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Official publication of the Chemical Warfare Service, Feb. 1944-Aug. 1945. ; Description based on: Vol. 20, no. 4 (Oct. 1934). ; Mode of access: Internet.

Gentlemen, psychological warfare is an elaborate and curently popular label for a wide variety of subjects. I cannot present specifically naval doctrine to you, nor is it my province to delineate those distinctions which—in sound naval theory­—should prevail between psychological warfare, political warfare, "special operations," economic warfare, sabotage activities, guer­rilla warfare, and a variety of other related subjects.

"The bush warfare referred to here is principally West African." --Pref. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Throughout U.S. history, the American military services have had an unfortunate penchant for not being ready for the next war. Part of the problem has had to do with factors beyond their control: the American policy has been notoriously slow to respond to the challenges posed by dangerous enemies. On the other hand, American military institutions have been surprisingly optimistic in weighing their preparedness as they embarked on the nation's wars. The first battles involving American military forces hardly give reason for optimism. The initial defeats in the War of 1812, Bull Run, Belleau Woods, Savo Island, Kasserine Pass, Task Force Smith, and Landing Zone Albany hardly suggest unalloyed success by America's military in preparing for the next war. Admittedly, in each of its major wars the United States did enjoy the luxury of time to repair the deficiencies that showed up so glaringly in the country's first battles. Unfortunately, in the 21st century the United States may not have that luxury of time. Whatever approaches the American military take to innovation, war will occur. And it will provide a harsh audit. Almost certainly the next war will take the United States by surprise. U.S. military institutions may well have prepared for some other form of warfare, in some other location. To paraphrase Omar Bradley: it may well be the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time. But there it will be, and the American military will have to fight that conflict on its terms rather than their own. Unfortunately, military history is replete with examples of military institutions that have refused to adapt to the real conditions of war, but rather have attempted to impose their own paradigm--no matter how irrelevant or ill-suited to the actual conditions. If we cannot predict where the next war will occur or what form it will take, there are some things for which the American military can prepare as they enter the next millennium. Obviously, the services have to prepare the physical condition and training of soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen. But equally important, they must prepare the minds of the next generation of military leaders to handle the challenges of the battlefield. And that mental preparation will be more important than all the technological wizardry U.S. forces can bring to bear in combat. Most important in that intellectual preparation must be a recognition of what will not change: the fundamental nature of war, the fact that fog, friction, ambiguity, and uncertainty will dominate the battlefields of the future just as they have those of the past. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1153/thumbnail.jpg

On October 15th, 2020, the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) Vancouver hosted its sixth Digital Roundtable event of the year, Intrastate Warfare. The presentation was conducted by guest speaker Dr. Arjun Chowdhury, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. Dr. Chowdhury's presentation delivered a historical overview of types of conflicts, and a brief analysis on the patterns of conflicts and whether they have changed over a period of approximately 200 years, with a particular focus on the last 50 years. He described two types of war, interstate and intrastate, mentioning trends in intrastate war and the contrast to interstate war, as well as the consequences to life expectancy and infrastructure in the regions affected by intrastate wars. Subsequently, Dr. Chowdhury answered questions submitted by the attendees, which elaborated on the concepts of interstate and intrastate wars, using current examples such as, COVID-19, right-wing extremism, cybercrimes, and foreign aid. APA Citation CASIS Vancouver. (2020). Intrastate warfare. The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare, 3(2), 66-71. https://journals.lib.sfu.ca/index.php/jicw/article/view/2411/1814.

ROTH, Jonathan P 2009. Roman Warfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pbk. R250. ISBN 978-0-521-53726-1.Jonathan Roth of San Jose State University, known as an expert on military logistics, has written this attractive Cambridge Introduction to Roman Civilization volume on Roman Warfare. The series is designed for students with no prior knowledge of Roman antiquity. The book comprises an Introduction on Sources and Methods (pp. 1-6) and 15 chapters on Roman warfare from the beginnings to the fall of the Western Empire in AD 476, using a chronological approach. There are 68 illustrations and maps, a Timeline, a Glossary, a Glossary of People, a Bibliography (which includes several websites) and an Index.

Businesses are under attack. State and non-state adversaries are assaulting companies using drones, mercenaries, cyberweapons, sanctions, and restrictions. Instead of military installations and government institutions, private firms are often the preferred targets in this mode of warfare. Instead of soldiers and squadrons with bullets and bombs, the weapons of choice are frequently economic hostilities and cyberattacks. This is the new war on business. This Article offers an original examination of contemporary business warfare, its growing importance to national and corporate affairs, and the need for better pragmatic approaches to understanding and addressing its rising threat to our economic stability, national security, and social welfare. It begins by providing an overview of the business theater of war, investigating the combatants, targets, and weapons. Next, this Article analyzes recent episodes of business warfare involving the United States, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China to ground the theoretical discussion in the real world. These case studies illustrate the complex matrix of considerations posed by business warfare. The Article then contends with the fundamental legal and practical tensions of economic impact, business hostilities, cyberattacks, and non-state actors that emanate from business warfare. Finally, moving from problems to solutions, this Article proposes three workable initiatives to better protect firms and nations against the risks of business warfare. Specifically, it argues for robust business war games, smart cybersecurity guidance and incentives, as well as greater supply chain and market diversification. Ultimately, this Article aspires to provide a practical blueprint for government and corporate leaders to reflect, plan, and act with more urgency about the consequential realities of business warfare.

Despite a long history, riverine operations have received only scant attention from the academic community and military analysts. The little writing that exists on the topic tends to be either personal memoir or tactical instruction, with serious analyses few and far between, and then often hidden away in more-general texts on amphibious warfare. This article sets out to explore this unfamiliar yet vital territory to determine the relevance of riverine operations to contemporary and future military campaigns. It is pertinent now, as budget allocations once again are reviewed and NATO's amphibious doctrine is refreshed.

On October 15th, 2020, the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) Vancouver hosted its sixth Digital Roundtable event of the year, Intrastate Warfare. The presentation was conducted by guest speaker Dr. Arjun Chowdhury, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. Dr. Chowdhury's presentation delivered a historical overview of types of conflicts and a brief analysis on the patterns of conflicts and whether they have changed over a period of approximately 200 years, with a particular focus on the last 50 years. He described two types of war, interstate and intrastate, mentioning trends in intrastate war and the contrast to interstate war, as well as the consequences to life expectancy and infrastructure in the regions affected by intrastate wars. Subsequently, Dr. Chowdhury answered questions submitted by the attendees, which elaborated on the concepts of interstate and intrastate wars, using current examples such as, COVID-19, right-wing extremism, cybercrimes, and foreign aid.

These robot used in military are usually employed with the integrated system, including video screens, sensors, gripper and cameras. Android application controlled WARFARE ROBOT, built in with Robotic arm mechanism to pick up or place small objects like explosives, an on board Wireless video camera, Infrared based surface depth and irregularities perception and android application for movement and other controls of the Robot. The robot will serve as an appropriate gadget for the defence sector to reduce the loss of human life. Sushmita Shivalkar | Geeta Yadav | Swapnali Patil | Sakshi Dale "Warfare Robot" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-3 | Issue-3 , April 2019, URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd22888.pdf

This paper provides a synthetic description of the discontinuity between the evolution of warfare as it was in a pre-cyber era and the switch to cyber warfare. The evolution from bronze to iron weapons, and later to gunpower weapons and flying objects does not compare with the cyber era warfare, even UAV and "intelligent" rockets does not provide a significant understanding of the actual and near future scenarios. Cyber technology is nowadays pervasive and utilised world-wide. Global networking is one of the building blocks of our society, communication, information, government, health, education, mobility, markets, the list of involved sectors is endless, all of them rely on cyber security and the trustfulness of the information provided through the network. An even increasing volume of information is flowing through the network including messages concerning future risks or cyber-weapons. There is a clear need to adopt a renovated set of countermeasures to face and possibly cancel or mitigate such harms.

To approach teh sea side of maneuver warfare, one ought first to understand its nature and content in general. Contemporary American military reformers seem to claim that maneuver warfare is everything good: outwitting the enemy, creating and exploiting an information advantage, moving faster and more adroitly, and shooting more precisely and effectively. In the rhetoric, maneuver warfare is "rapid, violent, coordinated attack." But who would espouse the opposite, a "slow, feeble, disorganized attack"? If maneuver warfare is nothing more than fighting intelligently, then its antithesis is "stupid" warfare.

Electronic warfare (EW) is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. During Cold War, electronic warfare was an important military activity; a typical attack method was jamming (disturbance) of communication frequencies and radar signals. After cold war, the focus shifted to network-centric and cyber warfare and drove attention away from traditional EW. Meanwhile, the development of directed energy (laser and high-powered microwave) weapons has made substantial progress. In particular, the US and Chinese Navy have advanced prototypes of military laser weapons and first reports of real-world attacks exist. In the United States, electronic warfare and cyber warfare are now integrated in the concept of cyber electromagnetic attacks (CEMA). Moreover, satellites and their communication lines are increasingly important, but they are vulnerable for CEMA. The concept of space resilience was developed as a technical backbone of space defense. This working paper provides a brief overview and background on EW and CEMA, followed by an overview on directed energy weapons and security issues with a particular focus on laser weapons and satellites.

The world of today can look back at some fifty years of widespread and virtually continuous political revolution. Prob­ ably more governments have come into being, passed through drastic change, or ceased to exist than in any comparable period in history. Certainly a larger proportion of the world's popula­ tion has been involved in and has been aware of these upheavals than was ever the case in earlier days. It is the political pheno­ menon of the twentieth century, the visible wind of revolution, stirring in many continents.

What is network-centric warfare? What does it bring to us? Why is it so critical to America's future military power that we must give up other capabilities to buy it? A warfare-centered working con- cept of network-centric operations is needed. The measure of success will be the effect that net- working enables us to have on would-be enemies in peace and in war.