Suchergebnisse

The article contrasts the validity of the model of interbloc punishment as a result of labor market precarity for the Spanish general elections of 2000. According to this model, labor market experiences in the flexible segment of the Spanish labor market are expected to generate discontent with the incumbent party and, thereby, facilitate trans-ideological voting. Using a restrictive definition of labor market precarity, which is operationalized as unemployment, the predictions of the model are tested on a representative sample of the economically active population drawn from the pre-electoral survey carried out by the governmental Centre for Sociological Research (study 2382). The model is supported by the evidence, which suggests that the Popular Party was punished by unemployed rightwing voters who were unsatisfied with their unemployment situation, as well as by unsatisfied unemployed voters who did not identify with any of the ideological blocs in the left-right spectrum. Confidence intervals around the predicted estimators for punishment effects are calculated using techniques of statistical simulation. Together with the results obtained in a previous analysis of the electoral impact of labor market precarity in the 1996 general elections, the results of the analysis of the 2000 elections suggest that the model of interbloc punishment is symmetrical, as it seems to work irrespectively of which party is in power. Tables, Graphs, References. Adapted from the source document.

The article analyses the possible electoral consequences of being an outsider in the Spanish labor market. A theoretical model based on the premise that economic experiences are always filtered by, & interpreted through, ideological maps is defended against additive models, which assume that economic experiences have a direct electoral impact irrespectively of voters' ideological allegiances. Both models are tested empirically by analyzing voting intention in the 1996 general election as reported in a survey undertaken in 1995 by the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research of a representative sample of 4,000 adults. Empirical analysis provides evidence in favor of the interaction model & suggests that labor precarity in the flexible segment of the Spanish labor market could have induced two types of electoral punishment: 1) punishment of the incumbent Socialist party amongst left-wing voters either through voting for the United Left (IU) or for the Popular Party (PP); & 2) punishment of all parties amongst radicalized respondents through electoral abstention. Tables, Graphs, References. Adapted from the source document.