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2020 marks the 30th anniversary of China's participation in UN peacekeeping operations. China's participation in it is gaining weight in China's diplomatic and military strategy. China is currently the second largest contributor to UN peacekeeping after the United States. The reasons for the rapid development that China's participation in UN peacekeeping operations has gained in a short period of time are of particular interest to study. The purpose of the research is to examine China's participation in UN peacekeeping. The study highlights the main stages of China's attitude to UN peacekeeping and its participation in peacekeeping operations, identifies the motives and reasons for China's participation in peacekeeping operations, as well as the unique features of Chinese peacekeeping. Results. China's motivations for becoming a peacekeeper consist of "soft" reputational and "hard" national interests. Support for international peacekeeping under the auspices of the UN provides an opportunity to maintain China's image as a responsible power interested in creating a stable environment for peaceful development. China encourages the use of political and diplomatic means to resolve conflicts and adheres to the principle of national sovereignty. China's participation in UN peacekeeping operations is a manifestation of China's active multilateral diplomacy and a kind of "creative intervention".

United Nations (un) peacekeeping missions have become an important feature of world politics since the end of the Cold War. In recent times, the intensity of peacekeeping missions has increased and new challenges have also emerged. Under such circumstances, the un has often highlighted the importance of regional organizations getting more involved in undertaking and sustaining such missions. South Asian countries provide a large number of troops to un missions and yet, a regional collaboration has not been accorded much importance by countries of the region. This paper argues, given the emerging challenges, South Asian countries may have to resort to a regional approach with regard to peacekeeping missions.

AbstractHow do UN peacekeeping missions enforce peace agreements, and what effect do higher rates of enforcement have on agreement implementation and conflict termination? Peace agreement enforcement forms a central component of peacekeeping effectiveness, yet missions are often mandated to enforce a minority of agreement provisions, and they vary across both time and space in the ways in which they do so. I identify the three dimensions along which enforcement operates—the proportion and type of provisions that missions are mandated to enforce, alongside their mandated level of involvement in their implementation—and theorize about their positive effects on agreement implementation and conflict termination. Analyzing the Peacekeeping Enforcement Dataset, an original data set of the enforcement patterns of all UN peacekeeping missions (1989–2015), I find that each dimension of enforcement has, at various time points, a distinct impact on agreement implementation and preventing conflict recidivism.

What makes a UN member state contribute more peacekeepers to be deployed in hostile environments and place their troops at risk? A significant amount of scholarly research explores the need for, and effectiveness of, UN peacekeeping in conflict zones around the world. Few studies examine the factors that determine the size of peacekeeping contributions, and these studies do not focus on the role of neoliberal institutions. This study examines the relationship between the degree of linkages in neoliberal institutions and the size of peacekeeping contributions. I argue that the degree of linkages in neoliberal international institutions creates structural conditions that facilitate the information gathering process on the preferences and needs of UN member states and incentivize these states to contribute more peacekeeping troops. In my analysis of UN peacekeeping troop contributions data for all countries between 1990 and 2015, I find that the degree of neoliberal institutional linkages is the most consistent predictor of a UN member state's size of peacekeeping contributions.

This article documents humanitarian action undertaken by Chinese troops in six UN peacekeeping missions and shows that Chinese peacekeepers engaged in very similar types of humanitarian action regardless of their unit type or mission area. The patterns in their behaviour strongly suggest that their activities constitute a humanitarian program that is coordinated systematically at the level of China's national military organization. Potential explanations for the humanitarianism of Chinese peacekeepers include China's broader foreign policy objectives, its internal model of civil–military relations, the 'developmental peace' theory of peacekeeping and domestic public relations in China. Despite the UN's official policy of discouraging humanitarian action by military actors, national contingents can still implement humanitarian tactics largely due to the decentralized and fragmented command and control structure of UN peacekeeping missions. More broadly, such failure to protect the humanitarian space speaks to shortcomings of the current system of UN peacekeeping. Overall, closer attention to the role of national military doctrines and national military cultures would add significantly to our understanding of the behaviour of UN peacekeepers.