Suchergebnisse

Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Transaction Introduction -- Preface -- 1 The Instability of Knowledge and Belief -- 2 The Stability of Law and Custom -- 3 The State of the Industrial Arts -- 4 Free Income -- 5 The Vested Interests -- 6 The Divine Right of Nations -- 7 Live and Let Live -- 8 The Vested Interests and the Common Man

Earlier attempts to overhaul the funding of education foundered in the face opposition from vested interests. Lawrence Norcross, Headmaster of Highbury Grove School in North London, warns that the educators will themselves require education if change is to be effective.

This book, first published in 1942, covers the whole field of wartime life and organization. Is the private ownership and control of industry holding up production? Are the burdens of war being shared equally by the whole community? How can individual liberty be reconciled with maximum efficiency? Are women taking their rightful share in the national effort? Does our literature and art reflect the spirit of an aroused and determined people? Have we a message which will win the oppressed peoples of Europe to our side? These questions are frankly discussed and positive suggestions are made.

With this inquiry I shall seek to establish that Thorstein Veblen advanced theories which related the vested interests with power. To accomplish this I shall first dissect the meanings behind Veblen's definitions of "the vested interest", "intangible assets" and "free income." I then, using the previous analysis relate the state to vested interests and solidify their collective unity. After this connection I proceed onto analyzing the implications of the vested interest and how it relates to the common man. Power, normally analyzed within the context of political science is rarely spoken of within economics, this analysis strives to bring the idea of power into the realm of economics through Thorstein Veblen's work, The Vested Interest and the Common Man [1919].

AbstractVested interests have been blamed for resisting the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. Yet, various interest groups have heterogeneous interests in privatization. Using both firm- and provincial-level data, we find that SOE managers and local bureaucrats—two key players of privatization—have contingent, rather than vested, interests in privatization, depending partly on their political connections with the central government. On the one hand, political connections motivate SOE managers to privatize more state ownership while retaining managerial control. On the other hand, central connections discourage provincial leaders from using privatization to boost their economic performance. These results shed light on the conditions under which China implements its economic reforms. With the increasing embeddedness and declining autonomy for policymakers, the once well-performing developmental state models now face serious challenges as politically powerful interest groups can manipulate economic reforms for their own purposes rather than for structural transformation.