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"Open-Minded Cognition and Political Thought" published on by Oxford University Press.

Research into the Hebrew Bible, Ancient Near East, Philosophy and History have long considered whether thought in the cultural area of the ancient Middle East differs from that in the western Mediterranean. The inclusion of neurobiology, psychology, brain research and evolutionary research will widen this horizon and allow new approaches. This volume provides in depth insides into this Archaeology of Mind in 22 contributions.

"Using classic texts in African philosophy, Bruce B. Janz applies the strand of cognitive science known as enactivism to realise new connections and intersections between both fields. The idea that cognition is embodied and embedded in a social world neatly maps onto specifically African epistemologies to outline a new direction of study on what philosophy is. By working through a rich range of texts and thinkers, Janz provides a fruitful new interpretation of African philosophy and provides close readings of seminal and side lined thinkers to provide an invaluable resource for students and scholars. Janz's study takes in the creative humanism of Sylvia Wynter, Placide Tempels's Bantu Philosophy , Mbiti's theory of time, Oruka's last work on sage philosophy, Mogobe Ramose's own version of Ubuntu, Sophie Oluwole's active literature of philosophy, Achille Mbembe's excoriating attack on the effects of colonialism on life in Africa, and Suzanne Césaire writings on négritude. This book reorients African philosophy towards an active and creative future informed by enactivist thinking."--

Previous research has shown that thinking about some attitude object results in more polarized attitudes than being distracted from thinking about the object. Perhaps this difference is due to thought producing additional cognitions consistent with the initial attitude direction. To
test this hypothesis, 64 subjects indicated their attitudes toward fictitious persons described with either four or eight adjectives. After thinking about the person or being distracted from thinking about the person, they again scaled their attitude. Assuming that it is easier to add cognitions
to the smaller initial set, the following was predicted and obtained: Opportunity for thought and initial set size interact in polarizing attitudes (p < 0.05); the difference between thought and distraction conditions is more pronounced with four cognitions (p < 0.01) than
with eight cognitions (n.s.); and number of cognitions is negatively related to polarization under thought (0.10 < p < 0.05).