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In political theory, the word virtue usually refers to the disposition or character traits appropriate to a citizen. Someone who takes the responsibilities of citizenship seriously, to the point of putting the common good ahead of his or her personal interests, is thus said to display civic virtue. Political theorists have frequently warned that such virtue cannot be taken for granted, however, and many of them have urged that steps be taken to promote or foster civic virtue. This concern for the fragility of civic virtue is a clear theme in ancient (or classical) political thought, but it has also played an important part in modern and contemporary political theory.

Michael Perry's thoughtful jurisprudential musings in Morality, Politics, and Law get most things just right. His framework of moral knowledge and a constitution of aspirations resonates with much of the best of contemporary moral philosophy and constitutional jurisprudence. When Perry turns to specifics, however, his reasoning weakens considerably. In particular, his discussion of abortion is fundamentally flawed. Perry draws two conclusions about abortion: (1) That the extremely restrictive Texas statute at issue in Roe v. Wade-- which permitted abortion only to save the woman's life -was unconstitutional; and (2) that the Supreme Court went too far when it invalidated virtually all restrictions on pre-viability abortions. Perry argues that the Court should have required all anti-abortion laws to contain three exceptions. Abortion must be permitted if the woman's health is endangered by continuing the pregnancy, if the fetus's life would be short and painful because of a genetic defect, or if the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest.' Professor Perry's first conclusion is indisputable. It is the second conclusion-that elective abortions should be restricted-with which I take issue in this Essay.

Pluralism and its inner potential conflictuality is the main problem of political thought in the modern world, as the recent querelle between liberals and communitarians has significantly demonstrated. A different perspective emerges from the careful consideration of social interaction. The political body arises, when the pursuing of social communication itself is set as a common end - that is, when social communication institutes a permanent space of communication. Thus, a re-consideration of politics is possible through a re-thinking of human relationships. This opens the path to the possibility of a significative convergence towards the political aristotelism of the origins and with its notion of "natural sociality" of mankind: a tradition which indicates in the participation to the "useful" (a category which implies the virtue of justice) the proper ground for politics.

Virtue ethics is often proposed as a third way in health-care ethics, that while consequentialism and deontology focus on action guidelines, virtue focuses on character; all three aim to help agents discern morally right action although virtue seems to have least to contribute to political issues, such as austerity. I claim: (1) This is a bad way to characterize virtue ethics. The 20th century renaissance of virtue ethics was first proposed as a response to the difficulty of making sense of 'moral rightness' outside a religious context. For Aristotle the right action is that which is practically best; that means best for the agent in order to live a flourishing life. There are no moral considerations besides this. (2) Properly characterized, virtue ethics can contribute to discussion of austerity. A criticism of virtue ethics is that fixed characteristics seem a bad idea in ever-changing environments; perhaps we should be generous in prosperity, selfish in austerity. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that people indeed do change with their environment. However, I argue that virtues concern fixed values not fixed behaviour; the values underlying virtue allow for different behaviour in different circumstances: in austerity, virtues still give the agent the best chance of flourishing. Two questions arise. (a) In austere environments might not injustice help an individual flourish by, say, obtaining material goods? No, because unjust acts undermine the type of society the agent needs for flourishing. (b) What good is virtue to those lacking the other means to flourish? The notion of degrees of flourishing shows that most people would benefit somewhat from virtue. However, in extreme circumstances virtue might harm rather than benefit the agent: such circumstances are to be avoided; virtue ethics thus has a political agenda to enable flourishing. This requires justice, a fortiori when in austerity.

This article sets forth a general theory of the justification of legal punishment based on virtue ethics and republican political theory. Criminal law serves not only to deter and take retribution, but also to inculcate virtue. This theory explains why, for example, people do not consciously abide by law. They just do, because they have no desire to do things that are contrary to the criminal law. This conception of virtue as well-ordered desire is distinctively Aristotelian. The political justification for inculcating virtue by means of criminal law is the classic republican conception of government as being devoted specifically to the inculcation of virtue.

The history of ethical and political thought and that of pedagogical ideas share some common aspects and themes. It is known, for example, that in classical Greece citizenship was closely connected with the sharing of a cosmos of values, attitudes and social practices centred around the idea of "virtue"; this connection, which im-plied the transmission of that cosmos of values and attitudes from one generation to the next, constitutes a central element in the history of Western culture and education. After an analysis of some of the main ancient and modern positions in this regard, this paper focuses on the principal pedagogical theories of the twentieth century; in fact, a wide-ranging debate regarding democracy and the "educational" needs that its stability and prosperity implies took place during the last century. It is possible to grasp harmonies and dissonances through diverging ideological options, which the "global" perspective as-sumed today by the main trends in contemporary political and educational theories tries to overcome. ; La storia del pensiero etico e politico e quella delle idee pedagogiche presentano alcuni aspetti e tematiche comuni, che emergono dal contesto culturale e valoriale delle singole epoche e società storiche. È risaputo che nella Grecia classica la cittadinanza era strettamente connessa con la condivisione di un cosmo di valori, atteggiamenti e pratiche sociali imperniate sull'idea di "virtù"; questa connessione, che implicava la trasmissione da una generazione all'altra di quel cosmo di valori e atteggiamenti, costituisce un elemento centrale nella storia della cultura e dell'educazione occidentali. Dopo un'analisi di alcune tra le principali posizioni antiche e moderne al riguardo, il testo si sofferma sulle prin-cipali teorie pedagogiche del Novecento; nel secolo scorso, infatti, si è sviluppato un ampio dibattito sulla democrazia e sulle esigenze "educative" che implica per la sua stessa stabilità e prosperità. È possibile cogliere armonie e dissonanze nella diversità delle ...

The last half-century has seen a steady loss of confidence in the defensibility of a duty to obey the law - even a qualified, pro tanto duty to obey the laws of a just or nearly just state. Over roughly the same period, there has been increasing interest in virtue ethics as an alternative to the dominant consequentialist and deontological approaches to normative ethics. Curiously, these two tendencies have so far only just barely linked up. Although there has been discussion of the question whether patriotism should be considered a virtue, and abstract discussion about the virtuous person's relation to authority and justice in general, there has been little virtue-oriented discussion having specific reference to the kinds of difficulties that have motivated the ascendant skepticism about political obligation. This silence has persisted despite repeated calls for renewed work on "virtue politics ". This article proposes and defends a preliminary account of law-abidance (as contrasted to obedience) as a virtue. It argues that a virtue-theoretic account of our relation to the law offers advantages that are not contingent upon the independence or priority of the virtues with respect to consequentialist and deontological components of a complete moral theory. Chief among these advantages is the promise of an alternative to the deadlocked positions taken by apologists for the duty to obey the law and their philosophical-anarchist critics - positions which have tacitly been assumed to exhaust the viable possibilities.

The prominent Australian earth scientist, Tim Flannery, closes his recent book Here on Earth: A New Beginning with the words "… if we do not strive to love one another, and to love our planet as much as we love ourselves, then no further progress is possible here on Earth". This is a remarkable conclusion to his magisterial survey of the state of the planet. Climatic and other environmental changes are showing us not only the extent of human influence on the planet, but also the limits of programmatic management of this influence, whether through political, economic, technological or social engineering. A changing climate is a condition of modernity, but a condition which modernity seems uncomfortable with. Inspired by the recent "environmental turn" in the humanities—and calls from a range of environmental scholars and scientists such as Flannery—I wish to suggest a different, non-programmatic response to climate change: a reacquaintance with the ancient and religious ideas of virtue and its renaissance in the field of virtue ethics. Drawing upon work by Alasdair MacIntyre, Melissa Lane and Tom Wright, I outline an apologetic for why the cultivation of virtue is an appropriate response to the challenges of climate change.

Opponents of biomedical enhancement frequently adopt what Allen Buchanan has called the Personal Goods Assumption. On this assumption, the benefits of biomedical enhancement will accrue primarily to those individuals who undergo enhancements, not to wider society. Buchanan has argued that biomedical enhancements might in fact have substantial social benefits by increasing productivity. We outline another way in which enhancements might benefit wider society: by augmenting civic virtue and thus improving the functioning of our political communities. We thus directly confront critics of biomedical enhancement who argue that it will lead to a loss of social cohesion and a breakdown in political life.

Opponents of biomedical enhancement frequently adopt what Allen Buchanan has called the Personal Goods Assumption. On this assumption, the benefits of biomedical enhancement will accrue primarily to those individuals who undergo enhancements, not to wider society. Buchanan has argued that biomedical enhancements might in fact have substantial social benefits by increasing productivity. We outline another way in which enhancements might benefit wider society: by augmenting civic virtue and thus improving the functioning of our political communities. We thus directly confront critics of biomedical enhancement who argue that it will lead to a loss of social cohesion and a breakdown in political life.

Tolerance means respect, acceptance and understanding of the rich cultures of our world, the different ways of expressing oneself and one's individuality. It is formed by knowledge, sincerity, open communication and free thought, conscience and faith. Tolerance is a unit of diversity. This is not only a moral duty, but also a political and legal need. Tolerance is the key to peace and the transition from the uncultured to the culture of peace. The concept of tolerance is widely used in various fields of science and life, including politics, philosophy, social ethics, and comparative theology. Tolerance is derived from the Latin word (tolerae), which means to endure, to be patient, and basically to accept something, a different idea or point of view with as much tolerance and perseverance as possible, regardless of one's own personal understanding. Tolerance is a concept that means refraining from distortion of the creed, the absoluteness of truth, and affirms the rules established by international human rights instruments.

The paper offers a new account of the rule of law, revising my previous view, and criticising some alternatives. It focuses on the rule of law's aim to avoid arbitrary government, and on its relation to the essential functions of government. The rule of law requires that government action will manifest an intention to protect and advance the interests of the governed. As such it is almost a necessary condition for the law's ability to meet other moral demands, and it facilitate coordination and cooperation internally and internationally.

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1984, given by Alasdair Maclntyre, a Scottish philosopher.

This essay explores the dynamic links between experiences of impasse—when a government or a congregation or relationship has become stuck and can neither go forward nor retreat—and the imagination as a pastoral resource. When the need for institutional change meets resistance, religious communities experience impasse. When individual transformation is sidetracked by fear, the desired growth through formation and supervision may be thwarted. The biblical resource of lamentation appears as the graceful practice that can rescue believers from impasse and a mood of resentment, opening them to a future they have yet to imagine.

The normative stability of a deliberative and democratic political order and the creativity and quality of the decisions its produces depend on citizens developing civic orientations and capacities through participation in deliberative events aiming at the cooperative solution of political problems. That, at least, is the claim made by critics of the systems approach to deliberative democracy, who argue that its proponents have lost sight of the educative function that respectful public reasoning plays for citizens. In this article I offer a response to this line of argument. There is no good philosophical reason to suppose that only unitary deliberation can perform an educative function for citizens. The kinds of informal and uncooperative public speech that occur in distributed deliberative processes can also develop participants' civic capacities and civic virtue – and not merely through their systemic effects. This is an insight that should encourage us to rethink the design and facilitation of deliberative forums and pay more attention to citizens' everyday deliberation.