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"This book examines the subject of constitutional unamendability from comparative, doctrinal, empirical, historical, political and theoretical perspectives. It explores and evaluates the legitimacy of unamendability in the various forms that exist in constitutional democracies. Modern constitutionalism has given rise to a paradox: can a constitutional amendment be unconstitutional? Today it is normatively contested but descriptively undeniable that a constitutional amendment--one that respects the formal procedures of textual alteration laid down in the constitutional text--may be invalidated for violating either a written or unwritten constitutional norm. This phenomenon of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment traces its political foundations to France and the United States, its doctrinal origins to Germany, and it has migrated in some form to all corners of the democratic world. One can trace this paradox to the concept of constitutional unamendability. Constitutional unamendability can be understood as a formally entrenched provision(s) or an informally entrenched norm that prohibits an alteration or violation of that provision or norm. An unamendable constitutional provision is impervious to formal amendment, even with supermajority or even unanimous agreement from the political actors whose consent is required to alter the constitutional text. Whether or not it is enforced, and also by whom, this prohibition raises fundamental questions implicating sovereignty, legitimacy, democracy and the rule of law."--

"We the People." That phrase conjures a vision of present-day U.S. citizens taking part of a continuous enterprise of constitutional development, each succeeding generation stepping into the shoes of those who framed and ratified the Constitution and, as the new performer in the role of "We the People," reinterpreting a centuries-old role. Like those who created the role, we have power to modify the Constitution. But is each succeeding generation really allowed the same creative and expressive power to alter the role, to amend the Constitution? The subject of this Article, in general, is the relationship between "We the People," who "ordain[ed] and establish[ed]" the Constitution, and we the "Posterity" to whom the "Blessings of Liberty" were to be secured. The rules for amending the Constitution, and any limitation on amendment emplaced by those rules, are central to relationships between generations of the American citizenry. The more particular topic of this Article is the special case of unamendable provisions as ties that bind and the gaps that separate generations of We the People. Such permanent, unalterable provisions are the ties that bind generations inflexibly to one another; yet such provisions create the widest of gaps between the sovereignties of those same generations.

Many of the most important legal texts in the United States are highly unamendable. This applies not only to the Constitution, which has not been amended in over forty years, but also to many framework statutes, like the Administrative Procedure Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act. The problem is becoming increasingly severe, as political polarization makes amendment of these texts even more unlikely. This Article considers how interpreters should respond to highly unamendable texts. Unamendable texts have a number of pathologies, such as excluding the people and their representatives from any direct participation in legal change. They also pose an especially difficult problem for interpreters, since the interpreter cannot rely on the implicit ratification of its efforts that comes about when an enacting body reviews and does not amend the efforts of the interpreter. Trapped in a one-sided echo chamber, the interpreter will increasingly rely on precedent as a source of legitimacy for its interpretive efforts. This, however, introduces other pathologies, including second-order unamendability, since the interpreter cannot overrule many of its precedents without also calling into question its fidelity to law. The Article suggests two interpretive strategies as a partial way out of this trap. One is to adopt a general "amendability canon" to the effect that disputes should be resolved under the more amendable text, when both an unamendable and a relatively more amendable source of law are available. The other, paradoxically, is to interpret unamendable texts in a Burkean, status-quo oriented fashion. This will discourage attempts to achieve legal change through interpretation of unamendable texts and encourage efforts to achieve such change through other means, such as new legislation and regulation, which will be inherently more amendable.

Many of the most important legal texts in the United States are highly unamendable. This applies not only to the Constitution, which has not been amended in over forty years, but also to many framework statutes, like the Administrative Procedure Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act. The problem is becoming increasingly severe, as political polarization makes amendment of these texts even more unlikely. This Article considers how interpreters should respond to highly unamendable texts. Unamendable texts have a number of pathologies, such as excluding the people and their representatives from any direct participation in legal change. They also pose an especially difficult problem for interpreters, since the interpreter cannot rely on the implicit ratification of its efforts that comes about when an enacting body reviews and does not amend the efforts of the interpreter. Trapped in a one-sided echo chamber, the interpreter will increasingly rely on precedent as a source of legitimacy for its interpretive efforts. This, however, introduces other pathologies, including second-order unamendability, since the interpreter cannot overrule many of its precedents without also calling into question its fidelity to law. The Article suggests two interpretive strategies as a partial way out of this trap. One is to adopt a general "amendability canon" to the effect that disputes should be resolved under the more amendable text, when both an unamendable and a relatively more amendable source of law are available. The other, paradoxically, is to interpret unamendable texts in a Burkean, status-quo oriented fashion. This will discourage attempts to achieve legal change through interpretation of unamendable texts and encourage efforts to achieve such change through other means, such as new legislation and regulation, which will be inherently more amendable.

Nothing in the United States Constitution is today formally unamendable. Yet it is worth asking whether the Constitution requires some form of implicit unamendability in order to survive according to its own terms. In this paper, I inquire whether anything in the Constitution — whose constitutional text, history and interpretation are rooted in the concept of popular sovereignty — should be regarded as informally unamendable. I conclude that, if the Constitution is to remain internally coherent, the informal unamendability of the First Amendment's democratic rights may be a condition precedent to the Constitution's promise of robust democracy. I nevertheless express some doubt about how political actors might reliably enforce an informally unamendable First Amendment. I suggest in closing that the optimal function of unamendability in modern constitutionalism is its expressive capacity, specifically that unamendability is more effective as a declaration of importance than as a referent for judicial enforceability.

We think of constitutional provisions as having contingent permanence—they are effective today and, barring amendment, tomorrow and the day after and so on until superseded by amendment. Once superseded, a provision is void. But are there exceptions to this default state of contingent permanence? Are there any provisions in the current United States Constitution that cannot be superseded by amendment—that are unamendable? And could a future amendment make itself or some portion of the existing Constitution unamendable? Commentators investigating limits on constitutional amendment frequently focus on limits imposed by natural law, the democratic underpinnings of our nation, or some other combination of normative forces exterior to the Constitution. Those analyses, while both interesting and important, require injecting into the Constitution ideas and ideals outside its text. This Article analyzes what limits on amendment we may find expressed in the text of the Constitution itself. A careful analysis of the text of the original Constitution and the history of its framing offer rewarding insights in addition to new answers to the questions posed in the opening paragraph. We learn the Framers of the U.S. Constitution understood the difficulties—logical, syntactic, and political—inherent in unamendable constitutional provisions, and yet decided to include them.

"Empowering women is a prerequisite for creating a good nation, when women are empowered, society with stability is assured. Empowerment of women is essential as their thoughts and their value systems lead to the development of a good family, good society and ultimately a good nation." –A.P.J. Abdul Kalam Formal-President Govt. of India. Women are main founder of the world as well as men. So that in India women are called "Ardhangini" and in western countries she is called "Better women in society. Empowerment of women is very essential for the development of society because women play an import key role in all the fields of development. Women contribute directly or indirectly for the economic development. Women play a strategic role in the developmentof society in particular and development economy in general. Although from last two centuries, in India, the position of women is so hazardous that year 2001 is announced as the year of "EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN, 2001." Empowerment of women involves many things-economic opportunity, property rights, political representation, social equality, personal rights and so on. The process of empowerment is taking place at so many levels that it is quite difficult to gauge the actual nature and extent of empowerment in improving status of women.