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Social norms and intrinsic motivations lead to voluntary environmentally responsible behaviour even in the absence of environmental policy. The paper shows that the introduction of environmental policy may lead to a reduction of voluntary abatement and sometimes may increase emissions and environmental damage. The explanation is that voluntary abatement is socially rewarded and the reward depends on the general attitude of society towards voluntary abatement. So, if the government tightens environmental standards, the voluntary component of abatement is reduced and the social reward is negatively affected. Some considerations concerning optimal environmental policies are discussed towards the end of the paper.

Social norms and intrinsic motivations lead to voluntary environmentally responsible behaviour even in the absence of environmental policy. The paper shows that the introduction of environmental policy may lead to a reduction of voluntary abatement and sometimes may increase emissions and environmental damage. The explanation is that voluntary abatement is socially rewarded and the reward depends on the general attitude of society towards voluntary abatement. So, if the government tightens environmental standards, the voluntary component of abatement is reduced and the social reward is negatively affected. Some considerations concerning optimal environmental policies are discussed towards the end of the paper.

Social norms and intrinsic motivations lead to voluntary environmentally responsible behaviour even in the absence of environmental policy. The paper shows that the introduction of environmental policy may lead to a reduction of voluntary abatement and sometimes may increase emissions and environmental damage. The explanation is that voluntary abatement is socially rewarded and the reward depends on the general attitude of society towards voluntary abatement. So, if the government tightens environmental standards, the voluntary component of abatement is reduced and the social reward is negatively affected. Some considerations concerning optimal environmental policies are discussed towards the end of the paper.

Afforestation and reforestation (AR) is an important component of China's Greenhouse Gases (GHG) Voluntary Emission Reduction Program, acting as a valuable nationwide carbon sink. Although a number of studies have explored the costs of creating a carbon sink, such an assessment is lacking for China's GHG Voluntary Emissions Reduction Program. This study develops an economic carbon sink costs measurement model for the Pinus elliottii afforestation project, based on the land opportunity cost method, which incorporates carbon sink transaction costs and leakage costs. From this, an empirical analysis on the carbon sink costs and its sensitivity factors was conducted. The results show that, firstly, the carbon sequestration costs of afforestation projects are generally high, ranging from 44.2 Yuan/tCO2e to 425.4 Yuan/tCO2e with and without considering the benefits of wood, respectively. This is higher than the current average carbon sink price of 20 Yuan/tCO2e. Secondly, forestry carbon sink transaction costs have a positive impact on carbon sequestration costs, but the impact is weak. Thirdly, carbon sequestration costs are negatively affected by timber prices but positively influenced by increasing labor prices and discount rate, which is not conductive to the development of carbon sink afforestation projects. In order to strengthen role of forestry in combating climate change, the study holds that the government departments should take measures to reduce carbon sink transaction costs, establish and improve the forestry carbon sink compensation mechanism in the future, and encourage wood-processing companies to make technological innovations to produce and sell durable wood products. The project owners can explore multiple operating models to increase their revenue, including market and non-market benefits, when the carbon sink afforestation project has been launched according to relevant methodologies.

Abstract
Environmental regulation and pollution control may clash against the presence of unverifiable tasks, like source-specific emissions. To tackle this issue, we reshape a voluntary agreement instrument, already available in the existing literature, from a dynamic perspective by means of a relational contracting approach. We define a Relational Voluntary Environmental Agreement (RVEA) in an N firms symmetric context, and show that even if emissions are not contractible across firms, and therefore enforcement cannot be delegated to a third party, if firms are sufficiently patient, a self-enforcing RVEA induces the achievement of the environmental objective. Finally, our welfare analysis reveals a notable result: our RVEA can imply less free riding and be welfare-improving with respect to a Voluntary Environmental Agreement enforced by a third party (along the lines of McEvoy, D. M., and J. K. Stranlund. 2010. "Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements." Environmental and Resource Economics 47: 45–63).

This paper analyzes voluntary agreements (VA) between public agencies & polluting industries. It is shown that voluntary agreements provide gains both for governments & for industries relative to the use of emission licenses & can thus be seen as both rational & self-enforcing. The condition for this conclusion is that the regulator has preferences over labor participation rates due to the presence of layoff costs. The gains for both parties in signing an agreement are highest when the industry is one with high productivity, low wages, & low environmental costs, while the effects on gains differ across the two negotiating parties for high output elasticities with respect to emissions & labor. 2 Tables, 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 14 References. Adapted from the source document.