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The aim of this article is to discuss how a weakening transatlantic relationship influences European defence cooperation and integration. It also asks how these observed patterns of weakening EU–US relations can be explained and what the consequences might be for the EU's efforts to build a stronger and more coherent security and defence policy. Building upon a "comprehensive neo-functionalist" approach first coined by the Norwegian scholar Martin Sæter, European security and defence policy should be seen as part of an externalisation of EU integration as a response to weakening transatlantic relations. The debate on European "strategic autonomy," the Strategic Compass, and the European "defence package" should therefore be considered as part of such an externalisation process of actively influencing and reshaping the transatlantic relationship. When analysing European security and defence, the article also shows that it is misleading to regard European integration as something to be subordinated to NATO. Nevertheless, a European security deficit does exist due to differing perspectives among member states on how the EU process should relate to NATO. The article, therefore, concludes that strategic autonomy can only be developed with close EU–NATO cooperation. Furthermore, a more multipolar world order where the EU no longer can rely upon a transatlantic security community to the same extent as before challenges the EU's role as a defender of multilateralism and poses new challenges to the EU's common foreign and security policy. ; publishedVersion

When, where, and why does Russia issue warnings about missile launches and other potentially dangerous military activities in international waters and airspace west and north of Norway? Drawing on information derived from a series of Russian "Notices to Airmen" (NOTAMs), this article examines the pattern of Russia's live-fire air and naval exercises in and over the Norwegian and Barents Seas between January 2015 and December 2021. It discusses factors that may explain the extent and nature of Russia's military muscle-flexing in the region. The study suggests that a number of the Russian exercises and missile launches, particularly in areas adjacent to Norway's west coast, were primarily meant to obstruct Norwegian/NATO exercises such as the Trident Juncture exercise of 2018. On a number of occasions, Russia's NOTAM warnings appear to have been tailored for the purpose of intimidating Norway and its allies and communicating Russia's displeasure with the occasional presence of United States and other NATO forces on or outside Norway's territory. ; Military Muscle-Flexing as Interstate Communication: Russian NOTAM Warnings off the Coast of Norway, 2015–2021 ; publishedVersion

For Norway, the Arctic is an integral part of the country in terms of both economic development and security considerations. Since 2005, consecutive governments in Oslo have made use of this fact, in combination with international attention given to the north, to foster a High North policy framed around regional economic development, climate issues and international cooperation (especially vis-à-vis Russia). However, over the last few years, challenges have emerged. Focusing on the foreign and security policy aspects of Norway's Arctic approach, this article defines Norway's Northern engagement and how this engagement has evolved since 2005. Then, the challenges currently facing Norway in the domain of foreign and security policy are discussed in terms of the new Arctic policy document released in late-2020. These challenges are broadly surmised as relating to Russia's military posture and the use of the Arctic as an arena for a China–US tug of war. ; publishedVersion

The essence of security is the protection of life and property both of which are important to human beings. However, without life or well-being of humans, property is useless. Human security involves the protection of human lives to enable people to enjoy freedom and fulfil their dreams. This study attempts to ascertain the dimensions of the socio-economic and political marginalisation experienced by different regions in South Sudan thereby explaining how this could have increased the threats to human security and reduced human development of the country. The study employs quantitative research methods by engaging in the analysis of two secondary datasets collected during the South Sudan household health survey in 2006 and 2010 in order to find out if the people of South Sudan are marginalized across regions/states/ethnic groups through the distribution of socio-economic welfare services like education and healthcare services. In addition, the study seeks to identify the dimensions of the threat to human security experienced by South Sudanese due to violent conflicts and the sources of threats to food security experienced by the people. Having agreed with the commission on human security's idea that human security is the protection of the vital core of all human lives, the study explains marginalisation through the theoretical framework of marginality. Thus, it establishes that South Sudanese, since their days with their Northern counterparts have been experiencing systemic marginality which thrived on positional polarity created by the British colonialists. More so, the study finds that despite their independence, South Sudanese continuously suffer systemic marginality as well as constant threat to their human (in the dimension of economic, food, health, personal and political) security caused by unequal distribution of socio-economic welfare services and continuous violent conflict. ; submittedVersion ; M-DS

The advantages that some military establishments have enjoyed in the remote Arctic region are diminishing. The military secrets of the Arctic Ocean are being progressively uncloaked, as civilian polar research expands into areas previously known only to a few. This study examines the security ramifications of broadened international research into what has been the most inhospitable and exclusive operational area on Earth. Firstly, the study argues that successful military operations in the Arctic depend on extended knowledge about area-specific issues related to e.g. the upper atmosphere and magnetosphere, weather, sea ice, ocean structure and dynamics, seafloor bathymetry and sediments, as well as reliable target detection systems. Secondly, it finds that a number of nations, both Arctic and non-Arctic, have stepped up their polar research in recent years. Secrets once held by a few are now accessible to many through international cooperation, data-sharing and open-access publishing. Finally, the study concludes that knowledge proliferation is likely to level the Arctic battlefield. Lending terms from Mica Endsley's three-level Situation Awareness model, polar research will result in increasingly shared perceptions about the Arctic operational environment, contribute to a more uniform comprehension of the elements, and even enable new actors to project a future state of the Arctic environment. ; publishedVersion

In 2014, the relationship between the European Union (EU) and Russia turned from cooperation to conflict. The backdrop of this stalemate was the Russian annexation of Crimea, which the EU responded to by implementing sanctions. While both scholars and politicians doubted that the EU would be able to implement such restrictive measures, a normalization of relations has yet to establish. This thesis sets out to examine how this policy can be understood as a security concern and how it has been made possible through discursive framing. Embedded in this inquiry is an interest in how we can understand the EU as a global actor in 2017. These questions guide this thesis and its objective of providing a more comprehensive understanding of the sanctions policy. Arguing that sanctions is about more than physical deterrence, ontological security theory is applied as the theoretical framework. To examine how we can understand ontological security concerns as an integral part of the sanctions policy, a discourse analysis is undertaken of the official EU response in 2014. Within the sanctions discourse, a principled and a pragmatic representation is observed. These representations open for different interpretations of both the Self and the Other, and thus make possible different policies towards Russia. In 2014, the principled representation attained dominance within the discourse. While the pragmatic representation remained to be sub-ordinate within the discourse in 2014, it has gained legitimacy as the sanctions policy struggled to materialize as a political success. Symbolic of this, is the release of the new European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) which argues towards a more geopolitical EU. As such, a more pragmatic approach to relations with Russia has gained legitimacy since 2014. But, a discursive leap from principles to pragmatism is not unproblematic. As this analysis will argue, questions of time cannot be separated from ontological security concerns. ; M-IR

This study examines the work of non-state crisis centres for women in Northwest Russia by asking "How do non-state crisis centres for women in Northwest Russia produce security?" The work of Pierre Bourdieu contributes to an analytical approach that illustrates security practices in regard to this context. On the basis of interviews conducted with crisis centre representatives, Moscow-based national women's groups and Norwegian collaborators in Northern crisis centre work, this analytical approach is used to explain the dynamics of the local security production. Three thinking tools in Bourdieu's work, field, capital and habitus are used in this study. The concept of field defines an analytical framework characterized by the relations between the crisis centres and local stakeholders as well as between the crisis centres and their clients. The concepts of capital and habitus depict the objective constraints and subjective aspects relevant to the local security production. In result the study illustrates that crisis centres in Northwest Russia manoeuvre in the field on the basis of their social capital. This implies in this context that security production is ad hoc and personalized. Most centres do not offer a physical shelter but nonetheless provide a discursive space and an information hub for victims' process of re-describing self and thus recreating a situation of security. This novel analytical approach to examining local security practices and the work of non-state crisis centres displays a de-militarized understanding of security. This conceptualization of security reflects human security and its concern with people-centred security. A weakness in human security research however concerns empirical study, and this is addressed in this case study of non-state crisis centres in Northwest Russia. The study contributes by making visible ongoing practices of security production that define people's security reality and thereby challenges pre-conceived conceptions of security and its connection to the use of military force.

Master's thesis in Political science and management (ME502) ; For a long time,theEuropean Union's(EU) member states have meticulously ring-fenced defence cooperation vis-à-vis the potential intrusion of supranationalism. Thus, defence cooperation has been conceived as perhaps the most central part of core state powers in Europe. Has this changed since member states have agreed to establish the so-called Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017? Cleary, PESCO has developed bothas a more structuredand legally 'binding'cooperation in defence mattersamongst participating member states, such as defence procurement, training and capability development.Yet, the jury is out for as to whether there are 'more' supranational principles enshrined in policies, governance rules, decision-making and day-to-day practices, or whether intergovernmentalism with its emphasis on the sovereign (member) state calls the tone in EU defence. Asa facilitatorfor cooperation, the PESCOSecretariathas been established in order tofunction as a focal point of communication and overall support atthe interface of EU 'bodies', such asthe European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), and the participating member states.

Master's thesis Public Policy and Management ME502 - University of Agder 2019 ; This thesis examinesthe EU foreign policy agenda-setting with regards to the drafting of the Union'snew Central Asia strategy. The EU Strategy for Central Asia was eventually released May 2019.The thesis adopts the analytical framework of Europeanization and seeks to explainthe coordination between the EU institutions on the one hand and howmember states influence EU foreign policy strategy-makingon the other.Analytically,the Europeanization framework subscribes to exploringthe EU's impact on member states ('down-loading')andthe capacity of member states to shape the direction of the EU('up-loading'). The down-loading dimension includesthe coordination of the EU institutions, the EU delegations in Central Asia and the headquarters in Brussels(EEAS and the Commission), as the degree of centralization in these processes affect EU's abilities of influencing the member states. The up-loading dimension examines small member state literature, and by that looks at the differencesbetween small and larger member states when it comes to influencingEU's agenda in these types of processes. Thus the research question is: Who sets the agenda for the making of EU foreign policy in the context of EU drafting its new Central Asia strategy? And how can we explain this pattern? This thesis addressesthesequestions by examiningtwo propositions: 1)The EU headquarters play the leading role in EU foreign policy strategy-making, while the EU delegations contribute with on the ground support and coordination as per instructed by the headquarters.2)Smaller member states exercise a disproportionately strong influence in the formulation of EU foreign policy strategy-making.These questions are discussed based on empirical findings from 29 semi-structed interviews which have been conductedin three Central Asian capitals(16), Brussels (12) as well as on Skype (1). This thesis shows that EU foreign policy-making has become fairly 'normal' with a centralized agenda-setting and where the influence by the member states comes mainly from the member states with the resources to do so. By combining the two dimensions of down-loading and up-loading in the Europeanization literature this thesis contribute to a more comprehensive way of studying EU foreign policy-making.

State-building is a popular approach to help states out of state weakness and state failure. Yet, state-building efforts have a long way to go to achieve desirable results. Reasons for inadequate state-building success have been discussed and assessed by many scholars before me. Commonly, lack of success is blamed on deeply embedded traditional structures, patronage politics and persistent insurgency. Fragile and Conflict Affected States (FCASs), where state-building measures are adopted, generally suffer from various internal problems, such as high levels of poverty, violent conflicts, derailed economies and widespread illiteracy. Conducting state-building in FCASs is therefore a difficult task. In Afghanistan, different state-building efforts by various national and international actors have been conducted for nearly two decades, yet Afghanistan still suffers from high levels of insurgency, weak democratic institutions and a weak economy. Through a case study of state-building efforts in Afghanistan, this research explores what impact Afghanistan´s local context has had on state-building efforts. Moreover, the study analyses how different stakeholders contributes to state-building and to what extent they acknowledge local context when carrying out certain state-building efforts. The thesis reveals that state-building efforts in Afghanistan have not been tailored adequately to the local context, and that this has constrained state-building´s success. Deeply embedded traditional structures and forms for governance have been a major challenge to the goals envisioned by state-building policies. The thesis explains then how future state-building policies can benefit from using local context as a starting point and discusses whether traditional structures and patronage politics can be used as an asset in state-building efforts. ; submittedVersion ; M-IR

Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, severe limitations have been placed on Ukraine's coastal state rights and navigational freedoms in the Black and Azov Seas and the Kerch Strait. The "Kerch Strait clash" in November 2018, which resulted in the Russian capture of three Ukrainian naval vessels in international waters south of the strait, can be seen as the temporary culmination of tensions that have been building up over a longer period. In violation of international law and bilateral agreements, Russia has in recent years pursued an increasingly assertive and revisionist policy in the region and sought to turn the maritime spaces on the country's southwestern flank into a "Russian lake". This policy is affecting not only the security and economy of neighbouring states such as Ukraine and Georgia, but also the strategic balance in the southeastern corner of Europe. Drawing on empirical evidence derived from Russian, Ukrainian and Western sources, as well as insights from neoclassical realist theory, this article discusses legal, economic and security aspects of Russia's ongoing quest for a dominant position in the Black Sea region. ; publishedVersion ; Unit License Agreement

This thesis seeks to engage with the contested explanations as to why and how the Barotseland question keeps on re-emerging in Zambia while a peaceful solution remains elusive. It does so by analysing factors which account for its continuity since 1964 when the Barotseland Agreement, which unified two separate entities, namely Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia (thereby creating a unitary state called Zambia) was ratified but only to be prematurely and unilaterally terminated by the government in 1967. Over the years, Barotseland's traditional elites have presented several petitions to the state to have the agreement restored, but the futility of a peaceful settlement continues to loom large, sparking separatist demands. Therefore, chapter one establishes how the Barotseland question invokes IR's highly contested notion of state sovereignty since it challenges the very conventional interpretation of Zambia's postcolonial state sovereignty. The second chapter historicises the Barotseland question by tracing its origin as well as mapping actors involved in the conflict. It also highlights the trajectories in time and space pertaining to the region's quest for sovereignty, emanating from its precolonial autonomous status which apparently was enshrined in the 1964 agreement which was abrogated. Chapter three theorises state sovereignty by examining how the domestication of its problematic international norms or principles singled out by recent scholarship impedes rather than bolsters separatist movements. Notwithstanding the theoretical underpinnings of sovereignty as regards to the debate about redrawing Africa's bizarre borders or maintaining the status quo, chapter three investigates the literature on the Barotseland question in order to determine the extent to which alternative explanations beyond the modernist arguments about separatism need to be reconsidered. In so doing, Barotseland's sovereignty perils are discussed in the context of the region's peripheral outlook alongside politics of neopatrimonialism and state patronage, all of which instrumentalise the continuity of the Barotseland question. The findings and analytical discussion in chapters four and five respectively justify the argument presented in chapter one. By its nature, the Barotseland question is simply separatism as an alias (rather, a political necessity) premised on Zambia's juridical statehood which lends for Barotseland's political elites' in-group domination and contradictory national logic of resource appropriation for personal gain. Generally, this situation engenders the reproduction of the Zambian state and thus far negates its disintegration as promulgated by separatist groups who are seeking to free Barotseland. The thesis climaxes with concluding remarks which highlight among other issues practical recommendations with academic implications uncovered in the conclusion. ; M-IES

Along 188 years Peru and Ecuador maintained an open dispute over their shared border line. A Conflict that started in 19th century based on Independency theories over South-American boundaries had its end in 1998 through a peaceful process of conflict resolution. The peace process was influenced by International Relation theories and ideas such as international regimes, globalization, integration, cooperation, social development and political regional traditions. The conflict resolution process did not focus only in bringing peace by settling the border line between Peru and Ecuador, but it focused instead on the creation of an international regime between Peru and Ecuador to proportionate binational/and regional social and economic development, economic integration, and political cooperation. The conflict resolution process was successful and it highlighted a new era for South-America International Relations.

An extensive body of research documents how governing parties generally suffer electoral defeats. Varying explanations have been offered, most of which touch upon the liabilities of policy responsibility. Although media coverage is generally acknowledged as one of these liabilities, few empirical studies have examined how news content affect government support. Based on the fact that voters get their information about politics, policies and societal issues from the media, this article studies how the constant stream of negative news influences incumbent support over a 20‐year period in Denmark. Modeling a previously untested argument on the cost of ruling, it shows that the accumulation of bad news throughout tenure exerts a substantial effect on government support. ; publishedVersion

In Nigeria, the threat posed by climate change is leading policymakers and the media to frame climate change as a security threat that warrants support for adaptive actions. We draw upon securitization theory to examine how security narratives affect climate change adaptation. Using primary and secondary data, we find that although securitization arguments are easily identified in climate change policies and action plans in Nigeria, the implications of securitization for adaptation policy and practice are harder to discern. We find that adaptation is not as urgent a policy as would be expected from the logic of securitization. The transformation of security framing into urgent adaptation actions appears difficult because there are no urgent adaptation measures. We also find that people's level of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change is a function of deeper socio-political dynamics and processes that defy the political theatre of securitization. ; publishedVersion