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For the past decade the focus of the U.S. security policy has been changing. After a period of global American hegemony, which took place at the end of the Cold War, the international position of the country is declining; countries such as China, India, Brazil, Russia are moving alongside the United States and Europe as centres of power. Focusing U.S. interest on Asia and the Pacifi c ("Asia Pacifi c pivot") causes a reduction of its interests in Europe. Given these trends U.S and EU policymakers face the challenge to redefine their security and defence cooperation. This applies both to the acquisition by European allies more responsibility for their own safety as well as to develop new mechanisms for cooperation on the line US-NATO-EU relations. The article aims to answer about the current situation and perspectives of EU's place and role in U.S. security policy in the context of redistribution of power in the world politics. The analysis is carried out in the neorealistic paradigm.

The article focuses on different aspects of the nuclear energy challenges. In the recent past, there has been a paradigmatic shift in the approach to nuclear crisis legal arrangement. Effective nuclear management requires a multi-sectoral, multi-disciplinary, and holistic approach, encompassing pre-crisis preparedness initiatives, crisis response, and postcrisis rehabilitation, all with active participation of local people. As the incidence and severity of crises has increased over time, culture of HR management deserves highest priority at both the national and sub-national levels and the traditional approach of post-crisis response and relief need to be replaced by an all-in-compassing holistic approach. Nuclear security management is an important issue that cannot be addressed by one agency, technology or institution alone. It calls for convergence of technologies and institutions with the goal of fulfilling the various dimensions, timeliness, accuracy, scope and coverage, formats and standards to match the user needs and finally assimilation of information for decision-making. A holistic approach encompassing a suitable mix of policy reforms, institutional changes and technology options. Without this, it will not be possible to achieve longer term immunity against natural and manmade crises. It is quite evident that economic development may not be sustainable under conditions of vulnerability to crises ; Czy energia atomowa jest zabawą z ogniem czy też jedynym wyjściem z kryzysu energetycznego? Nowe wyzwania, które pojawiły się przed ludzkością w wyniku wydarzeń w Japonii, stwarzają nieznane dotąd zagrożenia. Energia nuklearna stała się przyczyną podziałów na świecie. Artykuł analizuje czynniki kształtujące europejską kulturę bezpieczeństwa atomowego uwzględniając efektywność procedur kierowania zespołami ludzkimi oraz adekwatne ramy legislacyjne wytwarzania energii z atomu. Autor szuka odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy można wyciągać jednoznaczne wnioski dla rozwoju energetyki atomowej w Polsce z wywołanych trzęsieniem ziemi i tsunami zdarzeń w japońskich elektrowniach jądrowych? Dla zapewnienia rozwoju oraz bezpiecznego funkcjonowania energetyki jądrowej w Polsce niezbędne jest przyjęcie ustaw tzw. pakietu atomowego. Czy nowelizacja Prawa atomowego określa wymagania bezpieczeństwa budowy i eksploatacji obiektów jądrowych zgodnie z najnowszymi standardami i zaleceniami międzynarodowymi?

In the face of demographic problems in Europe which are mainly caused by reduced reproduction of the population, in the case of Poland also emigration, it is no surprise that the declarations, which aim at indicating the proposals of staving off the threat of demographic crisis appear in electoral campaigns. This is indicated by the general formulated directions of actions as well as the proposals of particular actions. Because the biggest number of instruments which may be used to support the families' decision about procreation are found within the scope of family policy, this area of social policy has been selected as the object of analysis. This article presents the selected proposals of the electoral offer concerned with the solutions in the framework of family policy of those parties which during parliamentary elections 2015 in Poland, registered the lists of candidates for Sejm in at least half of electoral constituencies. The aim of the author is not only identify the vision of family policy and the directions of its development presented by given parties, but above all to try to indicate the main separation lines. Detailed analysis of the proposals, mainly from electoral programs, allowed also to mark off those areas and solutions around which political consensus can be created, as they were a part of electoral programs of almost all groups.

The article focuses on analysis of Germany's stance as regards transatlantic cooperation in the 21st century, presenting successively 1) main elements concerning the evolution of the transatlantic cooperation with special regard to Germany's stance toward the U.S.; 2) controversies in Germany around working out provisions of the TTIP agreement; 3) the attitude of Christian Democrat-Liberal government towards the prospects of successful negotiations as well as the significance of fi nalizing the TTIP agreement. In evaluating Germany's attitude as to the Transatlantic partnership the biggest emphasis has been devoted to Germany's determinants and interests in its relations with the U.S. in political and socio-economic grounds. As regards controversies around future shape of TTIP agreement positions of CSU/CDU/SPD government, opposition parties in Bundestag as well as economic circles, trade unions, experts, scholars and non-governmental organizations have been taken into consideration. Basing on conducted opinion polls in the U.S. and in Germany in the final part of the study the attitudes of public opinion in both these states as for the crucial questions of Transatlantic cooperation have been presented between the EU and the U.S. There is ambivalence because generally supporting the signing of TTIP agreement between the EU and the U.S. the German society expresses stringent opposition to importing American genetically modified food to European markets. Changing social moods among German society on TTIP agreement's provisions force CDU/CSU/SPD to declare enhanced readiness to European standards and the EU's interests.

The focal point of this paper is voter turnout in the self-government elections in Poland. Particular attention is given to the turnout in the city with district rights, Łódź. This city provides an interesting place of research, both on account of its peculiar location in the center of Poland, and its recent cultural, economic and political transformation. A local referendum on the dismissal of the city mayor, held on January 10, 2010, is worth mentioning. Łódź was the first large Polish city (with a population of over 500,000) where a one-man executive organ was dismissed before the end of his term. In the paper, the results of parliamentary election turnouts are juxtaposed with self-government election turnouts. Voter turnout is analyzed for each term of the self-government in Łódź, and the types and reasons for absence are indicated. The author uses these data to emphasize that over the twenty years of self-government's existence, voting procedures in Poland have not changed and are the most conservative in Europe.

The focal point of this paper is voter turnout in the self-government elections in Poland. Particular attention is given to the turnout in the city with district rights, Łódź. This city provides an interesting place of research, both on account of its peculiar location in the center of Poland, and its recent cultural, economic and political transformation. A local referendum on the dismissal of the city mayor, held on January 10, 2010, is worth mentioning. Łódź was the first large Polish city (with a population of over 500,000) where a one-man executive organ was dismissed before the end of his term. In the paper, the results of parliamentary election turnouts are juxtaposed with self-government election turnouts. Voter turnout is analyzed for each term of the self-government in Łódź, and the types and reasons for absence are indicated. The author uses these data to emphasize that over the twenty years of self-government's existence, voting procedures in Poland have not changed and are the most conservative in Europe.

Zacieśnianie współpracy politycznej, wojskowej i gospodarczej pomiędzy Chinami oraz Rosją zostało przyjęte przez Stany Zjednoczone w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku z dużym niepokojem, jako zagrożenie dla interesów narodowych i pozycji międzynarodowej supermocarstwa. Ze względu na słabnącą pozycję Moskwy w systemie międzynarodowym oraz pogarszające się relacje z Zachodem, w interesie Kremla było znalezienie silnego sojusznika, posiadającego zbliżone przedsięwzięcia i cele. Utworzenie chińsko-rosyjskiego tandemu ośmieliło Moskwę do prowadzenia jeszcze bardziej zdecydowanej i kategorycznej polityki wobec Zachodu. Stosunki amerykańsko-rosyjskie uległy przy tym znacznemu pogorszeniu do tego stopnia, że dziś stawiane jest pytanie: czy świat stoi w obliczu nowej "zimnej wojny"? Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza polityki bezpieczeństwa USA wobec Rosji w XXI wieku, w kontekście zacieśniania współpracy rosyjsko-chińskiej; przedstawienie współpracy na linii Waszyngton–Moskwa podczas rządów trzech ostatnich prezydentów USA oraz czynników mających wpływ na pogorszenie stosunków pomiędzy państwami. Słowa kluczowe: Stany Zjednoczone Ameryki, Rosja, Chiny, bezpieczeństwo, Donald Trump, Barack Obama, George W. Bush, stosunki międzynarodowe ; The strengthening of political, military and economic cooperation between China and Russia has been a cause for concern for the United States in the second decade of the twentyfirst century, who view it as a threat to national interests and to the international position of the superpower. Due to Moscow's weakening position in the international system and deteriorating relations with the West, it was in the Kremlin's interest to fi nd a strong ally with similar interests and goals. The creation of a Chinese-Russian front has emboldened the Moscow authorities to pursue an even more decisive and categorical policy towards the West. American-Russian relations have significantly deteriorated, to such an extent that there is a need to pose the question: is the world facing a new "Cold War"? The purpose of this article is to analyze US security policy towards Russia in the twentyfi rst century in the context of closer Russian-Chinese cooperation, as well as present the level of cooperation on the Washington-Moscow line during the rule of the last three US presidents and the factors aff ecting the deterioration of relations between the two states. Key words: United States of America, Russia, China, security, Donald Trump, Barack Obama, George W. Bush, international relations

The Treaty of Lisbon which entered into force in 1 December 2009 has once again increased powers of European Parliament. In fact, the treaties reforming the European Community (and then European Union) lead to change the role of European Parliament from the institution of an advisory nature with very limited power to important body with broad scope of competence and authority. This process ensures the democratization of European Union, because European Parliament is the only one fully democratic EU institution. In the Lisbon Treaty European Parliament for the first time were named as legislative body. According to the treaty the Parliament and Council can be regarded as two chambers in a bicameral legislative branch of the European Union. Therefore, the elections to European Parliament in 2014 were very important for all member states. Presented article provides the new scope of competence of European Parliament and the result of election to this institution in Poland. The author try to answer the question how the Lisbon Treaty influence on political practice.

The idea of building interconnectors between the transmission systems of the EU Member States is now getting more visible in Poland. This approach is a part of the implementation of European energy policy, which aims to strengthen cooperation between Member States' energy sectors. Combining transmission networks in the EU has also been included as one of the strategic objectives of the national energy policy and a tool of ensuring security of supplies. It is pointed out that the EU needs a fully functioning, connected and integrated internal market of energy, so that no country is isolated from the European network of transmission. The article discusses the grid investments in Poland and make comments on national interconnections in the context of their use of free bandwidth. ; Ostatnie lata to zwiększone zainteresowanie rozbudową transgranicznych połączeń międzysystemowych. Realizowana systematycznie w toku rozwoju integracji na zachodzie Europy idea budowania interkonektorów pomiędzy systemami przesyłowymi państw członkowskich, zajmuje obecnie coraz większą uwagę także w Polsce. Podejście to, odzwierciedlone realnymi inwestycjami, jest jednym z elementów realizacji europejskiej polityki energetycznej i systemu finansowego wsparcia powiązanych z nią programów, których celem jest zacieśnianie współpracy pomiędzy sektorami energetycznymi państw członkowskich.

On 1 March 2017, the Customs Service, which had operated since 1990, became part of the new model of the integrated public administration, i.e. the National Revenue Administration. The aim of the article is to analyze the organizational framework of the customs administration in Poland, to identify reasons for the institutional reform as well as to indicate courses of action of the future policies of the new model of the customs and fi scal administration. The research hypothesis has been as follows: the customs administration in Poland cannot be static against the challenges of the 21st century – the quality of operations, being the fundamental quality of any organization, a characteristic of any system and process, is in need of re-ordering of the entire area related to the management of customs and tax agencies as well as creating modern organization. The research problem that has been posed concerns the transformation of the customs administration in Poland – what reasons, predominantly in the organizational perspective, led to the introduced changes and whether these changes brought a positive outcome in the form of creating a new and eff ective organizational model. The research has employed descriptive analysis, preceded by a review of the subject literature and the secondary legislation. The structure of the article encompasses three parts and a summary. The fi rst section presents the development of the customs administration after World War 2, the second part concerns the reasons for and the implementation of the institutional reform, the third indicates the courses of action and development of the National Revenue Administration. The summary presents conclusions that have been drawn from the deliberations contained within the article. ; 1 marca 2017 r. funkcjonująca od 1990 r. Służba Celna stała się częścią nowego modelu zintegrowanej administracji publicznej, tj. Krajowej Administracji Skarbowej. Celem artykułu jest analiza ram organizacyjnych administracji celnej w Polsce, zidentyfi kowanie przesłanek przeprowadzenia reformy instytucjonalnej oraz wskazanie kierunków przyszłych działań nowego modelu administracji celno-skarbowej. Hipoteza badawcza została sformułowana następująco: administracja celna w Polsce nie może być statyczna wobec wyzwań XXI w. – jakość działania, będąca nadrzędną wartością każdej organizacji, cechą każdego systemu i procesu wymaga uporządkowania całego obszaru zarządzania organami celno-podatkowymi i stworzenia nowoczesnej organizacji. Postawiono pytanie badawcze, jak zmieniała się administracja celna w Polsce. Jakie przesłanki, przede wszystkim w wymiarze organizacyjnym, przyczyniły się do dokonanych zmian i czy zmiany te odniosły pozytywny efekt w postaci stworzenia nowego skutecznego i efektywnego modelu organizacji? W badaniach wykorzystano analizę opisową, poprzedzoną przeglądem źródeł literaturowych i aktów prawodawstwa wtórnego. Struktura artykułu obejmuje trzy części oraz podsumowanie. W pierwszej przedstawiono rozwój administracji celnej po II wojnie światowej, druga część odnosi się do przesłanek i wdrożenia reformy instytucjonalnej, trzecia – prezentuje kierunki działania i rozwoju Krajowej Administracji Skarbowej. W podsumowaniu zaprezentowano wnioski płynące z rozważań zawartych w artykule.

Celem artykułu jest ocena aktywności jednostek samorządu terytorialnego w powiecie poznańskim w zakresie pozyskiwania funduszy unijnych w latach 2004–2008. Podjęto próbę określenia roli środków, które można było pozyskać w ramach Zintegrowanego Programu Operacyjnego Rozwoju Regionalnego (ZPORR) w realizacji zadań podejmowanych przez gminy. Dokonana została analiza struktury projektów oraz próba oceny aktywności, skuteczności i efektywności władz gmin powiatu poznańskiego w pozyskiwaniu wsparcia finansowego w ramach ZPORR, który był najważniejszym instrumentem polityki regionalnej w pierwszych latach członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej. W analizie zwrócono również uwagę na fakt, że okres funkcjonowania tego programu był dla władz samorządowych ważnym etapem nabierania doświadczeń w zakresie aplikowania o środki unijne. ; The aim of the article is assessment of Poznan poviat local governments' activity in obtaining the EU funding over the years 2004–2008. An attempt has been made to diagnose the role of the resources attainable within the Integrated Operational Programme of Regional Development in executing assignments undertaken by gminas. Analysis of the projects' structure and an attempt of assessment of the activity, efficiency and effectiveness of the gminas' authorities in Poznan poviat in obtaining financial aid within the IOPRD been made. IOPRD has been the most important device of regional policy in the first years of Poland's membership in the European Union. What is more, the period of IOPRD's functioning for local authorities has been a time of learning applying for the EU funding.

Poland towards Russia between 1992 and 2015 and outline their specifics. The author attempted at a synthesis of major manifestations of Polish-Russian cooperation and most sticking points in the intergovernmental (international) relations during that period. An important objective was to show the sources and examples of a divergence of interests, and point to the goals, which were based on these premises, established by the foreign policy-makers in Poland and Russia and pursued in mutual relations and international affairs. Between 1992 and 2015, in Poland's foreign policy towards the East and national security policy, the relations with Russia and the Ukraine were of utmost importance. On the economic level, considering the volume of mutual trade turnover, Poland's main partner in the East was the Russian Federation, whereas on the political level, the Ukraine was seen as a strategic partner. Along with the Ukraine, Russia played a key role in Poland's security policy in the discussed period. It should be emphasized that Polish-Russian and Polish-Ukrainian relations were very closely linked, and so was Poland's policy towards Russia and the Ukraine. In Poland's foreign policy towards Russia, or in broader terms, in Polish-Russian relations between 1992 and 2015, seven stages can be distinguished; each having their own characteristic. Despite some new specifics in each particular stage, they all shared an element of continuity. The constant theme was a great divergence of interests between Poland and Russia, particularly with regard to the European security system, and the role of NATO in shaping this security, as well as further stages of the alliance's enlargement, especially by countries of the post-Soviet area; energy security and Poland's strive for diversification of fuels supplies faced with Russia's actions aimed at the diversification of routes of sending its gas and crude oil to Western Europe bypassing the Ukraine and Poland; a historic dispute, in which a thorough, satisfying for the Poles, explanation of the Katyn Forest massacre was particularly high on the agenda among other issues; opposing visions of building an order in Eastern Europe, and first and foremost, in the Ukraine. With the passing of time, especially after Poland's NATO and the EU accession, the future of Eastern European countries, particularly the Ukraine and Belarus, has become a fundamental issue in Polish-Russian relations. Both Russia and Poland treated Eastern European countries as a sort of a safety buffer. However, the two countries had entirely different visions of how this buffer ought to be shaped. The political leadership in Poland saw the strenghtening of national security in the strenghtening of the Ukrainian buffer through the Ukraine's membership in NATO and the EU, whereas for the political leadership in Russia, the strenghtening of national security through Ukrainian buffer meant preserving its outside NATO status, or incorporating it in the the security system built under the aegis of Russia on the area of CIS. A characteristic of the Polish-Russian relations in that period was a great imbalance to Poland's disadvantage, resulting from the differences in broadly understood physical potential of the two countries and, consequently, their international roles (Poland being a medium-size country situated in Central Europe and Russia being a superpower in Central Eurasia). The capacities of Poland to shape the situation in Eastern Europe on its own were incomparably lower than Russia's. Therefore, Poland was trying to make use of European and Euro-Atlantic multirateral structures, mainly through the Eastern Dimension realized by the EU and NATO, to have as much influence as possible, on the desired developments in Eastern Europe. The eastern policy under successive RP governments was characterized by their overrating, frequently, of their own capacities, lack of objectivity in assessment of the situation across our eastern border, and application of double standards, particularly in the policy towards Russia. Polish-Russian political relations throughout the post-Cold War period were critical, and improvements were relatively short-lasting. Not only Russia, but also Poland is to blame for such a state of events. The Polish side, due to historical reasons and imbalance of potential, expected Russia to take more initiative in coming to an agreement with Poland. However, it has to be admitted that in many activities undertaken by Poland with regard to European security, in particular Eastern European subregion, the interests of Russia were completly disregarded, although they did not have to be accepted fully. An example of this was Polish diplomacy in the second half of 2013 intended not to allow Russia to be included in the negotiations on the EU association agreement with the Ukraine about issues that had economic implications for Russia's interests. In their policy towards Russia, foreign policy-makers in Poland, forgot, all too often, or, were unwilling to remember, about the principle that in order to meet the security needs of one's own country, one should also consider the security needs of other countries, the neighbouring ones in the first place. Analyzing the policies under succesive III RP governments on European security and relations with the post-Soviet countries, it is hard to share the view prevailing in our country that Poland did its best to develop partnership and good neighbourly relations with Russia. Among politicians, publicists and the Polish society, there was a large group of people who took a stance, though it was not always formally articulated, that Poland has a right, or even a duty to remain hostile towards Russia. On the other hand, Russia should not act unfavourably towards Poland, regardless of Poland's anti-Russian policy, although, obviously, it was declared otherwise. One of the few stages showing a distinct improvement in Poland's policy towards Russia and a mutual willingness to normalize our political relations, was the one between 2008 and 2010, when an unsuccesful attempt was made at pragmatizing foreign policy towards Russia. Since the end of 2007, this new foreign policy, gradually encompassing other areas, led to a greater or lesser modification of the policy to date towards Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia by basing it on the so-called positive realism. These new trends increased cooperation between Poland and Russia and, eventually, a considerable progress was achieved in normalizing our relations. Between 2008 and 2010, Polish policy towards the East not only changed in practice, it was also a conceptual change. The crash of the presidential plane at Smoleńsk (April 10th, 2010), in which 96 peple were killed, including President of RP Lech Kaczyński and His Spouse, was a major, if not primary reason why the normalization process (2008–2010) was seriously hampered to the point of a standstill between 2011 and 2013. The Smoleńsk air disaster, and conflicting stands over its causes in particular, exacerbated divisions in the Polish society and strenghtened reluctance, if not hostility, towards Russia. A large part of the Polish political class and society did not accept a version of an inadvertent air disaster (plane crash), whose causes, like not following correct procedures, lay on both Poles and Russians. The surveys conducted during the years following the Smoleńsk air disaster showed that over 30% of the Polish society were convinced that it had been an attempt on the life of the Polish delegation en route to a commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Katyn Forrest massacre, and that the Russian government and secret services had been involved. After the Smoleńsk air disaster, foreign policy towards Russia and Polish-Russian relations became a ground for political struggle in our country. For many politicians and conservatist right-wing journalists, a demonstrated degree of anti-Russian sentiment became the main criterion of patriotism. In a large part of the Polish society, a belief was strenghtened that actions should be taken to weaken and isolate Russia, and to minimize, rather than increase cooperation between the two countries. This meant that internal conditions within our country, which could possibly motivate the foreign policy-makers to stop viewing Russia as the main threat and encourage a breakthrough in thinking about that issue, deteriorated markedly. Consequently, Polish-Russian relations between 2011 and 2013 remained in a state of deadlock. In the foreign policy of Poland between 1992 and 2015, Russia played the leading role. This, however, stemmed from Russia being perceived by the policy-makers as the main threat to our national security, not a recognized partner in pursuing this security. Throughout that period, in all successive stages of Polish security policy, Russia was regarded as the main threat. Each political leadership in Poland, especially since the mid 1990s, treated Russia in this way, and these were not merely anti-Russian declarations, but a guiding principle of the foreign policy. Behind it, was a conviction that Russian imperialism was timeless and Russia would never accept the sovereignty of Poland. It was an obvious reference to the classical Polish geopolitical thought about Russia posing main threats to our national security. During the crisis and conflict in eastern Ukraine, between 2014 and 2015, the foreign policymakers in Poland revived the stance of a military threat on the part of Russia. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, such loud voices were heard about a possible military attack on Poland. Unlike the earlier periods, when there was an informal presumption that Russia was a threat to the security of Poland, in 2014, for the first time, in III RP's security policy, Russia was formally pointed to as a direct military threat. It was articulated in official state documents, including Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej from November, 2014, and in addresses delivered by the Polish government officials (for instance in exposé of Foreign Minister R. Sikorski and his follower G. Schetyna). The crisis and conflict in south-eastern Ukraine did not substantially change Poland's policy towards Russia. What did change between 2014 and 2015, however, was that much more emphasis than ever was placed on Russia being a threat to our national security, and there being a serious risk of a Russian direct invasion of Poland. During 2014 and 2015, the process of politicizing fear (policy of fear) of Russia was at its height. For Poland, a major outcome of the Ukrainian conflict and crisis was decreased national security and growing fears, among them the fear of Russian invasion, which does not mean that such a threat was real. During the years 2014 and 2015, Polish-Russian political relations at the highest level came almost to the point of being frozen. Important direct implications of the Ukrainian conflict for Poland's security were, apart from a growing fear of Russia, increased desires towards strenghtening its own defense capability, strenghtening NATO cohesion, increased involvement of NATO in our sub-region's security and closer bilateral Polish-American cooperation regarding military security. Resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine as quickly as possible was in the interests of Poland. However, Polish diplomacy did not engage much in the conflict deescalation. They were very sceptical about the successive agreements aimed at ending the military operations negotiated within the frames of the so-called Normandy format (Mińsk I and Mińsk II). It seems that, considering the geopolitical situation in the Ukraine and divisions of the Ukrainian society, this country should remain a buffer state. Alternatively, coming out of this role should occur gradually, through a simultaneous Europeization of the Ukraine and Russia. Poland should not be interested in the "revolutionary" speeding up of the processes occuring in the Ukrainian society. Responsible politicians willing to serve the best interests of their nation should be aware of the limitations in pursuing even the most support worthy goals. The policy of every country, the foreign policy of Poland and the Ukraine included, should be founded on a realistic assessment of one's own capabilities so that aspirations would not outgrow the real possibilities of their attainment. Poland, aspiring to the role of the EU main expert in Russian and the post-Soviet area affairs, through insisting in the EU on the earliest possible Ukraine association with the EU, contributed in a way to the situation when the Ukraine had to choose between the EU and Russia. Polish politicians did not anticpate the negative outcomes of such acceleration for the Ukraine itself (including the loss of Crimea and strong separatist tendencies in the East of the Ukraine), as well as for Russian- Ukrainian relations and the security of Poland. Therefore, the firm support and involvement of the Polish political class in the so-called democratic revolution in the Ukraine during 2013 and 2014, can hardly be regarded as a succcess. Polish policy towards the East ended in yet another failure, which was shown as confirmation when Poland was not included in the talks aimed at resolving the Ukrainian crisis, which were held by officials from the Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France since the middle of 2014. The Ukrainian crisis and conflict was a turning point in Polish security policy and Polish-Russian relations. The Polish government officially began to treat Russia as the largest threat to the national and international security. A considerable part of the political elites in Poland did not see the threat in excessive dependence of Polish economy on Russian energy resources or other economic threats, but in a direct military attack. Generally speaking, it is unknown to what extent the Ukrainian crisis and conflict will, in the long run, have an impact on changes in Polish policy towards the East, particularly towards Russia and the Ukraine. It exposed the ineffectiveness of our foreign policy to date towards the East. In this context, a question arises: What will be mid- and long-term implications of the Ukrainian conflict for the modification or a radical alteration to Polish foreign policy towards the East? Another fundamental question pertains to Polish-Russian relations: What policy should Poland pursue towards Russia now and in the future? Will the foreign policy and security policy be directed, like in 2014 and 2015, at instransigence and confrontation, or will the normalization tendency prevail as regards Russia, and will the relations with the Ukraine be redefined? However, at the end of 2015, nothing implied that the foreign and security policy-makers intended to transform in any way the policy towards Russia and the Ukraine to date. It does not mean that changes will not be implemented in the years to come. It will be closely connected with the impact of the Ukrainian conflict on the modification of the policy of Germany and the entire European Union as well as the policy of the United States on the post-Soviet area. The crisis and conflict in eastern Ukraine strenghtened the legitimacy of argumentation that the main player in the post-Soviet area is Russia. None of the serious problems in this area can be resolved without the participation of Russia, and all the more, against Russia, which obviously, does not mean that the proponents of this stance overrate the capabilities of Russia in terms of shaping the closer and farther international environment. On this account, Polish policy will be hardly effective if at least some of Russia's interests in the post-Soviet area, especially in Eastern Europe, are taken into consideration, as was proven to date. Bearing in mind long-term consquences, the strategic conceptions of the Polish policy towards the East, should opt for the closest possible ties of Russia with political and economic structures of the EU and Euro-Atlantic structures (Europeization of Russia). This, in turn, should result in the evolution of the economic-political system of Russia into liberal democracy. The Ukrainian crisis and conflict classified the effectiveness of the Polish conception aimed at occidentalizing the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova without simultaneously occidentalizing Russia. As was indicated by the proponents of this conception, its implementation assumed an inevitable cost such as a political conflict with Russia. The crisis and conflict in the Ukraine between 2014 and 2015 should be a good reason to change this stance. The biggest price for its implementation was paid by the Ukraininas themselves. Therefore, in the context of these experiences, Poland should suport not in opposition to Russia, but together with Russia, which does not imply that this process has to be fully synchronized. The direction of actions in this matter is of key importance. Despite the many contentious issues in Polish-Russian relations and different historical memory of Poles and Russians, in the long-term interests of Poland's security, lies implementing a cooperative and integrating, not a confrontational conception. For the normalization of Polish-Russian relations, it is essential that the successive governemnets of Poland and Russia should have a political will to a less confrontational approach towards disputable issues and resolve emerging problems in a compromising way, which is one of the "scarcest commodities" in the Polish-Russian relations. A compromise should not be treated as a failure, as is often believed, also by the Poles. It also requires changes in mutual perception. A true normalization of mutual relations between Poland and Russia will not be possible if the majority of political elites, media and society in both countries will see the other not even as a difficult partner of rival, but an enemy. The divergence of interests does not have to lead to hostility. The governing groups in Poland and Russia face a challenge in improving Polish-Russian relations. They can either attempt to broaden the area of common interests or to highlight the discrepancies and divergence of interests, and thus strenghten social attitudes prone to either cooperation or confrontation.

requires a "renovation" in the face of increasing globalization and new security threats. The European Union and the United States, being the natural pillars of a multipolar world, are aware of need to revive the mutual relationship. France as a one of the traditional European powers strongly determines the shape of transatlantic cooperation. This article attempts to identify the French point of view on the transatlantic relationship. French interests and their perceptions in the security area are important and needs to be taken into account. So then, how France views transatlantic relations? What goals France wants to achieve in the context of transatlantic cooperation? Why France is not "easy" partner for the United States? The article focuses on the issue of economic cooperation liberalization in the light of the EU - the U.S. free trade agreement (under negotiation) and the political and military aspects of cooperation focused around the NATO and the "European Defense" concept.

Since 2005 an increased investment activity of territorial governments in Poland has been noticed. This was possible due to the availability of quite significant funds from the EU non--repayable aid. Investments that are being implemented have led, on the one hand, to the widening of the scope and the improvement of quality of local public services and, on the other hand, to the rise in the maintaining costs of the infrastructure that was brought to life. Investment needs of self--governments are still really high. This article aims to present financial investment opportunities of Polish self governments after the year 2012. Achieving such an aim was possible due to the analysis of historical data concerning revenues and expenses of LSE as well as their forecasts for the future. Study of theliterature was also carried out. Taking into consideration both the revenue and expenditure situation of self-governments and limitations in the indebtedness from 2014, it is possible to state that it is highly likely thata significant number of LSE will not be able to carry out investment activity, including this one, which can be financed from the EU non-repayable aid. Decreasing tax revenues together withincreasing running expenses caused by, among others, increase in the cost of debt service or salaries, will result in the higher difficulty for the self-governments to set investment funds aside.As the forecasted revenues and expenditures of LSE show, keeping the system of financing with no changes will lead to such a situation that LSE neither will be able to carry out investment activity nor pass the budget for the future years. According to the estimates, the number of suchLSEs can equal to 1300. Such a lingering situation in the long run will lead to the deepening of the infrastructural gap between Polish self-governments and better developed European countries.

Russian Federation in Franco‑American relations during the post‑Cold‑War period. This article analyzes the role of Russia in the relations between 5th French Republic and United States of America after 1989. The manuscript suggests that Franco‑American relations in the Russian dimension are based not only on the elements of cooperation but also on rivalry. However it has to be noted, that the reasons of activity in this area are different. On the one hand, French politics focus mostly on European and economic dimension. On the other hand, Russian‑American relations are connected mostly with international security, nonproliferation and disarmament issues. The significance of Russian Federation in bilateral relations is important in the context of main challenges for international security. Despite some differences between France and USA, both countries understand that only the cooperation with Russia will allow to cope with the dangers of the 21st century.