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"Strategic Voting Versus Sincere Voting" published on by Oxford University Press.

1. Introduction -- An Introduction to the Analysis of Power, Voting, and Voting Power -- 2. The Idea of Power -- Power in Game Forms -- A Philosophical View of Power -- Power and Profit in Hierarchical Organizations -- Equivalent Concepts of Power in Voting Games -- Attribution and Social Power -- Power: An Amorphous Term — Diverse Conceptual Approaches -- 3. Formal Analysis of Representation and Voting Procedures -- Proportional Representation and Effective Number of Parties in Finland -- The Relationship Between Voting and Party Strength in an Electoral System -- Manipulation of the Agenda by Strategic Voting: Separable and Nonseparable Preferences -- Order-of-Voting Effects -- Strategic Voting in Multicandidate Elections under Uncertainty and under Risk -- Electoral Rules and Rational Voting: The Effects of Candidate Viability Perceptions on Voting Decisions -- 4. Concepts of Power Measurement -- The Problem of the Right Distribution of Voting Power -- An Axiomated Family of Power Indices for Simple n-Person Games -- Measuring Power in Voting Bodies: Linear Constraints, Spatial Analysis, and a Computer Program -- Modification of the Banzhaf-Coleman Index for Games with A Priori Unions -- Power and Satisfaction in an Ideologically Divided Voting Body -- Power in an Ideological Space -- Measuring Power -- 5. The Empirical Approach -- Party Power and Government Formation: A Case Study -- The Distribution of Power in Specific Decision-Making Bodies -- Political Geography and Political Power -- Regional Power Allocation: The Problem of British Devolution -- The Paradox of Redistribution: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results.

I conduct an axiomatic analysis of voting rules in a context where voters evaluate each candidate by assigning her an evaluation from a pre-established set. I focus on additive rules, which follow the utilitarian paradigm. Characterization results are provided for each of the two prominent additive rules: Evaluative Voting when the evaluation set is finite and Range Voting when the evaluation set is [0,1].

Conventional democratic institutions aggregate preferences poorly. The norm of one-person-one-vote with majority rule treats people fairly by giving everyone an equal chance to influence outcomes but fails to give proportional weight to people whose interests in a social outcome are stronger than those of other people. This problem leads to the familiar phenomenon of tyranny of the majority. Various institutions that have been tried or proposed over the years to correct this problem-including supermajority rule, weighted voting, cumulative voting, "mixed constitutions," executive discretion, and judicially protected rights-all badly misfire in various ways, for example, by creating gridlock or corruption. This Article proposes a new form of political decisionmaking based on the theory of quadratic voting. It explains how quadratic voting solves the preference-aggregation problem by giving proper weight to preferences of varying intensity, how it can be incorporated into political institutions, and why it should improve equity.

Abstract
Populist, especially far-right populist, parties have gained votes in recent elections across Europe recently. This observation is true for Poland as well. The far-right populist party Law and Justice (PiS, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) won the parliamentary election in 2015. Next to the well-known nativist and populist messages, PiS promoted a social policy: the Family 500+ programme. Did this programme attract voters? The findings of this study lend reason to answer the question in the affirmative. The inclusion of social policies usually associated with left-wing parties might hence be a path to be explored by other far-right populist parties as well.

We discuss sincere voting when voters have cardinal preferences over alternatives. We interpret sincerity as opposed to strategic voting, and thus define sincerity as the optimal behaviour when conditions to vote strategically vanish. When voting mechanisms allow for only one message type we show that this optimal behaviour coincides with an intuitive and common definition of sincerity. For voting mechanisms allowing for multiple message types, such as approval voting (AV), there exists no conclusive definition of sincerity in the literature. We show that for AV, voters' optimal strategy tends to one of the existent definitions of sincerity, consisting in voting for those alternatives that yield more than the average of cardinal utilities. ; Financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología through grants BEC 2005-00836, SEJ2005-01481/ECON and FEDER, Generalitat de Catalunya through grant 2005SGR00454 and Barcelona Economics-XREA is gratefully acknowledged.

When a group of people with identical preferences but different abilities in identifying the best alternative (e.g., a jury) takes a vote to decide between two alternatives, the question of strategic voting arises. That is, depending on the voting rule used to determine the collective decision, it may or may not be rational for group members to always vote for the alternative believe to be their private information indicates is better (i.e., vote informatively). In fact, we show in this paper that, if a qualified majority rule is used, then informative voting is rational only if the rule is optimal in the class of all qualified majority rules, in the sense the sense that, when everybody votes informatively, none of the other rules in this class would yield a higher expected utility. However, this necessary condition is not sufficient for informative voting to be rational. Specifically, even if the qualified majority rule used is optimal in the above sense, some of those who are least competent in correctly identifying the better alternative may increase the expected utility by sometimes voting for the alternative they believe to be inferior. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for informative, non-strategic, voting to be rational is that the voting rule is optimal among the class of all qualified weighted majority rules, i.e., rules assigning (potentially) unequal weights to different individuals, this cannot happen: informative, non-strategic voting is rational.