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AbstractGough Whitlam's Labor government came to office in December 1972 with a vast and transformative reform agenda, at the heart of which was a fundamental policy shift in Aboriginal affairs away from assimilation and toward self‐determination, described by Whitlam as; 'Aboriginal communities deciding the pace and nature of their future development as significant components within a diverse Australia'. Whitlam's commitment to self‐determination reflected the United Nation's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which refers to the right of all peoples to 'freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development'. Whitlam made it clear that Aboriginal Affairs would be a priority of his government with the establishment of the first separate Ministry for Aboriginal Affairs and his government introduced a suite of path‐breaking policies for Aboriginal people. Pat Dodson, the inaugural chairperson of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, later described the change in policy and intent under Whitlam as, 'a transforming sentiment in this country for Aboriginal people'. This article explores the key features of Whitlam's Indigenous policy and argues that Whitlam's commitment to self‐determination was a unique and radical policy reframing in Indigenous affairs not seen before or since. These advances were wound back by the conservative government of Malcolm Fraser and the 'transforming sentiment' soon reverted to one of 'self‐management' and unarticulated assimilation.

Gough Whitlam was deeply committed to the preservation of history, and keenly attuned to the importance of the documentary record in the writing of it. For Whitlam, the written record — the contemporaneous documentary record of government activity — was central to the production of historical knowledge and the "verification" of history. As he reflected on the release of his government's 1975 Cabinet papers, "the publication of these records confirms my belief in the contemporary document as the primary source for writing and understanding history". This paper takes us through the shifting historiography of the dismissal of the Whitlam government by Governor‐General Sir John Kerr. In doing so, it is a reflection also on the role of archives in the writing of history, recognising as Peters does, that the construction of an archival record is "a deeply political act". This is particularly so for contested, polarised, episodes — of which the dismissal is surely the exemplar — for which archival records have been transformative. In this process of historical correction, revelations from Kerr's papers in the National Archives of Australia have been pivotal. Kerr's papers were also central to my successful legal action against the Archives securing the release of the "Palace letters" between Kerr and the Queen regarding the dismissal. This paper explores some critical "archival encounters" during that research journey — revelations, obstructions, missing archives, and even burnt archives. From the destruction of Whitlam's security file, missing Government House guestbooks, the denial of access to records, to royal letters of support for Kerr's dismissal of Whitlam "accidentally burnt" in the Yarralumla incinerator, these encounters illuminate the critical relationship between archives, access, and history which continue to shape our understanding of the dismissal of the Whitlam government.

AbstractThe Whitlam government played a significant role in introducing progressive new policies in Aboriginal Affairs following the 1972 election. Yet, Aboriginal activists based in Redfern soon expressed disappointment with and criticism of the direction of these policies. They challenged the meaning and administration of the newly introduced self‐determination policy and the limits it placed on Aboriginal control of their organisations. These organisations, including the Aboriginal Legal and Medical Services, had been established in Redfern before the Labor government came to power. Even though they benefited under the self‐determination policy, their ability to achieve Aboriginal control was not because Whitlam and his government agreed with the activists' aims and understanding of self‐determination. Rather the generous funding under the Labor government, together with some weaknesses in its management, allowed the organisations to push the limits of self‐determination as defined by the government. Thus, even though the Whitlam government was supportive of improved Aboriginal controlled services, it had not anticipated the development towards Aboriginal self‐determination pursued by the activists in Redfern.

This article focuses on the interaction between the Australian and British governments during the early 1970s over French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. It examines the considerations behind the Australian government's approach to Britain, and Britain's response to initiatives from Australia. Through the presentation of a case study demonstrating how Australia's Pacific interests and Britain's European concerns inevitably led to different perspectives, I argue that the policies of both countries were primarily determined by their consideration of regional geopolitical interests, rather than the lingering links of Empire.

AbstractIn 1974 Prime Minister Gough Whitlam established the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration ('the Commission'), appointing HC Coombs as chair. The Commission's brief was 'to inquire into and report on the administrative organization and services of the Australian Government' giving particular attention to, among other issues, public servants' 'participation in forming policy and making decisions'. From the outset the Commission aligned itself with the view that Aboriginal people were 'less than proportionately represented in the administration'. The Commission asked CD Rowley to prepare a report on Aboriginal issues. Barrie Dexter, Secretary of the newly established Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Charles Perkins, Assistant Secretary and Arrernte man from Central Australia, both gave evidence to the Commission. The competing ideas on Indigenous administrative participation expressed by Coombs, Rowley, Dexter and Perkins in the course of the Commission will be considered through the lens of representation theory. While all four doubted the capacity of the bureaucracy to provide a meaningful channel for Indigenous representation internally, each argued from a different view of representation. Understanding their positions on how Indigenous people should be represented in public administration, including their assumption that there would also be external Indigenous representation, could shed light on tensions that are still present today.

In August 1974, the Australian Labor Party Government under Prime Minister Gough Whitlam announced it had recognised the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union de jure. Historical writing around this diplomatic recognition is scarce and sheds little light on why the policy was enacted. Using previously unavailable archival evidence, as well as other sources including testimony from Government and public service workers, this article demonstrates that the recognition was induced primarily by Whitlam, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and Sir James Plimsoll, Australia's ambassador to the Soviet Union. These actors were motivated by varying considerations. These included an adherence to realist foreign policy principles, concerns regarding Australian–Soviet bi‐lateral relations, convictions around the legitimacy of Baltic self‐determination, and ethnic prejudice against Australians of Baltic descent.

During the 1970s the Whitlam government in Australia and the Kirk government in New Zealand each adopted a policy of new nationalism in an attempt to come to terms with a rapidly changing and increasingly decolonised world marked by the decline of Britain as an economic and military force in the world. In each case this new nationalism prioritised local and national identities over a larger pan‐British identity. Both governments were more inward‐looking and yet also more engaged with the Asia‐Pacific region than their predecessors. They promoted their own national distinctiveness and independence, while also forging closer relationships with each other and the wider region. Both embraced a new understanding of their geographic position and repudiated the idea that Australia and New Zealand were European nations on the edge of Asia. The nationalisms they promoted were remarkably similar, yet there are important differences that reflect their different ethnic makeup and geographic position.

Sir John Kerr's dismissal of the Whitlam government ensured that he became Australia's most controversial Governor‐General and the one seen to have taken vice‐regal powers to their limit. While this is understandable, Kerr's notoriety has obscured a wider appreciation of the significant activism and even intrusiveness which characterised Richard Casey's 1965–1969 term as Governor‐General. This article draws on Casey's extensive diaries to paint a broader picture of the man and to examine his activist view of the role. Casey's version of the vice‐regal role is almost certainly at the extreme end of any Australian vice‐regal activity spectrum, and is consistent with patterns in his overall career.

This article draws on previously classified Australian and British archival material to reevaluate Australian Prime Minister Gough Whidam's foreign policy. The article focuses on the Whitlam governments decision in 1973 to withdraw Australian forces from Malaysia and Singapore-a decision that constitutes a neglected but defining episode in the evolution of Australian postwar diplomacy. An analysis of this decision reveals the limits of Whidam's attempt to redefine the conduct of Australian foreign policy from 1972 to 1975, a policy he saw as too heavily influenced by the Cold War. Focusing on Whidam's approach to the Five Power Defence Arrangement, this article contends that far from being an adroit and skillful architect of Australian engagement with Asia, Whitlam irritated Australia's regional allies and complicated Australia's relations with its immediate neighbors. Australia's subsequent adjustment to its neighborhood was not the success story implied in the general histories of Australian diplomacy. Whidam's policy toward Southeast Asia, far from being a "watershed" in foreign relations, as often assumed, left Australia increasingly isolated from its region and more reliant on its chief Cold War ally, the United States. Adapted from the source document.