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In the United States, increasing uneasiness exists about the predominance of self-interest in both public and private life, growing fear about the fragmentation and privatization of American society, mounting concerns about the effects of institutions--ranging from families to schools to the media--on the character of young people, and a renewed tendency to believe that without certain traditional virtues neither public leaders nor public policies are likely to succeed. In this thirty-fourth volume in The American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy series, a distinguished group of international scholars from a range of disciplines examines what is meant by "virtue," analyzing various historical and analytical meanings of virtue, notions of liberal virtue, civic virtue, and judicial virtue, and the nature of secular and theological virtue.

Driver challenges Aristotle's classical theory of virtue, arguing that it fails to take into account virtues which do seem to involve ignorance or epistemic defect. She argues that we should abandon the highly intellectualist view of virtue and instead adopt a consequentialist perspective which holds that virtue is simply a character trait which systematically produces good consequences

Green reviews 'Machiavelli's Virtue' by Harvey C. Mansfield.

Machiavelli's Virtue is a comprehensive statement on the founder of modern politics. Harvey C. Mansfield begins by analyzing Machiavelli's radical notion of virtue, which culminates in his own personal virtue. Machiavelli shows that princes need a new morality that only he has supplied. Mansfield argues that Machiavelli intended to rule the world through his thought; though a prince without a state, his subjects were the princes who would follow his writings on founding and ruling. This new "perpetual republic" is Machiavelli's own sect - and a remedy for the failures of all previous republics.

Michael Perry's thoughtful jurisprudential musings in Morality, Politics, and Law get most things just right. His framework of moral knowledge and a constitution of aspirations resonates with much of the best of contemporary moral philosophy and constitutional jurisprudence. When Perry turns to specifics, however, his reasoning weakens considerably. In particular, his discussion of abortion is fundamentally flawed. Perry draws two conclusions about abortion: (1) That the extremely restrictive Texas statute at issue in Roe v. Wade-- which permitted abortion only to save the woman's life -was unconstitutional; and (2) that the Supreme Court went too far when it invalidated virtually all restrictions on pre-viability abortions. Perry argues that the Court should have required all anti-abortion laws to contain three exceptions. Abortion must be permitted if the woman's health is endangered by continuing the pregnancy, if the fetus's life would be short and painful because of a genetic defect, or if the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest.' Professor Perry's first conclusion is indisputable. It is the second conclusion-that elective abortions should be restricted-with which I take issue in this Essay.