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We assess the influence of moneyed interests on legislative decisions. Our theory predicts that the vote outcome distribution and donation flows in a legislature feature a discontinuity at the approval threshold of bills if special interest groups are involved in vote buying. Testing the theoretical predictions based on two decades of roll-call voting in the U.S. House, we identify the link between narrowly passed bills and well-timed campaign contributions. Several pieces of evidence substantiate our main finding, suggesting that moneyed interests exert remarkably effective control over the passage of contested bills.

We assess the influence of moneyed interests on legislative decisions. Our theory predicts that the vote outcome distribution and donation flows in a legislature feature a discontinuity at the approval threshold of bills if special interest groups are involved in vote buying. Testing the theoretical predictions based on two decades of roll-call voting in the U.S. House, we identify the link between narrowly passed bills and well-timed campaign contributions. Several pieces of evidence substantiate our main finding, suggesting that moneyed interests exert remarkably effective control over the passage of contested bills.

The virtual disappearance of moderate and cross-pressured members from the US Congress is analysed in this article. There were substantial numbers of these partisan non-conformists in both parties and in both chambers until the early 1980s when the middle began to shrink. This trend continued and accelerated in the 1990s. Partisan non-conformists disappeared through replacement and conversion. When moderate and cross-pressured members left Congress, their replacements were much more likely to be mainstream partisans in the 1980s and 1990s than they had been in earlier decades. The occurrence of some type of conversion (a shift towards the party's ideological mainstream or a party switch) is also much more common in recent decades. We present evidence that the shrinking middle in Congress resulted from electoral changes.

AbstractWho supports trade in the US Congress? We uncover the ideological space of trade voting, focusing on trade agreements and development policy as two fundamental cleavages around globalization. We then cluster members of Congress into coherent voting blocs, and identify the most pro-trade voting blocs in each Chamber. We find that these blocs: cross party lines; are ideologically heterogeneous; and are over-represented on the committees with jurisdiction over trade. We then examine two leading theories of Congressional voting – on constituency characteristics and campaign contributions – and find support for each using our learned voting blocs. Members of pro-trade blocs have defended their constituents' and contributors' interests by speaking out to confront the Trump administration's protectionism. We conclude that unsupervised learning methods provide a valuable tool for exploring the multifaceted and dynamic divisions which characterize current debates over global economic integration.

U.S. Congress plays an increasing role in the American policy of economic sanctions. Although the President and the Administration retain a significant power in national foreign policy, including the use of sanctions, Congress affects political agenda, promotes its own design of sanctions and keeps an eye on their implementation and further upgrade. Emergence of sanctions in the pubic laws, initiated and passed by Congress, usually makes their revocation hardly possible and keeps them for a long term. Such an institutional role of Congress raises a number of research questions. What are the key target priorities for Congress in terms of sanctions policy? Do these priorities overlap with the ones of the Administration? Are there any partisan splits on sanctions or sanctions policy is rather a matter of bipartisan consensus? What instruments of sanctions does Congress prefer? What share of bills finally turns into public laws and what is a connection of bills success to partisan affiliation or priorities concerned? To deal with these questions, the article reflects an analysis of 539 Congressional bills on sanctions, introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate in 2019-2023. The database of bills includes such variables as targets of sanctions, political triggers of proposed restrictions, list of measures proposed, partisan affiliation of sponsors and cosponsors, etc. Results demonstrate the overlapping of priorities of Congress and Administration, though Congress attempts to constrain Administration on a number of issues, such as Iranian Nuclear Deal. There are specific partisan priorities. Republicans are proactive on sanctioning China, Iran and Afghanistan. Democrats are exploring new areas of sanctions use, such as climate, ecology, minorities' rights, etc. Still, most of the bills have a bipartisan composition of sponsors and cosponsors. Most of successful bills, which turned into laws, are of bipartisan nature. Congressional bills imply the use of universal instruments of targeted sanctions such as asset blocking, visa bans or trade restrictions. However, country-specific measures, like suspension of particular military cooperation programs, are also on the radars of Congress. China and Russia a key priorities for Congress in terms of sanctions.