Suchergebnisse

Hibridno ratovanje ne predstavlja nov i revolucionaran pristup u ostvarivanju političkih ciljeva. Navedeno je temeljna pretpostavka ove doktorske disertacije koja je potvrĎena kroz znanstveno istraţivanje i komparativnu analizu tri studije slučaja. Pokušaj stvaranja Velike Srbije, zbog činjenice da se relativno nedavno odvijao na teritoriju Republike Hrvatske, najrelevantniji je slučaj kada govorimo o aktualnim vanjskopolitičkim i obrambenim izazovima Republike Hrvatske. Izraelsko-libanonski rat iz 2006. godine smatra se oglednim primjerkom hibridnog rata izmeĎu drţavnog i nedrţavnog aktera. Rat Rusije i Ukrajine i aneksija Krima najrecentniji je primjer hibridnog rata izmeĎu dva drţavna aktera, i katalizator koji je aktualizirao pojam hibridnog rata, pokrenuo meĎunarodnu zajednicu i NATO savez da preispitaju svoj pristup suvremenom ratovanju. Ova disertacija temelji na se razmatranju ratova s vojnopolitičkog stajališta, a kombiniranjem tri teorijska okvira odabrano je 16 čimbenika koji karakteriziraju hibridnog aktera. Teorijskom analizom sve tri studije slučaja potvrĎeno je da hibridnom ratu prethodi period političkih, ideoloških ili sličnih neslaganja izmeĎu suprotstavljenih strana, tijekom kojeg hibridni akter nastoji širiti vlastiti narativ i otvoreno ili prikriveno provodi aktivnosti koje će mu dati prednost u ratu. Provedbom istraţivanja u tri rata testirana je prisutnost svakog pojedinog čimbenika hibridnog modela, a komparacijom rezultata utvrĎeno je da su odreĎeni čimbenici bili, u većoj ili manjoj mjeri, prisutni u sva tri rata. Unatoč činjenici da slučajevi pripadaju različitom geopolitičkom kontekstu, da su se odvijali u različitom vremenskom razdoblju i na različitoj zemljopisnoj lokaciji, prisutnost čimbenika u sva tri rata potvrĎuju pretpostavku da hibridni rat nije ništa novo. ; Hybrid warfare does not represent a new and revolutionary approach to the realization of political goals. This is the central hypothesis of this doctoral dissertation which has been tested by scientific research and comparative analysis of three post Cold War, geographically and chronically dispersed case studies. The first case study encompasses the initial attempt to create a Greater Serbia at the territorial expense of the Republic of Croatia which occurred in the early 1990's within the context of Yugoslavia's dissolution. The second case study details the Israeli - Hezbollah war of 2006 which is considered by many to be a textbook example of a state versus non-state actor conflict. Finally, the third case study analyzes the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine (including the Russian annexation of Crimea) which has popularized the term "hybrid warfare" and acted as a catalyst in initiating NATO re-examination of its approach to contemporary security threats. This dissertation analyzes the manifestation of hybrid war from a military and political perspective, and to characterize hybrid actors, it makes use of sixteen individual factors derived from three established theoretical frameworks. Theoretical analysis of the three case studies suggests that in all three cases open warfare was preceded by a period of political, ideological or other conflict between the opposing parties. In all instances, the hybrid actor made use of this period to promulgate its narrative, while at the same time covertly or overtly undertaking activities designed to ensure an advantage upon the onset of violence. The presence of each individual factor of the combined theoretical framework was determined through research, and a comparison of the results proves that certain characteristics are present, in varying degree, in all three conflicts. Despite occurring in different geopolitical circumstances, in different chronological periods, and in different geographical locations, the presence of hybrid factors in all three conflicts confirms the initial hypothesis that hybrid warfare is not a new phenomenon.

After the breakup of the USSR, and the several rounds of Post-Cold War enlargements of the Western integrations, once large space of newly independent and geopolitically uncontrolled European post-communist states, located between the EU, NATO and Russia, contracts geopolitically and 'wanders' strategically. The three states, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, located on Russia's western borders share about three thousand kilometers of borders with the EU and NATO, and about two thousand and five hundred kilometers with Russia, which implicates that they are prone to the geopolitical influences from their surroundings. This Interspace of the three states lies inside the strategic triangle comprised of: 1) Russia - geopolitically and militarily powerful state as well as a giant considering its energy reserves, which makes her relatively strong 'hard' power as well as a significant 'soft' power; 2) the EU - economic giant on the global level that is not unified enough; has domestic problems and is partially dependent on Russia when it comes to energy, a civilian power without 'hard' power that in its foreign relations relies on policies based on financial assistance, assurance, and attractiveness; 3) NATO, led by the USA - the most powerful military-political-security 'hard' power that exists today; it does not have the kind of influence on Europe and the Post-Soviet space that it had in the 90-ies. However, as a consequence of subordination of the Interspace that lasted for a couple of centuries, the common characteristics intrinsic to this space occur: ambiguous identities; deficits in the democratic practices; complicated, prolonged and incomplete transition; economic decline, demographic problems - all of which favor a strategic 'adoption' of the Interspace by the Kremlin, a former imperial master. At the same time, a relative marginalization of the Interspace is evident regarding the processes of Euro-Atlantic integration. After the unsuccessful attempts of 'pulling out' Kiev, Kishinev, and the South Caucasian Tbilisi from this Russian sphere of influence, the states positioned in the Interspace, together with Russia, comprise a regional security complex, a stabilized geopolitical 'Russosphere' that is a key part of the Kremlin's attempts for Eurasian reintegration under Russia's leadership. Adapted from the source document.

Namjera je rada ukazati na problematiku izmijenjene naravi ratovanja u posljednjih nekoliko desetljeća 20. i 21. stoljeća, s osobitim naglaskom na problem korištenja sve većeg broja djece ratnika. Osnovna je teza rada ta da je praksa korištenja i regrutiranja djece u oružanim sukobima diljem svijeta najmanje prepoznata i najviše zanemarena forma zlostavljanja djece u suvremenom društvu te da je ona manje stvar kulture i nepostojanja stave društva prema vrijednostima djeteta, a više stvar pragmatizma i općenito socioekonomski fenomen. Očekivani doprinos rada ide u smjeru isticanja i prepoznavanja najtežih oblika zlostavljanja djeteta i posljedica zlostavljanja, kao što su to loši zdravstveni ishodi i razaranje njihova života, te u smjeru pronalaska mogućih rješenja spomenutog problema. ; The intention of this paper is to highlight the issues of the changed nature of warfare in the last few decades of the twentieth and twenty-first century, with particular emphasis on the use and availability of the children warriors or children soldiers. The basic hypothesis is that the practice of the use and recruitment of children in armed conflicts around the world is an unknown form of worldwide child abuse in contemporary society, and it is less the matter of culture and the lack of attitude of society towards the value of a child, and more the matter of pragmatism and a socioeconomic phenomenon. The expected contribution of this paper goes towards recognizing and highlighting the most serious forms of child abuse, consequences such as poor health outcomes, and the destruction of their lives. Finally, the aim is to find possible solutions to these problems.

U suvremenom zapadnom društvu terorizam je postao kulturalni simbol straha te je samim time postao referentni okvir za evaluaciju bilo kakvih drugih oblika ugroze ljudskoj sigurnosti. Pokušaji donošenja univerzalne definicije terorizma nikada nisu rezultirali uspjehom, a razlog tomu je njegova situacijska i pejorativna priroda te preklapanje s drugim formama političkog nasilja (gerilsko ratovanje, pobune i slično). Na tom tragu, prikazivanje određenih fenomena i događaja kao terorističkih može biti stvar subjektivne konstrukcije značenja tog pojma. Stoga je u ovom radu, uz metodu kritičke analize diskursa protuterorističkih strategija Europske unije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, prikazano kako se konstruira strah od terorizma u kolektivnoj svijesti zapadnog društva, te su komparativnom analizom utvrđene sličnosti i razlike u provođenju politike straha od strane zapadnih političkih elita. Rezultati analiza ukazuju kako se prikaz prijetnje koju terorizam predstavlja zapadnom svijetu ne temelji na činjenicama, nego na zamišljanju najgorih mogućih ishodišnih scenarija terorističkih napada. ; Terrorism has become a cultural symbol of fear in contemporary Western society and therefore a frame of reference for evaluation of any other type of threat to human security. Attempts to universally define terrorism have never been succesful because of its situational and pejorative nature and overlap with other forms of political violence (guerilla warfare, insurgency etc.). Consequently, representation of certain phenomena and events as terrorist can be a matter of subjective construction. Therefore, by applying method of critical discourse analysis to counterterrorism strategies of the European Union and the United States of America, it is shown how the fear of terrorism in collective consciousness of Western society is constructed. In addition, comparative analysis method shows similarities and differences in conduction of politics of fear by western political elites. Results of analysis indicate that the representation of terrorist threat to Western society is based not on facts but on imagining worst-case scenarios of terrorist attack.

U tekstu koji slijedi dat ćemo pregled organizacijskoga razvoja Jugoslavenske narodne armije u Narodnoj/Socijalističkoj Republici Hrvatskoj tijekom 60-ih godina. U tom periodu provedeno je nekoliko reorganizacija Armije. Cijelo desetljeće počinje reorganizacijom "Drvar" u drugoj polovini 1959., na bazi uvođenja koncepcije takozvane općenarodne obrane i očekivanoga nuklearnog rata, preko nekoliko reorganizacija između 1964. i 1968., pa do vremena nakon agresije snaga Varšavskoga pakta na Čehoslovačku. Članak je nastao na bazi arhivske građe koja se čuva u Upravi za organizaciju, Vojnom arhivu i Muzeju Jugoslovenskoga ratnog vazduhoplovstva, sve u sastavu Ministarstva odbrane Republike Srbije u Beogradu, te dvaju prethodno objavljenih autorovih radova koji se bave istom tematikom, ali u širem vremenskom kontekstu. ; The article provides an overview of the organisational development of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) in the Socialist Republic of Croatia (SRC) during the 1960s. The organisational development of YPA units in the SRC was generally almost identical to that of YPA units in the other Yugoslav republics. The development of the Navy, however, was different. There were several organisational changes that affected the YPA units in the SRC in this period. The first of these was the plan 'Drvar' in 1959, which introduced many new organisational forms inspired by experiences from Yugoslav Partisan warfare in World War II and by war in expected nuclear conditions. Due to some radical solutions that actually burdened the functioning of the YPA, a new organisational plan, 'Drvar II', was introduced in 1964 to amend this. It was followed by further reorganisations: one in 1965, which adjusted the names and traditions of the Partisan units and existing YPA units, another in 1966–1968, entitled 'Snaga' (Power), which led to the downsizing of the YPA following the notion in the highest Yugoslav military circles that foreign aggression was only possible from the NATO side. The sudden Warsaw Pact aggression on Czechoslovakia in August 1968 brought change in the Yugoslav perception of possible aggressors, which now included the neighbouring communist countries. This led to another organisational change entitled 'Snaga II'. Looking from a distance, it seems that organisational changes in the YPA during the 1960s were endless. The article also notes the YPA turn to the Soviet Union for the purchasing of the modern military equipment, ranging from main battle tanks to supersonic fighters. It was written on the basis of the still-restricted sources of the Yugoslav General Staff that are kept in the Organisational Department of the Republic of Serbia's Ministry of Defence.

Plemićka vojna akademija u Bečkom Novom Mjestu otvorena je 1752. o državnom trošku, a cilj habsburških vlasti bio je da bude komplementarna viteškoj akademiji Terezijanumu (osnovan 1746. pod isusovačkom upravom). Naime, ondje su se školovali mladi plemići za rad u civilnoj službi, dok je Bečko Novo Mjesto bilo namijenjeno obrazovanju časnika. Marija Terezija osigurala je stipendije za četristotinjak kadeta iz siromašnijih plemićkih obitelji, kao i za sinove zaslužnih časnika koji su dokazali lojalnost u vojnoj službi. Prije Plemićke akademije dječaci mlađi od 14 godina pohađali su tzv. Pripremnu vojnu školu u Beču. Obje ustanove spojene su 1769. u c. i k. Terezijansku vojnu akademiju. Učiteljski kadar, koji je isprva bio samo svjetovni, tj. časnički, nastavljao je tradiciju humanističkih i baroknih viteških akademija te usvajanja "viteških vještina i vojnih vrlina" koje su bile usmjerene više na fizičku spremnost nego na stjecanje suvremenih znanja o ratovanju koja su bila potrebna za profesionalizaciju vojske. U radu se prikazuju reforme i promjene koje su se provodile na Akademiji za vrijeme Marije Terezije i Josipa II. u nastojanju da se osuvremeni časničko obrazovanje i da se uz pomoć prosvjetiteljskih načela razvije nadnacionalni "austrijski patriotizam" koji bi bio glavni temelj lojalnosti budućih časnika. Ta nastojanja kulminirala su za vrijeme uprave prosvijetljenog pedagoškog pisca, austrijskog generala i češkog grofa Franza Josepha Kinskog (1779.-1805.), čiji su odgajateljski koncepti i djelovanje opširnije predstavljeni. ; The Noble Military Academy at Wiener Neustadt was opened in 1752 at state expense, and the aim of the Habsburg authorities was to make it a counterpart of the Theresianum Knight Academy (founded in 1746 under the Jesuit administration). Young noblemen were trained there for work in civil service, while the academy at Wiener Neustadt was intended for officer education. Maria Theresa secured scholarships for ca. four hundred cadets from poorer noble families, as well as for sons of deserving senior officers. Boys under the age of 14 attended the so-called Preparatory Military School in Vienna before being admitted at the Wiener Neustadt Noble Military Academy. Both institutions were merged in 1769 into one Imperial and Royal Theresian Military Academy. Teachers, who were at first only secular, that is, coming from the officer class, continued the tradition of humanist and baroque knight academies and the adoption of "knightly skills and military virtues," aimed at the acquisition of physical readiness rather than the contemporary knowledge of warfare needed to professionalize the army. This paper presents the reforms and changes that took place at the Theresian Military Academy during the reign of Maria Theresa and Joseph II with the intention of modernizing officer education and developing the supra-national "Austrian patriotism" based on the Enlightenment principles as the main foundation of the future officers' loyalty. These efforts culminated during the command of the enlightened pedagogical writer, the Austrian general and Bohemian aristocrat, Franz Joseph Kinsky (1779-1755), whose educational concepts and actions are here extensively presented.

Autor donosi prikaze osobnih proučavanja utvrđenih zbijenih naselja na položajima Gradina na Prizni, na sjevernom obalnom rubu Velebitskog kanala i utvrde Sutojanj na sjevernom rtu otoka Paga. To su primjeri utvrda, koje se uklapaju u cirkummediteransku sliku kastrizacije primjerene epohi cara Justinijana I. (527.-565.). Osvrtanje na spomenuta dva primjera utvrda od posebne je važnosti, jer s preostalim utvrdama uz sjevernu obalu Velebitskog kanala zapravo ocrtava početke procesa kastrizacije na arhipelagu i istočnom pročelju Jadrana. Taj je proces ujedno odredio i oblikovanje osebujnog kulturnog krajobraza na svršetku kasne antike i početku ranoga srednjeg vijeka u kojem će Bizantsko Carstvo, posredovanjem urbanih središta, dati znatan prinos. ; Taking as an example a part of the Velebit coastal area and the Pag archipelago group in the northern Dalmatian islands, in our paper dedicated to Nenad Cambi, whose work and life we are celebrating, we look at two important points in the area. Concerned are the positions of the fortification complexes of Gradina on Prizna, on the northern coastal rim of the Velebit Channel, located opposite the fortress of Sutojanj on the northern point of Pag Island. These are examples of fortified compact settlements with important components, or ports, which fit into the circum-Mediterranean image of the castrification typical of the epoch of Emperor Justinian I (527-565). Reference to these two examples of forts is particularly important, for with the other fortifications along the northern coast of the Velebit Channel the beginnings of the process of the castrification in the archipelago and along the eastern facade of the Adriatic can be depicted. This process also defined the beginnings of the Early Middle Ages. During summer and late autumn 1989 and 1990 the present author carried out a detailed reconnoitre of the field in the area from the strait of Novsko ždrilo in the south east to Donja Prizna on the south west of the Velebit Channel. Also carried out was an immediate field autopsy of the western part of the island of Pag. During these investigations an endeavour was made to verify the hypothesis that there are several new sites, or sites not well enough known to scholarship, on which there are significant characteristics of military construction from the time of the early rule of Byzantium in the Adriatic. From the field walking and remote research and the interpretation of monumental complexes and visits to the fortifications in Prizna and Sutojanj, it is possible to conclude that the archaeological facts found can persuade us that they belonged to a very important cultural and historical bridge across which Late Antiquity we gradually transited into the Early Middle Age. This is a very interesting transitional period marked by the widely ranging activity of the Eastern Roman Emperor Justinian I (537-565). The consequences of this activity are revealed on the eastern facade and the archipelago of the Adriatic and in its hinterland with a unique organisation of the physical space, with the building of new types of fort, with the renovation of the fortifications of urban centres, with marked secular and religious construction going on in every corner of the vast empire, then with the thallasocracy in the Mediterranean, and its northernmost gulf, the Adriatic. The new urbanism on the classical base, the victorious progress of Christianity marked by the policy and personality of Justinian I, the wide ranging commerce over great distances, founded on well distributed artistic and artisanal work, then warfare at several theatres of war, all changed the organisation of the space and created new cultural landscapes. Such landscapes, with their new place names, particularly the hagyotoponyms and the lasting points of reference - the forts and churches, were turned into a part of the world heritage that should be the subject of scholarly research, evaluation and presentation as added value to the tourist product. The epoch of Justinian I had a crucial influence on the beginnings of the formation of the early Middle Ages and at the same time preceded the long-lasting presence of the Byzantine Empire in the urban centres up and down the easternmshores of the Adriatic.

U"terra interior", u BiH, kao i u njezinom okruženju, zaplelo se u izvitoperene forme demokracije, u demokrature, u ne-pravne i prazne države koje su porazile svoje građane. U njima se u osnovi i danas kontraproduktivno slijede modeli "nacije države", iluzija o preklapanju teritorijalnog i nacionalnog, identitarne jednosti, dok se u svijetu slijede logike transnacionalnih umreženja i jednakopravnosti građana svih oformljenih identiteta. Posebice u BiH se ne razumije vlastita identitarna višestrukost, te iz nje logična nužnost ukotvljenosti skupnih prava u individualna ljudska prava i slobode, pa potom skrb i o jednima i drugima u svakoj administrativnoj jedinici. Radi se o samoj suštini novog liberalizma i kulturološkog senzibilizma putem kojih se djeluje i u mnogonacionalnim državama s autohtono oformljenim identitetima i u polietničkim zajednicama s tzv. useljeničkim identitetima na formiranju političkih zajednica jednakopravnih građana svih identiteta. I u jednima i u drugima se primijenjuju demokratske metode upravljanja razlikama, u koje se ubrajaju: hegemonistička kontrola; arbitraža (intervencija treće strane); kantonizacija i/ili federalizacija; te konsocijativizam kao sporazumna podjela moći. U BiH i nije uopće moguće primijeniti iskustva tzv. hegemonističke kontrole ili ravnoteže, ma koliko sve tri ko-nacije rado izigravaju "hegemona", pa je nužna paradigma nenasilja i u mišljenju zasebitosti, navlastitosti i zajedništva u javnim politikama. Nažalost, takvo što nije u izgledu, jer skoro nitko ne razmišlja u kategorijama "svjetskog ethosa", ćudorednosti u unutarnjoj i vanjskoj politici, o balansima konsocijativne i većinske demokracije, o institucionalnoj jednakopravnosti, o ravnotežama nacionalnog i građanskog. Do toga bi se, pak, moglo i moralo stići putem međunacionalnih dijaloga, a ne unutar nacionalnih monologa, te nužnim kompromisom, jer se do održivih rješenja i ne može stići "ratom referata" i politikama sukobljavanja i zgađivanja (containment policy) međusobno bliskih identiteta u kulturološkom pogledu. I zbog toga bi se moralo žurno prestati oglušavati o odluke Europskog suda za ljudska prava u Strasbourgu, o rezolucije Europskog parlamenta i o poruke europskih čelnika o potrebi "zajedničkog upravljanja" i govora jednim glasom u ime BiH u odnosima i s EU i cijelim svijetom. BiH potrebuje "treći modus": alternativan pristup i etnonacionalističkom i tzv lijevo-građanskom redukcionizmu. Ma koliko bili majušni, možda bi Hrvati u BiH trebali - posvuda gdje su u većini - pokazati da je u BiH moguće napraviti "političku zajednicu" jednakopravnih građana svih ko-nacija i građana svih drugih identiteta. Možda bi ih potom i drugi slijedili? ; In "terra interior", in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in its surroundings, unnatural forms of democracy are imposed in the non-legal and empty states that have defeated their citizens. In them are followed contradictory models of "nation-states", an illusion of overlapping territorial and national, unity of identities, while in the world there are logics of transnational networking and equality of citizens of all created identities. Particularly in BiH, one does not understand its own plurality of identities, and the logical necessity of integrating collective rights into individual human rights and freedoms and then caring for one another in every administrative unit. It is about the very essence of the new liberalism and cultural sensibility through which it is operated in many multiethnic states with indigenous identities and in the polyethnic communities with the so-called immigrant identities on the formation of political communities of equal citizens of all identities. In both are applied democratic methods of government, which include: hegemonic control; arbitration (third party intervention); cantonization and/or federalization; and consociation as an agreement power division. In BiH, it is not possible to apply the so-called experiences of hegemonic control or equilibrium, no matter how much the three nations would gladly play "hegemons", so the paradigm of nonviolence is necessary in the thinking of detachment, peculiarities and common public policies. Unfortunately, this is unlikely because almost no one is thinking of the categories of "world ethos", of morality in internal and external politics, of the balances of the consociational and majority democracy, of institutional equality, of national and civil equilibrium. This could be achieved through inter-ethnic dialogues, not within national monologues, and with the necessary compromise, as sustainable solutions cannot be achieved through "verbal warfare" and politics of conflict and aggravation (containment policy) of mutually close identities in the cultural sense. And it should be promptly stopped with the denying of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, the resolutions of the European Parliament and the messages of European leaders about the need for "shared rule" and speak through one-voice on behalf of BiH in relations with the EU and the world as a whole. In as much as they might be small in numbers, perhaps Croats in BiH should first - wherever they are majority- show that in BiH it is possible to create a "political community" of equal citizens of all co-nations and citizens of all other identities. Maybe the others would then follow them?