In: Gesellschaften im Umbau: Identitäten, Konflikte, Differenzen ; Hauptreferate des Kongresses der schweizerischen Sozialwissenschaften, Bern 1995, S. 427-439
This article addresses the problems associated with aircraft noise with or without pilots. It asks whether the administrative measures taken by France and the United Arab Emirates are sufficient and efficient to combat noise pollution. It examines the aeronautical preventive measures, as well as those related to urbanism, before discussing remedial measures for aircraft noise. This article finds that the administrative measures taken by the UAE, in comparison to those of France, are insufficient and ineffective. One of the reasons is that the preventative and suppressive measures reflect the transversal nature of noise: they are both national and international regulations, but they are not homogenous, unitary and structured. Legislative policies, taking into account expert suggestions and opinions, must emerge in the UAE by following the recommendations on the protection of the environment of international institutions, such as ICAO. Thus, the mitigation measures would be used to redistribute aircraft noise to diminish its impact on the most sensitive areas. This article recommends measures such as modifying runways, as well as routes, and special manoeuvres to reduce noise during take-off and approach.
"Cruelty is a specific kind of human behaviour and has a clearly cultural dimension. It is often the result of passions and drives, accompanied by the breaking of taboos and a crossing of boundaries that cultures have raised to prevent the moral regression of mankind. Cruelty is also a "rational" way to acquire and stabilize political power. Both the atrocities themselves and the accusations of cruelty are instruments of power. The political efficiency of cruelty depends on the fear and awe, which it produces. Seneca regarded cruelty as the main attribute of tyranny. Through its imagery (like the bull of Phalaris) it breaks possible resistance and establishes despotism permanently. In the Middle Ages and Early Modern Times cruelty was considered a necessary evil in order to realize superior positive goals. So did the inquisitors, and so did Machiavelli who regarded cruelty not only as a means to the acquisition and preservation of power. The prince should also use cruelty to unify Italy and to build a stable and peaceful political order. Later, the understanding that cruelties are necessary to achieve good ends did not fall into oblivion, in spite of all criticism of Machiavelli's thought. In totalitarianism the aim of cruelty was not primarily the infliction of pain, but the abolition of individualism and the enforcement of the belief in a general law, which rules mankind. This could be either the law of history like during the French Revolution and in socialist states, or the 'natural law' of social Darwinism in the National Socialist and Fascist regimes. After the breakdown of totalitarianism and the triumph of liberal democracy the question arises, if cruelties are necessary components of all politics. Although we can still find cruel policies in liberal democracies (see Guantanamo Bay), at the same time the struggle against cruelty is vital in these systems and explains the dominance of the discourse on human rights." (author's abstract)
Die ungarische Verfassung behauptet, daß die Richter in ihren Entscheidungen unabhängig und erst dem Gesetz unterworfen sind. In einem anderen Artikel der Verfassung steht noch, daß die Entscheidung für Rechtseinheit vom Obersten Gericht für die unteren Gerichte verbindlich ist. Formalrechtlich sind die Richter frei innerhalb des Rahmens der Rechtsvorschriften aber im realen Rechtsleben sind diese Rahmen durch Dutzende der Präjudizien und der Gerichtsausübungen eingeengt.
L'objectif de cette contribution est d'analyser à travers des exemples de programmes politiques de partis d'extrême d'droite d'Allemagne (Afd et NPD), de l'Autriche (FPÖ), de la Belgique (Vlaams Belang), du Danmark (Dans Folkeparti), de la France (FN), des Pays-Bas (PVV) et de la Suède (Sverigedemokraterna) des années 2010 à 2017, comment ces partis se servent de l'implicite dans leurs programmes politiques pour soutenir la stratégie de "normalisation" sans renoncer à leur noyau idéologique d'extrême droite qui est essentiel pour leur électorat traditionnel. Dans cette perspective, il importe aussi d'examiner quelles sont les valeurs et les messages subjacents transportés par l'implicite au service de leurs stratégies. Nous en analyserons deux types de stratégies: les stratégies centrées sur une analyse de la réalité définie par le présupposé et les stratégies centrées sur le sous-entendu. Il est montré comment ces stratégies contribuent à une resémantisation des concepts clés des sociétés démocratiques et sont à même de mettre en péril le consensus démocratique de nos sociétés.
This article analyses the image of the three abrahamic religions in the recent political programs of the French Front National (2012 and 2017) in a comparative perspective with other successful populist radical right-wing parties in EU-Countries of continental Western and Northern Europe. It will be shown that even if there is a common tendency of representing Islam negatively and avoiding overt antisemitism, there are differences with regard to Judaism and/or Israel as well as to the weight of Christianity for the national and/or European culture, which have interesting parallels with the national discourse traditions and the particular radical right-wing history of these parties.