Suchergebnisse

Eine Welle von Fusionen hat die Weltwirtschaft erfasst. Allein die Dimension der bei Großfusionen genannten Summen, die nicht selten das Bruttoinlandsprodukt von Volkswirtschaften übersteigen, führen zu einem erheblichen Maß an Verunsicherung. Dies wird auch in den Überschriften von Zeitungsartikeln deutlich: "Megafusionen bedrohen den Wettbewerb - Was tut der Staat?" "Weltwirtschaft im Fusionsfieber - Die Politik ist überfordert". Oder: "Wirtschaft im Größenwahn." Im folgenden soll nach einem kurzen historischen Rückblick über die Fusionsaktivitäten im 20. Jahrhundert explizit auf die Situation und die Zukunftsperspektiven der Fusionstätigkeit in der deutschen Ernährungswirtschaft eingegangen werden. Nach einer Darstellung der Folgen und Auswirkungen von Fusionen schließt dieser Aufsatz mit einer Diskussion über die Rolle des Staates im Bereich der Fusionskontrolle.

Das Internet ist stark durch Wettbewerb zwischen Plattformen geprägt, welche potenzielle Tauschpartner zusammenbringen. Die Konkurrenz zwischen solchen mehrseitigen Plattformen und die Marktkonzentration wird maßgeblich bestimmt durch (1) die Stärke der indirekten Netzeffekte, (2) das Ausmaß steigender Skaleneffekte, (3) Überlastungsgefahren, (4) Differenzierung der Plattformen und (5) die Möglichkeit des sogenannten Multihoming. Je nach Ausprägung dieser Faktoren ergeben sich unterschiedliche Konzentrationstendenzen und Markteintrittsbarrieren. Pauschal lässt sich zwar nicht feststellen, dass im Internet besonders viele dauerhaft resistente Monopole anzutreffen wären und ein besonderer Regulierungsbedarf besteht. Gleichwohl zeigt sich, dass einzelne Plattformen wie z.B. ebay auf manchen Märkten durchaus beträchtliche Marktmacht besitzen, die aufgrund erheblicher Markteintrittsbarrieren auch nicht schnell erodieren wird. ; The Internet is characterized by competition between platforms which bring together potential partners of exchange. The degree of competition between these multi-sided platforms und market concentration are determined through (1) the strength of the direct and indirect network effects, (2) the extent of economies of scale, (3) the risk of congestition, (4) platform differentiation, and (5) the possibility of multi-homing. Depending on these factors different market concentrations and barriers to entry result. While there is no general tendency for concentration in the Internet and no general need for special market regulation of online content providers and intermediaries, single platforms may still have long lasting and significant market power which is unlikely to erode fastly, as the example of ebay illustrate.

This paper examines the nature of Japanese regulation, its effect on international trade, and the reasons for the slow progress of deregulation. It argues that theinformal and discretionary power of the Japanese bureaucracy, combined with acontinued protectionist, pro-producer, and pro-insider bias to the manipulation of the regulatory system, continues to maintain high prices and discourage imports into Japanese markets. The paper also argues that Japan's weak anti-trust enforcementallows cartels to play an important role in regulating Japanese markets, particularly inindustries such as steel and chemicals. While liberal initiatives have introduced some important regulatory reforms, they have not fundamentally transformed the Japanese regulatory system because neither business nor the bureaucracy genuinely wantdrastic reform or free-wheeling markets. Liberal reformist measures in Japan are animportant corrective and supplement to mercantilist policy, but are not likely tofundamentally transform Japan's political-economic system ; In dieser Studie werden Konzept und Realisierung der japanischen Regulationspraxis analysiert sowie ihre Auswirkungen auf den internationalen Handel und die Ursachen für den langsamen Fortschritt bei der Deregulation. Dabeiwird die Meinung vertreten, daß als Folge der informellen Macht der japanischenBürokratie mit ihrem großen Ermessensspielraum, kombiniert mit der fortdauernden protektionistischen, Unternehmer- und Insiderfreundlichen Grundeinstellung zur Beeinflussung des regulatorischen Systems, sowohl hohe Preise als auch die Abschottung der japanischen Märkte vor Importen aufrechterhalten werden.Außerdem ist zu berücksichtigen, daß die nur schwach entwickelte japanische Anti-Trust-Politik den Kartellen die Möglichkeit gibt, eine einflußreiche Rolle bei derRegulierung der Märkte zu spielen, vor allem in der Stahl- und Chemiebranche. Auchwenn einige Liberalisierungsinitiativen durchaus erkennbare regulatorische Reformen gebracht haben, so haben sie doch nicht das japanische regulatorische System in seiner prinzipiellen Wirkungsweise verändert. Weder die Unternehmen noch die Bürokratie wollen eine wirklich durchgreifende Reform oder freie Märkte. Liberale Reformmaßnahmen in Japan sind wichtig als Korrektiv und Ergänzung der merkantilistischen Politik, aber es ist unwahrscheinlich, daß sie Japans politikökonomisches System verändern.

A trend common to virtually all European banking markets over the last decade or so has been the fall in bank numbers. The decline in number of banks and the associated increase in market concentration may suggest that banking service choice is declining. However, a growth in branch numbers in many systems, increasing foreign bank presence, as well as the growth of non-traditional banking service providers make it difficult to categorically state that overall customer choice is declining. In this section we discuss in more detail how market structure affects performance in the banking sector. This is followed with a discussion of the changing European market structure, and whether increased concentration does actually pose any risks for consumers. The paper concludes with some observations on the impact of mergers on bank performance. Economic theory tells us that there is a relationship between market structure and firm performance. A market characterised by a large number of firms will be expected to operate in a different fashion to a market with one dominant firm. There is a variety of different types of market structure ranging from perfect competition when there are very many firms (and when consumer welfare is maximised), through imperfect competition under an oligopoly, to monopoly.

This paper studies competition in prices and opening hours in a model with free entry. It is shown that under free competition a market failure arises: Entry is excessive and opening hours are under-provided. Restrictions on opening hours aggravate this failure. I analyze the impact of a liberalization of opening hours. The model predicts that in the short run prices will remain constant, but increase in the long run. Concentration in the retail sector will rise and opening hours will increase in two steps, immediately after deregulation and further over time. Finally, employment in the retail sector increases.

This paper considers a theoretical model of n asymmetric firms that reduce their initial unit costs by spending on R&D activities. In accordance with Schumpeterian hypotheses we obtain that more efficient (bigger) firms spend more in R&D and this leads to a more concentrated market structure. We also find a positive relationship between innovation and market concentration. This calls for a corrective tax on R&D activities to curtail strategic incentives to over-invest in R&D trying to achieve a higher market share.

This paper is motivated by the European Union strategy to secure competitiveness for Europe in the globalising world by focussing on technological supremacy (the Lisbon - agenda). Parallel to that, the EU Commission is trying to take a more economic approach to competition policy in general and anti-trust policy in particular. Our analysis tries to establish the relationship between increasing knowledge intensity and the resulting market concentration: if the European Union economy is gradually shifting to a pattern of sectoral specialisation that features a bias on knowledge intensive sectors, then this may well have some influence on market concentration and competition policy would have to adjust not to counterfeit the Lisbon-agenda. Following a review of the available theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between knowledge intensity and market structure, we use a larger Eurostat database to test the shape of this relationship. Assuming a causality that runs from knowledge to concentration, we show that the relationship between knowledge intensity and market structures is in fact different for knowledge intensive industries and we establish a non-linear, inverted U-curve shape.

This paper uses a large cross-country survey of business firms to assess their influence on government policies. It is found that influence is associated with larger, government-owned firms that have a high degree of ownership concentration. In contrast, foreign ownership matters little. It is also found that the extent to which government policies and legislation are viewed as impeding firm growth decreases with political influence and, independently, with a country's level of institutional quality.

Since objective news coverage is vital to democracy, captured media can seriously distort collective decisions. The current paper develops a voting model where citizens are uncertain about the welfare effects induced by alternative policy options and derive information about those effects from the mass media. The media might however secretly collude with interest groups in order to influence the public opinion. In the case of voting over the level of a productivity-enhancing public bad, it is shown that an increase in the concentration of firm ownership makes the occurrence of media bias more likely. Although media bias is not always welfare worsening, conditions for it to raise welfare are restrictive.