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The reputation of Ernst Wigforss (1881–1977), the foremost ideologist of Swedish Social Democracy, has suffered from the lack of a coherent treatment of his work in English. This article briefly surveys Wigforss' historical contributions to Swedish Social Democracy. Then it examines the structure of Wigforss' thought, analyzing first the conceptions of equality, liberty, democracy, security, economic efficiency, and solidarity that serve for Wigforss as the aims of Social Democracy. Then it considers the reformist measures Wigforss espoused to achieve these aims–social welfare policy, progressive taxation, economic planning, industrial democracy, and socialization of industry. It concludes with an assessment of Wigforss' importance as a Social Democratic theorist and suggests the relevance of his ideas to American politics and social science.

THIS ARTICLE BRIEFLY SURVEYS WIGFORSS' AND THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRACY" STRUCTURE OF WIGFORSS THOUGHT, ANALYZING THE CONCEPTIONS OF EQUALITY, LIBERTY, DEMOCRACY, SECURITY, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, AND SOLIDARITY. IT CONCLUDES WITH SUGGESTIONS AS TO HIS RELEVANCE TO AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

Words, like thoughts, often change their significance when used as political symbols. For a great many Swedes neutrality has come to be a synonym for peace and independence. Of course neutrality, if it succeeds, always means peace for the country itself. But it is hardly a policy intended to preserve peace among nations. It is more similar to one of those means which man has invented in order to be able to wage war. When neutrality began to appear as a conception in international law it was rooted in the view that war is a legitimate contest and that no distinction should be drawn between an aggressor state and the state attacked. When in modern war a mighty aggressor looks upon the neutrality of small countries not as a useful limitation of the theater of operations but as an obstacle to victory, that power simply forces its will upon the neutral. At the same time the great contest of our time arises from a conflict between authoritarian states and free democracies and tends to be total, involving all spheres of national and individual life. Moreover, international law no longer implies a sovereign right to go to war but moves towards a distinction between an unjust war of aggression and a just war of defense. All this means that the states attacked are not likely to look upon impartial neutrality as a matter of course and a proper standard of conduct.