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In this article, the author carries out a comprehensive analysis of the security policy pursued by Ukraine towards the broadly understood West. While describing the Ukrainian security policy since the state gained independence, it draws attention to both the conceptual layer (strategic documents, political declarations) and the implementation layer (the actions actually taken). The considerations in the article contain historical and comparative issues concerning the nature of the Ukrainian security policy towards the West, including towards the European Union, NATO and the United States. The theory of neoclassical realism, which is still not very popular among researchers, was applied to analyze this issue. It has a great explanatory power, because it takes into account both external aspects inherent in the international system, as well as internal ones resulting from the situation in the state itself. The aim of this article was to search for answers to the following questions: why, how and under what factors did the position of the West change in Ukraine's security policy? As a result of the research, the hypothesis that the Ukrainian state is gradually approaching the West is confirmed, despite the inconsistency in its security policy and the West's uncertainty as to the deepening of cooperation with it. ; W niniejszym artykule autorka dokonuje wszechstronnej analizy prowadzonej przez Ukrainę wobec szeroko pojętego Zachodu polityki bezpieczeństwa. Charakteryzując ukraińską politykę bezpieczeństwa od momentu uzyskania przez państwo niepodległości, zwraca uwagę na warstwę zarówno koncepcyjną (dokumenty strategiczne, deklaracje polityczne), jak i realizacyjną (faktycznie podjęte działania). Rozważania w artykule zawierają w sobie zagadnienia historyczne i komparatystyczne dotyczące charakteru ukraińskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa prowadzonej wobec Zachodu, m.in. wobec Unii Europejskiej, NATO i Stanów Zjednoczonych. Do analizy niniejszej kwestii została wykorzystana jeszcze niezbyt ciesząca się popularnością wśród ...

The object of research is the trust problem in the relations of the East and the West. The author in detail analyzes the phenomenon of trust, its principles and distinctive signs. Special attention is paid to conditions of formation of trust as on micro (between individuals) and at the macro level (between societies). The author connects the trust problem with a categorization "friend-or-foe", considered in the civilization aspect of the subject. Thus, the author in the research used the case study method and content analysis. The novelty of research consists in approach to understanding intensity between civilizations of the East and the West through a problem of the possibility of confidential relations between them. The author comes to a conclusion that in the modern international relations there is a paradoxical situation: the trust measure between the countries decreases, in volume time as it is possible to cope with new calls and threats only through consolidation of the world community on the basis of mutual trust.

The object of research is the trust problem in the relations of the East and the West. The author in detail analyzes the phenomenon of trust, its principles and distinctive signs. Special attention is paid to conditions of formation of trust as on micro (between individuals) and at the macro level (between societies). The author connects the trust problem with a categorization "friend-or-foe", considered in the civilization aspect of the subject. Thus, the author in the research used the case study method and content analysis. The novelty of research consists in approach to understanding intensity between civilizations of the East and the West through a problem of the possibility of confidential relations between them. The author comes to a conclusion that in the modern international relations there is a paradoxical situation: the trust measure between the countries decreases, in volume time as it is possible to cope with new calls and threats only through consolidation of the world community on the basis of mutual trust.

W niniejszym artykule autorka dokonuje wszechstronnej analizy prowadzonej przez Ukrainę wobec szeroko pojętego Zachodu polityki bezpieczeństwa. Charakteryzując ukraińską politykę bezpieczeństwa od momentu uzyskania przez państwo niepodległości, zwraca uwagę na warstwę zarówno koncepcyjną (dokumenty strategiczne, deklaracje polityczne), jak i realizacyjną (faktycznie podjęte działania). Rozważania w artykule zawierają w sobie zagadnienia historyczne i komparatystyczne dotyczące charakteru ukraińskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa prowadzonej wobec Zachodu, m.in. wobec Unii Europejskiej, NATO i Stanów Zjednoczonych. Do analizy niniejszej kwestii została wykorzystana jeszcze niezbyt ciesząca się popularnością wśród badaczy teoria realizmu neoklasycznego. Posiada ona dużą moc eksplanacyjną, ponieważ uwzględnia aspekty zewnętrzne, tkwiące w systemie międzynarodowym, jak i wewnętrzne, wynikające z sytuacji w samym państwie. Jako cel tego artykułu wyznaczono poszukiwanie odpowiedzi na następujące pytania: dlaczego, w jaki sposób oraz pod wpływem jakich czynników zmieniała się pozycja Zachodu w polityce bezpieczeństwa Ukrainy? Wskutek przeprowadzonych badań potwierdza się postawiona hipoteza o stopniowym zbliżeniu się państwa ukraińskiego do Zachodu mimo niekonsekwentności w jego polityce bezpieczeństwa oraz niepewności Zachodu co do pogłębiania współpracy z nim. ; In this article, the author carries out a comprehensive analysis of the security policy pursued by Ukraine towards the broadly understood West. While describing the Ukrainian security policy since the state gained independence, it draws attention to both the conceptual layer (strategic documents, political declarations) and the implementation layer (the actions actually taken). The considerations in the article contain historical and comparative issues concerning the nature of the Ukrainian security policy towards the West, including towards the European Union, NATO and the United States. The theory of neoclassical realism, which is still not very popular among ...

The tendency to equate economic growth with industrialization has in the recent past started a violent and bloody movement in the Indian state of West Bengal. The movement that started against forced acquisition of agricultural land for industrialization in Singur gradually spread to other parts of the state of West Bengal including Nandigram. This movement acquired explosive proportions with the intellectuals, civil society and anti-left political parties throwing in their weight behind the displaced peasants who lost their land. Ultimately it became an albatross around the neck of the Left leadership and sunk the political fortunes of the thirty-four year old Left Front government in 2011 state assembly elections. The Singur and Nandigram tragedy are only one among the many agitations that have exploded in various parts of India in recent past. These protest movements have kicked off the development versus displacement debate in India. The killing of protesting peasants in Singur and Nandigram by the trigger happy police not only exposes the political myopia and inhuman indifference of the so-called pro-poor Left Front Government of West Bengal. But it also goes on to show that the political process in India is increasingly getting hijacked by the logic of the market which sees displacement only as an appendix to development. What we need today is to reinvent the principles laid down by Gandhi to usher in a just and equitable economic order. The Gandhian model of economic development is based on the simple yet profound principles of altruism and egalitarianism. This article would focus on the reasons behind the inception of a violent movement in Singur and Nandigram, the fundamental flaws in the development model of the erstwhile Left Front Government of West Bengal, and end by providing a Gandhian solution to the development versus displacement dilemma in the state of West Bengal in India.

The tendency to equate economic growth with industrialization has in the recent past started a violent and bloody movement in the Indian state of West Bengal. The movement that started against forced acquisition of agricultural land for industrialization in Singur gradually spread to other parts of the state of West Bengal including Nandigram. This movement acquired explosive proportions with the intellectuals, civil society and anti-left political parties throwing in their weight behind the displaced peasants who lost their land. Ultimately it became an albatross around the neck of the Left leadership and sunk the political fortunes of the thirty-four year old Left Front government in 2011 state assembly elections. The Singur and Nandigram tragedy are only one among the many agitations that have exploded in various parts of India in recent past. These protest movements have kicked off the development versus displacement debate in India. The killing of protesting peasants in Singur and Nandigram by the trigger happy police not only exposes the political myopia and inhuman indifference of the so-called pro-poor Left Front Government of West Bengal. But it also goes on to show that the political process in India is increasingly getting hijacked by the logic of the market which sees displacement only as an appendix to development. What we need today is to reinvent the principles laid down by Gandhi to usher in a just and equitable economic order. The Gandhian model of economic development is based on the simple yet profound principles of altruism and egalitarianism. This article would focus on the reasons behind the inception of a violent movement in Singur and Nandigram, the fundamental flaws in the development model of the erstwhile Left Front Government of West Bengal, and end by providing a Gandhian solution to the development versus displacement dilemma in the state of West Bengal in India.

Transparency in higher education is one of the aims of the Bologna Declaration (1999). In a number of countries in Europe this led to processes to change quality assurance into accreditation, which supposedly results in more transparency. Are these lessons to be learnt from experiences and Central and Eastern Europe regarding accreditation since 1990? The author maintains that the character of those "first generation" accreditation systems is more exclusively academic and drives towards uniformity more than the multifaceted systems needed for Bologna's "second generation" requirements. A "multiple accreditation system" would answer these requirements better. Some principles of a multiple accreditation systems are presented, together with consequences of external evaluation criteria and procedures. Two nascent accreditation systems designs in Western European countries (Germany and the Netherlands) are then compared with the demands set by the Bologna Declaration and with the design principles of a multiple accreditation system. The main conclusion is that although some steps towards an open and flexible accreditation system are set, at the present stage of their development it seems that maintaining national control in these two cases has more priority than achieving Europeanwide transparency. ; Jednym z celów Deklaracji Bolońskiej, podpisanej w 1999 roku, jest osiągnięcie przejrzystości systemów szkolnictwa wyższego. W wielu państwach europejskich metody zapewniania jakości kształcenia zaczęto zastępować procesem akredytacji. Zakładano, iż wynikiem tych działań będzie właśnie większa przejrzystość. Czy można skorzystać z doświadczeń państw Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej zdobytych po 1990 roku i odnoszących się do akredytacji? Autor utrzymuje, iż systemy akredytacyjne "pierwszej generacji" miały niemal wyłącznie charakter akademicki i celem ich było w większym stopniu ujednolicanie niż tworzenie różnorodnych systemów. W świetle dokumentu przyjętego w Bolonii systemy akredytacyjne "drugiej generacji" mają zapewnić większą różnorodność. W artykule ukazane są niektóre zasady zróżnicowanego systemu akredytacji, a także ich wpływ na kryteria i procedury oceny zewnętrznej. Następnie autor dokonuje porównania dwóch rodzących się modeli systemów akredytacyjnych w krajach Europy Zachodniej (Niemczech i Holandii) z wymaganiami określonymi w Deklaracji Bolońskiej oraz z zasadami zróżnicowanego systemu akredytacji. Na podstawie tego porównania formułuje wniosek, iż - mimo podjęcia już pewnych kroków w kierunku stworzenia otwartego i elastycznego systemu akredytacji - można odnieść wrażenie, że w dwóch wymienionych przypadkach utrzymanie kontroli na poziomie krajowym jest ważniejsze niż osiągnięcie przejrzystości w szerokim wymiarze europejskim.

Peacekeeping operations are nowadays an important phenomenon in international relations and especially in conflict-ridden regions. The concept and framework of such operations has been constantly evolving in the past and one of the milestones of this evolution was the fall of the communist system and the end of the cold war. In Europe, this historic moment coincided with establishment by the Maastricht Treaty of the new organism within the process of western Europe's integration: the European Union. Both these facts triggered a reaction of the somewhat passive and hardly visible European defence organisation of the Western European Union. Its Petersberg Declaration of 1992 redefined security and sought to change peace obligations of the member states of WEU, as they accepted a broader responsibility and a broader concept of security in the European region. This was an important first step in making defence integration a part of the mainstream integration process. On the legal basis of the Petersberg Declaration, six operations were carried out. The paper discusses them, showing striking similarities, which actually comprise a special philosophy of intervention by WEU. This philosophy reflects both strengths and weaknesses of WEU's role in the European integration.

Peacekeeping operations are nowadays an important phenomenon in international relations and especially in conflict-ridden regions. The concept and framework of such operations has been constantly evolving in the past and one of the milestones of this evolution was the fall of the communist system and the end of the cold war. In Europe, this historic moment coincided with establishment by the Maastricht Treaty of the new organism within the process of western Europe's integration: the European Union. Both these facts triggered a reaction of the somewhat passive and hardly visible European defence organisation of the Western European Union. Its Petersberg Declaration of 1992 redefined security and sought to change peace obligations of the member states of WEU, as they accepted a broader responsibility and a broader concept of security in the European region. This was an important first step in making defence integration a part of the mainstream integration process. On the legal basis of the Petersberg Declaration, six operations were carried out. The paper discusses them, showing striking similarities, which actually comprise a special philosophy of intervention by WEU. This philosophy reflects both strengths and weaknesses of WEU's role in the European integration.

Russo-Western relations after the declared end of the Cold War, just as on the eve and in the middle of it, have been fraught with developments pointing towards the persisting distrust and disgust in one another's perceptions cast against the background of officially declared truce. Such a decades-long half-truth-balancing has gradually lost its flexibility and acceptability and culminated in what much of the current academic debate calls, since 2014, a "Russian-Ukrainian conflict", but what, in fact, presents an extension to the latent Russo-Western conflict that embarked upon the end of the Cold War – a "cold peace".This article aims to reveal the origins, form and substance of the current Russian hybrid gambling in Ukraine by addressing the essential notions in international but also domestic politics – trust, truth, lies/deception, distrust, war and peace immensely trapped by politics of incremental hybridity and interpretivism.

Russo-Western relations after the declared end of the Cold War, just as on the eve and in the middle of it, have been fraught with developments pointing towards the persisting distrust and disgust in one another's perceptions cast against the background of officially declared truce. Such a decades-long half-truth-balancing has gradually lost its flexibility and acceptability and culminated in what much of the current academic debate calls, since 2014, a "Russian-Ukrainian conflict", but what, in fact, presents an extension to the latent Russo-Western conflict that embarked upon the end of the Cold War – a "cold peace".This article aims to reveal the origins, form and substance of the current Russian hybrid gambling in Ukraine by addressing the essential notions in international but also domestic politics – trust, truth, lies/deception, distrust, war and peace immensely trapped by politics of incremental hybridity and interpretivism.

Autor przyjął założenia badawcze oparte na teorii realizmu politycznego. To pozwoliło mu przeanalizować kryzys ukraiński jako rywalizację mocarstw o Ukrainę. W rywalizacji tej z jednej strony uczestniczy Zachód, tj. USA i Unia Europejska, a z drugiej strony Rosja. Artykuł przedstawia motywy obu stron, uwzględniając w stanowisku Zachodu motywy zaangażowania Polski. Niejako dla zobiektywizowania analizy ukazuje stanowisko strony trzeciej, tj. mocarstw azjatyckich Indii i Chin oraz niezależnych ekspertów z krajów zachodnich. Następnie wskazuje na konsekwencje kryzysu ukraińskiego dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego w Europie. W ostatniej części podejmuje próbę ukazania szans znalezienia porozumienia Zachodu z Rosją w celu rozwiązania kryzysu ukraińskiego. Stwierdza, że jest to potrzebne i możliwe, jednak pod warunkiem rezygnacji przez zaangażowane strony z "absolutnej satysfakcji" i zdecydowania się na kompromisowe rozwiązanie. ; The author has adopted the assumptions based on the theory of political realism. This allowed him to analyse the Ukraine crisis as powers rivalry on Ukraine. In this competition, on the one hand, attending West, the United States and the European Union and Russia, on the other hand. The paper presents reasons of both sides, taking into account within the position of the West the motives of Poland's involvement. To make the analysis objective it shows the position of a third party, i.e. Asian powers India and China, and independent experts from Western countries. Then the paper points the Ukraine crisis consequences for international security in Europe. In the last part attempts to show the chances of reaching an agreement between the West and Russia to solve the Ukraine crisis. It states that it is necessary and possible, but subject to the abandonment by the parties involved "absolute satisfaction" and decide on a compromise solution.

In this article, the author's present relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union in the context of competition for influence in the Western Balkans. Particular attention is paid to the intersecting lines of interest and, nevertheless, important aspects of historical participation in intra-regional relations between the two actors. The article addresses both political, social and economic issues, which are the merits of mutual relations both within the Russian Federation – the European Union as well as between the two actors and the countries of the region. ; W niniejszym artykule autorzy prezentują relacje pomiędzy Federacją Rosyjską a Unią Europejską w kontekście rywalizacji o wpływy na obszarze Bałkanów Zachodnich. Szczególną uwagę autorzy zwracają na przecinające się linie interesów i niemniej ważne aspekty historycznej partycypacji w stosunkach wewnątrz regionu obu aktorów. W artykule zarówno poruszono kwestie polityczne, społeczne jak i gospodarcze, które stanowią meritum wzajemnych relacji zarówno na przestrzeni Federacja Rosyjska – Unia Europejska, jak i pomiędzy oboma aktorami a państwami regionu.

W niniejszym artykule autorzy prezentują relacje pomiędzy Federacją Rosyjską a Unią Europejską w kontekście rywalizacji o wpływy na obszarze Bałkanów Zachodnich. Szczególną uwagę autorzy zwracają na przecinające się linie interesów i niemniej ważne aspekty historycznej partycypacji w stosunkach wewnątrz regionu obu aktorów. W artykule zarówno poruszono kwestie polityczne, społeczne jak i gospodarcze, które stanowią meritum wzajemnych relacji zarówno na przestrzeni Federacja Rosyjska – Unia Europejska, jak i pomiędzy oboma aktorami a państwami regionu. ; In this article, the author's present relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union in the context of competition for influence in the Western Balkans. Particular attention is paid to the intersecting lines of interest and, nevertheless, important aspects of historical participation in intra-regional relations between the two actors. The article addresses both political, social and economic issues, which are the merits of mutual relations both within the Russian Federation – the European Union as well as between the two actors and the countries of the region.

Celem artykułu jest analiza dotychczasowych osiągnięć negocjacji prowadzonych przez pię¬ciu stałych członków Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ i Niemiec z władzami Iranu. Negocjacje skierowane są na ograniczenie irańskiego programu nuklearnego i normalizację wzajemnych stosunków. Porozumienie tymczasowe, podpisane w listopadzie 2013 r. w Genewie nie doprowadziło do zawarcia ostatecznych uzgodnień. Wynegocjowane 2 kwietnia 2015 r. porozumienie ramowe z Lozanny, choć powinno być uznane za sukces przez fakt prowadzenia rozmów, to brak konkretnych ustaleń nakazuje uznać je za negocjacyjne niepowodzenie. ; This article analyses and assesses the hitherto achievements in the negotiations of the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany with Iran devoted to the limitation of its nuclear program and normalization of the mutual relations. This is prerequisite of the full nor-malization of political and economic relations between Iran and Western states. An interim agreement struck in the end of November 2013 in Geneva has not led, for the time being, to the signing of the permanent agreement. On the contrary, the negotiations were extended for the third time since November 2013 till June 2015. There is a danger that Iran will get another exten¬sion in June this year and will be able to play for time again. Thus it is reasonable to doubt whether Iran wants a deal with the West or tries to produce a nuclear bomb in the near future, The Obama administration conducts rather "soft" policy towards Iran as the U.S. needs that country in the war with the Islamic State. On the other hand even the present U.S. administration cannot accept a deal that allows Iran to expand its nuclear programme and enrich uranium to 20%. From various reasons the present stalemate in the negotiations with Iran cannot be resolved with the use of military force. Thus the only hope is that Iran will reconsider all benefits connected with the normalization of its economic and political relations with the West and finally sign a deal with the United States and other Western states.