Suchergebnisse

Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of foreign bank assets (FBA) and (FBP) presence is examined on banking stability in the economies with strong and weak country-level corporate governance (CLCG) in Africa between 2006 and 2015.


Design/methodology/approach
Using a Prais–Winsten panel data model of 86 banks in about 30 African economies, findings on how FBA and presence influence banking stability in strong and weak corporate governance economies under different regulatory regimes are reported for the first in Africa.


Findings
The findings show that foreign bank presence (FBP) and assets promote banking stability. However, the positive effect of FBA and presence is enhanced in economies with strong CLCG, whereas the positive effect of FBA and presence is weakened in economies with weak CLCG. After introducing different regulatory regimes, it is observed that the enhancing effect of FBP and assets on banking stability in the full sample and economies with strong and weak CLCG systems is deepened or improved under the loan loss provision regulation regime. However, under the private and public sector-led financial transparency regulations, the reducing effect of FBP and assets on banking stability in economies with weak corporate governance systems is further dampened.


Practical implications
These findings show that the relationship between FBP and assets is deeply shaped by corporate governance systems and regulatory regimes in Africa. Hence, policymakers must build strong corporate governance and sound regulatory regimes to enhance how foreign bank operations promote banking stability.


Originality/value
This study presents first-time evidence on how FBA and presence influence banking stability under strong and weak governance systems while considering different regulatory regimes.

Corporate Governance in African National Development Banks is critical to their success or failure. These Banks have complex corporate governance structures with hierarchies comprising both national government representatives and in some cases the private sector. By focusing on election years this study aimed to show how external interventions from the owners of the Banks (governments) can unduly influence their performance and sustainability. Two causes of weak governance were identified, these were non-independence of the board and broad and unclear mandates. The study shows an increase in lending during election years, suggesting evidence of non-independence of the board signifying undue political influence and wide mandates leading to "mission creeps" usually encouraged by politicians. Non independence has its effects, these were identified as crowding out of the private sector, misallocation of funds and low profitability. A positive correlation was found between the African National Development Bank lending and private bank lending an indication that the African National Development Banks compete with the private banks instead of performing their counter cyclical role, this in turn leads to crowding out the private banks. Misallocat ion of funds is demonstrated by an increase in lending during election years followed by an increase in bad debts two years after the election year, an indication that loans where given to unviable projects. Lastly the study proves the low profitability effect by showing that loans given out are negatively correlated to the Banks profitability, showing a reduction in Bank profitability as more loans are advanced and vice versa. The findings suggest that non-independent boards and wide and broad mandates weaken African National Development Banks corporate governance, negatively affecting their performance and preventing them from executing their mandates effectively.

AbstractResearch Question/IssueThis study examines the effect of weak corporate governance in terms of concentrated ownership, low board effectiveness, low financial transparency and higher shareholder rights on default correlation when firms have different credit qualities.Research Findings/InsightsUsing historical default data in the United States from 2000 to 2015, we find that the degree of default correlation increases disproportionately for firms with concentrated ownership, low board effectiveness, low financial transparency and disclosures, and higher shareholder rights. More importantly, the effect of weak corporate governance on default correlation is high during a financial crisis.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThis is one of the first studies testing the impact of corporate governance on the correlation in corporate defaults. It indicates new avenues of research for both corporate governance and credit risk management in relation to why joint default probabilities vary among firms.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsOur results imply that good corporate governance is essential for credit risk management because poor corporate governance may increase individual default risk and create the domino effect of credit defaults. Practitioners and policy makers should enhance control over poor governance practices to reduce the probabilities of default. Moreover, the impact of corporate governance on correlation in corporate defaults is more pronounced in financial crises and warrants consideration from policy makers to take steps toward cushioning its effects.

Prior empirical evidence supports the wealth expropriation hypothesis that weak corporate governance induced by certain types of ownership structures and board composition tends to result in minority interest expropriation. This in turn reduces corporate value. However, it is still unclear whether corporate financial distress is related to these corporate governance characteristics. To answer this question, we adopt three variables to proxy for corporate governance risk, namely, the percentage of directors occupied by the controlling shareholder, the percentage the controlling shareholders shareholding pledged for bank loans (pledge ratio), and the deviation in control away from the cash flow rights. Binary logistic regressions are then fitted to generate dichotomous prediction models. Taiwanese listed firms, characterised by a high degree of ownership concentration, similar to that in most countries, are used as our empirical samples. The evidence suggests that the three variables mentioned above are positively related to the risk for financial distress in the following year. Generally speaking, firms with weak corporate governance are vulnerable to economic downturns and the probability of falling into financial distress increases.

Japan's high corporate savings might be holding back growth. We focus on the causes and consequences of the current corporate behavior and suggest options for reform. In particular, Japan's weak corporate governance—as measured by available indexes—might be contributing to high cash holdings. Our empirical analysis on a panel of Japanese firms confirms that improving corporate governance would help unlock corporate savings. The main policy implication of our analysis is that comprehensive corporate governance reform should be a key component of Japan's growth strategy

PurposeThis paper aims to analyze existing corporate governance rules which aim to regulate and control the following type of problems: to restore confidence in the financial markets, to reformulate the existing corporate governance systems and mechanisms that have been inadequate, and, finally, to rethink the relationship between ethics and economy. It also aims to identify the factors determining the corporate governance systems and mechanisms in a global economy.Design/methodology/approachThe paper reports the results of a comparative analysis between different corporate governance systems and mechanisms. In addition, in order to explore the role of institutional determinants in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, this study considers variables such as an index of shareholder protection, openness to FDI and the interaction between the two above mentioned variables.FindingsThis analysis confirms the economic theory that less open countries are characterized by stronger ownership restrictions and a weak corporate governance mechanism. Conversely, open market and investment regimes are particularly powerful instruments to attract investment in general and FDI in particular.Originality/valueThis study provides a survey of the main system and mechanisms of corporate governance all supported by a survey of recent developments regarding the empirical analysis on the role of institutional determinants in attracting FDI flows.

This policy paper is motivated by the Government's 'Pakistan: framework for Economic Growth (FEG) 2011' which places weak corporate governance at the top of the 'software' constraints to growth. The efforts to reform the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have stalled in Pakistan for almost five years with significant negative implications not only in terms of fiscal losses, but also deteriorated and cost-ineffective service delivery. The paper suggests a number of urgent policy measures designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of SOEs. These include basic governance reforms, revamped commercialization processes and enhanced market regulations. The paper also provides some perspectives on international experience on SOE reforms combined with some suggestions on how the Government can move forward.

This study examines the relationship between cross-listing and managerial compensation of Chinese firms that concurrently issued A- and B-shares or A- and H-shares during 2001 - 2010. The results show that executive compensation is a positive factor to motivate Chinese A-share firms to cross-list as B- or H-shares; it implies that cross-listings could be employed as a way of asset appropriation at the managers' discretion. The results also confirm that corporate governance is important in determining cross-listings. Under the weak corporate governance institution, Chinese firms were chosen to cross-list based on political considerations rather than on economic merits, serving as a vehicle to signal the quality of state owned enterprises. The results are drawn on agency theory, signalling hypothesis and bonding hypothesis.

The implicit association between firm's success and good corporate governance standards does not find its bold footprint apparently but following corporate collapse the root can easily be traced in the weak corporate governance mechanism. Since April, 2009 the Banks crossed the threshold of Basel II norms wherein corporate governance also receives due acknowledgement in promoting transparency, accountability, and disclosures abiding by the market discipline. A mere report on corporate governance disclosed by the Banks bears no meaning unless its different cells are weighed separately. In this paper the efficacy of Bank's corporate governance practice has been attempted to gauge constructing a disclosure index under different dimensions the Basel II norms carved for banking industry.

"Die Corporate-Governance-Forschung hat sich lange Zeit vor allem auf die Veränderungen in den kontinentaleuropäischen 'Insidersystemen' konzentriert. Nach den dramatischen Unternehmensskandalen in den USA und im Zuge der steigenden Anforderungen an ein 'nachhaltiges Wirtschaften' werden in den letzten Jahren jedoch auch die Veränderungen in den angelsächsischen 'Outsidersystemen' stärker thematisiert. Damit wird die Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie als die bislang dominierende Theorie der Corporate Governance einer grundlegenden Kritik unterzogen. Es verstärkt sich der Ruf nach neuen theoretischen Modellen, die der komplexen Realität dynamischer Corporate-Governance-Systeme besser entsprechen, als das klassische Paradigma. Die kritische Reflexion der Principal-Agent-Annahmen hat in den angelsächsischen Ländern in den letzten Jahren zu einem Aufschwung von Ansätzen und Studien geführt, die gegenüber der traditionellen Forschung breitere Sichtweisen auf die Corporate Governance einnehmen und neue Fragen im Hinblick auf die Gestaltung der Systeme aufwerfen. Die Ergebnisse dieser Forschung werden in Deutschland noch wenig diskutiert. Sie können aber wichtige Impulse für die Diskussion zur Reform der Unternehmensmitbestimmung und Weiterentwicklung der Aufsichtsratsarbeit bieten. Ziel des Literaturberichts ist es, die neueren Ansätze und Studien in Abgrenzung zur Principal-Agent-Theorie darzustellen und damit Ansatzpunkte für eine ressourcen- und prozessbezogene Veränderungsperspektive des deutschen Corporate-Governance-Systems zu entwickeln." (Autorenreferat)

Corporate Governance is significant in managing the financial sector particularly banks of both the developing and the developed nations. Major corporate collapses worldwide revealed the presence of weak corporate governance system. The researcher conducted survey from the finance managers of the five commercial Jordanian banks which revealed that good corporate is significant for the performance of the banks. Good corporate governance balances the conflict of interest among the stakeholders. The participants believed that good corporate governance mechanisms such as transparency, privacy, legislations, code of conduct and clarity of procedures can enhance the efficiency of the banks. They believed that good corporate governance mechanisms effects the bank risks such as it protects the shareholders, stakeholders and reduces or transfers risk and ensures the stability of the economy. Hence, good corporate governance is essential for achieving success of the banking sector and in turn for the economic growth. The participants suggested that implementing good corporate governance in the banks leads to the integration of the capital markets, better solutions of the corporate governance issues and helps in building trust, integrity and transparency.

Ende Mai des Jahres 2000 hat Bundeskanzler Schröder die Regierungskommission Corporate Governance eingesetzt. Der Auftrag der Kommission beschränkt sich nicht nur darauf, Vorschläge zur Verbesserung des gesetzlichen Modells der Unternehmensführung und -kontrolle zu erarbeiten. Die Kommission soll sich darüber hinaus auch mit anderen Bereichen des Aktienrechts, etwa der Unternehmensfinanzierung, befassen. Der Autor, Vorsitzender diese Ausschusses, präsentiert in dem Übersichtsartikel die Rahmenbedingungen der Gründung, die Aufgaben und die Ergebnisse der Corporate Governance-Kommission. Bei Corporate Governance geht es um die Steuerung der Großunternehmen, insbesondere der börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaft. Dabei vor allem um die Kontrolle und das Miteinander der Leitungsorgane, also im deutschen Modell von Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat. Das erste Kapitel umfasst die Anlässe und Ursachen für die Gründung der Regierungskommission, wozu (1) die Globalisierung der Kapitalmärkte, (2) die veränderte Aktienkultur in Deutschland, (3) die Entwicklung der Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologie, (4) der Wettbewerb der Regelsysteme sowie (5) die Bedürfnisse von Venture Capital Unternehmen zählen. Das zweite Kapitel widmet sich der Zusammensetzung bzw. den Beratungen der Corporate Governance-Kommission. Das dritte Kapitel dokumentiert den Bericht der Regierungskommission Corporate Governance. Hier stehen die Aspekte (1) Rechte und Pflichten des Vorstands und des Aufsichtsrats, (2) Partizipation und Rechte der Aktionäre und Anleger, (3) Unternehmensfinanzierung, (4) Unternehmenspublizität, (5) Rechnungslegung und Abschlussprüfung sowie (6) die Entwicklung eines Corporate Governance-Kodex' im Mittelpunkt des Interesses. In einem abschließenden Ausblick äußert sich der Autor zu den zukünftigen Entwicklungen im Bereich Corporate Governance, wie beispielsweise dem Reformbedarf der Innen- und Außenhaftung der Vorstands- und Aufsichtsratsmitglieder.