Suchergebnisse

The text is in the form of a letter addressed to the author by a friend, signed at the end (p. 91): Q.N. Rotterdam 23 Jan. 1781. In the preface the author states that it is a commentary, written at his suggestion, in response to a pamphlet entitled "Het politieck systema van de regeering van Amsterdam," attributed to Hendrik Calkoen. The subject in part is the unauthorized negotiations for a commercial treaty between the burgomasters of Amsterdam and the United States. Attributed to Elie Luzac by Knuttel. Date of publication from preface, page [4], signed Middelburg, 1 February 1781. ; Florida Atlantic University Libraries' Marvin and Sybil Weiner Spirit of America Collection, Pamphlets: Foreign Language B8F17 ; Florida Atlantic Digital Library Collections

Why did the Dutch hold on to Western New Guinea, one of the many territories that constituted the Dutch East Indies (modern-day Indonesia), when the colony became independent in 1949? This thesis argues against the traditional explanation that it was due to a singular Dutch 'decolonization trauma': an inability to let go of the glorious colonial past, combined with resentment against Indonesian nationalist leaders such as Sukarno. It shows that historians have overstated the importance of emotions in Dutch colonial policy-making and diplomacy after 1949, mainly because of their narrow scope of analysis, which has traditionally been restricted to trilateral relations between the Netherlands, independent Indonesia (which wanted to incorporate Western New Guinea, if need be with military means) and the allegedly 'anti-colonial' United States. This thesis situates Dutch decision-making in the Western New Guinea Crisis in a much wider network, incorporating the colonial policy, diplomacy and perception of other Western powers such as Britain, France, Australia, Belgium and Portugal between 1930 and 1962. It is argued that, when viewed within this network and its discourse, the Dutch decision to retain Western New Guinea is best explained with rational actor theory. The decision was inspired not so much by emotions as by cost-benefit analyses, which included the possibility of transferring the territory to a new Indonesian regime—which the Dutch expected to be more forthcoming to the interests of the Papuans, the native inhabitants of Western New Guinea, and the Dutch (economic) interests in Indonesia than the regime headed by Sukarno. Research into hitherto neglected French, Belgian, British and Dutch archives also shows that the Netherlands could count on much more support for its New Guinea policy from its Western allies—including the US—than traditional historiography suggests. It remains true that the United States forced the Netherlands to hand over Western New Guinea to Indonesia in 1962, but the Kennedy ...

Inclusive mediation involves a mediator whose neutrality is based on involvement with both sides of the dispute, and whose normative references are implicit; he or she is an insider. Exclusive mediation, on the other hand, involves a third party whose neutrality derives from his knowing neither disputant, and whose references to norms are explicit; an outsider, so to speak. The concepts of inclusive and exclusive mediation have been introduced by the anthropologist Carol Greenhouse in the 1980s. Inclusive mediation heavily relies on local knowledge and local ties, and its orientation can be labelled as horizontal. Basically, it fits small-scale societies, while exclusive mediation is more common in Europe and the United States. This article is about dispute settlement in an indigenous community in the Ecuadorian highlands, were I have encountered a unusual mixture of both forms: a local teniente político who applies inclusive as well as exclusive aspects of mediation at the same time.

Inclusive mediation involves a mediator whose neutrality is based on involvement with both sides of the dispute, and whose normative references are implicit; he or she is an insider. Exclusive mediation, on the other hand, involves a third party whose neutrality derives from his knowing neither disputant, and whose references to norms are explicit; an outsider, so to speak. The concepts of inclusive and exclusive mediation have been introduced by the anthropologist Carol Greenhouse in the 1980s. Inclusive mediation heavily relies on local knowledge and local ties, and its orientation can be labelled as horizontal. Basically, it fits small-scale societies, while exclusive mediation is more common in Europe and the United States. This article is about dispute settlement in an indigenous community in the Ecuadorian highlands, were I have encountered a unusual mixture of both forms: a local teniente político who applies inclusive as well as exclusive aspects of mediation at the same time.

After the Vienna Congress in 1815, the Allied ministers did not return home, but continued their negotiations in Paris. They deliberated on the measure of reparation payments and arrear payments that France owed to the other European states. The new peace also rested on financial securities. The United Kingdom of the Netherlands assumed a large part in these conferences, since through the mass of private claims it was France's largest creditor. In this article we demonstrate how, as one of the essentials of the new concert diplomacy of 1815, smaller powers such as the Netherlands were allowed to weigh in on the Four Powers' deliberations in Paris. The political conundrums regarding these financial securities and reparationshave not been charted and analysed before. Through previously unstudied sources,such as the minutes of the Paris Ministerial Conference, we discuss the influence a secondary power could exert provided they deployed smart financial experts. Under that condition large political and financial gains could be made.

The subject of this study is the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the Security Council in the period 1946 2000. Because of their right of veto the cooperation of the permanent members has a significant influence on the functioning of the Council. The most important aspects of the cooperation that were investigated are the intensity of the cooperation and the ef-fectiveness of this cooperation in preventing and ending wars. To investigate these aspects, for both the intensity and the effectiveness measuring instruments were constructed. These measuring instruments were based on comprehensive sets of so-called 'leading indicators' and statistical methods and techniques. The intensity of the cooperation increased gradually from 1946 until 1990 (the end of the Cold War). Then it started to increase rapidly until 1996. From 1996 a slight decrease can be discer-ned. The strong increase in the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the security Council can be established in all the majors forms of cooperation in the Council: the numbers of adopted strategic resolutions and presidential statements, the numbers of employed means (like peacekeeping missions and enforcement actions) and the amounts of money that were spent on peacekeeping activities. Further it was established that the response times of the Council regarding potential and waged wars dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War. The effectiveness of the cooperation of the permanent members in the Council was, insofar this was measurable with the applied method, not good for many years, but after the Cold War a clear improvement can be discerned. This goes for the prevention of wars, as well as for post war peacebuilding and the ending of wars. Also the numbers of potential and waged wars in which the Council not intervened dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War, as well as the use of vetoes. The large number of potential and waged wars in which the Council did not intervene during the Cold War was nearly exclusively caused by 'non decisions' (the non placing of wars on the agenda), and not by the use of vetoes by permanent members, as is often assumed in literature. Further, a comparison of two phase classifications of the Cold War showed that the great powers, even when there are great tensions among them, are prepared to cooperate in the Security Council to resolve strategic matters, if they consider this in their interest. Analyses of the adopted strategic resolutions during the Cold War revealed that cooperation here was nearly exclusively limited to issues that were not core issues of the Cold War. From this it can be concluded that cooperation against third party states was a basis of cooperation of the great powers in the Security Council. Finally, the results of this study show clearly that the Security Council was regarded and used to a large extent by the permanent members in the period 1946 2000 as an instrument of foreign policy to pursue their national interests, and not as an instrument of the world community to prevent and end wars.

Simon van Slingelandt (1664-1736) has been in the service of the Republic of the United Netherlands during his entire working life. In 1690 he started his career as secretary of the Council of State (Raad van State). In 1725 he was appointed Treasurer-General and in 1727 he accepted the position of Grand Pensionary over Holland and West Friesland. In this final position he was 'le premier homme de la Republique' during the Second Stadtholderless period. This period commenced after the death of stadtholder-king William III in 1702 and would last until 1747. As a civil servant, he has left a great impression upon the daily affairs in both domestic and foreign political business. He sharply perceived how hairline cracks in the union of the seven provinces (Utrecht 1579) threatened to become fractures. After the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713), the Republic faced hard times. This incited Van Slingelandt to write critical texts. In both a personal capacity and as secretary of the Council of State, he pointed out the danger of a collapse of the system of government to the domestic allies. He also made propositions to improve the political-administrative system and financial policy. Van Slingelandt gathered these ideas in several treatises. These writings circulated during his lifetime, but were published later, in 1784-1785, titled Staatkundige Geschriften (Political Writings), fifty years after his death. This book contains a complete analysis of these treatises – as yet missing from historiography – which is preceded by an extensive biographical chapter about Van Slingelandt.

Hans Schippers surveys the position of Hezbollah in Lebanese politics and its relations with Iran and Syria. Hezbollah is an organisation with two faces. Together with Amal it represents the Shia in Lebanon. It participates in elections and the government. However, in the Southern part of the country Hezbollah constitutes a state within a state, with a militia and a social and medical network of its own. Most of the costs of this structure are paid for by Iran. The Shia leadership of Iran also played a vital role in the establishment of the organisation in 1982. Syria acted as the protector of Hezbollah in its agitation against Israel. With the departure of Syrian troops following the Cedar Revolution in the spring of 2005 most non-Shia Lebanese wanted to see the Hezbollah militia, seen as a pro-Syrian force, dissolved. However, this was refused by leader Nasrallah. The militia protected Lebanon against Israeli aggression, he declared. It is unclear what motivated Hezbollah to kidnap the Israeli soldiers. This action seemed to be co-ordinated with Iran and Syria to divert attention from the Iranian troubles with the United Nations about Iran's uranium enrichment programme. However, also solidarity with Hamas and the personality of Nasrallah may have played a role. The War of Summer 2006 made it clear once more that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict maybe exploited by forces not directly involved, like Iran. The strong presence of European soldiers in the new peace force presents an opportunity for the EU to take the initiative for a restart of the peace process in the region. A new Madrid type conference may offer away out of the deadlock.

Dutch-American relations in the post-war period have been inexorably intertwined with the Cold War. In the course of the 1960s the East-West struggle entered a new phase with the beginning of a period of détente, which had important consequences for the Dutch-American relationship. In this dissertation, which focuses on the governmental level, the following issues are dealt with: firstly, to what extent was the relationship affected by the complicating developments that took place in the years 1969-1976? Secondly, how did Dutch and American policy makers view the relationship? Finally, what did the asymmetry in the relationship mean and were the Dutch able to exert any influence? When taking into account both international and domestic factors, the picture that emerges is one of both change and continuity. What makes the period concerned stand out is the fact that the Atlantic Alliance was at a point where a redefinition of the common goals seemed unavoidable. Security concerns and preserving the American dominant position in the international arena were the foremost concerns of President Nixon and NSC-advisor Kissinger. These ideas clashed with those of Dutch politicians of for instance the Labour Party who wanted détente, an active human rights policy and development cooperation to be part of the Atlantic foreign policy agenda. The American embassy in The Hague was aware of these changes: it noticed a turn to the left in Dutch society and the political landscape. The Dutch cabinets in the period concerned faced domestic pressure to take a more critical stance towards the United States, where the Nixon administration faced problems concerning its image and credibility because of the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandal. On the other hand, unmistakable signs of continuity in the Dutch-American relationship were present. The Dutch governments in the years concerned did not turn away from Atlantic cooperation, as the Netherlands remained dependent on the American military commitment to Western Europe. Détente was ...

The hereafter following is abstract of the discourse held by Prof. dr. ir. C. L. Temminck Groll in honour of the jubilee 1899-1989 of the KNOB on September 23th 1989. The KNOB (Royal Antiquarian Society of the Netherlands) exists 90 years. A respectable age after human standards. Although a society depends on human devotion it does not know age limitations. This is an excellent moment to reflect upon our centenary. Then, in 1999, we will have to present an extremely good manifest for the coming millennium! We have been spoiled very much during the past 90 years. Which of the founders would have expected so many people professionally involved at the protection of monuments? Which of them could have estimated the money available to realize restoration activities? Still, despite of all we obtained, we are rightly concerned about our country and especially that part of the world beyond our borders. These concerns are formulated by the National Geographic Society which hereby stated: 'Can we save this fragile earth?' This society aims at the earth herself as well as at human achievements. Co-operation between the protection of nature and the protection of monuments certainly is sensible and could be one of our future actions. How much nature, how much culture is not already 'dead'! Wren's St. Benet in London f.e. seems saved, but surrounded by flowing thoroughfares the church misses every relation with the original urban structure. Thus in fact the monument has not been saved. At Liège, Belgium, 20th century traffic and concrete buildings overran the medieval Place St. Lambert. And what about the European countryside? How much harmonious farmer's land has not been industrialized yet? Old structures disappear everywhere. Instead of the newly made our Society had to study more and more the continuous changes of the already extant. As to our foreign activities, we can distinguish three angles of incidence. First of all: what can we learn from other countries? Our founder mr. dr. J.C. Overvoorde already realized the importance of study of the way monuments are protected in different European countries. ICOMOS at present is the platform to discuss organizational and substantial aspects. Second: stock-taking of Dutch cultural influences to other regions in Europe, which subject used to attract more attention than it does now. At last: Dutch influences beyond European borders. Like our founder in 1910-11 studied Hindu-Buddhistic antiquaries and the monuments of the Dutch East-Indian Company our Foundation Social History of the Dutch Oversea studies these treasures now. One of her working-groups tries to solve Indonesian problems with respect to the protection of monuments and started stocktaking of especially younger architecture and town-planning. Still, a lot remains to be done on this field in the 'West'! Borders fade. But with the introduction of new fields of work we may not forget the old. Not the older monuments, since we are occupied with the young, not the Dutch, being directed at the whole world. After the question of what we study, the question rises how. Our purpose always was protection. Unlike nature culture cannot renew herself: we have to 'maintain'. And then mankind also is a piece of nature with continuous new desires to which the extant has been adapted. 'Maintain' as well as 'adapt to' means: to change. We can let nature change the made - how beautifully weathered the ruins are! - but we can also preserve the weathering - until now. Replacement of weathered material by new in the shape of colour it used to have is another possibility. Also opinions about this sort of alterations are constantly changing. Thus a platform like the KNOB at national level or ICOMOS at international level will always be needed. That's why: an extremely good manifesto in 10 years. One that states that we are occupied with changing instead of static affairs. Alterations must be directed professionally in a careful and modest way. For the real is infinitely more valuable than the copy.