Suchergebnisse

he modern doctrine of sovereignty is derived basically from two thoughts of development which emerged during the end of Indian medieval history. On the one side there was an emergence of new National States which are curious enough to assert their absolute independence during the new age of economic expansion by rejecting the feudal notions including exaggerated lordship or papal interference and on the other side, the departure from medieval idea of law based on fundamental customs and legislations as a form of declaring the existence of new customs.

The Jurisprudential theory of Jeremy Bentham, though have been considered way too old, especially in the socialist countries the Theory of Utility, might have been disregarded as unacceptable on the grounds that only the thoughts about pain and pleasure might not be the sole interest of the country. The country's welfare might not be measured in the quantum of happiness to majority and grief and pain to minorities. However, it cannot be totally waived and be done away with. For how can social welfare legislations be not measured on the quantum of maximum pleasure and minimum pain? The essence of Bentham's theory and his philosophy is retained by the world even in today's modern day legislation. It is human nature to take a step forward when he can measure the risk and the gain of that direction. Thereby the modern day man is much more a hedonistic calculus. This research aims at reflecting the various juncture whereby the modern day legislations, directives, judgments and policies draw their essence from the Theory of Utility.

The thesis of this book is to develop a theory of value covering all kinds of values, based on my unified utilitarian theory. It is unique and is different from all traditional and existing theories of value. Like the views of most psychologists and decision-scientists, value is asserted to be subjective in nature because value exists only for a subject. Value and value judgment are considered statistical in nature in three dimensions, namely in the dimensions of subject, object, and judge. This theory covers a modified von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory as an integral part. The three conceptions of utility held by philosophers, economicsts, and decision-scientists are unified. The traditional and conventional classification of value into intrinsic and instrumental, which may lead to confusion, misunderstanding, and circularity, is not used. Instead, a classification based on the classification of good things in life according to the principle of exchangeability and replaceability is emphasized and used. A decision-theoretic approach is taken for the study of actions in life. All the actions in a person's life are for the pursuit of values, and all the values pursued are related, directly or indirectly, closely or remotely, to a life plan. Thus, this utilitarian general theory of value eventually leads to a philosophy of life, which is also consequential, teleological, and utilitarian

D.G. Brown's revisionist interpretation, despite its interest, misrepresents Mill's moral theory as outlined in Utilitarianism . Mill's utilitarianism is extraordinary because it explicitly aims to maximize general happiness both in point of quality and quantity. It encompasses spheres of life beyond morality, and its structure cannot be understood without clarification of his much-maligned doctrine that some kinds of pleasant feelings are qualitatively superior to others irrespective of quantity. This doctrine of higher pleasures establishes an order of precedence among conflicting kinds of enjoyments, including moral as well as non-moral kinds. In particular, as he indicates in Utilitarianism, Chapter V, the higher kind of pleasure associated with the moral sentiment of justice, namely, a feeling of 'security' for vital personal concerns that everyone has and that ought to be recognized as equal rights, is qualitatively superior to any competing kinds of pleasures regardless of quantity. Justice (more generally, morality) is conceived as a social system of rules and dispositions which has as its ultimate end the maximization of this pleasant feeling of security for everyone. The upshot is that an optimal social code that distributes and sanctions particular equal rights and correlative duties has absolute priority over competing considerations within his utilitarianism. The code seeks to prevent conduct that, in the judgment of suitably competent majorities, causes grievous kinds of harm to other people by injuring their vital personal concerns. To prevent the acts and omissions which are judged to cause such undue harm, the code assigns equal duties not to perform them, and authorizes due punishment of anyone who fails to fulfill his duties. Punishment is always expedient to condemn and deter wrongdoing. But it is properly a separate issue which particular ways of inflicting punishment are expedient in any particular situation. Given that feelings of guilt are a way of inflicting punishment, coercion is not necessary for punishment. Thus, Mill's claim that wrongdoing always deserves to be punished in some way does not imply that coercive legal sanctions and public stigma are always expedient for the enforcement of moral duties.