drones and missiles — will ensure that access to top-notch drones spreads even further. Add to this the dissemination of accessible artificial intelligence and virtual trainers, all of which are coming online in Yemen, and the possibilities for sowing mayhem are endless. Many of Yemen's tribes have a long history of taking hostages or attacking infrastructure as a means of addressing grievances. Now, many of these same tribes and allied armed groups use drones as tools to facilitate both. Even in the unlikely event that some kind of peace deal is achieved in Yemen, the spread of drone technology will continue to ensure that investment in critical infrastructure is limited. Yemen's oil and gas pipelines and pumping stations are all easy targets for any group wanting to ensure that they receive their share of revenue, jobs, or development funds. Yemen was in most respects a broken state long before the proliferation of this technology and it will help ensure that Yemen remains a failed state for the foreseeable future. The unchecked spread of a technology that allows even the least sophisticated armed groups to monitor and attack distant targets with few risks, means that many other fragile states will become mired in a drone doom loop.

Louisiana should pass on joining a
pandemic-inspired cash payment program to lower-income families intended to
provide a souped-up add-on for school-served meals when schools are out in the
summer, because there's a better way to do it.

This week, the U.S. Department of Agriculture
announced which states would participate in its Summer EBT program. Qualifying
families – essentially those who already are eligible for the National School Lunch and
Breakfast Programs, which can supply free meals for children of families starting
at 130 percent of the federal poverty level and subsidized all the way up to 185
percent of FPL (for example, a single parent and school child earning before
taxes no more than $36,482 annually) – receive $40 per child for three months.

Louisiana actually goes well beyond school meal
program rules, which is run by the Department of Children and Family Services.
A law passed last year has state
taxpayers chipping in to waive the amount due from the families that qualify
only for subsidization. Additionally, a number of schools serving high
proportions of qualifying families can apply for the Community Eligibility
Provision that considers all attendees eligible regardless of family income.

Plus, Summer EBT is an add-on to an existing
program that extends the school meal program into the months when most schools
don't regularly meet. The Summer Food
Service Program, which in Louisiana is run by the Department of Education,
basically replicates the school meal program during the summer months by having
contracted locations – nearly 1,000 across
the state last year, including some mobile – serve meals to the same
covered population (schools also may participate using the Seamless Summer
Option, and some sites in high-poverty areas are empowered to serve all
children regardless of income level).

This effectively can cover all eligible children
already. By contrast, Summer EBT is a good-as-cash new benefit on top of all of
this.

And
an expensive one. If all states and Indian tribes participated, it would
cost about $3.5 billion in federal dollars from benefits, plus about ten percent
of that in administrative costs where these are split between it and
participating states. These benefits, if all states and tribes accepted, would constitute
about seven
times what is spent on the SFSP.

The majority of states opted in for Summer EBT by
the end of 2023 deadline, but Louisiana was one of 15 that didn't. This made
Democrat former Gov. John Bel Edwards the only Democrat governor not to take
the federal aid, although it made little sense to commit to it with his term
ending eight days into the next year and the intentions of the Republican Gov. Jeff Landry
Administration unknown. A statement from DCFS hints that it feels it still
could apply for program participation this summer, although the federal
government has indicated 2025 would be the next summer non-participants from this
year could enter.

Rejecting states cited a couple of reasons for their
passing on the program. Some said they didn't appreciate the duplicative nature
of it, not only because of the presence of SFSP but also the highoverlap with Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program benefits which provide generous food cash allowances (in
Louisiana for this year, $535 a month for a family of two). Others pointed to
the administrative costs involved; Louisiana's prorated cost would be close to
$3 million.

Add to these a third reason: the wasteful nature
of EBT mechanisms. Summer EBT would operate the same as SNAP, which has plenty
of avenues for improper, if not outright fraudulent, payments to occur. Nearly
12 percent of such payments fall into this category. By contrast, meal
provision rather than cash provision cuts out almost all waste.

Louisiana does plenty, if not taxpayers going
above and beyond, to ensure children in lower-income families have access to
meals year-round. There's no need to spend more taxpayer dollars – on top of
what residents will have to pay extra now or later to fund more cash benefits
through the federal government – to implement more leaky bureaucracy. If extra
needs to be done, spending to expand SFSP outlets and provision are more
appropriate and cost effective. Now and in the future, DCFS should reject
participation in Summer EBT. 

The Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and their missile and drone launches toward Israel have gone a long way to restoring a sense of national pride among many Yemenis. This, combined with growing support from other political groups within Yemen, and in the region, mean attacks will not likely end soon — despite sustained U.S. airstrikes against them.Since January 13, the U.S. and the UK have carried out eight rounds of strikes on targets in Houthi-controlled northwest Yemen. This followed multiple warnings by Washington for the Houthis to end their attacks on ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. There are now indications that the Biden administration is preparing to carry out airstrikes for an indefinite period whilst expanding the target list.Sustained airstrikes will slowly degrade some of the Houthis' military capacity, especially their ability to launch anti-ship missiles. However, they will do little to stop the groups's use of one-way attack drones (OADs) and marine mines to target ships. The OADs and the facilities used to manufacture and assemble them are spread across northwest Yemen. Most of these facilities are either underground or located in dense urban areas. Even with a continued air campaign against them, the Houthis are in a position to keep menacing international shipping with OADs and mines for months if not years.Most significantly, Western airstrikes risk strengthening the Houthis' grip on power. Many of the Houthis' former enemies are openly and covertly expressing their support for the group now. The Houthi attacks on what they describe as Israeli and U.S.-vessels resonates with many Yemenis, and indeed, many people around the world who are decrying the Israeli actions in Gaza. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Yemenis routinely gather on Fridays in the capital of Sana'a to protest the Israeli invasion of Gaza and, more recently, U.S. and UK airstrikes. From the perspective of many Yemenis, the Houthis possess the moral high-ground, and the power of that narrative, regardless of its veracity, should not be underestimated. The Houthis' determination to lift the siege of Gaza of course is replete with irony given that they persist in blockading the Yemeni city of Taiz.However, the Houthis' domestic enemies are not making the mistake of underestimating the power of the Houthi narrative. There are indications that oppositional figures, from members of Islah to tribes and sections of tribes in contested areas, are aligning with them. Multiple Yemeni analysts and former government officials speaking to this author indicated that some factions within Islah are now providing material support to the Houthis in the form of weapons transfers. Arms smuggling is big business in Yemen. Almost all armed groups regardless of their political alignment are involved in facilitating the movement of arms and materiel into, around, and out of Yemen. It is noteworthy that the majority of the Houthis' imported weapons, as well as parts and components for their missile and drone programs, transit territory under the nominal control of Yemen's internationally recognized government (IRG). Endemic corruption and incompetence among the Houthis' primary domestic foes have, more than any other factor, contributed to their rise to power and to their continuing grip on power. The IRG's inability to grapple with corruption, including the arms trade, and provide predictable levels of security consistently undermines its authority.By comparison, Houthi-controlled areas are generally more secure and enjoy greater levels of predictability. However, this comes at a cost. The Houthis' various security services are harsh, they routinely arrest and torture opponents, and they often act with impunity. The Houthis also routinely seize businesses and property and are also engaged in illicit trade of all kinds. However, in comparison with many of their foes, corruption within Houthi-controlled areas generally serves the Houthi organization as a whole rather than particular individuals.While U.S.-led airstrikes may be justifiable, they do nothing to address the fundamental and growing power and reputational imbalances between the Houthis and their domestic rivals. Instead, airstrikes risk exacerbating these imbalances by compelling more militias to align themselves with the Houthis who are increasingly viewed as victors over not only Saudi Arabia, but also over much of the West.The Houthis' major rivals in Yemen are struggling with how to align themselves against what are viewed as Israeli atrocities in Gaza and now U.S./ UK airstrikes, while maintaining their opposition to the Houthis. The IRG, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), and Tariq Saleh's National Resistance Forces (NRF) are all finding it difficult to create narratives can simultaneously condemn Israeli actions in Gaza and the Houthis' attacks on shipping.U.S.-led airstrikes on targets in Houthi-controlled Yemen have greatly complicated matters for all of the Houthis' domestic rivals. The acceptance of U.S. military aid—nothing remains secret in Yemen for long—much less the covert or overt presence of U.S. soldiers or contractors in areas controlled by the STC, IRG, and or the NRF could lead to them being painted as Washington collaborators and, by extension, linked to Israel. The only long-term answer to mitigating the threat posed by the Houthis are measured, monitored, and carefully designed programs that slowly build the capacity of viable IRG-linked forces to check the Houthis with both better governance and effective well-led fighting forces. But such programs are exceedingly difficult to execute in the current environment.Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates both provided hundreds of millions of dollars in funding, arms, and training for the various armed groups aligned with the IRG. In some cases, especially in the Hadramawt and in parts of Yemen's southern Red Sea coast with the NRF, effective fighting forces were developed. However, by and large, there is little to show for Saudi and Emirati efforts. This is why both countries, but especially Saudi Arabia, have curtailed funding and support for their various proxies. In fact, Saudi Arabia has moved away from any kinetic involvement in Yemen. This is partly the result of Saudi Arabia's inability to get the IRG and aligned militias to fundamentally reform. It is also partly due to the Houthis' ability to target Saudi Arabia with drones and missiles. Instead of pouring more money into the black hole that is a war in Yemen, Riyadh is returning to its tried-and-tested policy of appeasement, tribal engagement, and the cultivation of long-term assets in Yemen. The Saudis have already effectively made their peace with the Houthis. It is notable that the Houthis are no longer launching cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia is not allowing its airspace to be used for any attacks on Houthi targets. Saudi Arabia's intervention in Yemen achieved none of the stated aims, and the Saudis, indeed the world, are now grappling with the blowback. Military engagement alone will not defeat the Houthis. Their ancestors fought off the Ottoman Turks multiple times, the Egyptians, the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the Saudis. They possess an innate understanding of what T.E. Lawrence came to understand: Maximum disorder is its equilibrium.Mitigating the threat posed by the Houthis will take years of careful engagement with communities and groups that oppose them, while also forcing the IRG and aligned forces to develop cohesive chains of command, counter corruption, and to meaningfully build governmental capacity. If the IRG and the other opposition groups do not reform and develop the capacity to consistently govern, no amount of support from external backers will prevent them from being defeated by the Houthis and their growing list of new allies in the years ahead.

Die Idee war gut: Der "Hochschulpakt" sollte hunderttausenden Abiturienten ein Studium ermöglichen. Jetzt hat der Wissenschaftsrat untersucht, ob das Bund-Länder-Programm seine Ziele erreicht hat.






Bild: Mikael Kristenson / Unsplash.






WENN BUNDESBILDUNGSMINISTERIN Bettina Stark-Watzinger (FDP) über das geplante 20 Milliarden Euro schwere "Startchancen"-Programm für benachteiligte Schüler und Schulen spricht, nennt sie es
gern "das bislang größte Bildungsprogramm in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland". Ein Satz, über den Hochschulpolitiker nur milde lächeln können. Lief doch zwischen 2007 und 2020 (mit
Ausläufern bis 2023) eine Initiative, die schon ohne Berücksichtigung der Inflation die doppelte Größe erreichte: 39 Milliarden Euro investierten Bund und Länder im "Hochschulpakt", um
hunderttausenden jungen Menschen ein Studium zu ermöglichen, die sonst mangels Kapazitäten draußen geblieben wären.



 



Jetzt hat sich der Wissenschaftsrat, das wichtigste wissenschaftspolitische Beratungsgremium in Deutschland, die Wirkungen des Programms noch einmal genauer angeschaut und Empfehlungen für
künftige Bund-Länder-Programme abgeleitet. Was insofern nicht frei von Ironie ist, weil der Nachfolge-Pakt, der Zukunftsvertrag "Studium und Lehre stärken" (übrigens ebenfalls deutlich
umfangreicher als die "Startchancen") längst läuft. Und weil Bund und Länder jetzt und absehbar so klamm bei Kasse sind, dass weitere Groß-Programme nicht einmal am Horizont erkennbar sind.



 



Betreuungsschlüssel



verschlechterte sich



 



Wobei bei der Lektüre schnell klar wird, dass schon die Frage, ob das 39-Milliarden-Programm eigentlich seine Ziele erreicht hat, so einfach gar nicht zu beantworten ist. Denn, wie Sabine
Behrenbeck, Abteilungsleiterin für Tertiäre Bildung beim Wissenschaftsrat, sagt: "Das, was der Pakt erreichen sollte, haben Bund und Länder 2006 nur sehr allgemein definiert, fixe Zielvorgaben
gab es nicht."



 



Gezahlt wurde pro zusätzlichem Studienanfänger, wobei 2005 das Vergleichsjahr war: Bis 2015 gar nach oben hin offen, erst dann zog der Bund einen Deckel ein, weil die Milliarden nur so purzelten.
Und die Zahl der zusätzlichen Studienanfänger stieg und stieg. Bis 2020 summierte sie sich laut Wissenschaftsrat auf über 1,6 Millionen.



 



Allerdings flossen pro Studierendem übers ganze Studium hinweg nur rund 24.000 Euro. Das war so knapp kalkuliert, dass die vor dem Hochschulpakt miesen Betreuungsrelationen sich je nach Fach
teilweise weiter verschlechterten, weil vor allem nicht genug neue Professuren entstanden. Die Abbrecherquote an Universitäten stieg zwischen 2016 und 2020 von 32 auf 35 Prozent, während sie an
Hochschulen für angewandte Wissenschaften (HAWs) von 25 auf 20 Prozent sank.



 



"Während der Programmlaufzeit nahmen befristete Beschäftigungsverhältnisse beim wissenschaftlichen Personal zu", schreibt der Wissenschaftsrat. "Man kann kritisieren, dass die mit einer Expansion
einhergehenden Risiken für Qualitätsverluste nicht bereits zu Beginn des Programms stärker berücksichtigt wurden und auch keine ambitionierten Ziele bei der Qualitätsentwicklung angestrebt
wurden." Erst mit der zweiten Förderphase seien die Pauschalen erhöht und in der dritten Phase ein Anteil von zehn Prozent der Bundesmittel zum Qualitätsausbau genutzt worden.



 



Neben dem Ausbau von Studienanfängerplätzen habe der Hochschulpakt weitere Nebenziele, sprich "reformerische Anliegen" gehabt, die auch erreicht worden seien: das überproportionale Wachstum der
Hochschulen für angewandte Wissenschaften, die Zahl der MINT-Studierenden auf stabilem Niveau zu halten, mehr Studienanfänger ohne Abitur und einen höheren Wissenschaftlerinnen-Anteil.



 



Keine Spitzen-, aber eine respektable Bilanz, die vor allem für die Anpassungsfähigkeit der Hochschulen spricht. Und die wurde auch gebraucht, wie das Wissenschaftsratspapier anhand einer
Aufstellung all der hochschulpolitischen Veränderungen während der gut anderthalb Jahrzehnte Hochschulpakt zeigt: angefangen etwa mit der Bologna-Reform über die doppelten Abiturjahrgänge und
zwischenzeitliche Studiengebühren in verschiedenen Ländern bis hin zur Reform der Studienplatzvergabe. Hinzu kamen die Aussetzung der Wehrpflicht und die unerwartet stark gestiegene
Studierneigung bei den Schulabgängern.



 



Geld nicht für



Studierende ausgegeben



 



Zwischendurch allerdings lesen sich die Ausführungen auch wie eine Rechtfertigung gegenüber Haushaltspolitikern des Bundestages und des Bundesrechnungshofs. Letzterer hatte beispielsweise
moniert, dass die Hochschulen einen beträchtlichen Teil der Hochschulpakt-Gelder nicht sofort für die Studienanfänger ausgegeben, sondern in ihren Rücklagen gebunkert hätten: bis Ende 2018
mindestens 3,7 Milliarden.



 



Und die Prüfer hatten aufgezählt, was Hochschulen außer Studienplätzen noch so alles mit dem Geld finanziert hätten: Musikerauftritte, Ladestationen für E-Autos, einen "Raum der Stille", ein
Studierendentheater mit einer Tribüne und anderes mehr. Wobei solche Beispiele lediglich anekdotischen Charakter hatten, denn, wie der Bundesrechnungshof ebenfalls kritisierte, hätten die Länder
nur lückenhaft nachgewiesen, ob sie die Bundesmilliarden vereinbarungsgemäß investiert hatten.



 



Deshalb, vermerkt der Wissenschaftsrat, habe sich gegen Ende des Hochschulpakts auf Druck des Haushaltsausschusses des Bundestags der Anspruch an die Berichterstattung durch die Länder geändert
und ein "relativ detailliertes Finanzcontrolling" erzeugt. Und das Gremium konstatiert: "Im Rückblick betrachtet hat es vermutlich vermeidbare und unvermeidbare Rücklagen gegeben, doch fehlen für
eine konkrete Kritik oft die Daten."



 



Das war ja laut der Hochschulpakt-Kritiker das Problem und in der Konzeption angelegt. Doch befindet der Wissenschaftsrat: Die "nichtintendierten Effekte des Programms" sollten nicht "als Fehler
der Programmkonzeption auf der Bund-Länder-Ebene gewertet werden", sondern sie seien eine Folge der Kontextsteuerung, "mit der länderspezifisch auf Handlungsbedarfe beim Ausbau und Erhalt von
Studienanfängerplätzen – kombiniert mit den weiteren Nebenzielen – reagiert wurde".



 



Selbstkritik



der Länder



 



An solchen Stellen muss man sich vergegenwärtigen, wer da spricht durch den Wissenschaftsrat: Es sind neben dem Bund und den Wissenschaftsvertretern die Länder selbst.



 



An anderen Stellen ist die (Selbst-)Kritik der Politik im Papier wiederum überraschend deutlich. "Im Ergebnis wurde das programmimmanente Risiko der befristet zugesagten Programmmittel den
Hochschulen und den befristet Beschäftigten aufgebürdet." Womit die Hochschulen übrigens häufig auch die hohen Rücklagen begründeten.



 



Und welche Empfehlungen – im Papier "Ableitungen" genannt – präsentiert der Rat für mögliche neue Bund-Länder-Programme? Erstens: So wie der Hochschulpakt nach Bedarf finanzierte, anstatt einen
weiteren Wettbewerb um Fördermittel zu organisieren, sollte die Politik auch künftig nicht automatisch aufs "Wettbewerbsparadigma" setzen, sondern den "Fördermodus an Förderzielen ausrichten".



 



Außerdem müssten solche Großprogramme mit ausreichend – das heißt: jahrelangem – Vorlauf verlässlich geplant werden, dazu so agil, dass sie sich bei neuen Anforderungen und Fehlentwicklungen
zwischendurch frühzeitig nachsteuern ließen. Es müsse einfache und flexible Verfahrensregeln geben. Und ein Learning aus den Diskussionen, unter anderem mit dem Rechnungshof, ein Berichtswesen,
das "transparent und effizient" ist.



 



Den Hochschulen schreibt der Wissenschaftsrat überraschend deutlich ins Stammbuch: So wie das exzessive Bilden von Rücklagen "und deren oft unzureichende Plausibilisierung" das Vertrauen zwischen
Wissenschaft und Politik (besonders dem Bund) beeinträchtigt habe, müsse bei neuen Programmen viel intensiver kommuniziert werden. "Vertrauensbildende und Vertrauen erhaltende Maßnahmen sollten
regelhaft vorgesehen und gepflegt werden."



 



Anders gesagt: Abwiegeln und das Verweisen auf die Hochschulautonomie führen zu viel mehr und viel kleinteiligeren Berichtspflichten – wie sich bereits am Hochschulpakt-Nachfolger Zukunftsvertrag
beobachten lässt. Immerhin, auch das zeigt der Zukunftsvertrag, war das Vertrauen aber nicht so gestört, dass nach dem Hochschulpakt Schluss war.



 



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Brett Stephens gave a great commencement speech (NYT link, HT Luis Garicano) at the University of Chicago. One part stood out to me, and worthy of comment. Bret starts with the problem of Groupthink:Why did nobody at Facebook — sorry, Meta — stop Mark Zuckerberg from going all in on the Metaverse, possibly the worst business idea since New Coke? Why were the economists and governors at the Federal Reserve so confident that interest rates could remain at rock bottom for years without running a serious risk of inflation? Why did the C.I.A. believe that the government of Afghanistan could hold out against the Taliban for months but that the government of Ukraine would fold to the Russian Army in days? Why were so few people on Wall Street betting against the housing market in 2007? Why were so many officials and highly qualified analysts so adamant that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction? Why were so many people convinced that overpopulation was going to lead to catastrophic food shortages, and that the only sensible answers were a one-child policy and forced sterilizations?Oh, and why did so many major polling firms fail to predict Donald Trump's victory in 2016?Conspicuous institutional failures are the question of our age We could add the SBV regulatory fiasco, the 2007 financial regulatory failure, the CDC FDA and numerous governments under Covid,  and many more.  Systemic incompetence doesn't just include disasters, but ongoing wounds from the Jones act to California's billions wasted on obviously ineffective homeless spending. The list is a bit unfair, of course. Selection bias: These are the grand failures, but large organizations occasionally produce some successes. For every Metaverse there is an iPhone, which I certainly thought a dumb idea at the time. And it's always easy to see idiocy with hindsight, but it's a lot harder in real time. De-growthing our economies and spending trillions in the name of carbon reduction will be seen, 20 years from now, either as a farsighted visionary move that saved civilization, or a grand collective delusion. Which is it? Who is the naked emperor and who is the little girl on the sidelines of the parade? Remember too that the gadflies are usually wrong. But the question on my mind is this: How do you structure large organizations to avoid such catastrophic mistakes? As an economist, and a macroeconomist at that, it's something I don't know anywhere near enough about. Bret: ... Why is it that, when you bring together a lot of smart people in a room, their collective intelligence tends to go down, not up? Why do they always seem to press the mute button on their critical faculties when confronted with propositions that, as an old colleague of mine liked to say, ought to vanish in the presence of thought? It's not obvious people's critical faculties are impaired, but their incentives to speak out about them are. First, the problem isn't that people aren't smart. It's that they are scared.To yell stop when everyone else says go — or go when everyone else says stop — takes guts, and guts aren't part of any kind of normal college curriculum. In my generation, the hardest people to say "no" to were the people who had professional power over us. In your generation, I think, it's the people who are in your own ideological tribe. Whatever it is, how many of us, if we're honest with ourselves, really have that kind of courage?Second, there is the problem of rationalization — of smart people convincing themselves, and others, of some truly dumb things.Robert McNamara, one of the original "Whiz Kids" and probably one of the brighter bulbs in 20th-century American public life, was one of the fathers of the Vietnam War when he was at the Pentagon, and of the Third World debt crisis when he was at the World Bank. Somehow, he always managed to convince the other smart people in the room that he was right. Will you be able to notice the underlying flaw in an idea when the arguments for it sound so persuasive? Or, he convinced them to silence their doubts and go along. Third, there is the psychological dimension.Some people are inveterate truth seekers. They are almost congenitally willing to risk rejection, ostracism, even hatred for the sake of being right. But most people just want to belong, and the most essential elements of belonging are agreeing and conforming. ...the usual emotional companion to intellectual independence isn't pride or self-confidence. It's loneliness and sometimes crippling self-doubt.This is insightful, but it's not getting us to the question on my mind: Why do some institutions seem more prone to groupthink disasters than others? Bret's final insight gets to that: here's a fourth factor, maybe the most crucial. It's culture. Does the culture of a society, or of an institution, encourage us to stand out or to fit in; to speak up or to bury our doubts? Does it serve as a conduit to groupthink, or as an obstacle to it?I mentioned a moment ago that all of us like to think of ourselves as independent thinkers, even if comparatively few of us really are. There's an institutional corollary. Nearly every American institution outside of certain religious orders claims to encourage open debate and — that awful cliché — thinking "outside the box." Apple's famous slogan, "Think Different," was one of the most successful ad campaigns of my lifetime...But, at least in my experience, very few institutions truly welcome it, at least when it exposes them to any sort of pressure or criticism, much less loss of social capital or potential revenue...But this doesn't always have to be the case. Institutions can, in fact, practice what they preach. They can declare principles, set a tone, announce norms and expectations — and then live up to their principles through regular practice. They can explain to every incoming class of students or new employees that they champion independent thinking and free expression in both word and deed. They can prove that they won't cave to outrage mobs and other forms of public pressure, either by canceling invited speakers or by never inviting controversial speakers in the first place.There's a way this is done. It's called leadership. You have one magnificent example of it right on this stage, in the person of John Boyer. And you have had a historic example of it in the person of Bob Zimmer. I want to say a few words about him.That's as far as Bret goes, appropriately for a graduation speech at Chicago. So we have one answer to my question: Some institutions have cultures that welcome emperor is naked commentary, and most do not. Leaders can set cultures. I think this just scratches the surface. A college's free speech culture is nowhere near as consequential as a government making a decision to go to war, or any of Bret's other examples. Institutions eventually have to have mechanisms for coming to a decision, closing ranks and pursuing it. If you're going to go to war or not, you have to make a decision and not keep arguing about it forever. If you've ever participated in any group decision you know there are gadflies bringing up stupid points over and over, and if you have too much discussion you're never going to get anywhere. I think institutions in today's government are in CYA mode for good political reasons. The Fed doesn't have a groupthink culture because it wants to, but because in today's Washington admitting mistakes would lead to a completely ineffective institution under constant attack. Again, the gadflys are also mostly wrong too! I do think there are additional institutional structures that could help to promote good decision making. An official devil's advocate to big decisions, and making sure that isn't a career dead end is one useful concept I've heard of. But the larger question of just what those are remains something I'd like to know more about. 

Since the hijacking of the Galaxy Leader cargo ship in the Red Sea last week, the Houthis reportedly fired ballistic missiles that landed within ten nautical miles of the USS Mason on Sunday. The missile launch followed the U.S. Navy destroyer's intervention in the attempted hijacking of another ship, a tanker named the Central Park, in the Gulf of Aden. The Houthis denied responsibility for this hijacking which appears to have been carried out by Somali pirates.The Houthis, who control most of northwest Yemen, also continue to launch cruise missiles and armed drones toward Israel.There are few good options when it comes to dealing with the Houthis. They are a formidable near-state organization that has evolved and been repeatedly tested during nearly two decades of war. From 2014, when they seized control of the Yemeni capital, Sana'a, the Houthis systematically vetted and incorporated many of Yemen's best engineers, technicians, and officers from the Yemeni military and intelligence services into its own organization. This incorporation, combined with assistance from Iran, has transformed the Houthis from a hardened guerrilla force into a militarily sophisticated group that is now, at least at a low level, an important regional actor.Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which launched an intervention in Yemen in 2015, are learning just how dogged and determined the Houthis are as an enemy. After repeated border incursions by the Houthis as well as missile and drone strikes on its territory, Saudi Arabia pivoted from war to negotiations. Rather than continue to pursue a policy modeled on a kinetic American approach, the Saudis returned to the careful and measured foreign policy that had served them well for decades. Since late 2022, the Saudis have been engaged in unilateral talks with the Houthis, part of a well-designed effort to de-escalate tensions and stabilize areas along the more than 800-mile-long Saudi-Yemeni border. These talks, which have been aided by China and Iran, were nearing a conclusion before the Houthis effectively declared war on Israel. Now, provocative actions by the Houthis are in danger of derailing those talks.The U.S. has indicated that the Biden Administration is considering re-designating the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). The Trump administration previously designated the Houthis as an FTO in January 2021, which the Biden administration subsequently revoked. While the designation is more justifiable now than when it was first imposed, it will have little or no impact on the Houthis or their leadership. Senior Houthi members do not leave Yemen and do not have foreign assets that would be subject to seizure. In fact, the designation will be celebrated in Sana'a as proof that the Houthis are "winning." However, the FTO designation will negatively impact the NGOs providing humanitarian assistance that must deal with the Houthis.Military strikes, which are undoubtedly at an advanced planning stage, are an equally poor option for dealing with the Houthis. The militant group has not only survived years of strikes carried out by Saudi Arabia and the UAE during their intervention in Yemen, but they thrived militarily and politically. The Saudi and Emirati-led airstrikes stoked public anger and acted as a glue that kept the broader Houthi organization together. During that time, the group refined its ability to hide weapons and facilities within northwest Yemen's maze of mountains and narrow valleys and within densely-populated urban areas. At the same time, they continued to launch cross-border attacks with men, drones, and missiles deep into Saudi territory.Much like the imposition of an FTO designation, attacks by the U.S .or Israel on targets in Yemen will be viewed as a victory by many within the Houthis' leadership. This is especially the case with the hardliners who are ascendant. Strikes are also likely to bolster support for the Houthis among Yemenis. Military strikes, which will likely be limited in nature, will do little to degrade the Houthis' ability to carry out strikes in the Red Sea or elsewhere.More worryingly, such U.S. or Israeli strikes, even if they are limited, are likely to set off an escalatory loop that could have regional and even global implications. The Houthis have the ability to impede shipping in the Red Sea, at least for short periods. They can also target vital energy-producing infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Such attacks, even if only modestly successful, can materially move global energy prices. It must also be noted that the Houthis still control the replacement tanker for the FSO Safer, which is anchored near the port of Hodeidah on the Red Sea. The UN successfully transferred over a million barrels of degraded crude from the rusting tanker to a new tanker, MOST Yemen, in August of this year. The Houthi leadership has an innate understanding of asymmetric warfare and, if cornered, they might well damage or blow up the tanker to cause havoc in the Red Sea.While the Houthis' missiles and drones have all been intercepted, the Houthis are viewed by many in Yemen and in the larger Muslim world, as "fighting back" against perceived Israeli aggression. The attacks, including the recent hijacking of the Galaxy Leader, which is partly owned by Israeli billionaire Abraham Ungar, have also demonstrated the group's military reach. Most importantly for the Houthis, the attacks on Israel-linked targets have, just as they were intended to, bolstered support for them among many Yemenis.Before the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war, the Houthis' were facing headwinds with respect to internal support. Unemployment, a profound lack of economic opportunity, rising food and energy prices, and the Houthis' brutal suppression of dissent were beginning to erode support for the group, especially among some key tribes. This is not to argue that the Houthis were in danger of losing control of northwest Yemen. They were not. But the fissures were growing. Now, even old enemies of the Houthis are signaling support for their attacks on Israel. Prominent members of Islah, Yemen's branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is aligned with Yemen's internationally recognized government, recently met with Houthi officials in Sana'a. This is noteworthy given that Islah has been engaged in deadly fighting with the Houthis since 2015. Attacks on the Houthis, even if justified, will only reinforce this trend and further bolster support for the group. But this support will be short-lived. Due to the Houthis' hijacking of the Galaxy Leader and their ongoing threats, insurance rates for ships transiting the Red Sea, and especially for any ships docking at the Houthi controlled port of Hodeidah, have soared. There are indications that some ships that were due to dock in Hodeidah have altered course as a result of Houthi actions. If there are further provocations, it is possible that the port, through which most of Yemen's food flows, will be closed to international shipping. This will put immense pressure on the Yemeni people who are already suffering from ever-increasing levels of food insecurity. There are no good options for dealing with the Houthis. But the simple fact is that they aren't going anywhere anytime soon, and they will not be defeated by military means alone.Saudi Arabia, which has recast itself as a valuable mediator in a number of conflicts, including Yemen, is best placed to try to moderate Houthi behavior through continued hard nosed negotiations. Saudi officials understand that there are moderates within the Houthi leadership who have more interest in business and development than in war. Even Houthi hardliners now have fortunes and legacies that they want to protect and pass on. There are also technocrats within the Houthi organization who understand that Houthi control of northwest Yemen cannot easily weather continued economic decline. Saudi officials are betting that an approach that fosters moderates through development and reconstruction efforts will be more successful over the medium and long-term than a return to war. The Houthis thrive on war, but peace is far more of a challenge for them. However, the Houthis' escalating provocations are all but guaranteeing a kinetic response from the U.S. and its allies. Such a response is justified, but it will be giving the Houthis, or at least the hardliners among them, exactly what they want, war. Dear RS readers! It has been an extraordinary year and our editing team has been working overtime to make sure that we are covering the current conflicts with quality, fresh analysis that doesn't cleave to the mainstream orthodoxy or take official Washington and the commentariat at face value. Our staff reporters, experts, and outside writers offer top-notch, independent work, daily. Please consider making a tax-exempt, year-end contribution to Responsible Statecraft so that we can continue this quality coverage — which you will find nowhere else — into 2024. Happy Holidays!