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"Responding to the challenges of fostering regional growth and employment in an increasingly competitive global economy, many U.S. states and regions have developed programs to attract and grow companies as well as attract the talent and resources necessary to develop regional innovation clusters. These state and regionally based initiatives have a broad range of goals and increasingly include larger resources commitments, often with a sectoral focus and often in partnership with foundations and universities. Recent studies, however, have pointed out that many of these efforts lack the scale and the steady commitment needed for success. This has prompted new initiatives to coordinate and concentrate investments from a variety of federal agencies to develop research parks, business incubators, and other strategies to encourage entrepreneurships and high-tech development in the nation's regions. Understanding the nature of innovation clusters and public policies associated with successful cluster development is therefore of current relevance. Clustering for 21st Century Prosperity identifies best practices with regard to goals, structures, instruments, modes of operation, synergies across private and public programs, funding mechanisms and levels, and evaluation efforts. The committee, under the Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy (STEP) is reviewing selected state and regional efforts to capitalize on federal and state investments in areas of critical national needs. This review includes both efforts to strengthen existing industries as well as specific technology focus areas such as nanotechnology, stem cells, and advanced energy in order to better understand program goals, challenges, and accomplishments."--Publisher's description.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1. Overview: What is Domestic Surveillance? -- 2. The National Security Agency Violates Civil Rights -- 3. The National Security Agency is Acting Within the Law -- 4. The United States must Balance Security and Privacy Needs -- 5. Can Congress Oversee the NSA? -- 6. Strong Oversight of Intelligence Gathering Protects Civil Rights -- 7. Americans Can't Find Out Whether the Government Watches them -- 8. Domestic Surveillance has a Chilling Effect on Political Speech -- 9. Surveillance should be Embraced to Create a Transparent Society -- 10. NSA Spying Undermines Separation of Powers -- 11. Drones over America: Public Safety Benefit or "Creepy" Privacy Threat? -- 12. How Stores Spy on you -- 13. Domestic Surveillance is Bad for the US Economy -- 14. Technology Drives Advances in Domestic Surveillance -- 15. The American Public is Skeptical of Domestic Surveillance -- Organizations to Contact -- Bibliography -- Index -- Back Cover

How powerful is the President of the United States? In The Isolated Presidency, Jordan T. Cash re-frames this question to instead ask what authority is available to all presidents. Drawing on the Constitution itself, Cash argues that the presidency possesses an internal logic derived from its structure, duties, and powers which not only grants the president a unique institutional perspective, but also provides the president with considerable agency and discretion in pursuing his agenda. Through three case studies of "isolated presidents"--presidents who were unelected, faced divided government, and were opposed by major factions of their own political parties--Cash provides lessons and examples of what constitutionally derived actions a president can take when confronted with the recurring issues of divided government and political gridlock.

Every day thousands of individuals need to make critical decisions about their health based on numerical information, yet recent surveys have found that over half the population of the United States is unable to complete basic math problems. How does this lack of numerical ability (also referred to as low numeracy, quantitative illiteracy or statistical illiteracy) impact healthcare? What can be done to help people with low numeracy skills? Numerical Reasoning in Judgments and Decision Making about Health addresses these questions by examining and explaining the impact of quantitative illiteracy on healthcare and in specific healthcare contexts, and discussing what can be done to reduce these healthcare disparities. This book will be a useful resource for professionals in many health fields including academics, policy makers, physicians and other healthcare providers

V dizertaciji sem poskušal raziskati, kako oskrba z energijo v vsaki od štirih svetovnih velesil (EU, ZDA, Ruski federaciji, Ljudski republiki Kitajski) vpliva na njihovo zunanjo energetsko politiko, kateri od treh elementov energetske politike (konkurenčnost, varnost oskrbe, trajnostnost) odraža zunanjo energetsko politiko teh držav in kako lahko različne regionalne iniciative iyhajajoče iz zunanje energetske politike teh držav pojasnjujemo s teorijo neofunkcionalizma. Prvo poglavje želi predstaviti neofunkcionistično teorijo kot teorijo regionalne integracije. Najprej analizira poskus Jeana Monneta za spodbujanje evropske integracije, ki so jo po drugi svetovni vojni ilustrirale Evropske skupnosti: Evropska gospodarska skupnost, Euratom in Evropska skupnost za jeklo in premog. Neofunkcionalizem je teorija, ki razlaga proces integracije na regionalni ravni glede na naraščajoče vzajemne gospodarske odnose med državami. Analizira sposobnost regionalnih organizacij za reševanje sporov in oblikovanje mednarodnih pravnih režimov, znotraj katerih lahko nadnacionalna tržna pravila nadomestijo nacionalne regulatorne režime. Integracijo pojasnjuje tudi s specializacijo elit in s pozitivnim učinkom prelitja (spill over effect), ki se kaže v nujnosti sodelovanja med sektorji, povezanimi s tistim sektorjem, v katerem se je regionalno sodelovanje prvič začelo. Drugo poglavje na kratko predstavlja 130 let zgodovine regulacije za zaščito konkurence na energetskih trgih, približno 80 let izzivov glede varnosti oskrbe in prestopa te teme v politiko ter približno 70 let stremljenja k trajnostnosti v sodobni energetski politiki. Tretje poglavje predstavlja strukturo oskrbe z energijo v vsaki od analiziranih svetovnih velesil. Očitno je, da so energetski trgi (nafta, plin, elektrika) v ZDA in EU zelo konkurenčni in učinkoviti. Velesili si prizadevata za trajnostnost in nenehno zmanjšujeta izpuste škodljivih emisij iz elektrarn, v prometu ter pri drugih dejavnostih. Medtem, ko je EU močno odvisna od uvoza (leta 2017 je uvozila več kot 55% vseh virov energije), so se ZDA v zadnjih 15 letih iz največjega uvoznika energetskih virov na svetu razvile v neto izvoznico in leta 2018 dosegle energetsko samozadostnost. Ruski indeks neto uvoza energije znaša -84%. Po podatkih iz leta 2014 je država ena največjih neto izvoznikov nafte (približno 10% svetovne proizvodnje) in plina (blizu 20% svetovne proizvodnje). Leta 2018 je bila izvožena količina energije skoraj enaka tisti, ki jo je država v tem letu porabila. Kljub energetskemu izobilju, ima Rusija močno regulirane in neučinkovite trge s plinom, nafto in električno energijo. Med štirimi analiziranimi velesilami daleč najmanj učinkovito izrablja svoje energetske vire. Monopol državnega podjetja Gazprom postaja vedno bolj vprašljiv zaradi vse manjših koristi, ki jih tako stanje prinaša Rusiji. Posledično naraščajo pritiski na Moskvo za reformo energetskega (zlasti plinskega) sektorja. Do zdaj je ruska vlada bolj ali manj odklanjala strukturne reforme in se poskušala prilagajati novim okoliščinam s prerazporejanjem obstoječih dohodkov. Kitajska počasi liberalizira svoj trg s plinom. Reforma, ki je v devetdesetih pritegnila v proizvodnjo električne energije nove, zasebne vlagatelje, je bila vmes že odpravljena, zasebni vlagatelji pa izrinjeni. Plin, premog, nafto ter proizvodnjo električne energije v glavnem nadzirajo državna podjetja, ki praviloma ne dopuščajo konkurence. Kitajska je leta 2017 porabila 22% vseh svetovnih virov energije in je bila tako daleč največji porabnik energije na vsem svetu. Kitajska izkoplje in sežge približno polovico svetovnega premoga in je tako močno netrajnostno usmerjena. Količina izpustov škodljivih emisij iz elektrarn ostaja visoka in stabilna, emisije CO2 pa se nenehno povečujejo. Se pa Kitajska v zadnjih letih veliko bolj osredotoča na storitveno ekonomijo in proizvodnjo elektrike iz obnovljivih virov. Kitajski indeks neto uvoza energije je 15%, kar kaže na zmerno odvisnost od uvoza. Četrto poglavje je namenjeno analizi zunanje energetske politike EU v globalnem kontekstu zapletenih energetskih odnosov. Energetika je že zelo dolgo politično občutljiv sektor in je kot tak tesno povezan z državno suverenostjo in nacionalnimi interesi. Posledično so se bruseljska prizadevanja za oblikovanje skupne zunanje energetske politike, ob delitvi pristojnosti z državami članicami in ob upoštevanju skrbno pripravljenega kompromisa iz člena 194 Pogodbe o delovanju EU, izkazala za zelo zahteven in težko dosegljiv cilj. Dejstvo, da je Evropska unija močno odvisna od tujih dobaviteljev energije (med katerimi ima Rusija s svojo vizijo političnim ciljem podrejene energetske politike najpomembnejšo vlogo), dodatno omejuje težnje EU po uvedbi univerzalnih tržnih pravil v energetskem sektorju. Pri promociji tržnih pravil kot osnovi energetske politike je EU vseeno uspelo doseči nekaj napredka, zlasti z ustanovitvijo Evropskega gospodarskega prostora in Energetske skupnosti. V zadnjih letih, ki jih zaznamujeta zmanjšan pomen multilateralizma in povečan pomen bilateralnih odnosov, je EU začela oblikovati svojo lastno zunanjo energetsko politiko (po moji oceni od 2015 dalje) in takoj, tako kot druge velesile, v svojo zunanjo energetsko politiko vnesla elemente dominantnosti. Neofunkcionalistična teorija, ki evropsko integracijo razlaga z učinkom prelitja, se je izkazala za uporabno tudi pri razlagi procesov oblikovanja zunanje energetske politike EU in povečane vloge in avtonomije Evropske komisije v tem procesu. Po teoriji Nye-ja o štirih stopnjah pri oblikovanju regionalne integracije EU trenutno prehaja iz tretje stopnje (redukcija alternativ) v četrto (eksternalizacija). Peto poglavje skuša pokazati kako je ameriška energetska politika skozi zgodovino doživela več sprememb. ZDA so si v začetku dvajsetega stoletja, tako kot mnogo let od krize v Sueškem prekopu sredi 70-ih let 20.stoletja, prizadevale za konkurenco, ki naj bi omogočila ustrezen dostop do virov energije s ciljem, da bi ohranile sprotno zadovoljevanje svojih energetskih potreb. Od sredine osemdesetih let je postala ameriška energetska politika bolj večstranska, z vedno večjo skrbjo glede okoljskih vprašanj, vendar sta varnost oskrbe in konkurenčnosti še vedno na prvem mestu. Medtem, ko je ameriško energetsko politiko v dvajsetem stoletju vodil strah pred pomanjkanjem energije, je tako imenovana nekonvencionalna revolucija pri pridobivanju plina in nafte iz škrilavcev v drugem desetletju enaindvajsetega stoletja spremenila odnos Washingtona do zunanje energetske politike in močno vplivala na mednarodne trge nafte in plina. Obdobje nenehno rastoče skrbi glede pridobivanja energetskih virov je tako nadomestila doba energetske obilnosti. V dobi energetske obilnosti v ZDA si je Trumpova administracija zastavila cilj, da ZDA postanejo energetsko dominantne. Zaradi tega je Trumpova administracija začela podpirati politične posege v kreacijo cen na naftnem trgu in odmik od multilateralizma, ki je poprej omogočal globalno konkurenco. Kljub temu, da so ZDA dosegle status največje svetovne proizvajalke nafte in plina, se zdi, da Washington še vedno ne odstopa od ciljev, ki jih tradicionalno zasleduje s svojo zunanjo energetsko politiko: zagotavljanje zalog na svetovnih naftnih trgih in zmanjševanje motenj pri dobavi ; spodbujanje zaveznikov, da diverzificirajo lastne energetske vire, kjer je bila Evropa v glavnem v središču prizadevanj ZDA ; in s svojo močjo kaznovati države izvoznice plina in nafte ter jim ukazati, naj spremenijo politike, z uporabo možnosti uvedbe sankcij. Uvajanje sankcij ima vse pomembnejšo vlogo v ameriški zunanji politiki, saj je vedno bolj vprašljivo, kdaj, in če sploh, uporabiti vojaško silo za politične cilje. Nova doba obilja energije ZDA omogoča, da k uvedbi sankcij pritegnejo tudi druge države ter jih tako skupaj lažje uvedejo koordinirajo. Po drugi strani pa je zelo verjetno, da bi odločitev ZDA, da izkoristijo svoj položaj energetskega dobavitelja in začnejo izvoz energije uporabljati v politične namene, lahko delovala proti njihovim lastnim interesom in zmožnosti doseganja njihovih zunanjepolitičnih ciljev. ZDA nikoli niso sodelovale v nobeni gospodarski organizaciji, ki bi omogočala prenos suverenosti glede energetske politike v roke neke nadnacionalne strukture in neofunkcionalizem v njihovi zunanji energetski politiki nima nobenega odmeva. Šesto poglavje, ki je posvečeno Rusiji, raziskuje, kako njena bogata baza energetskih virov zagotavlja davčno osnovo za državno porabo, devizne prihodke in vzvod (zlasti v primeru dobave plina) v mednarodnih odnosih. Zahvaljujoč visokim cenam nafte iz obdobja pred pandemijo COVID-19 je Rusiji uspelo obnoviti gospodarstvo in povečati svojo geopolitično trdnost. Zaradi izjemne odvisnosti od energetskih prihodkov za ruski državni proračun je neugodna kombinacija nizkih cen nafte in finančnih sankcij ZDA in EU skupaj z naraščajočo konkurenco v proizvodnji nafte in plina povzročila postopno zmanjševanje ruskega vpliva v mednarodni politiki. Rusija nima veliko možnosti, da bi v bližnji prihodnosti postala pomemben igralec na azijskih trgih. Tako se je država usmerila k širitvi in osvežitvi svojih energetskih vezi z Evropo. Kljub temu pa Moskva vzporedno s tem spodbuja svoj konkurenčni integracijski projekt Evroazijske ekonomske unije (EAEU), katerega namen je povsem nasproten cilju evropskih integracijskih projektov, po katerih se vsaj formalno zgleduje. S tem projektom želi Rusija, med drugim, v energetskem sektorju zaščiti svoj prevladujoči položaj v postsovjetskem prostoru. Kljub formalni podobnosti EAEU z EU tam ni mogoče pričakovati učinkov prelitja na nadnacionalni ravni v skladu s teorijo neofunkcionalizma, saj gre za združitev neenakopravnih partnerjev z močnim ruskim vodstvom, ki ne dovoljuje socializacije neke nove, nadnacionalne elite. Sedmo poglavje predstavlja kako je zaradi hitro rastočega gospodarstva in povečanega povpraševanja po energiji Kitajska povečevala vpliv na svetovnih energetskih trgih. Na energetsko politiko kitajske vlade je močno vplivalo vse večje povpraševanje po nafti in odvisnost države od uvoza le-te. Naftna in plinska industrija sta zaslužni za zagotavljanje oskrbe, za zadosten proračunski dohodek in tudi za delovna mesta. Kitajska državna podjetja skušajo svoje poslovanje prilagoditi svetovnim praksam, vendar je bil do sedaj njihov manevrski prostor vedno omejen z državnim nadzorom. Pod sedanjim vodstvom kitajska podjetja sodelujejo v mednarodnem prodoru z velikimi, neposrednimi naložbami. Prvi poskus takega prodora je bila iniciativa 16+1 (sedaj 17+1) [e pred sedanjim predsednikom Xi Jinpingom. Njegov prihod na oblast je sprožil še obsežnejšo iniciativo. Prosor v svetovnem merilu je bil pred kratkim zasnovan kot Iniciativa pasu in ceste (Belt and Road Initiative - BRI). Kljub temu, da v BRI sodeluje skoraj 70 držav, pomen iniciative ostaja nejasen. BRI zagotavlja zaščito kitajskih trgovskih poti in oskrbe z energijo ter omogoča državi, da svoje industrijske presežke in gradbene kapacitete učinkovito izvaža po vsem svetu. Z BRI kitajska zunanja politika prek gospodarske diplomacije poskuša povečati svoj vpliv. Ta projekt je treba razumeti kot dolgoročno, globalno iniciativo, ki nima samo gospodarskega cilja. BRI in iniciativa 17+1 sta še dve obliki mednarodnega sodelovanja, ki sta neprimerljivi s postopkom vključevanja v EU in v njiju zaradi dominantnosti Kitajske ni prelitja funkcij na nadnacionalno raven kot ga opisuje neofunkcionalistična teorija. ; In the study, I tried to explore how characteristics of energy supply in each of the four global superpowers (EU, US, Russian Federation, People's Republic of China) influences their foreign energy policy, which out of the three elements of energy policy (competitiveness, security of supply, sustainability) primarily reflects it and how and if different forms of foreign energy policy regional initiatives can be explained with the theory of neofunctionalism. The first chapter aims to present the neofunctionalist theory as a theory of regional integration. It first analyzes Jean Monnet's attempts for European integration, at that time illustrated by the European Communities: European Economic Community, Euratom and the European Steel and Coal Community. Later, it was further developed to be able to explain processes like territorial growth of a regional integrated area and also processes of its shrinking, i.e. Brexit. Neofunctionalism is a theory explaining the process of integration on a regional level with reference to growing reciprocal economic relationships in-between nations. It also analyzes capacity of a regional organization in dispute resolution and creation of international legal regimes, within which the supranational market rules may replace national regulatory regimes. It explains also integration by positive spillover effects as necessities to cooperate in sectors, which are indirectly related to the sector where regional cooperation first started. I briefly present also intergovernmentalism as an alternative theory. The first chapter also briefly presents 130 years of history of regulation to protect competiveness on energy markets, some 80 years of security of supply challenges and their translation into political decisions and some 70 years of history of creation of sustainability in modern energy policy. The second chapter presents the structure of energy supply and the market structure in each of the analyzed global superpowers. It is evident that energy markets (oil, gas, electricity) in the US and the EU are highly competitive and efficient. Both superpowers strive also towards sustainability and are constantly decreasing harmful emissions from fossil fuel power plants as well as transport and other energy consuming activities. While the EU is highly import dependent (in 2017 imported more than 55% of all energy sources), the United States in the last 15 years developed from the biggest importer of energy sources globally into a net exporter, reaching energy self-sufficiency in 2018. Russia has a net energy imports index at -84%. It is one of the biggest net exporters of oil (some 10% of global production) and gas (close to 20% of global production), according to data from 2014. In 2018, it exported almost the same amount of energy as was consumed in the country. Despite its energy abundance, Russia has heavily regulated and inefficient gas, oil and electricity markets. Among the four analyzed superpowers, it has far the least energy efficient use of its energy resources. The position of Gazprom, which enjoys a monopoly on pipeline gas exports to Russia's neighbors, has been increasingly challenged. Consequently, pressures on Moscow to reform its energy (particularly gas) sector have been rising. So far, the Russian government has shown reluctance with regard to implementing structural reforms in its energy sector and has rather been trying to adjust, react and adapt to created circumstances. China is slowly liberalizing its gas market. Reform that attracted new private investors into electricity generation in the 1990s has backslid. Gas, coal, electricity generation and oil sectors are primarily controlled by state-owned companies and do not allow much room for competition. China in 2017 consumed 22% of all energy sources globally and was by far the biggest energy consumer worldwide. China extracts and burns around half of all coal being extracted worldwide and is heavily unsustainable. Its harmful emissions from power plants remain high and stable, while CO2 emissions are in constant ascent. However, in recent years, the country has been focusing much more on services-based economy and renewable energy. Additionally, taking into account the combination of effects of factors like structural changes in the economy, growing efficiency within the energy industry and demographic changes, total growth of the energy demand up until the year of 2040 will be comparable to the one that China experienced from 2008 to 2016. Its net energy imports index is 15% and shows moderate dependence on import. The third chapter aims at analyzing the EU's emerging foreign energy policy in a global context of imperfect energy relations. Energy, being an increasingly politicized sector, still remains closely linked with state sovereignty and national interest. Consequently, Brussels's efforts to shape a coherent foreign energy policy, while sharing competences with the Member States and taking into account the carefully drafted compromise of article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, has proved to be increasingly challenging. Moreover, Europe, being highly dependent on foreign energy suppliers (among which Russia, with its contrasting vision of energy policy, plays the most important role) has been further undermining the EU's aspirations of introducing universal, market-based norms in global energy relations. Against this backdrop, the EU managed to make some achievements in its foreign energy policy, particularly, by the means of the European Economic Area and the Energy Community, which was a successful example of what Europe aspired to achieve globally. In recent years marked by the decreased role of multilateralism and the increased role of bilateral relations, also the EU introduced elements of dominance into its foreign energy policy despite opposition to such behavior when performed by other superpowers. The neofunctionalist theory explaining European integration by spillover effect has proven to be usable also in explaining processes of creation of EU foreign energy policy in the years from 2015 on and increased role and autonomy of the European Commission in it. The fourth chapter attempts to demonstrate that US energy policy has gone through multiple changes throughout history. While in the beginning of the twentieth century, the US pursued competitive access to energy sources to sustain the strong growth of its demand, after the Suez Canal crisis and the subsequent oil crisis in the mid-seventies, the US energy policy became centered on ensuring the security of supply. Since the mid-eighties, it became much more multi-sided, with growing concern about environmental issues, yet without detriment to the importance given to security of supply and competitiveness. While American energy policy throughout the twentieth century has been driven by fears of energy scarcity, the so-called unconventional revolution of the past decade changed Washington's attitude towards its foreign energy policy and also considerably impacted international oil and gas markets. An atmosphere of continuously growing competition for resources has, thus, been replaced by the age of energy abundance, where the Trump's US administration has set the objective of the United States becoming energy dominant, supporting political interventions into the creation of prices on the oil market and moving away from multilateralism, which enabled global competition. Despite the fact that the US achieved the status of being the biggest producer of oil and gas in the world, Washington does not seem to withdraw the objectives traditionally pursued by its foreign energy policy. Namely, ensuring supplies on the global oil markets and minimizing disruptions ; encouraging allies to diversify their own energy resources, where Europe has usually been the main focus of US efforts ; and using its power to punish countries and to command them to change policies, using the possibility of imposing sanctions on gas and oil exporting nations. With latest Biden's administration US seems to reposition its focus on sustainability and multilateral cooperation again. Despite that sanctions play increasingly important role in US foreign policy, since it is more and more questionable when and if at all to deploy military force. New energy abundant age enables the US to get on board other nations to collectively impose multilateral sanctions easier than in previous times. ON the other side it is very possible that US decision to become energy dominant and start using energy exports for political purposes could work against their interests and ability to achieve their objectives. The US never participated in any economic organization that would tend to transfer sovereignty over energy policy to a supranational structure. The fifth chapter dealing with Russia explores how its vast energy resource base provides the fiscal basis for state spending, foreign exchange earnings, and leverage (especially for gas) in international relations. Thanks to the high oil prices of the pre COVID-19 pandemic decade, Russia managed to recover its economy and increase its geopolitical assertiveness. Nevertheless, due to its extreme dependence on energy revenues, following the unfavorable combination of low oil prices, financial sanctions of the West combined with the rising competition in production resulted in Russia's gradually diminishing economic leverage. Russia, with unlikely prospects to become a prominent player in Asian markets in the foreseeable future, has turned to expanding and refreshing its energy ties with Europe. Yet, in parallel, Moscow has been pushing forward its competing integrationist project of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which aims to conflict and overlap with the European integrationist projects, inter alia, in the sector of energy in order to safeguard its dominant position in the post-Soviet space. Despite the formal similarity of the EAEU with the EU, there is no spillover effect since it is an association of unequal partners with strong Russian leadership. Country's fast-growing economy and rapid increase in energy demand has lead China to gain more influence in global energy markets. The energy policy of the Chinese government has been strongly influenced by the increasing demand for oil and country's dependence on oil imports. The oil and gas industry has remained a strategic asset for the Chinese government. This industry is responsible for ensuring supplies of oil and gas, for sufficient budget income as well as for employment. With closer integration into global markets, Chinese state-owned companies have been seeking to adapt their operations to global practices, yet, the room for maneuver has always been limited by state control. Under the present leadership, Chinese companies have been engaged in large-scale outward direct investments. This process was recently soon packed as a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The fact that nearly 70 countries are participating in the BRI does not improve the perception that its label remains unclear. There is still no exact definition of the qualification of a BRI project Yet, half a decade after the launch of one of the most ambitious geo-economic projects of recent history, some more things became clearer. To name a few, BRI is not only responsible for securing China's trade routes and energy supplies, it is also accountable for the fact, that the country is being able to export worldwide several construction projects due to its industrial overcapacities. The BRI became a major component of China's grandiose foreign policy agenda aimed at increasing Chinese influence in the BRI region and beyond. The past years have proven that the BRI project is to be understood as a long-term, global and not having only an economic goal. Yet, challenges regarding to the future success of the BRI are many and of different nature: technical, political, financial and regulatory, to name a few. Both suspicion and skepticism concerning its real motives and viability remain high, especially among those countries who have been the main designers of today's global financial system and international trade rules. The Belt and Road Initiative is yet another form of international cooperation which is incomparable with the EU integration process and neofunctionalist theory cannot be used for its explanation. The thesis confirmed that characteristics of energy supply in a country are directly and with the same attitude reflected in the foreign energy policy. Foreign energy policy is additionally held up by whichever tool of dominance being available to one of the four studied cases. The thesis also confirmed that Haas' theory of neofunctionalism is still supportive in explanation of regional integration of all initiatives proposed in and by the four global superpowers. EU is creating its own foreign energy policy entering externalization as the last, fourth stage of regional cooperation, according to Nye.

ALL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS DO NOT AGREE ON THE PROPER DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY, BUT FOUR CRITERIA HAVE BEEN ADDUCED AS THE MEASURES OF A TRULY DEMOCRATIC REGIME: POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, POLITICAL EQUALITY, POPULAR CONSULTATION, AND MAJORITY RULE.2 ALL GOVERNMENTS CAN BE JUDGED ON THEIR RELATIVE AMOUNTS OF EACH OF THESE CHARACTERISTICS. USING THESE STANDARDS, AS LONG AS ANY GROUPING IN A SOCIETY IS DENIED EQUAL PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION, THAT SOCIETY FAILS TO MEASURE UP AS A DEMOCRACY. CLEARLY, THE UNDERREPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN POLITICAL OFFICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER NATIONS AS WELL CALLS INTO QUESTION THE VERY BASIS OF THEIR CLAIMS TO BE DEMOCRATIC REGIMES. WOMEN FOUGHT HARD TO ACHIEVE THE VERY FOUNDATION OF PARTICIPATION, THE RIGHT TO VOTE. NOW MORE THAN 60 YEARS FOLLOWING THE GRANT OF FEMALE SUFFRAGE, THEY REMAIN DISTINCTLY A MINORITY IN THE HALLS OF GOVERNMENT, BEING ONLY 2 PERCENT OF THE U.S. SENATE, 4 PERCENT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 14 PERCENT OF STATE LEGISLATURES, AND 20 PERCENT OF CITY COUNCILS IN LARGE URBAN AREAS.3 FOLLOWING THE ADVENT OF THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT IN THE 1960S AND 1970S, ACTIVISTS AND SCHOLARS ALIKE HAVE DEMONSTRATED SIGNIFICANT INTEREST IN THE CAUSES OF THE LOW LEVELS OF FEMALE PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. SEVERAL EXPLANATIONS HAVE BEEN OFFERED AND MANY STUDIES HAVE LOOKED AT THE IMPACT OF SUCH FACTORS AS SEX-ROLE SPECIALIZATION, SOCIALIZATION, THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF CHILD BEARING AND REARING, THE LOW LEVEL OF POLITIPY: 1984

George W. Bush certainly did not expect to be a war president. In his private sector career and as Governor of Texas he had seldom traveled abroad, and he did not demonstrate much interest in international affairs. In his campaign for the presidency he expressed skepticism about foreign entanglements and a disdain for "nation building." Yet events conspired to make war the central concern of his presidency; after the terrorist attack on the United States in September 2001, Bush saw the war on terrorism as the primary mission of his presidency. "I'm here for a reason, and this [the war on terrorism] is going to be how we're to be judged."1 Soon thereafter he decided that the U.S. should conduct a campaign for regime change in Iraq, by military means, if necessary.

You will be aware from our discussions at the EU-U.S. summit in Washington in June and from your meetings during the recent G7 in Lyons of the deep and widespread concern in Europe over the potential application of the Helms Burton legislation to European companies. As you know, the EU and the United States share the same common desire to promote democracy, respect for human rights and market economics in Cuba. The European Council meeting in Florence in June has regretted that political circumstances in Cuba have not allowed progress to be made. However, the European Council also expressed its deep concern over the extraterritorial effects of the "Cuban Liberty and Solidarity (Libertad) Act" and believes that such action taken against partners and allies does nothing to further these objectives in Cuba.

Does a young person commit suicide every thirteen minutes in the United States? Are four million women really battered to death by their husbands or boyfriends each year? Is methamphetamine our number one drug problem today? Alarming statistics bombard our daily lives, appearing in the news, on the Web, seemingly everywhere. But all too often, even the most respected publications present numbers that are miscalculated, misinterpreted, hyped, or simply misleading. This new edition contains revised benchmark statistics, updated resources, and a new section on the rhetorical uses of statistics, complete with new problems to be spotted and new examples illustrating those problems. Joel Best's best seller exposes questionable uses of statistics and guides the reader toward becoming a more critical, savvy consumer of news, information, and data. Entertaining, informative, and concise, Stat-Spotting takes a commonsense approach to understanding data and doesn't require advanced math or statistics