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Drawing upon experiences with legislatively dominated government at the state and national levels in the post-Revolution period, the Founders granted the president the power to veto bills passed by Congress. An analysis of all vetoes cast by modern presidents in office from 1933 to 1981, beginning with Franklin Roosevelt and ending with Jimmy Carter, indicates that Roosevelt used the power most frequently. If, however, one focuses on public bills of national significance and takes into account the number of years each of these presidents served, Gerald Ford was the most significant vetoer of the period. Harry Truman vetoed more major bills than any of the other modern presidents and was also overridden most frequently by Congress on such bills. Most vetoed bills are eventually passed and signed by the president in a different form. The president can also affect legislation by threatening to veto proposed bills: such action may prevent their passage at all or may influence Congress to put them in a form that is acceptable to him.

Current use of the item veto power in Washington fails to check legislative spending and encourages gubernatorial encroachment on the legislative appropriations process. This Comment examines the history of the item veto and suggests reforms that would permit use of the item veto power to achieve cost savings while minimizing separation of powers violations.

Jonathan B. Slapin traces the historical development of the veto privilege in the EU and how a veto— or veto threat— has been employed in treaty negotiations of the past two decades. As he explains, the importance of veto power in treaty negotiations is one of the features that distinguishes the EU from other international organizations in which exit and expulsion threats play a greater role. At the same time, the prominence of veto power means that bargaining in the EU looks more like bargaining in a federal system. Slapin's findings have significant ramifications for the study of international negotiations, the design of international organizations, and European integration.

Jonathan B. Slapin traces the historical development of the veto privilege in the EU and how a veto— or veto threat— has been employed in treaty negotiations of the past two decades. As he explains, the importance of veto power in treaty negotiations is one of the features that distinguishes the EU from other international organizations in which exit and expulsion threats play a greater role. At the same time, the prominence of veto power means that bargaining in the EU looks more like bargaining in a federal system. Slapin's findings have significant ramifications for the study of international negotiations, the design of international organizations, and European integration.

The term "veto" has been traced from the power of the tribune of the plebs in ancient Rome to annul or suspend the acts of other public authorities. From the establishment of the Roman tribune, that official had the right of intercession (intercessio), to cancel any command of a consul which infringed the liberties of a citizen; and this was gradually extended to other administrative acts and even to decrees of the senate. The word veto (I forbid) was at least occasionally used by the tribune in such cases.But historically what is called the veto power of American executives is derived from the legislative power of the British Crown. Until the fifteenth century statutes in England were enacted by the king on his own initiative or in response to petitions. From that time parliament presented bills in place of petitions; and statutes were enacted by the king "by and with the advice and consent of the lords …. and the commons …. and by the authority of the same." The king's assent was still necessary; and without this assent a bill was not law. For two hundred years the Crown continued to exercise the negative power of declining to accept bills, not by any formal act of disapproval, but by the polite response in old Norman French, "le roy s'avisera." Since the beginning of the eighteenth century no bill which has passed parliament has failed to receive the royal assent; but the old form of enacting laws is still in use.

'POCKET VETO', ITS CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS, AND ITS USE BY RICHARD NIXON ARE EXAMINED IN THIS ESSAY. THE CASE STUDY ATTEMPTS TO ILLUSTRATE THE POTENTIAL FOR ANACHRONISMS TO EXIST IN WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE INCREASED ROLE PLAYED BY THE COURTS IN ADJUDICATING EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE DISPUTES IN THE US. A RECOMMENDATION FOR CLARIFYING THE PROPER USE OF THE POCKET VETO IS PRESENTED.