In the article, the authors analyze the formation of the political identity of citizens of Ukraine as a security factor of Ukrainian statehood. It is noted that, in addition to political identity, there are many other identities, that are presented in the form of a matrix, the components of which continuously interact with, complement and influence each other. In terms of methodology, the process of forming political identity is considered from the standpoint of symbolic interactionism, where the emphasis is placed on political interaction. In addition, in order to objectively assess the effectiveness of the formation of political identity and potential negative consequences in the form of a crisis of statehood, the mechanism for transforming a situational identity into a basic political identity is considered from the standpoint of post-structuralism. The study identifies and formulates criteria for constructing this basic type of political identity, the prerequisites for their formation and correlation with the actual political situation in Ukraine. The multitude of approaches to the study of the formation of political identity is complemented by the consideration of various models of its construction. Fragmental, elite and organic models are considered. Particular attention is paid to the leading role of the state in the process of forming political identity, where the key participants are political elites, the media and civil society. To determine how the perception of the degree of influence of each participant affects the process of political identity formation by the population of Ukraine at different periods of time, with its intermittent outbursts of social activity, the method of factor analysis is used. On the basis of the results of the analysis of the constructed triangular diagrams, two patterns are extracted. According to one, an increase in positive perception and integration into the process of socialization of models of the political identity formation proposed by the political elite is observed in society after each surge in mass protests that leads to a regime change. The other pattern is manifested in the revealed tendentiousness of the influence of the media and political elites on the security level of Ukrainian statehood and the growth of tension in society.
AbstractThis article introduces a special issue on Ukrainian statehood. Based on the conference "A Century of Ukrainian Statehoods: 1917 and Beyond" at the University of Toronto, the special issue examines the relationship between the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1920 and the Soviet Ukrainian state over the long term. The authors survey the history of the Ukrainian SSR and propose two points of emphasis: the need to study the promises of "national" and "social" liberation in tandem and the persistent presence of an "internal other" in Soviet Ukrainian history.
AbstractThis article analyzes the debate on Ukrainian statehood going on in the 1960s inSuchasnist', the most intellectually prestigious journal among Ukrainian emigrants in the West. These intellectuals and political activists interpreted the renaissance of Ukrainian national culture in the 1960s (the so-calledshistdesiatnytstvo) in various ways and proposed different political strategies to influence their original homeland and its future political and cultural developments. In the Ukrainian diaspora, two opposing factions emerged: the first, despite condemning Soviet imperialism, favorably evaluated the birth of a movement for the defense of human rights in Soviet Ukraine and was happy to exploit the rapprochement between the USSR and USA to finally have an opportunity to make contact with the motherland. The other did not consider the Ukrainian SSR as a real example of a Ukrainian state and acknowledged its existence only for tactical reasons; this faction thought that contact should be avoided and that the Soviets should be offered no opportunity to address the Western public. Eventually, at the beginning of the 1970s, even those who had opposed collaboration with any subject from Soviet Ukraine decided to embrace the cause of human rights and join the struggle led by the Ukrainian dissent.
Tym, co przyczyniło się do podziału Ukrainy i długotwałości procesów budowania narodu i państwa, był przede wszystkim brak dziedziczonej tożsamości narodowej, dlatego też niektóre jej terytoria okazały się bardziej "dojrzałe", a inne "nierozwinięte". W trakcie długiego procesu historycznego, biegnącego od autonomii do narodzin niezależnego państwa ukraińskiego, terytoria ukraińskie stały się podwójnym, a następnie potrójnym peryferiami sfer władzy. Począwszy od drugiej połowy XVII wieku, "państwo kozackie" Bohdana Chmielnickiego wpadało w ręce hetmanów reprezentujących różne orientacje polityczne i sąsiednie mocarstwa, co więcej, pod koniec pierwszej wojny światowej Ukraina stała się polem walki przywódców ukraińskich oraz mocarstw centralnych i ententy. W obydwu tych sytuacjach historycznych dają się dostrzec podobieństwa, polegające nie tylko na istnieniu niesprzyjającego środowiska politycznego, ale także i wewnętrznych podziałów stojących na drodze do jedności i samostanowienia. W czasach "rewolucji ukraińskich" z XVII i XX wieku powstanie suwerennego państwa ukraińskiego nie leżało w interesie żadnej z regionalnych potęg, w związku z czym w obu tych przypadkach Ukraina znalazła się w "historycznym ślepym zaułku".
Tym, co przyczyniło się do podziału Ukrainy i długotwałości procesów budowania narodu i państwa, był przede wszystkim brak dziedziczonej tożsamości narodowej, dlatego też niektóre jej terytoria okazały się bardziej "dojrzałe", a inne "nierozwinięte". W trakcie długiego procesu historycznego, biegnącego od autonomii do narodzin niezależnego państwa ukraińskiego, terytoria ukraińskie stały się podwójnym, a następnie potrójnym peryferiami sfer władzy. Począwszy od drugiej połowy XVII wieku, "państwo kozackie" Bohdana Chmielnickiego wpadało w ręce hetmanów reprezentujących różne orientacje polityczne i sąsiednie mocarstwa, co więcej, pod koniec pierwszej wojny światowej Ukraina stała się polem walki przywódców ukraińskich oraz mocarstw centralnych i ententy. W obydwu tych sytuacjach historycznych dają się dostrzec podobieństwa, polegające nie tylko na istnieniu niesprzyjającego środowiska politycznego, ale także i wewnętrznych podziałów stojących na drodze do jedności i samostanowienia. W czasach "rewolucji ukraińskich" z XVII i XX wieku powstanie suwerennego państwa ukraińskiego nie leżało w interesie żadnej z regionalnych potęg, w związku z czym w obu tych przypadkach Ukraina znalazła się w "historycznym ślepym zaułku".
Tym, co przyczyniło się do podziału Ukrainy i długotwałości procesów budowania narodu i państwa, był przede wszystkim brak dziedziczonej tożsamości narodowej, dlatego też niektóre jej terytoria okazały się bardziej "dojrzałe", a inne "nierozwinięte". W trakcie długiego procesu historycznego, biegnącego od autonomii do narodzin niezależnego państwa ukraińskiego, terytoria ukraińskie stały się podwójnym, a następnie potrójnym peryferiami sfer władzy. Począwszy od drugiej połowy XVII wieku, "państwo kozackie" Bohdana Chmielnickiego wpadało w ręce hetmanów reprezentujących różne orientacje polityczne i sąsiednie mocarstwa, co więcej, pod koniec pierwszej wojny światowej Ukraina stała się polem walki przywódców ukraińskich oraz mocarstw centralnych i ententy. W obydwu tych sytuacjach historycznych dają się dostrzec podobieństwa, polegające nie tylko na istnieniu niesprzyjającego środowiska politycznego, ale także i wewnętrznych podziałów stojących na drodze do jedności i samostanowienia. W czasach "rewolucji ukraińskich" z XVII i XX wieku powstanie suwerennego państwa ukraińskiego nie leżało w interesie żadnej z regionalnych potęg, w związku z czym w obu tych przypadkach Ukraina znalazła się w "historycznym ślepym zaułku".
In the article the problem to determine the nature, peculiarities of origin and means to overcome military conflicts like Russian-Ukrainian war (have been continuing since 2014) is studied.Modern scientific approaches to understanding of modern wars' essence such as the theory of "hybrid wars", "conflicts of low intensity", "privatized wars", рost-modern conflict and degenerate warfare are analyzed.Special attention is given to M. Kaldor's conception of "new war" and the unusual character of modern wars is emphasized, when elements of partisan confrontation and international warring parties are combined. In reality it is impossible to distinguish civilian population from warring parties. A very important feature is the formation of new forces, which are decentralized and consist of many different types (para-military secessionist units, local field commanders, mercenaries and regular armies).The author gives special consideration to such nuance of Russian-Ukrainian war as the destruction of Ukrainian statehood by the Russian Federation (RF) using not only the external front but the inner one. In the article the influence of the RF on home Ukrainian problems is proposed to study in three projections: political, economic and cultural. At the same time the accent is made on the RF's using of democratic Ukrainian procedures and institutions for Russia's benefit.As to the economic component, Russia holds an interest in creating of additional expenses for Ukraine because of: 1) population that in fact is in occupation (social services: pensions, indemnities for health and home losses, etc.); 2) destruction of infrastructure in occupied regions; 3) works in territories under the RF's control.The cultural changes, which help Russia in the war confrontation, are emphasized. Firstly, it is the formation of a separate regional identity (prevailing over the state one) in the occupied territories. Secondly, there are strained relations (between Russians and Ukrainians, parishioners of the Moscow and Kiev Patriarchate, age strata, etc.). Thirdly, gradual destruction of "new" Ukrainian heroes' (soldier of Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO)) images is conducted. Fourthly, they consolidate negative images of local population of the 'LPR'-'DPR', who couldn't defend the independence of their region and now make additional budgetary loadings.Reasons of Russia entry into the war against Ukraine are also analyzed in the article. These reasons are: overdependence of Russian economic system from external world, fatal developmental scientific lag. The author indicates that concentration of social attention on the war let mobilize Russian society to struggle against common enemy, level the aftermath of hydrocarbon era and inevitable social and economic polarization of Russian society.The following aspects are treated by the author as the aftermath of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict:compensation of total government ownership and encroachment on rights ands freedoms of Russian citizens by means of felling like "the great nation" as the result of the of Ukrainian territory seizure (the Crimea); 2) creation of a precedent to reconsider post-World War II agreements.In the conclusions of the article it is indicated that the most acceptable for the RF variant of further Russian-Ukrainian conflict is its tailing. The existence of the "grey zone" (the 'LPR and the 'DPR') is advantageous in long-term perspective: to make up economic losses; to draw dividends from the opportunity to influence Ukraine the opportunities to reallocate areas of influence in world politics. ; In the article the problem to determine the nature, peculiarities of origin and means to overcome military conflicts like Russian-Ukrainian war (have been continuing since 2014) is studied.Modern scientific approaches to understanding of modern wars' essence such as the theory of "hybrid wars", "conflicts of low intensity", "privatized wars", рost-modern conflict and degenerate warfare are analyzed.Special attention is given to M. Kaldor's conception of "new war" and the unusual character of modern wars is emphasized, when elements of partisan confrontation and international warring parties are combined. In reality it is impossible to distinguish civilian population from warring parties. A very important feature is the formation of new forces, which are decentralized and consist of many different types (para-military secessionist units, local field commanders, mercenaries and regular armies).The author gives special consideration to such nuance of Russian-Ukrainian war as the destruction of Ukrainian statehood by the Russian Federation (RF) using not only the external front but the inner one. In the article the influence of the RF on home Ukrainian problems is proposed to study in three projections: political, economic and cultural. At the same time the accent is made on the RF's using of democratic Ukrainian procedures and institutions for Russia's benefit.As to the economic component, Russia holds an interest in creating of additional expenses for Ukraine because of: 1) population that in fact is in occupation (social services: pensions, indemnities for health and home losses, etc.); 2) destruction of infrastructure in occupied regions; 3) works in territories under the RF's control.The cultural changes, which help Russia in the war confrontation, are emphasized. Firstly, it is the formation of a separate regional identity (prevailing over the state one) in the occupied territories. Secondly, there are strained relations (between Russians and Ukrainians, parishioners of the Moscow and Kiev Patriarchate, age strata, etc.). Thirdly, gradual destruction of "new" Ukrainian heroes' (soldier of Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO)) images is conducted. Fourthly, they consolidate negative images of local population of the 'LPR'-'DPR', who couldn't defend the independence of their region and now make additional budgetary loadings.Reasons of Russia entry into the war against Ukraine are also analyzed in the article. These reasons are: overdependence of Russian economic system from external world, fatal developmental scientific lag. The author indicates that concentration of social attention on the war let mobilize Russian society to struggle against common enemy, level the aftermath of hydrocarbon era and inevitable social and economic polarization of Russian society.The following aspects are treated by the author as the aftermath of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict:compensation of total government ownership and encroachment on rights ands freedoms of Russian citizens by means of felling like "the great nation" as the result of the of Ukrainian territory seizure (the Crimea); 2) creation of a precedent to reconsider post-World War II agreements.In the conclusions of the article it is indicated that the most acceptable for the RF variant of further Russian-Ukrainian conflict is its tailing. The existence of the "grey zone" (the 'LPR and the 'DPR') is advantageous in long-term perspective: to make up economic losses; to draw dividends from the opportunity to influence Ukraine the opportunities to reallocate areas of influence in world politics.
The article is written on the basis of the library and archive collections in London during the author's UK internship. Its value lies in the fact that this is the first special study of the history of the English-language magazine of Ukrainians, published inLondonfor almost 40 years in the second half of the twentieth century and intended for a foreign reader. The author formulates three main reasons why Ukrainians founded such a magazine in London: to break the stereotype of the world's perception of Eastern Europe through the prism of the Russian Empire, to remind Europe about the Ukrainian issue still unresolved after the defeat of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921, to expand the number of foreign politicians and parliamentarians who sympathized with the Ukraine's revival as an independent state. The founders of the magazine were Union of the Ukrainians in the United Kingdom, the League of Liberation of Ukraine in Canada and the Organization for the Defense of Four Liberties of Ukraine in the United States. Two categories of readers a new magazine was aimed at, have been identified. First: English-speaking foreigners from among politicians, parliamentarians, journalists. Second: young Ukrainians who grew up in emigration and did not learn Ukrainian. The main principle of the editorial policy of the magazine was proclaimed: to be an authoritative source of information about the situation of Ukrainians under the occupation of Russia, to explain the distinctness of the history of Ukrainians and their statehood aspirations to foreigners, to get them acquainted with culture, literature and traditions of Ukrainians. In the analysis of the magazine's mass circulation policy the attention is drawn to the fact that for 38 years circulation was 1,500 copies, minimum – 950. Half of this press run was accounted for subscribers, the other half was distributed free of charge. The magazine was distributed in accordance with an addressees' list. It was sent to libraries, academic institutions, newspaper editors, ...
