Suchergebnisse

Talking about foreign policy relations of a country, it cannot be explained without adapting to the changes that occur in the growing environment or situation of both countries. Adjustments to the environment and the situation, especially the foreign policy are done in order to maintain the physical, economic, politic and social culture of the country in the midst of the real conditions of the situation occurred, like the history of bilateral relations between Indonesia and Australia). This is a study of the history of Australian foreign policy towards Indonesia since Whitlam government in 1972 until Hawke. The goal of the study is to explain how the foreign policy of the Australian Prime Ministers during their reigns. Although in reality in the course of its history, Australian and Indonesian diplomatic relations were full of intrigues, turmoil and conflicts, but it did not severe the relation of the two nations. Eventually, the conclusion of this study explicitly states that Australia and Indonesia still need each other in an attempt to establish political stability, economic and security in Southeast Asia and the Pacific peacefully.

This thesis focuses on the political and diplomatic history relating to Australian foreign policymaking towards the East Timor question during the Whitlam and Fraser governments, from April 1974 to January 1978. With reference to a number of published and unpublished Australian diplomatic records, a study of newspaper coverage (in particular, the Sydney Morning Herald, the Age and the Canberra Times), and also contemporary periodicals and personal memoirs, this thesis analyses the Australian foreign policymaking process towards Indonesia's integration policy towards East Timor. Although the existing literature has tended to focus on Australian policymakers, notably Prime Minister Whitlam in collaboration with Ambassador to Indonesia Woolcott – who were mostly concerned with Australian relations with Indonesia and sought to avoid the outcome of a small independent East Timor in the neighbourhood – this research also pays attention to the contribution of other foreign policy actors, including Foreign Minister Willesee of the Whitlam government in consultation with Secretary Renouf, both of whom thought it necessary to take account of domestic opinion sympathetic to self-determination. Considering that the Department of Foreign Affairs was convinced of the need for a proper act of self-determination in Portuguese Timor from the beginning and accordingly advised Foreign Ministers Willesee and Peacock to issue official statements in support of the right of self-determination against the backdrop of mounting domestic opinion – in particular during the period from October 1975 to July 1976 – this thesis argues that the Department took a substantial role in foreign policymaking in an attempt to dissociate the Australian government from Indonesia's coercive integration policy. In conclusion, despite the commonly-accepted view of the strong personal leadership of Prime Minister Whitlam who favoured Indonesia's integration of East Timor, this thesis argues that his influence was not unlimited. It is essential to consider ...

Australia's engagement with Asia from 1944 until the late 1960s was based on a sense of responsibility to the United Kingdom and its Southeast Asian colonies as they navigated a turbulent independence into the British Commonwealth. The circumstances of the early Cold War decades also provided for a mutual sense of solidarity with the non‑communist states of East Asia, with which Australia mostly enjoyed close relationships. From 1967 into the early 1970s, however, Commonwealth Responsibility and Cold War Solidarity demonstrates that the framework for this deep Australian engagement with its region was progressively eroded by a series of compounding, external factors: the 1967 formation of ASEAN and its consolidation by the mid-1970s as the premier regional organisation surpassing the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC); Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez; Washington's de‑escalation and gradual withdrawal from Vietnam after March 1968; the 1969 Nixon doctrine that America's Asia-Pacific allies must take up more of the burden of providing for their own security; and US rapprochement with China in 1972. The book shows that these profound changes marked the start of Australia's political distancing from the region during the 1970s despite the intentions, efforts and policies of governments from Whitlam onwards to foster deeper engagement. By 1974, Australia had been pushed to the margins of the region, with its engagement premised on a broadening but shallower transactional basis.

This article focuses on the interaction between the Australian and British governments during the early 1970s over French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. It examines the considerations behind the Australian government's approach to Britain, and Britain's response to initiatives from Australia. Through the presentation of a case study demonstrating how Australia's Pacific interests and Britain's European concerns inevitably led to different perspectives, I argue that the policies of both countries were primarily determined by their consideration of regional geopolitical interests, rather than the lingering links of Empire.

AbstractIn 1974 Prime Minister Gough Whitlam established the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration ('the Commission'), appointing HC Coombs as chair. The Commission's brief was 'to inquire into and report on the administrative organization and services of the Australian Government' giving particular attention to, among other issues, public servants' 'participation in forming policy and making decisions'. From the outset the Commission aligned itself with the view that Aboriginal people were 'less than proportionately represented in the administration'. The Commission asked CD Rowley to prepare a report on Aboriginal issues. Barrie Dexter, Secretary of the newly established Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Charles Perkins, Assistant Secretary and Arrernte man from Central Australia, both gave evidence to the Commission. The competing ideas on Indigenous administrative participation expressed by Coombs, Rowley, Dexter and Perkins in the course of the Commission will be considered through the lens of representation theory. While all four doubted the capacity of the bureaucracy to provide a meaningful channel for Indigenous representation internally, each argued from a different view of representation. Understanding their positions on how Indigenous people should be represented in public administration, including their assumption that there would also be external Indigenous representation, could shed light on tensions that are still present today.

Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- 1 Social Democracy and the Crisis of Equality: The Background -- Australian Social Democracy in an International Context -- The Australian Labor Party's Focus on Equality -- Early Conceptions of Economic Equality -- Early Racial Exclusions from Equality -- Equality and the Male Wage Worker Head of Household -- Transformations in the Concept of Equality -- Chapter Structure of Book -- References -- 2 Social Democracy and Racial/Ethnic Equality -- Australian Social Democracy in an International Context -- Curtin and Chifley Governments (1941-1949) -- Whitlam Government (1972-1975) -- Hawke and Keating Governments (1983-1996) -- Rudd and Gillard Governments (2007-2013) -- Labor Post the Rudd/Gillard Governments -- Excluded from Equality: Asylum Seekers -- Conclusion: Social Democracy and Racial/Ethnic Identity -- References -- 3 Gender: From Male Breadwinner to the Independent Adult Worker -- Australian Social Democracy in an International Context -- The Curtin and Chifley Governments (1941-1949) -- Whitlam Government (1972-1975) -- Hawke and Keating Governments (1983-1996) -- Rudd and Gillard Governments (2007-2013) -- Tensions Between Feminism and Social Democracy -- Labor Post the Rudd and Gillard Governments -- Cultural Politics and Gender Inequality -- Conclusion: Australian and International Social Democracy -- References -- 4 Sexuality: From Morality to Equality -- Australian Social Democracy in an International Context -- Pre the 1970's Whitlam Period -- The Whitlam Government (1972-1975) -- The Hawke and Keating Governments (1983-1996) -- Relationship Recognition: The Rudd and Gillard Governments (2007-2013) -- Same-Sex Marriage and the Rudd and Gillard Governments (2007-2013) -- Conclusion: Australian and International Social Democracy -- References.

In August 1974, the Australian Labor Party Government under Prime Minister Gough Whitlam announced it had recognised the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union de jure. Historical writing around this diplomatic recognition is scarce and sheds little light on why the policy was enacted. Using previously unavailable archival evidence, as well as other sources including testimony from Government and public service workers, this article demonstrates that the recognition was induced primarily by Whitlam, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and Sir James Plimsoll, Australia's ambassador to the Soviet Union. These actors were motivated by varying considerations. These included an adherence to realist foreign policy principles, concerns regarding Australian–Soviet bi‐lateral relations, convictions around the legitimacy of Baltic self‐determination, and ethnic prejudice against Australians of Baltic descent.

Acknowledgments -- Contents -- 1: Introduction -- References -- 2: Multiculturalism, Australian Style: Official Multiculturalism from Whitlam to Fraser -- The Beginnings of Official Multiculturalism: The Whitlam Government -- The Fraser Government: The Expansion of Multiculturalism -- The Emerging Critiques of Multiculturalism, from the Late 1970s to the Early 1980s -- References -- 3: Multiculturalism as Social Justice: The Hawke and Keating Governments -- Multiculturalism and Keating -- Conclusion: Further Critiques of Multiculturalism -- References

[Introduction]:.I want to concentrate on what Australian Governments have done and should do to improve Australia's system of representative government. Federal parliamentarians have the main responsibility because they and they alone can initiate constitutional referendums and enact international instruments. In all my own accounts and analyses of the matter, I contend that November 1975 was fundamentally a political crisis, fully capable of a political resolution, and, indeed, about to be so resolved, not more than 48 hours later than my government's dismissal. That is, by the fully attested switch of votes imminent on the part of at least four coalition senators. One such defection would have been enough to end the crisis. The dismissal was needless and premature. More recent accounts go to this conclusion. John Menadue's indispensable book, Things You Learn Along the Way, was published last year. Tonight, however, I propose only to touch on some aspects which point to changes in the Constitution which, if made before 1975, would have prevented the crisis or which, if made now, would prevent a repetition.