Suchergebnisse

Vol. 1: Belgique/Belgie, Danmark, Deutschland. - XXIII,570 S. - ISBN 92-829-0229-3.; Vol. 2: France. - XXI, S. 573-1326. - ISBN 92-829-0230-7.; Vol. 3: Hellas, Espana, Ireland. - XXI, S. 1329-2003. - ISBN 92-829-0231-5.; Vol. 4: Italia, Luxembourg, Nederland, Portugal, United Kingdom. - XXI, S. 2009-2718. - ISBN 92-829-0232-3

Lecturing the Dutch in public probably makes them more stubborn rather than less stubborn. And they are already stubborn enough,' wrote a British diplomat in July 1947. How did the United States, the United Kingdom and France view the Indonesian War of Independence in the period of 1945-1949? Did they show understanding for the Dutch political and military policies or rather for the Indonesian position, and in what ways did they try to influence the parties? Where did the Dutch get their military equipment to wage war in Indonesia? In 'Diplomatie en geweld', the authors show how other countries and the recently founded United Nations were involved in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict and how they helped determine its course and outcome. In doing so they focus not only on the political and diplomatic aspects of the struggle, but also on foreign views on the use of violence by the Dutch armed forces

A little appreciated member of the international community in 2004, Belgium has developed the previous years into a constructive diplomatic element that takes to heart its international responsibility (examples: troops in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Balkans, and an effective diplomatic intervention concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo). Responsibly for this success are called Belgian impartiality, its open ears, imagination and collaboration regarding multilateralism. Furthermore, the EU's enlargement by 10 states is discussed, the rejecting of the European Constitution by France and the Netherlands, and the strengthened position of the BENELUX within the EU. A second topic: relations with the neighboring countries France, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg. A last item discusses cooperation in multilateral development projects. References. O. van Zijl

Vol. 1: Belgique. - 653 S. - ISBN 92-829-0315-X; Vol. 2: Belgique. - S. 654-1334. - ISBN 92-829-0300-1; Vol. 3: Danmark. - 725 S. - ISBN 92-829-0301-X; Vol. 4: Deutschland. - 534 S. - ISBN 92-829-0302-8; Vol. 5: Ellas. - 580 S. - ISBN 92-829-0303-6; Vol. 6: Espana. - 635 S. - ISBN 92-829-0304-4; Vol. 7: France I. - 560 S. - ISBN 92-829-0316-8; Vol. 8: France II. - S. 565-1019. - ISBN 92-829-0305-2; Vol. 9: Ireland. - 201 S. - ISBN 92-829-0306-0.; Vol. 10: Italia I. - 435 S. - ISBN 92-829-0317-6; Vol. 11: Italia II. - S. 439-1199. - ISBN 92-829-0307-9; Vol. 12: Luxembourg. - 517 S. - ISBN 92-829-0308-7; Vol. 13: Nederland. - 605 S. - ISBN 92-829-0309-5; Vol. 14: Portugal. - 288 S. - ISBN 92-829-0310-9; Vol. 15: United Kingdom. - 636 S. - ISBN 92-829-0311-7

After the Vienna Congress in 1815, the Allied ministers did not return home, but continued their negotiations in Paris. They deliberated on the measure of reparation payments and arrear payments that France owed to the other European states. The new peace also rested on financial securities. The United Kingdom of the Netherlands assumed a large part in these conferences, since through the mass of private claims it was France's largest creditor. In this article we demonstrate how, as one of the essentials of the new concert diplomacy of 1815, smaller powers such as the Netherlands were allowed to weigh in on the Four Powers' deliberations in Paris. The political conundrums regarding these financial securities and reparationshave not been charted and analysed before. Through previously unstudied sources,such as the minutes of the Paris Ministerial Conference, we discuss the influence a secondary power could exert provided they deployed smart financial experts. Under that condition large political and financial gains could be made.