Violence and Democracy
In: Politologický časopis, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 324-331
ISSN: 1211-3247
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In: Politologický časopis, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 324-331
ISSN: 1211-3247
The relation between the working of democratic systems today and the exploitation of "modern" forms of politically motivated extreme violence, especially the different types of subversive terrorism, has been an object of thorough study and discussion at most varied levels in the course of recent decades, often with contradictory results. This is not a surprise bearing in mind the diversity of bases for such study and discussion, as well as the complexity and changing nature of the subject matter itself, and last but not least, also the deforming impact of different political factors which in many a case predetermined both the horizon of discussions and the character of "politically correct" or at least acceptable conclusions. This does not apply just to decayed political and propagandist writings displaying a remarkable dose of cynicism and lack of shame in serving the interests of power which decided who would be labelled "terrorist" or "freedom fighter", or else. There is a number of scientific works defending the principles and values of democracy which also display apparent effort to a priori exclude raising a particular problem in full in order to prevent any doubt being cast on the purposefulness and justifiability of traditional approaches to and standpoints regarding the assessment of political violence and extremism. At the same time, polemics regarding terrorism had a large impact. Discussions about terrorism changed the way the public felt about both terrorism as a particular category of extremist violence, and politically motivated violence and extremism as such, propagating and reinforcing the view of political violence (acceptance of violent methods of political fight including terrorism) as an utterly undemocratic and anti-democratic behaviour and as a key characteristic of extremism. There is a growing tendency in substantial part of the public in democratic countries today to a priori associate manifestations of extremist orientation with acts of politically motivated violence, and to identify ...
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In: Mezinárodní vztahy: Czech journal of international relations, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 86-89
ISSN: 0543-7989, 0323-1844
In: Politologický časopis, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 324-331
ISSN: 1211-3247
A review essay on a book by John Keane, Violence and Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge U Press, 2004). References.
In: Mezinárodní vztahy: Czech journal of international relations, Band 49, Heft 3, S. 5-25
ISSN: 0543-7989, 0323-1844
A decade ago there emerged the idea that environmental cooperation is able to initiate and sustain a dialogue between the parties of a conflict and facilitates conflict transformation and peacebuilding. This article tests three hypotheses which stipulate conditions and effects of environmental cooperation in conflict-prone areas. The article shows that environmental cooperation can emerge even during a conflict, but only at a time when the intensity of the violence is low. The emergence and development of environmental cooperative projects also depends on the support of external actors, and the intensity of environmental cooperations in conflict-prone areas remains weak even after many years. Adapted from the source document.
In: Seria "Świat w naszych oczach
In: Politologický časopis, Band 11, Heft 4, S. 370-392
ISSN: 1211-3247
This article deals with the relations between two different cultures existing within one state: the dominant culture is continental France & the peripheral one is the insular society of Corsica. This article reviews the historical background of the problem in France & subsequently analyzes the response of the administrative center to the Corsican independence struggle. Regarding the cultural, historical & political differences, the distinct experiences of these two cultures, the collective identity of the Corsican community & the institutionalization of its ethnic-regional representatives, the situation can be described as a center-periphery cleavage. The Corsican society -- asking for autonomy within the state or even for separation -- faces the domination of the administrative center. This independence struggle originates within the community, which is the reason why the dominant culture has several times modified its strategy for dealing with the demands & violence of Corsican patriots. The analysis illustrates the power & the limits of the independence struggle of this small island that is still economically dependent on France. 33 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: Politologický časopis, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 27-34
ISSN: 1211-3247
Year 2003 was meant to be the year that would change the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for good, but the violence continued on both sides. There was a new peace plan -- the roadmap -- & talk of a new Middle East. But as the year ended, the roadmap was not fulfilled. In an attempt to make the roadmap work, peacemakers invented a new post -- that of Palestinian prime minister. Mahmoud Abbas was the first man to try the new post. But he did not get very far. He spent most of his premiership in a power struggle with Mr. Arafat & he gave up. Last year a group of former Israeli officials & Palestinian ministers was promoting their own proposal the Geneva Accord. This plan details the exact dimensions of a two state solution. For now, it is just fantasy peacemaking -- but its backers are hoping that it could take hold as a serious alternative. Finally, there is the proposal which may be the most important of them all. Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has warned that he will impose what he calls his Disengagement Plan should the Palestinians fail to meet his demands for a new leadership & the dismantling of armed Palestinian factions. Ariel Sharon has decided to give the Palestinians a few months to comply -- he will not be any more specific than that. If they do not meet his terms & his timetable, he has warned that he will take unilateral steps to draw up his own borders & to impose a settlement in Israel's favor. 32 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: Monografie Instytutu Problematyki Przestępczości nr. 9
Following the case of the disappearance of the 43 Ayotzinapa students, the Pandora's Box was opened: pits filled with bodies, corruption, impunity and institutional weakness of a state where politicians, police and authorities at all three government levels have been infiltrated by the organized crime. In Mexico, corruption and drug trafficking are common and the economic reforms are not enough if they do not go together with an effective program of combating corruption and the society is not the main beneficiary of the reforms.This article will explain the background of the Ayotzinapa case, the characteristics of the Mexican political system that allow cases like Ayotzinapa, the consequences of the fight against organized crime launched by ex-President Felipe Calderon, the behavior of a sleeping civil society tired of the reduced economic results and where the state does not have the monopoly of the authority and does not guarantee security.
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Following the case of the disappearance of the 43 Ayotzinapa students, the Pandora's Box was opened: pits filled with bodies, corruption, impunity and institutional weakness of a state where politicians, police and authorities at all three government levels have been infiltrated by the organized crime. In Mexico, corruption and drug trafficking are common and the economic reforms are not enough if they do not go together with an effective program of combating corruption and the society is not the main beneficiary of the reforms.This article will explain the background of the Ayotzinapa case, the characteristics of the Mexican political system that allow cases like Ayotzinapa, the consequences of the fight against organized crime launched by ex-President Felipe Calderon, the behavior of a sleeping civil society tired of the reduced economic results and where the state does not have the monopoly of the authority and does not guarantee security.
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In: Politologický časopis, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 331-359
ISSN: 1211-3247
This article examines the development of framing processes of the so-called Roma movement in the Czech Republic after 1989. Although there have been studies describing several & predominantly general frames in relation to the Roma movement in post-Communist countries, there has still yet to be a systematic analysis. Using frame analysis we examine diagnostic, prognostic & motivational frames in three years1992, 1996, 2006. We find important variation over the years & speculate about possible explanatory factors such as changes in integration policies, the level of extreme-right violence, public debate, & opportunities in fundraising. The last part of the article focuses on European Union funding & its possible relation to framing. Adapted from the source document.
In: Politologický časopis, Band 18, Heft 4, S. 379-406
ISSN: 1211-3247
This article presents an analysis of the civil war and subsequent developments in Nepal through the concept of the failed state. The aim of the article is to evaluate whether Nepal meets the criteria for being recognised as a failed state. In the first part, the conceptualization of the term failed state and its general definition are introduced. The second part of the article focuses on methodology. Finally, the main part of the article presents an analysis of Nepal through the concept of the failed state, following theoretical concepts developed by Robert I. Rotberg. The authors conclusion is that contemporary Nepal should not be regarded as a failed state. Despite the chronic internal weakness of the country and its institutions, whose functions are in many cases carried out by parallel institutions, it is not possible to say that such functions were completely missing. Instead, we can say that the functions of these institutions and structures are limited -- that is, that these institutions are performing their functions, albeit partially. In addition, the level of violence that occurs in some areas is not comparable with the period when Nepal was experiencing deep internal armed conflict. Adapted from the source document.
Na poziom uprzedzeń i ksenofobii w społeczeństwach wpływa nie tyle liczba imigrantów, którzy mieszkają w danym kraju, a raczej poczucie zagrożenia, jakie panuje w danym społeczeństwie przed napływem imigrantów. Stąd poziom uprzedzeń jest wyższy w tych społeczeństwach, które są bardziej homogeniczne. Potwierdzają to wyniki badań nad polskimi uprzedzeniami w stosunku do muzułmanów czy ogólnie wobec imigrantów. Badania kryminologiczne pokazują silny związek między ksenofobicznymi postawami rodziny sprawców a popełnianiem przez nich czynów na tle uprzedzeń. Sprawcami tych czynów są przede wszystkim działający w grupie młodzi mężczyźni (poniżej 25 lat), a podstawowymi motywacjami ich czynów jest poszukiwanie wrażeń (połączone ze spożyciem alkoholu) czy też specyficznie rozumiana próba ochrony społeczeństwa przed napływem Obcych. Ważnym motorem działań sprawców jest także przekonanie, że za pokrzywdzonymi nikt się nie ujmie – ani policja, ani społeczeństwo. The level of biases and xenophobic attitudes in a society is influenced mostly by the fear towards immigrants and their influx instead of the real number of immigrants residing in a particular country. That's why the level of bias towards the Others is much higher in homogeneous societies. The results of Polish opinion polls research on bias attitudes of our society towards Muslims or immigrants echo these findings. In the criminological research we find strong relations between xenophobic attitudes of the family of the perpetrator and acts of bias violence committed by the latter. Biased crimes are usually committed by young males (under 25 years old), and the main motivation of their actions is either thrill (usually connected with the consumption of alcohol) or specifically understood defence of their community from the Others and their presence. An important factor of the perpetrators' behaviour is also the conviction that no one will stand up for the victims, neither the police, nor the society.
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