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This paper studies how a politician's term length affects public finances. I test whether the gradual increase from two- to four-year terms for American governors affects state finances using a rich state-year panel stretching back almost a century. The results show that adopting four-year terms decreases annual expenditures and revenues by 6 %. The effect of the reform is present immediately after voters approve the ballot measure, when the last two-year-term governor is still in office, which suggests that the mechanism at work is stronger re-election incentives for the incumbent. The effect is larger among electorally 'at risk' governors. Democratic governors respond to longer terms by increasing public employment instead of decreasing expenditures.

This paper studies how a politician's term length affects public finances. I test whether the gradual increase from two- to four-year terms for American governors affects state finances using a rich state-year panel stretching back almost a century. The results show that adopting four-year terms decreases annual expenditures and revenues by 6 %. The effect of the reform is present immediately after voters approve the ballot measure, when the last two-year-term governor is still in office, which suggests that the mechanism at work is stronger re-election incentives for the incumbent. The effect is larger among electorally "at risk" governors. Democratic governors respond to longer terms by increasing public employment instead of decreasing expenditures.

When political scandals erupt in the press, we usually blame misconduct by public officials, but these episodes are political events whose occurrence and severity also depend in part on the political and media context. Using data on U.S. governors, I show that several key factors affect the likelihood and intensity that alleged misconduct will be politicized by the opposition and publicized by the press. First, lower approval ratings, which decrease the cost of politicizing and publicizing an allegation, are generally associated with more frequent and intense media scandals. By contrast, competing news events can crowd potential scandals off the news agenda. However, no evidence is found that opposition control of state political institutions leads to more media scandal. These results suggest that the occurrence of media scandal depends more on circumstance than we typically assume.

Informed by the public health policymaking literature, this study's objective is to identify scientific, political, social, economic, and external factors related to U.S. governors' decisions to issue stay-at-home orders (SAHOs) in response to the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. Public health experts advocate for social distancing to slow the spread of infectious diseases, but government mandates to social distance can impose substantial social and economic costs. This study uses event history analysis to investigate the issuance of COVID-19-related gubernatorial SAHOs during a 41-day period in the 50 U.S. states. The findings indicate that scientific, political, and economic factors were associated with the issuance of SAHOs, but that external considerations played the largest role, particularly those related to the timing of other governors' decisions. This study offers evidence about how some U.S. political leaders balance public health concerns against other considerations and, more broadly, how state governments address crisis-level issues.

This paper empirically evaluates the economic performance of U.S. state governors who came to the position from a business background (CEO governors), focusing on the growth rate of real personal income per capita, unemployment rate, and income inequality. Methodologically, we apply a matching method to account for the endogeneity of political selection. Using entropy balancing, we identify credible counterfactuals for CEO governors, that is, governors without a business background who took office under similar economic and fiscal situations. We find, first, that businesspeople tend to take office in times of economic and fiscal strain. Second, the tenures of CEO governors are associated with a 0.6 percentage points higher annual income growth rate and a 0.6 percentage points lower unemployment rate than are the tenures of non-CEO governors. Also, state-level income inequality decreases when CEO governors hold office, indicating that low-income households benefit from the economic upswing. Third, the positive effect of having a CEO governor increases with time in office. Fourth, Republican CEO governors perform slightly better than their Democratic colleagues.

This paper empirically evaluates the economic performance of U.S. state governors who came to the position from a business background (CEO governors), focusing on income growth, unemployment, private investment, and income inequality. Methodologically, I apply a matching method to account for the endogeneity of political selection. I find that the tenures of CEO governors are associated with a 0.6 percentage points higher annual income growth rate, a 0.4 pp higher growth rate of the private capital stock, and a 0.6 percentage points lower unemployment rate than are the tenures of non-CEO governors. Income inequality decreases when CEO governors hold office.

Acknowledgments; Introduction: The Puzzle of the Governors' Lobbyists; 1. Governors' Lobbyists as Political Safeguards of Federalism; 2. The Political Development of State Lobbying Offices; 3. The Political Development of the National Governors Association; 4. Modern State Offices at Work; 5. Modern Governors Organizations as Organized Interests; 6. Politics, Culture, and Variation in Maintenance of State Offices; 7. The Value of the Governors' Lobbyists; Notes; References; Index.

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were a dramatic reminder of the importance of cultivating a better understanding of the United States and its policies with overseas audiences. U.S. public diplomacy activities include the efforts of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, which oversees all nonmilitary U.S. international broadcasting by the Voice of America (VOA) and several other broadcast entities. Such broadcasting helps promote a better understanding of the United States and serves U.S. interests by providing overseas audiences with accurate and objective news about the United States and the world. GAO has issued three reports over the past 4 years examining the organizational, marketing, resource, and performance reporting challenges faced by the Board. Our recommendations to the Board have included the need to address the long-standing issue of overlapping language services (i.e., where two services broadcast in the same language to the same audience) and to strengthen the Board's strategic planning and performance by placing a greater emphasis on results. The Board has taken significant steps to respond to these and other recommendations."