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China has the most extensive and most practised cyber-warfare capabilities in Asia. This article describes the development of these capabilities since the mid-1990s, the intelligence and military organisations involved, and the particular capabilities that have been demonstrated in defence exercises and in attacks on computer systems and networks in other countries. It notes that it is often very difficult to determine whether these attacks have originated with official agencies or private �Netizens?. It argues that China?s own computer systems and networks are replete with vulnerabilities, of which Chinese officials are well aware. It concludes that this appreciation of China?s deficiencies and vulnerabilities has led to the adoption of a pre-emptive strategy, as practiced in People?s Liberation Army exercises, in which China?s very destructive but relatively unsophisticated cyber-warfare capabilities are unleashed at the very outset of prospective conflicts.

Based largely on essays discussed at a conference sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies' Committee on Studies of Chinese Civilization and the East Asian Research Center of Harvard University. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The 2013 Defence White Paper includes security against major cyber attacks on Australia as an element of our �defence of Australia� national strategic interest. It devotes a separate section to cyber in its strategic outlook. While the White Paper makes heartening comment about the need to integrate cyber power into national strategy, it provides no insights into how this might be achieved, nor does it set any real strategic direction for an improved whole-of-nation effort. It does not attempt to identify any cyber objectives that should underpin Australia�s national security strategy. Australia needs to develop a current baseline cyber posture, derive a consolidated view of all requirements and gaps, and develop future remediation and implementation plans in an integrated fashion. Without this, cyber capability gaps across the Australian Government will continue to hinder the agencies� ability to plan for and conduct effective operations. Accordingly, this article calls for a comprehensive capabilities-based assessment, a national cyber capability plan, and an implementation plan (with specific actions and implementation responsibilities, timeframes, and performance measures) and a funding strategy for addressing any gaps resulting from the assessment. It also calls for a clearer articulation of operational planning considerations, including dealing with the conflation of electronic warfare and cyber warfare, and the use of uninhabited aerial vehicles for improved intelligence collection and network penetration.

The 2013 Defence White Paper includes security against major cyber attacks on Australia as an element of our �defence of Australia� national strategic interest. It devotes a separate section to cyber in its strategic outlook. While the White Paper makes heartening comment about the need to integrate cyber power into national strategy, it provides no insights into how this might be achieved, nor does it set any real strategic direction for an improved whole-of-nation effort. It does not attempt to identify any cyber objectives that should underpin Australia�s national security strategy. Australia needs to develop a current baseline cyber posture, derive a consolidated view of all requirements and gaps, and develop future remediation and implementation plans in an integrated fashion. Without this, cyber capability gaps across the Australian Government will continue to hinder the agencies� ability to plan for and conduct effective operations. Accordingly, this article calls for a comprehensive capabilities-based assessment, a national cyber capability plan, and an implementation plan (with specific actions and implementation responsibilities, timeframes, and performance measures) and a funding strategy for addressing any gaps resulting from the assessment. It also calls for a clearer articulation of operational planning considerations, including dealing with the conflation of electronic warfare and cyber warfare, and the use of uninhabited aerial vehicles for improved intelligence collection and network penetration.

While Unconventional Warfare (UW) remains a viable, low-cost method of indirect warfare, some of the assumptions underpinning traditional UW have diverged from reality in the last two decades. These include the idea that UW occurs mostly within denied areas; the categorisation of resistance movements into underground, auxiliary and guerrilla components; the model of a pyramid of resistance activities becoming larger in scale, more violent and less covert until they emerge 'above ground' into overt combat; and the assumption that the external (non-indigenous) component of UW primarily consists of infiltrated Special Forces elements, or support from governments-in-exile. Arguably these assumptions were always theoretical attempts to model a messy reality. But since the start of this century the evolution of resistance warfare within a rapidly changing environment has prompted the UW community to reconsider their relevance. This article examines that evolution and its implications. It begins with a historical overview, examines how drivers of evolutionary change are manifested in modern resistance warfare and considers the implications for future UW.

Hybrid warfare has almost become new orthodoxy in the defense community. The term is regarded as a new phenomenon that allegedly interprets the characteristics of contemporary warfare. Furthermore, within the international community, ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict is almost unanimously referred to as a model for hybrid warfare. However, hybrid warfare as a term itself or the referring Russia's war to a model for hybrid warfare might lead analysts, defense planners, and policymakers down an unhelpful path. There is a risk of rediscovering old ideas in the efforts of defining the parameters of modern warfare, which might fall short of expectations.

Hybrid warfare has almost become new orthodoxy in the defense community. The term is regarded as a new phenomenon that allegedly interprets the characteristics of contemporary warfare. Furthermore, within the international community, ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict is almost unanimously referred to as a model for hybrid warfare. However, hybrid warfare as a term itself or the referring Russia's war to a model for hybrid warfare might lead analysts, defense planners, and policymakers down an unhelpful path. There is a risk of rediscovering old ideas in the efforts of defining the parameters of modern warfare, which might fall short of expectations.

"Operating under contract with the Department of the Army." ; Mode of access: Internet. ; MAIN; U240.A12.A6: Photocopy (positive)

While Unconventional Warfare (UW) remains a viable, low-cost method of indirect warfare, some of the assumptions underpinning traditional UW have diverged from reality in the last two decades. These include the idea that UW occurs mostly within denied areas; the categorisation of resistance movements into underground, auxiliary and guerrilla components; the model of a pyramid of resistance activities becoming larger in scale, more violent and less covert until they emerge 'above ground' into overt combat; and the assumption that the external (non-indigenous) component of UW primarily consists of infiltrated Special Forces elements, or support from governments-in-exile. Arguably these assumptions were always theoretical attempts to model a messy reality. But since the start of this century the evolution of resistance warfare within a rapidly changing environment has prompted the UW community to reconsider their relevance. This article examines that evolution and its implications. It begins with a historical overview, examines how drivers of evolutionary change are manifested in modern resistance warfare and considers the implications for future UW.

"B-206548."--p. 1. ; "GAO/NSIAD-89-137." ; Running title : Electronic warfare. ; At head of title : Report to the Chairman, Legislation and National Security Subcommittee, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives. ; Cover title. ; "August 1989." ; Includes bibliographic footnotes. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Part 1: THEMES AND ISSUES ; International audience ; The use of botnets for malicious activities has grown significantly in recent years. Criminals leverage the flexibility and anonymity associated with botnets to harvest personal data, generate spam, distribute malware and launch distributed denial-of-service attacks. These same attributes readily translate to applications that can support operations in warfare. In 2007, distributed denial-of-service attacks launched by botnets targeted IT assets belonging to Estonian banks, newspapers and parliament. This paper explores the use of botnets as instruments of warfare. Seven scenarios are used to demonstrate how traditional applications of botnets such as spam, theft of resources and distributed denial-of-service attacks can have implications across the spectrum of warfare. Additionally, the paper discusses the ethical and political concerns associated with the use of botnets by nation states.

This article explores the current debate about service and Joint operating concepts, starting with the Army's multi-domain operations concept. It argues for adaptations to an old operational design technique—defeat mechanisms; updates to Joint and service planning doctrine; and discipline regarding emerging concepts. Rather than debate over attrition versus maneuver, combinations of a suite of defeat mechanisms should be applied to gain victory in the future.

Globalization influenced by the development of science and technology has brought the world into the era of industrial revolution 4.0. It led to an unstable and confusing situation, which implies the emergence of VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, Ambiguity) conditions. VUCA created the term Irregular Warfare as a new form of war, which is defined as a violent struggle between state and non-state actors to gain legitimate influence on the people relevant in the form of terrorist attacks, subversion, and rebellion or separatism. Irregular Warfare in Indonesia is known as a non-military threat, which must be faced by state institutions outside the defense sector as the main element. This study aims to develop a non-military defense strategy in dealing with non-military threats through the collaboration between the ministry of defense with ministries/agencies and local governments as the main elements under the mandate of the defense law. This study used qualitative research methods and phenomenological descriptive-analytical design and supported by relevant theories such as; strategy theory and synergy theory. This study indicates that the synergy of the ministry of defense with the ministries/agencies and local governments is significant in realizing a reliable national defense system.

Military operations research and combat modeling apply mathematical models to analyze a variety of military conflicts and obtain insights about these phenomena. One of the earliest and most important set of models used for combat modeling is the Lanchester equations. Legacy Lanchester equations model the mutual attritional dynamics of two opposing military forces and provide some insights regarding the fate of such engagements. In this paper, we review recent developments in Lanchester modeling, focusing on contemporary conflicts in the world. Specifically, we present models that capture irregular warfare, such as insurgencies, highlight the role of target information in such conflicts, and capture multilateral situations where several players are involved in the conflict (such as the current war in Syria).

17 USC 105 interim-entered record; under review. ; The article of record as published may be found at https://doi.org/10.3390/math8050737 ; Military operations research and combat modeling apply mathematical models to analyze a variety of military conflicts and obtain insights about these phenomena. One of the earliest and most important set of models used for combat modeling is the Lanchester equations. Legacy Lanchester equations model the mutual attritional dynamics of two opposing military forces and provide some insights regarding the fate of such engagements. In this paper, we review recent developments in Lanchester modeling, focusing on contemporary conflicts in the world. Specifically, we present models that capture irregular warfare, such as insurgencies, highlight the role of target information in such conflicts, and capture multilateral situations where several players are involved in the conflict (such as the current war in Syria).