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This paper contributes to the literature on current account imbalances. Econometric analysis of the paper finds evidence that wage centralization, in a cross-section of industrialized economies, significantly improve current accounts through reducing budget deficits. To explain this empirical finding, the paper provides a political economy framework in which the government follows preferences of N-sector workers (majority rule). An increase in public and so, current account deficits by issuing external public debt leads to real appreciation of the currency. As between-sector mobility is constrained by friction in the labor market, wages in N-sector rises. The opposite happens if the government improves the two balances by rising its saving. Thus, N-sector workers relatively support (oppose) more a rise (reform) in the two deficits. Centralization of wage bargaining moderates the benefit and costs from such twin-deficit policies by reducing the responsiveness of sectoral wage with respect to sectoral prices. Thus, the more centralized is the wage determination, the less N-sector workers support (oppose) a rise (reform) in the two deficits. Correspondingly, more centralized wage bargaining reduces the government's political incentive (cost) to deteriorate (reform) the external balance through the fiscal balance.

This paper contributes to the literature on current account imbalances. Econometric analysis of the paper finds evidence that wage centralization, in a cross-section of industrialized economies, significantly improve current accounts through reducing budget deficits. To explain this empirical finding, the paper provides a political economy framework in which the government follows preferences of N-sector workers (majority rule). An increase in public and so, current account deficits by issuing external public debt leads to real appreciation of the currency. As between-sector mobility is constrained by friction in the labor market, wages in N-sector rises. The opposite happens if the government improves the two balances by rising its saving. Thus, N-sector workers relatively support (oppose) more a rise (reform) in the two deficits. Centralization of wage bargaining moderates the benefit and costs from such twin-deficit policies by reducing the responsiveness of sectoral wage with respect to sectoral prices. Thus, the more centralized is the wage determination, the less N-sector workers support (oppose) a rise (reform) in the two deficits. Correspondingly, more centralized wage bargaining reduces the government's political incentive (cost) to deteriorate (reform) the external balance through the fiscal balance.

The Treaty of Maastricht (1993) and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) strongly institutionalised and formalised the relationship between the social partners at the level of the European Union (EU). It is self-evident that notion of social dialogue also includes collective bargaining, the conclusion of agreements between the social partners. Collective bargaining, however, is a delicate flower. Indeed, quite a number of questions pop up over which opinions, especially between the social partners, diverge. Then there is the reality of the power relationship between the European socials partners; the European trade unions are nearly powerless when it comes to pushing the employers to the bargaining table. The social partners were empowered, within the social dialogue, to negotiate agreements, which the European Commission can subsequently adopt as directives (Article 137 to 139 EC). This formalised process, termed bargained legislationE by Biagi (1999), grants the social partners a mandate to initiate legislation in certain areas. Although many other substantial rights and regulations, such as a labour dispute law, are lacking at the European level, the process of bargained legislation is a stronger instrument to influence legislation than most social partners in the European Union member states have at their disposal (BIAGI 1999). Notwithstanding this potential, however, at the inter-industry level only three agreements, affecting substantial portions of the European workforce, have to date been concluded. These covered minimum standards on parental leave, part time work, and fixed-term work (HORNUNG-DRAUS 2001). Since the European Commission introduced some of these topics into the social dialogue as early as 1990, the number of successful agreements must be considered extremely low, and it is only fair to conclude that the new framework did not boost the Europeanisation of industrial relations.

This paper contributes to the literature on current account imbalances. Econometric analysis of the paper finds evidence that wage centralization, in a cross-section of industrialized economies, significantly improve current accounts through reducing budget deficits. To explain this empirical finding, the paper provides a political economy framework in which the government follows preferences of N-sector workers (majority rule). An increase in public and so, current account deficits by issuing external public debt leads to real appreciation of the currency. As between-sector mobility is constrained by friction in the labor market, wages in N-sector rises. The opposite happens if the government improves the two balances by rising its saving. Thus, N-sector workers relatively support (oppose) more a rise (reform) in the two deficits. Centralization of wage bargaining moderates the benefit and costs from such twin-deficit policies by reducing the responsiveness of sectoral wage with respect to sectoral prices. Thus, the more centralized is the wage determination, the less N-sector workers support (oppose) a rise (reform) in the two deficits. Correspondingly, more centralized wage bargaining reduces the government's political incentive (cost) to deteriorate (reform) the external balance through the fiscal balance.

This paper focuses on the role that wage centralization may play regarding the endogenous determination of the scope of firm–union bargaining. Findings suggest that, as long as the alternative wage is sufficiently low, compliance with the centralized (minimum) wage deal is sustained by wage‐takers (small inefficient employers and their employees), and 'labour demand' proves to be an equilibrium bargaining arrangement for wage‐setters (large efficient employers and their workers' union). Otherwise, and also if union power is low enough, 'efficient bargains' may be unanimously chosen by the latter agents, as a strategic device to counter losses arising from wage‐undercutting rivalry.

"Dieser Aufsatz diskutiert die Effizienz- und Gerechtigkeitseffekte des Tarifsystems am Beispiel jener wirtschafts- und sozialpolitischen Steuerungsfunktionen des tariflichen Zentralisationsgrades, die für Fragen der ökonomischen Effizienz und der sozialen Gerechtigkeit besonders relevant sind: die Fähigkeit zur Internalisierung lohnpolitischer Externalitäten (d.h. zur Abstimmung der Tarifpolitik mit gesamtwirtschaftlichen Erfordernissen) und zur Einflussnahme auf die Lohnstruktur. Auf der Grundlage eines internationalen Vergleichs wird untersucht, in welcher Weise die Fähigkeit zur Internalisierung der Externalitäten und zur Beeinflussung der Lohnstruktur mit dem jeweiligen tariflichen Zentralisationsgrad variieren. Es zeigt sich, dass einerseits die Nivellierung der Lohnstruktur signifikant mit dem Zentralisationsgrad zunimmt, andererseits die Internalisierung von Externalitäten bei unterschiedlichen Zentralisationsniveaus gewährleistet ist, sofern die 'Verpflichtungsfähigkeit' des Tarifsystems strukturell verankert ist. Dies bedeutet, dass bei gegebener Verpflichtungsfähigkeit die Effizienz des Tarifsystems mit jedem beliebigen Zentralisationsniveau und damit mit jedem beliebigen Gerechtigkeitsziel vereinbar ist." (Autorenreferat)