This paper explores how Britain's and Colombia's privileged relations with the United States (U.S.) influenced their journey through the European Community (EC) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). The Anglo–American Special Relationship (AASR) was compatible with British participation in the European Single Market, but not with adherence to creating the EC's common currency, nor with leadership in building a European defence structure autonomous from NATO. Thus, since the start of the Iraq war, Britain played a rather obstructive role in what later was called European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The US–Colombia Partnership (USCP), based on a longstanding military association reinforced under Plan Colombia, naturally discouraged any meaningful Colombian participation in UNASUR's South American Security Council (CDS), a regional cooperative security project, promoted by Brazil. Cherished projects of the liberal CAP – such as triangular cooperation (to export Colombian security expertise to Central America with U.S. co-financing and oversight) and NATO partnership – also distracted Colombia's interest from UNASUR, diminishing the latter's relevance collaterally. A role for UNASUR – alongside the Organization of American States (OAS) – in South American security management was compatible with the liberal CAP, but not with the neoconservative CAP. Even a lopsided complementation – such as the one between NATO and the CSDP – proved unviable between the OAS and UNASUR.
In recent decades, the United States has increasingly used the means of economic warfare in its geopolitical struggles. Among these instruments – in addition to the financial markets – it most often launches geoeconomic attacks in the oil market against its geopolitical adversaries. The United States can cause significant economic damage both for oil exporter (eg. Iran, Venezuela) and oil importer (eg. Cuba, North Korea) countries by restricting their access to oil markets.This paper analyzes the economic warfare in the oil market between the United States and Iran, Russia, and North Korea. Through these examples this paper demonstrates how the United States organizes and executes geoeconomic attacks in the oil market and how it handles country-specific problems. The United States has the means to organize broad international coalition alongside the oil market sanctions – even in the lack of UN Security Council resolutions.United Nations has decided on a number of economic sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear program. These sanctions reduced the supply in the world oil market and resulted in about 10-20% price increase, while Iran – despite of the sanctions – found the way to sell significant amount of oil, mainly to China and India.Russia is a member of the UN Security Council, so no UN sanctions can be imposed on it, nevertheless the United States and its allies launched a geoeconomics assault against Russia after the annexation of the Crimea. Russia was prepared for these economic sanctions and could effectively reduce the negative effects on its oil export, which could even increase after the western sanctions. North Korea is under UN sanctions since 2006 because of its nuclear program. The sanctions refer to oil and oil products as well, but has no significant effect on world oil market and oil price, because North Korea is a relatively small country with low oil consumption.North Korea is suffering a huge economic burden due to severe restrictions and its only way to circumvent the embargo – according to American accusations – is to smuggle some oil from China and Russia. ; In recent decades, the United States has increasingly used the means of economic warfare in its geopolitical struggles. Among these instruments – in addition to the financial markets – it most often launches geoeconomic attacks in the oil market against its geopolitical adversaries. The United States can cause significant economic damage both for oil exporter (eg. Iran, Venezuela) and oil importer (eg. Cuba, North Korea) countries by restricting their access to oil markets.This paper analyzes the economic warfare in the oil market between the United States and Iran, Russia, and North Korea. Through these examples this paper demonstrates how the United States organizes and executes geoeconomic attacks in the oil market and how it handles country-specific problems. The United States has the means to organize broad international coalition alongside the oil market sanctions – even in the lack of UN Security Council resolutions.United Nations has decided on a number of economic sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear program. These sanctions reduced the supply in the world oil market and resulted in about 10-20% price increase, while Iran – despite of the sanctions – found the way to sell significant amount of oil, mainly to China and India.Russia is a member of the UN Security Council, so no UN sanctions can be imposed on it, nevertheless the United States and its allies launched a geoeconomics assault against Russia after the annexation of the Crimea. Russia was prepared for these economic sanctions and could effectively reduce the negative effects on its oil export, which could even increase after the western sanctions. North Korea is under UN sanctions since 2006 because of its nuclear program. The sanctions refer to oil and oil products as well, but has no significant effect on world oil market and oil price, because North Korea is a relatively small country with low oil consumption.North Korea is suffering a huge economic burden due to severe restrictions and its only way to circumvent the embargo – according to American accusations – is to smuggle some oil from China and Russia.
After Germany introduced the unrestricted submarine warfare at the beginning of February 1917, the United States declared war on 6th April 1917 on Berlin and joined the First World War beside the Allied countries. In response to the declaration of war the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy broke off its diplomatic relations with Washington on the 9th April 1917. The martial law between the two states came into force on the 7th December 1917 with the US's declaration of war. The First World War ended with the victory of the Entente and the peace was dictated by the victors. US President Woodrow Wilson achieved that the victorious powers adopted the League of Nations Covenant in April 1919, which became part of the Paris peace treaties. The US domestic politics was divided over the League of Nations, and as a result of that the US Senate has not ratified neither Germany's nor Austria's and Hungary's peace treaties. The US concluded a separate peace treaty with the losing countries on the basis of the Knox-Porter-resolution. In the history of diplomacy the Knox-Porter-resolution became known as a peace resolution that abolished the state of war between the parties, but the United States has assured all the rights guaranteed by the ceasefire agreement and the peace treaty. The study deals with the preliminaries, the parliamentary debate, details of the ratification, and also describes the most important points of the peace treaty between the United States and Hungary signed on 29th August 1921.
The lessons learned from the crisis management of the 2008 Great Recession are due to significant structural differences between the two centers of the world, the United States and the eurozone. This has been the worst and most widespread global economic downturn since the Great Depression. The crisis is over, but it seems that the crisis has long-lasting consequences. In the case of the United States, a monetary, fiscal and political union is realized, which with a single economic policy, operates as a coherent unit, uniting the three areas. GDP is rising, unemployment is at the lowest level since 1969 and government debt is the highest it has ever been which can cause problems in the long run. In the case of the eurozone, we can talk about a monetary union. The crisis has highlighted the structural flaws of the eurozone, because without a unified fiscal policy no effective economic policy can be achieved. The symptoms of the euro area crisis weren't the consequences of the global economic crisis; rather the stalling of the integration process, the lack of real convergence, and the weaknesses of monetary and fiscal policy were the problems that have been brought to the fore and exacerbated by the crisis. I consider the crisis management of the United States to be more successful, in which the single economic policy has played an important role – as long as the eurozone doesn't deepen integration, it will not be able to address vulnerabilities between its countries. For Central Europe to be competitive, it has to have the right economic policies and an independent monetary policy. The postcrisis recovery has taken place, but in order to avoid further crises and to have a faster convergence towards the eurozone, we need targeted steps which could create the opportunities.
Considering the recent series of events and intensified diplomatic and economic relations, many experts envisage a new Cold War between the two superpowers of the twenty-first century. Although the Chinese-American relationship over the last half-century has experienced some great moments, it has mostly been characterised by less amicable or even hostile attitudes, as well as economically volatile competition. The pragmatic realist approach and diplomatic appeasement of the 1970s and 1980s served mutual interests for the two countries against their common foe, the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, concerning their political values and visions, the democratic US and the Marxist-Maoist People's Republic of China have proven to be two irreconcilable political and social experiments, worlds apart from each other's spheres and paradigms. Within the context of the drastically altered global political milieu of the new millennium, the two great powers have manoeuvred themselves into heated confrontational positions over the last decade, not even excluding the possibility of a severe clash of interests in the future.
This paper is aimed at analysing the impact of the crisis of the liberal international order on the transatlantic relations. Both the EU and the US have vital interest to maintain the existing international order, however regarding certain foreign policy goals we witness an increasingly divergent approach to world politics. This is the case with the Middle East, where the EU acts as a global player based on historical ties, while the United States have recently started a gradual disengagement from the region. The so-called post-American Middle East have its own opportunities as well as challenges for the European diplomacy. This article focuses on the differences between the EU and the US foreign policy goals related to the Middle East. It primarily addresses the Iranian nuclear program and the Middle East Peace Plan recently launched by the US. The author argues despite some differences in interests, the EU and the US do not perceive the region in an entirely different way.
A 20. század második felének bipoláris hatalma struktúráját (Amerikai Egyesült Államok versus Szovjetunió) követően a 21.században a két hagyományos nagyhatalom mellett egy újabb globális geopolitikai és geoökonómiai nagyhatalom is megjelent Kína gazdasági és katonai előtörésével. Az Amerikai Egyesült Államok vezető szerepe ugyanakkor (egyelőre) megkérdőjelezhetetlen, de Kína gazdaságilag tíz éven belül beérheti, Oroszország ásványkincs vagyona (földgáz, kőolaj) pedig függőségét jelent számos gazdasági hatalom számára. A három globális geopolitikai hatalom egymás közötti, bilaterális gazdasági és kereskedelmi kapcsolatai az elmúlt évtizedben nagyon heterogén módon alakultak: az amerikai-orosz relációban lineárisan csökkenő, az amerikai-kínai relációban jelentősen növekvő, majd a kereskedelmi háborúnak köszönhetően (talán átmenetileg) megtorpanó és csökkenő, az orosz-kínai relációban pedig folyamatosan növekvő trend figyelhető meg az elmúlt évtizedben. Az Oroszország által életre hívott gazdasági és kereskedelmi kezdeményezés a Szovjetunió felbomlását követő integrációs törekvések folytatása, az Eurázsiai Gazdasági Unió az elmúlt öt évben sikereket tud felmutatni, azonban már rövid távon is jelentős kihívásokkal néz szembe és kérdéses a további fejlődése. Előre tekintve új globális kockázati tényezők jelentek meg, melyek közül a legaktuálisabb és legnagyobb hatású a koronavírus járvány világszintű megjelenése és elterjedése. A globális szereplők egészségügyi és gazdasági járvány adott válasz lépései mind sebességet, mind mélységet tekintve heterogén képet mutatnak. Kérdés, hogy a jelenleg még mélyülő globális gazdasági válság a nemzetállamok szerepét fogja-e felerősíteni vagy új szövetségek jönnek létre a világban. Izgalmas, fordulatokkal teli évek következnek a globális geopolitikai színtéren, ahol a status quo megváltozása várható, új hatalmi központok jöhetnek létre, régi szövetségi rendszerek szűnhetnek meg illetve újak alakulhatnak ki, melyek a jelenlegi tripoláris világrendet alapjaiban változtathatják meg. Following the structure of bipolar power in the second half of the 20th century (United States versus the Soviet Union), in the 21st century, in addition to the two traditional superpowers, another global geopolitical and geoeconomic superpower emerged with the economic and military outbreak of China. At the same time, the leadership of the United States of America (for the time being) is unquestionable, but China can reach the nominal GDP of the US within ten years and still many economic powers depend on Russia's mineral wealth (natural gas, oil). Bilateral economic and trade relations between the three global geopolitical powers have evolved in a very heterogeneous manner over the last decade: linearly declining in the US-Russian relationship, significantly increasing in the US-China relationship, and then (possibly temporarily) due to the trade war stagnant and declining, and the Russian-Chinese relationship has been steadily increasing over the last decade. The economic and trade initiative launched by Russia is a continuation of the integration efforts following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the Eurasian Economic Union has been successful over the last five years, but it faces significant challenges in the short term and its further development is questionable. Looking ahead, new global risk factors have emerged, the most relevant and influential of which is the global emergence and spread of the coronavirus epidemic. The response of global actors to the health and economic epidemic shows a heterogeneous picture in terms of both speed and depth. The question is whether the global economic crisis, which is currently deepening, will strengthen the role of nation-states or create new alliances in the world. Exciting, turbulent years will follow on the global geopolitical scene, where the status quo is expected to change, new centers of power may emerge, old federal systems may disband, and new ones may be formed that can fundamentally change the current tripolar world order.
During the Cold War, the Philippines was an indispensable US ally, and this was still basically the case at the turn of the 21st century. However, the inauguration of President Rodrigo Duterte in June 2016 heralded great changes for the international position of the Philippines: a shift towards China and Russia occurred, followed by the emergence of a more balanced foreign policy. The partnership with the US has changed, too: during the Obama administration, the relationship between the two countries became cooler, although the foundations of the alliance were never contested. In the wake of Donald Trump's assumption of office in January 2017, the alliance seems to have become as strong as before, and economic as well as security-military cooperation has continued. The author's aim is to analyze the Philippines' position in the US-led world order from 1945 to the present, as well as the foundations of the United States–Philippines special relationship. After that the main components of Duterte's "independent" foreign policy and the fundamental changes in the Philippines' foreign relations are presented. The analysis focuses on the causes of the conflict at the end of Barack Obama's presidency, followed by the improving partnership during the Trump era and the main geopolitical challenges the alliance has had to face. According to its conclusion the US–Philippines security cooperation will remain strong under Presidents Duterte and Trump due to strategic considerations, which indicate the military alliance is in the interests of both nations.
The EU is the global frontrunner on sustainability and has introduced regulations under the Renewable Energy Directive and Fuel Quality Directive that lay down sustainability criteria that biofuels must meet before being eligible to contribute to the binding national targets that each Member State must achieve by 2020. In Europe, the revised EU Renewable Energy Directive for 2020-2030, approved in December 2018, sets a target for a 14% share of renewable energy in the transport sector by 2030, with a sub-target of at least 3.5% use of advanced biofuels and biomethane. The Directive also places a 7% cap on the share of the overall target that can be met by conventional biofuels based on feedstocks that also could be used as food, reflecting EU concerns about competition between food and fuel and about potential indirect land-use change impacts. In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for the Renewable Fuel Standard program. This establishes specific annual volume requirements for renewable fuels, which rise to 36 billion gallons by 2022. These regulatory requirements apply to domestic and foreign producers and importers of renewable fuel used in the U.S. ; Az EU a fenntarthatóság globális éllovasa, és a megújuló energiáról szóló irányelv és az üzemanyag-minőségére vonatkozó irányelv értelmében meghatározzák azokat a fenntarthatósági kritériumokat, amelyeknek a bioüzemanyagoknak meg kell felelniük ahhoz, hogy beszámítható legyen a 2020-ig kötelezően vállalt nemzeti célok teljesítésébe. A 2018 decemberében jóváhagyott és a 2020–2030 közötti időszakra szóló megújuló energiáról szóló irányelv a megújuló energiaforrások 14%-os részesedését tűzi ki célul 2030-ra a közlekedési ágazatban, ebből legalább 3,5%-os részcélként a fejlett bioüzemanyagok és biometán arányát. Az irányelv emellett 7%-os felső határt ír elő az élelmiszernövényekből készült hagyományos bioüzemanyagok részarányára, ami tükrözi az EU aggodalmát az élelmiszerek és az üzemanyagok termőföldért folytatott versenye és a közvetett földhasználat-változás miatt. Az Egyesült Államokban a Környezetvédelmi Ügynökség felel a megújuló üzemanyag szabványra vonatkozó programért. Ez a program specifikus éves mennyiségi követelményeket határoz meg a megújuló üzemanyagokra, amelyek 2022-re 36 milliárd gallonra emelkednek. Ezek a szabályozási követelmények az Egyesült Államokban használt megújuló üzemanyagok hazai és külföldi gyártóira és importőreire vonatkoznak.
On his two days campaign trip in the territory between the Danube and River Tisza, Count István Bethlen primarily emphasised the reconstitution of national unity, religious peace and reconciliation among social classes. This political campaign aimed at peacefully revising the Treaty of Trianon. And he thought it well: in order to achieve this goal, it was necessary to conceive political realism, that is, the economic, social and cultural reinforcement of die nation. For example, it was expedient for beginning the land reform, the dissemination of intensive forms of agricultural production and the industrialisation supplementing imports. For the intellectual basis to achieve these goals, Bethlen considered Christian liberalism the most appropriate. As a result of this campaign, the nominees of the United Party won 6 out of the 9 electoral districts. And among these 6 constituencies, 3 were eventually taken by the governing party by an intervention through the civil service. Bethlen and the leaders of the United Party often exploited the state apparatus and the civil service - in many cases illegally - to preserve power positions. Thus even the subsequent successes of the Bethlen consolidation cannot overshadow this fact.
