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Gough Whitlam's Labor government came to office in December 1972 with a vast and transformative reform agenda, at the heart of which was a fundamental policy shift in Aboriginal affairs away from assimilation and toward self-determination, described by Whitlam as; 'Aboriginal communities deciding the pace and nature of their future development as significant components within a diverse Australia'. Whitlam's commitment to self-determination reflected the United Nation's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which refers to the right of all peoples to 'freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development'. Whitlam made it clear that Aboriginal Affairs would be a priority of his government with the establishment of the first separate Ministry for Aboriginal Affairs and his government introduced a suite of path-breaking policies for Aboriginal people. Pat Dodson, the inaugural chairperson of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, later described the change in policy and intent under Whitlam as, 'a transforming sentiment in this country for Aboriginal people'. This article explores the key features of Whitlam's Indigenous policy and argues that Whitlam's commitment to self-determination was a unique and radical policy reframing in Indigenous affairs not seen before or since. These advances were wound back by the conservative government of Malcolm Fraser and the 'transforming sentiment' soon reverted to one of 'self-management' and unarticulated assimilation.

Considers the nature of the Australian Labor Party and Labor governments in the course of a critique of two books on the Party. Stresses the continuity in the ALP's pursuit of the interests of Australian capital when it is in office and its 'structural constitution', that is its distinctive relationship with the working class, especially through the union movement, and with the capitalist class. Evidence to support the analysis is drawn from the experience of the Chifley government during the 1940s, the Whitlam government during the 1970s and the Hawke government during the 1980s.

Talking about foreign policy relations of a country, it cannot be explained without adapting to the changes that occur in the growing environment or situation of both countries. Adjustments to the environment and the situation, especially the foreign policy are done in order to maintain the physical, economic, politic and social culture of the country in the midst of the real conditions of the situation occurred, like the history of bilateral relations between Indonesia and Australia). This is a study of the history of Australian foreign policy towards Indonesia since Whitlam government in 1972 until Hawke. The goal of the study is to explain how the foreign policy of the Australian Prime Ministers during their reigns. Although in reality in the course of its history, Australian and Indonesian diplomatic relations were full of intrigues, turmoil and conflicts, but it did not severe the relation of the two nations. Eventually, the conclusion of this study explicitly states that Australia and Indonesia still need each other in an attempt to establish political stability, economic and security in Southeast Asia and the Pacific peacefully.

This thesis focuses on the political and diplomatic history relating to Australian foreign policymaking towards the East Timor question during the Whitlam and Fraser governments, from April 1974 to January 1978. With reference to a number of published and unpublished Australian diplomatic records, a study of newspaper coverage (in particular, the Sydney Morning Herald, the Age and the Canberra Times), and also contemporary periodicals and personal memoirs, this thesis analyses the Australian foreign policymaking process towards Indonesia's integration policy towards East Timor. Although the existing literature has tended to focus on Australian policymakers, notably Prime Minister Whitlam in collaboration with Ambassador to Indonesia Woolcott – who were mostly concerned with Australian relations with Indonesia and sought to avoid the outcome of a small independent East Timor in the neighbourhood – this research also pays attention to the contribution of other foreign policy actors, including Foreign Minister Willesee of the Whitlam government in consultation with Secretary Renouf, both of whom thought it necessary to take account of domestic opinion sympathetic to self-determination. Considering that the Department of Foreign Affairs was convinced of the need for a proper act of self-determination in Portuguese Timor from the beginning and accordingly advised Foreign Ministers Willesee and Peacock to issue official statements in support of the right of self-determination against the backdrop of mounting domestic opinion – in particular during the period from October 1975 to July 1976 – this thesis argues that the Department took a substantial role in foreign policymaking in an attempt to dissociate the Australian government from Indonesia's coercive integration policy. In conclusion, despite the commonly-accepted view of the strong personal leadership of Prime Minister Whitlam who favoured Indonesia's integration of East Timor, this thesis argues that his influence was not unlimited. It is essential to consider ...

[Introduction]:.I want to concentrate on what Australian Governments have done and should do to improve Australia's system of representative government. Federal parliamentarians have the main responsibility because they and they alone can initiate constitutional referendums and enact international instruments. In all my own accounts and analyses of the matter, I contend that November 1975 was fundamentally a political crisis, fully capable of a political resolution, and, indeed, about to be so resolved, not more than 48 hours later than my government's dismissal. That is, by the fully attested switch of votes imminent on the part of at least four coalition senators. One such defection would have been enough to end the crisis. The dismissal was needless and premature. More recent accounts go to this conclusion. John Menadue's indispensable book, Things You Learn Along the Way, was published last year. Tonight, however, I propose only to touch on some aspects which point to changes in the Constitution which, if made before 1975, would have prevented the crisis or which, if made now, would prevent a repetition.

This thesis explores the context in which the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security, 1974-1977 came to be. The Whitlam Government wanted to reform the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) so as to depoliticise it and make it more effective in combating genuine threats to the state, including global terrorism. In early 1973 the government's reform was stalled as a result of the attorney-general's raid on ASIO offices. The Prime Minister announced in late 1973 that an inquiry into ASIO would arise at some point. The Australian Labor Party took the idea of a judicial inquiry into Australia's intelligence and security apparatus to the 1974 election. Within weeks of returning to office the Whitlam Government decided to launch the Royal Commission. Even by the time of the government's dismissal in 1975 the process of ASIO's reform was advanced. The decision to keep ASIO was made by Labor prior to the 1972 election. This was despite experiencing two decades of ASIO's ideological partisanship, which had consequences for Labor. But the party's decision was not inconsistent with its history, having been an anti-communist party from the 1920s and responsible for ASIO's creation in 1949. The Royal Commission's terms of reference ensured that an intelligence apparatus would continue to be available to the Commonwealth. The decision to erect the Royal Commission was also widely supported by major Australian newspapers. When the Royal Commission finished in 1977 a lasting bipartisan consensus on ASIO was emerging.

This thesis explores the context in which the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security, 1974-1977 came to be. The Whitlam Government wanted to reform the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) so as to depoliticise it and make it more effective in combating genuine threats to the state, including global terrorism. In early 1973 the government's reform was stalled as a result of the attorney-general's raid on ASIO offices. The Prime Minister announced in late 1973 that an inquiry into ASIO would arise at some point. The Australian Labor Party took the idea of a judicial inquiry into Australia's intelligence and security apparatus to the 1974 election. Within weeks of returning to office the Whitlam Government decided to launch the Royal Commission. Even by the time of the government's dismissal in 1975 the process of ASIO's reform was advanced. The decision to keep ASIO was made by Labor prior to the 1972 election. This was despite experiencing two decades of ASIO's ideological partisanship, which had consequences for Labor. But the party's decision was not inconsistent with its history, having been an anti-communist party from the 1920s and responsible for ASIO's creation in 1949. The Royal Commission's terms of reference ensured that an intelligence apparatus would continue to be available to the Commonwealth. The decision to erect the Royal Commission was also widely supported by major Australian newspapers. When the Royal Commission finished in 1977 a lasting bipartisan consensus on ASIO was emerging.

[Introduction]:.The choice of topic was, for me, an easy one. The campaign for open government was the first topic on which I developed an academic and professional interest. That was at a time, in the early 1970s, when the concept of open government did not enjoy widespread acceptance. The mood was aptly captured a little later by Sir Arnold Robinson's explanation to Sir Humphrey Appleby – "Open government is a contradiction in terms. You can be open – or you can have government". Sir Humphrey agreed: the word "secretary", he noted, is after all a derivative of "secret". The first assurance of change was a promise by the new Whitlam Government in 1972 to enact a freedom of information Act along the lines of the 1967 United States law. The realisation of that promise, ten years later, was a confirmation that government was changing, but of how difficult it was to accomplish that change. The intervening development of the legislative model told the story. An interdepartmental committee appointed by the Government to develop a legislative model took nearly two years to prepare its report of 18 pages. Sent back to the drawing board, it returned two years later with a report that had grown to 100 pages. The Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs then took control of the reform agenda, conducting hearings around Australia, receiving submissions in support of a stronger law from over 125 individuals, public interest groups, unions and professional associations, and delivering finally a report of over 500 pages, heralded at the time as one of the finest products of the Senate committee system. The momentum was sustained when six government senators crossed the floor to vote with the Opposition in favour of a stronger FOI law. The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) was a part, a small but vital part, of the revolution in government and thinking that occurred in Australia. The Act thus serves as a barometer of sorts for measuring the strength of government commitment to openness. I want to return to that issue –problems with the FOI Act, and contemporary challenges to open government – but before doing so it is important to paint a fuller picture of the current structural basis for open government in Australia. I will look at three areas of structural support – legal doctrine, the framework of government, and our philosophy of government.

Elizabeth Reid (AO, FASSA, FAIIA) was the first adviser on women's affairs to any head of government in the world, appointed by Prime Minister Gough Whitlam in 1973. Drawing on her own life and writing, and those of other members of the Women's Liberation Movement and the Women's Electoral Lobby, Reid recreates the fire that burned in 1970s feminists. Weaving together connections between sexuality, justice, morality, and the cultural structures of sexism, Reid evokes women's experiences of personal disempowerment that fuelled their activism and political determination. In 1973 when the Prime Minister's office advertised for a Women's Adviser, feminists debated whether or not revolution could be made from within government. Reid recalls her work as Women's Adviser, and her leadership of the Australian delegation to the 1975 International Women's Year events in Mexico City. As the nation's most prominent feminist, Reid travelled around Australia and spoke to all kinds of women. She received more letters than any member of Cabinet other than the Prime Minister. In this significant retrospective, Reid summarises the achievements of the Whitlam Government in various areas, the constraints it faced, and more broadly the successes of the 1970s feminist movement and what we can learn from it now.

Sir Arthur Tange was perhaps the most powerful Secretary of the Australian Defence Department and one of the most powerful of the great 'mandarins' who dominated the Commonwealth Public Service between the 1940s and the 1970s. His strong, and often decisive, influence on both administration and policy was exerted by virtue of his intellectual capacity, his administrative ability and the sheer force of his personality. Controversies from his time in Defence, including those associated with 'the Tange report' and 'the Tange reforms', echo to this day, and it is still easy to identify both staunch admirers and vitriolic critics in defence and public service circles. Tange wrote this account in his last years. It is a memoir – based largely on memory supplemented by limited reference to documentary material – that focuses upon his career after he came to Defence in 1970. It records his own account of his part in those administrative reforms and policy shifts, as well as his involvement-or non-involvement or alleged involvement-in several of the political crises of the 1970s, including the downfall of John Gorton as Prime Minister and the dismissal of the Whitlam Government.

In the 1970s the Australian Commonwealth Government and three States, Victoria (1974), New South Wales (1977) and South Australia (1978), passed legislation to protect the built heritage within their jurisdictions. The legislation was primarily a response to two factors: a large number of public protests against the demolition of historic buildings in all Australian states by the 1970s and the influence of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention, which the Whitlam Government (1972-75) embraced enthusiastically. The other states, with governments that were more influenced by development interests, were slow to follow the federal lead. In this study, Sharon Mosler examines heritage issues and conflicts in Adelaide from enactment of the first South Australian Heritage Act in 1978 to its successor in 1993, and also analyses issues leading from that period into the twenty-first century. State legislation introduced by the Labor government of Premier Mike Rann (2002 – present) has affected the built environment significantly since this book began. The Rann government has given the built heritage a low priority in its strategic plan compared to population growth, while the Adelaide City Council has become more balanced in the past decade, although the council too has focussed on increasing Adelaide's population. The result has been more high-rise buildings at the expense of heritage conservation and historic precincts.

The study of embassy architecture has predominately focused on the United States and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom. In particular this research has been conducted by Jane Loeffler as captured in her book The Architecture of Diplomacy: Building America's Embassies (2011) and by Ron Robin in Enclaves of America: The Rhetoric of American Political Architecture Abroad, 1900-1965 (1992). Both studies establish that embassy buildings can be utilised as historical references to establish a viewpoint into a nation's political and cultural history. This is no different in Australia, where Australian embassy buildings allow us insight into the directions taken in government policy, international relations, architecture and society. In order to begin to comprehend the complex nature of this building typology, archival research must initially be conducted into the government departments that were responsible for driving embassy design since the opening of Australia House in London in 1918. By correlating this research with domestic and foreign policies that were implemented as a response to changing world events, it becomes clear that a number of bureaucratic forces are behind the development of Australia's embassy buildings. This paper will focus on the influence these forces had on embassy design during the 1970's, when the Overseas Property Bureau was created and Australia developed several high profile embassies under the Whitlam Government.

What are the ideational, strategic, and political foundations of current Australian policy towards China? Although the strategic and security implication of a rising China in the region is frequently seen as a modern issue, the challenge of how to deal with a 'China growing strong' has preoccupied Australia since the 1950s; while modern approaches date from the 1960s. This paper traces the evolution of Australian security policy, attitudes, strategies, and assumptions behind both Liberal and Labor responses to the 'China security question' as well as the politics driving theme from Prime Minister Robert Menzies through to current Prime Minister John Howard. How have attitudes and responses to the 'China security question' evolved and changed, why did they do so, and how is this relevant to understanding current and future Australian responses to meeting the challenge of China's continued rise today? This paper explores these questions in chronological order, which coincides with the thematic development of the 'China security question' beginning with the Liberal Governments up to 1972, then to the Whitlam Government and the period leading to the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, and finally from the post-Tiananmen period to the present one culminating in Prime Minister John Howard's attempt at 'synthesis' of both Liberal and Labor approaches to the question.

'The Ayes Have It' is a fascinating account of the Queensland Parliament during three decades of high-drama politics. It examines in detail the Queensland Parliament from the days of the 'Labor split' in the 1950s, through the conservative governments of Frank Nicklin, John Bjelke- Petersen and Mike Ahern, to the fall of the Nationals government led briefly by Russell Cooper in December 1989. The volume traces the rough and tumble of parliamentary politics in the frontier state. The authors focus on parliament as a political forum, on the representatives and personalities that made up the institution over this period, on the priorities and political agendas that were pursued, and the increasingly contentious practices used to control parliamentary proceedings. Throughout the entire history are woven other controversies that repeatedly recur – controversies over state economic development, the provision of government services, industrial disputation and government reactions, electoral zoning and disputes over malapportionment, the impost of taxation in the 'low tax state', encroachments on civil liberties and political protests, the perennial topic of censorship, as well as the emerging issues of integrity, concerns about conflicts of interest and the slide towards corruption. There are fights with the federal government – especially with the Whitlam government – and internal fights within the governing coalition which eventually leads to its collapse in 1983, after which the Nationals manage to govern alone for two very tumultuous terms. On the non-government side, the bitterness of the 1950s split was reflected in the early parliaments of this period, and while the Australian Labor Party eventually saw off its rivalrous off-shoot (the QLP-DLP) it then began to implode through waves of internal factional discord.

Recent responses to Asian immigration in Australia can be assessed in relation to Australia's search for a national identity. Australian nationalism has always had its racist elements, reflected in the maintenance of the White Australia Policy until it was abolished by the Whitlam government in 1973. Asian immigration has built up considerably since them, though no one source country has been dominant. Since the late 1970s, generally one third or more of settler arrivals have been from Asian countries. Migrants to Australia from Asian countries have been, on average, more highly educated and have achieved higher income levels than the rest of the population. However, some groups have had below average education levels, notably refugees from the Indo-chines region. The polls indicate majority opposition to Asian immigration, as to immigration in general, though multiple issue opinion polling does not show immigration to be an issue of major concern. Since the maiden speech in parliament by the independent member for Oxley, Pauline Hanson, in September 1996, a "race controversy" has erupted which has reflected not only the persistence of racist attitudes among a section of the Australian population, but also that there is a class and education element: anti-Asian sentiment is more prevalent among the Anglo-Australian working class than among the better educated and those of immigrant background. Avoidance of further widening of these fault lines in Australian society will require statesmanship of a high order from Australia's political leaders.