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Rezension von: Bax, Mart: Medjugorje - Religion, politics, and violence in rural Bosnia. Amsterdam : VU Uitgeverij, 1995. XIX,139 S

Violations of human rights have become an almost daily occurrence via various TV and newspaper reports. Massacres, murders, torture, violence, imprisonment of political opponents, are facts of life in a number of contemporary states. While these states blatantly curtail human rights of their citizens, the governments and peoples of other countries have the right but also a kind of duty to demand they be respected. This feeling of global responsibility is increasing every day thanks to the process of globalization itself. (SOI : PM: S. 82)

The author analyses the role of the constitutional judiciary and the traditional theory of the tripartite division of power. His radical conclusion is: the division of power in Montesquieu's sense, as a tool of control and balance in modern state, does not exist. There is no social violence to which such balance, control or correction could be applied to. In such circumstances, the role, selection and work of constitutional judges is of utmost significance for the control, correction and balancing of political process. (SOI : PM: S. 87)

The collapse of the communist systems has brought about the crisis of identity and the political efficacy of the left not solely in Eastern Europe but in the West as well. Due to this situation, the author claims, all the elements of the traditional leftist identity have come under scrutiny. This applies both to the political ingredients common to all leftist parties (the primacy of economy, rejection of private ownership and market, egalitarianism, collectivism and the theory of progress) as well as the elements which instigated irreconcilable differentiations within the left (internationalism vs. nationalism, parliamentary democracy, the attitude towards violence, reform vs. revolution). The author concludes that due to the complex structure of the problems facing leftist parties and other political protagonists as well, there is little possibility for the emergence of an all-embracing leftist political programme; instead, partial programme variations should be expected. (SOI : PM: S. 21)

The author argues that in the debates about "democratic transition" of post- socialist societies the importance of development of state of law for the formation of democracy has not been sufficiently accounted for. The absence of state of law results in the formation of authoritarian structures of politi power which in the long run obstruct the process of democratization. Those structures include the concentration of political power in the hands of charismatic leaders, the transformation of political into economic power, the formation of clientelist structures, the development of a system of privileges and corruption, and the break-down of the state monopoly of the means of violence, resulting in the "refeudalization" of political power. In conclusion the author describes two developmental options for the post-socialist societies: the formation of a "Latin American" type of authoritarian-populist regimes or the gradual transformation towards a Western type of state of law and liberal democracy, initiated by the pressures from the international environment and internal forces. (SOI : PM: S. 85)

In the course of its history, Europe has structured itself by means of two models. The first was based on the territorial expansion of regional forces that used violence to break down the resistance of their weaker neighbors and establish the balance of power. In this way, at least temporarily, the way was paved for more radical changes in their polities. This model was in use until the end of World War II. The second model has been built around European integration. The aim of this process has not been the expansion of regional powers and the territorial conquest of their neighbors; it is based on the initiative of the weak to join the organizations that can satisfy their interests and goals. The process of integration excludes coercive methods. However, there is certain asymmetry in the relationship between the center and the periphery (the strong and the weak). The countries that belong to the center define the membership standards for the 'periphery' and evaluate their implementation. The 'central' countries are in a better position than the peripheral ones since the process of integration bolsters their collective identity, while the weaker states - by accepting the standards of stronger countries - have to alter their original identity. (SOI : PM: S. 97)

Slovakian political development following the collapse of communism is analysed in the text. The instigator of the democratic change in Slovakia was the organization "Public against violence" /VPN/ (the equivalent to the Czech "Citizens' Forum"), in which Vladimir Meciar came to prominence very early. Following his clash with the leadership of VPN in spring of 1991, he emerged as a charismatic political leader. Relying on his populist party called "Movement for Democratic Slovakia" /HZDS/, Meciar in 1992 won the Slovakian parliamentary elections and became Prime Minister. HZDS' radicalization of the nationalist discourse and its striving for a total institutional transformation of the Czechoslovakian federation led to the so called "velvet divorce" and Slovakian independence early in 1993. Meciar and HZDS briefly lost power in 1994 due to the party rift, but made a triumphant comeback after the elections in autumn of the same year. The authors' thesis is that this is responsible for the fact that in Slovakia national populism and client-patrimonial type of government have prevailed over democratic constitutionalism. The authors claim that the causes for such a development can be found in the social repercussions of the forced postwar industrialization and in the powerful tradition of cultural and political nationalism. (SOI : PM: S. 151)

The author deals with one of the most pressing problems of the 20th century - the problem of migrations. The essay is divided into four parts. In the first, the author presents empirical findings; in the second, he deals with the causes of the intra- and inter-national migrations; the third part is an outline of feasible perspectives, while the fourth offers possible options as countermeasures. The 20th century is characterized by the shift of the regional focal points of migrations. In the first half of the century, the inter-national migrations of refugees largely took place in Europe. However, in the second half of the century, the hub of the migrations shifted from the northern to the southern hemisphere. One of the major causes of migrations are wars and the accompanying violence. Other important causes are economic hardships, population boom, ecological disasters and the erosion of traditional values. Judging by the characteristics of the major causes of migrations, it is very unlikely that the situation at the turn of the millennium is going to change significantly. The only thing international organizations and states can do is to alleviate this problem by creating long-term strategies that might strike at the roots of the migration issue. (SOI : PM: S. 59)

The aim of this article, through an analysis of Veljko Vujacic's text and other pamphlets and manifestos by the Serbian political elite, was to show that the Serbian elite and the Serbian society have not got rid of their nationalist bias in explaining the events which led to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. They claim that the main culprit for this failure was the communist national policy and the failure to use adequate means (meaning Rankovic's technology of violence) in order to preserve the unity of the state. The second part of the article serves to demonstrate how Weber's view on the politics of power does not suffice to explain away the bolshevist and the communist form of the populist Serbian nationalism. The moment when the former Yugoslav political elite split into the anticommunist and anticentralist on the one hand, and the bolshevist and the centralist on the other, there was no possibility for a compromise. The third part suggests that Vujacic (and not only he) thinks that a way of overcoming the Serbian "dominant" nationalism is the catharsis of Serbian intellectuals and the Serbian society. However, as the latest events and proclamations of the Serbian elite show, his is a solitary case. (SOI : PM: S. 37)

The SANU-Memorandum of 1986 is the ultimate manifesto of the Greater Serbian idea; in the economic department, it is manifested in the form of vying for investments into Serbia, of the elimination of the "political and economic domination of Slovenia and Croatia", and of "disencumbering Serbia from contributing to the Federation fund". Its authors put the blame for the alleged lagging of Serbia exclusively on Slovenia and Croatia, and thus consequently make them responsible for all unsound economic policies in the former Yugoslavia. Particularly venomous charges are reserved for the Constitution of 1974, which makes for the independence ("secession") of Slovenia and Croatia, viewed as a precursor of a possible catastrophe. These two republics, they believe, are "morally obliged" to aid the development of the underdeveloped republics, since Serbia has sacrificed most, and the price of that has been its own thwarted development. + Two issues are central to Serbian economists: the 1961-1965 five-year plan and the system of financing a faster development of the underdeveloped regions (the Federation Fund). They demand that Serbia should be completely exempted from aiding the underdeveloped and, at the same time, extra measures for a faster development of Serbia proper should be decreed. The impossibility of solving these problems in this dictated manner brought about the economic disintegration of Yugoslavia, followed by the strategy of violence which ended in the aggression. Nevertheless, the Serbian political elite thinks that their political and economic standing has been enhanced and thus, in the negotiations about the succession, they flaunt the Memorandum propositions, and continue to live under the illusion that the Greater Serbia is a viable option, both economically and politically. (SOI : PM: S. 27)