Suchergebnisse

Wages are a vital economic variable in their influence on employment and unemployment and as the main source of personal income, affecting both living standards and labour incentives. Wage determination is studied here in an international perspective, using a common theoretical framework and statistical method through the individual country chapters to reveal similarities and differences between Japan, South Korea, the United States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany and France.

Le Van Ha onderzocht de invloed van het beloningsbeleid van ambtenaren op corruptie. Op basis van een steekproef van 76 landen toont Le aan dat het effect van ambtelijke lonen op corruptie wordt beïnvloed door het inkomen per capita. Als het inkomen per capita relatief laag is, leidt een toename van ambtelijke lonen tot minder corruptie. Dit negatieve effect wordt kleiner naarmate het inkomensniveau stijgt. De intuïtie is dat onbeduidende corruptie ('petty corruption') gangbaarder is in arme landen en dat goedbetaalde ambtenaren hiervan afzien. Naarmate het inkomensniveau stijgt, neemt corruptie ook een meer omvangrijke vorm aan. Deze zogenaamde 'grand corruption' leidt tot opbrengsten waartegen, in de ogen van de corrupte ambtenaar, een hoger salaris niet opwegen. Grand corruption is ook moeilijker om op te sporen. Het verhogen van ambtelijke lonen is dan geen efficiënte maatregel om deze vorm van corruptie tegen te gaan.

This paper presents a quality theory for labour. Analytical solutions for the equilibrium demand for labour quality equation and the equilibrium wage equation are computed. Wage differentials can be explained by variations in labour quality. A method that yields consistent estimates for all the parameters of the equilibrium demand for labour quality equation, the labour quality index equation, and the equilibrium wage equation is also presented. To illustrate the methodology an application is presented that focuses on the market for seminars and the wages and quality characteristics of trainers.

The essential feature of a perfectly competitive labour market
is that workers who accept jobs can expect to receive compensation equal
to their opportunity cost. Firms pay a wage which is just sufficient
enough, to attract workers of the quality they desire and no higher
[Krueger and Summers (1988)]. Overall, the markets do not follow the law
of one price, contradicting the competitive framework. This is where the
problem of wage differentials across different industries needs to be
assessed, and has also been the focus of many studies over the years,
mainly in the industrialised countries, e.g. USA, European Countries.
However, the issue of wage differentials has been addressed by very few
studies in the developing countries [Arbache (2001) and Erdil, et al.
(2001)]. Wage differentials analysis in developing countries should also
have equal importance as in the industrialised countries, in order to
gauge the effect of the corporate culture and
centralisation/decentralisation on the different industries and labour
market of those developing countries.

In many developed countries, racial and ethnic minorities are paid, on average, less than the native white majority. While racial wage differentials are partly the result of immigration, they also persist for racial minorities of second and further generations. Eliminating racial wage differentials and promoting equal opportunities among citizens with different racial backgrounds is an important social policy goal. Inequalities resulting from differences in opportunities lead to a waste of talent for those who cannot reach their potential and to a waste of resources if some people cannot contribute fully to society.

We analyze the effects, on nonredistributive taxation and on migrations, of wage differentials existing between two countries (regions) differing by the size of their population. Residents, otherwise identical, are heterogeneous because they incur different migration costs. Each resident compares the post-tax amount of money at home with the one obtained abroad, including the cost of migration. The government in each country maximizes the tax product in order to provide the largest possible amount of public good. We first assume that the income of citizens are identical across countries. Then, we assume that wages differ from one country to the other. We prove the existence of an equilibrium for any configuration of wage and any different relative size of the countries (regions). Then, we compute and characterize the equilibrium for any set of parameters, size and wage differential.

We analyze the effects, on nonredistributive taxation and on migrations, of wage differentials existing between two countries (regions) differing by the size of their population. Residents, otherwise identical, are heterogeneous because they incur different migration costs. Each resident compares the post-tax amount of money at home with the one obtained abroad, including the cost of migration. The government in each country maximizes the tax product in order to provide the largest possible amount of public good. We first assume that the income of citizens are identical across countries. Then, we assume that wages differ from one country to the other. We prove the existence of an equilibrium for any configuration of wage and any different relative size of the countries (regions). Then, we compute and characterize the equilibrium for any set of parameters, size and wage differential.