Patient safety is defined as the possibility of the patient, from unnecessary or potential harm associated with healthcare systems professional conduct. As published by the European Union pharmaceutical group (PGEU), patient safety is a serious concern throughout the European Union. Recent studies have shown that the patient's health in the process of errors, the EU has carried out about 10 percent. patient hospital admissions. Adverse events (errors) occur at every stage of where the healthcare is provided. Therefore, patient safety published in one of the EU's political agenda. 2005. Member States have begun to systematically examine the patient safety aspects of health care has become a priority. How to publish PGEU, safe drugs are important in the treatment of patients with diseases. They help to avoid problems associated with additional risk patients. Sufficient medicinal product safety is achieved by giving the patient full information about it. This is one of the most important aspects of operating a pharmacist, determining patient care safety. The master thesis will explore the daily activities of a pharmacist in relation to various aspects of patient safety process. The research will involve questionnaires will also be examined scientific articles, which will be submitted to foreign countries pharmacist patient safety activities. The results will be analyzed and compared.
Patient safety is defined as the possibility of the patient, from unnecessary or potential harm associated with healthcare systems professional conduct. As published by the European Union pharmaceutical group (PGEU), patient safety is a serious concern throughout the European Union. Recent studies have shown that the patient's health in the process of errors, the EU has carried out about 10 percent. patient hospital admissions. Adverse events (errors) occur at every stage of where the healthcare is provided. Therefore, patient safety published in one of the EU's political agenda. 2005. Member States have begun to systematically examine the patient safety aspects of health care has become a priority. How to publish PGEU, safe drugs are important in the treatment of patients with diseases. They help to avoid problems associated with additional risk patients. Sufficient medicinal product safety is achieved by giving the patient full information about it. This is one of the most important aspects of operating a pharmacist, determining patient care safety. The master thesis will explore the daily activities of a pharmacist in relation to various aspects of patient safety process. The research will involve questionnaires will also be examined scientific articles, which will be submitted to foreign countries pharmacist patient safety activities. The results will be analyzed and compared.
University's of Klaipeda students' today's culture research is described in the article, data, got in the end of 2002 y., in compared to data, got in the end of 2004 y. National upbringing's dimension is analyzed. Conclusions 1. In two years' time social trauma in Lithuania influence to academic youth has decreased: established, e. g., that there are a one third less students, who liked Lithuanian nation at the same time estimating it negative; the amount of students, who are favorably disposed towards their own nation, increased by one third. 2. It showed up, that fathers educate their children more patriotically than mothers; unfortunately, men do not socialize with children enough. 3. It was ascertained, that it is hard to educate youth patriotically because of the particularity of work in high school, but students' national optimism can be raised. 4. Lithuanian schools do not manage to indoctrinate love to native land worth - it stays in the last place between the students in the first courses and is important only for every fifteen student. With reference to working practice, it can be stated, that this worth should be indoctrinated from as early as possible, even before school. Despite the agitations, specific to international political unions, it is necessary to impose patriotic education course for pedagogical profile specialities' students in Lithuanian high schools.
University's of Klaipeda students' today's culture research is described in the article, data, got in the end of 2002 y., in compared to data, got in the end of 2004 y. National upbringing's dimension is analyzed. Conclusions 1. In two years' time social trauma in Lithuania influence to academic youth has decreased: established, e. g., that there are a one third less students, who liked Lithuanian nation at the same time estimating it negative; the amount of students, who are favorably disposed towards their own nation, increased by one third. 2. It showed up, that fathers educate their children more patriotically than mothers; unfortunately, men do not socialize with children enough. 3. It was ascertained, that it is hard to educate youth patriotically because of the particularity of work in high school, but students' national optimism can be raised. 4. Lithuanian schools do not manage to indoctrinate love to native land worth - it stays in the last place between the students in the first courses and is important only for every fifteen student. With reference to working practice, it can be stated, that this worth should be indoctrinated from as early as possible, even before school. Despite the agitations, specific to international political unions, it is necessary to impose patriotic education course for pedagogical profile specialities' students in Lithuanian high schools.
The present article considers the problems of implementation of public programs, there is presented the place of public programs in the structure of public government. Successful implementation of public programs is one of the essential elements of the efficient government of the public sector. Implementing of such programs is aimed towards a particular economical-social effect on entire society, its welfare. The effect of public programs on the society is felt not immediately, but after 10–15 years, therefore the lack of polar volition to consistent succession is rather frequent. In case the implementation of the program fails or it is implemented only partially, unrealised social-economical expectations of the participants, organisers of such program, and the whole society remain. The aim of the present article is to establish the position of public programs in the structure of public government as well as to perform the research into the opinions of the potential participants of a professional rehabilitation program. When implementing programs, such problems as insufficient motivation of the group of society to which the program is applied, pressure of concerned groups as well as financial, organisational problems are encountered. The opinions of potential participants of the particular public program (professional rehabilitation program) are analysed in the presented empirical research. During the research, the main reasons determining refusal of potential participants to participate in the program were revealed. [.]
The present article considers the problems of implementation of public programs, there is presented the place of public programs in the structure of public government. Successful implementation of public programs is one of the essential elements of the efficient government of the public sector. Implementing of such programs is aimed towards a particular economical-social effect on entire society, its welfare. The effect of public programs on the society is felt not immediately, but after 10–15 years, therefore the lack of polar volition to consistent succession is rather frequent. In case the implementation of the program fails or it is implemented only partially, unrealised social-economical expectations of the participants, organisers of such program, and the whole society remain. The aim of the present article is to establish the position of public programs in the structure of public government as well as to perform the research into the opinions of the potential participants of a professional rehabilitation program. When implementing programs, such problems as insufficient motivation of the group of society to which the program is applied, pressure of concerned groups as well as financial, organisational problems are encountered. The opinions of potential participants of the particular public program (professional rehabilitation program) are analysed in the presented empirical research. During the research, the main reasons determining refusal of potential participants to participate in the program were revealed. [.]
The 15th Lithuanian government cabinet is set to become the most stable of all to date. Nevertheless, its political programme was one of radical reform of governance (the term which was not expressly articulated in its political programme). During this period, the Lithuanian academe has also embraced the idea of governance. However, it resulted in two competing translations of the concept. In early 2012, the government has approved "The Programme of Governance Development" where it provided for an express definition of the term. An analysis of governance reform and its prospects for the future set out in the programme allows us conclude that governance is understood within the framework of "good governance". At the same time, the methods of implementation of the provisions of this programme will go along the lines of the existing administrative practice. ; XV Vyriausybės programoje 2008 m. buvo numatyta daug ambicingų pertvarkų viešojo valdymo srityje. Praėjus 3,5 jos veiklos metų galime vertinti įgyvendintų reformų turinį ir prognozuoti pasekmes. Per šį laikotarpį tiek viešajame, tiek akademiniame diskursuose taip pat paplito terminas viešasis valdymas arba valdysena (angl. governance). 2012 m. pradžioje viešasis valdymas buvo apibrėžtas Lietuvos teisėje naujai parengtoje Viešojo valdymo tobulinimo 2012–2020 programoje. Straipsnyje analizuojama viešojo valdymo samprata šioje programoje ir jos ryšys su XV Vyriausybės veiklos metu įgyvendintomis reformomis. Terminas "viešasis valdymas" ("valdysena") akademinėje literatūroje vartojamas labai įvairiuose kontekstuose ir, atrodytų, nesuderinamomis ontologinėmis prielaidomis besiremiančiose teorijose. Straipsnyje prieinama prie išvados, kad viešasis valdymas Lietuvoje apibrėžiamas labai specifiškai ir atitinka "gerojo valdymo" idėją. Tuo pat metu metodai, kuriais ketinama siekti programos principų įgyvendinimo, iš esmės išlaikys Lietuvoje nusistovėjusią administracinę praktiką.
The author analyses the influence of the Constitutional Court on a system of democratic governance. The Constitutional Court is usually treated an institution, which exercises control over the administrative power and attempts to protect a person from unjustified interference in his rights as well as to maintain the balance of the institutions of administration. The power of the Constitutional Court lies in its right to interpret the Constitution. Nowadays everybody acknowledges that the constitutional justice is a necessary element of the constitutional democracy when actions of the administrative power are supervised in regard to their conformity with the Constitution, which is the most important legal act of civil society's life. Nonetheless, assessors of the Constitutional Court's activity are constantly debating on issues as: how wide is Constitutional Court's discretion to interpret the text of the Constitution? Don't the justices of the Constitutional Court attempt to replace the Constitution, which was approved by the Nation, with their own Constitution; is such evolution of the Constitution, in itself, constitutional? It is therefore necessary to make clear exactly which conception of democracy has proved compatible with the existence of a constitutional justice. The science of constitutional law has to explain the essence of this phenomenon as well as limits of the power of the Constitutional Court to interpret the Constitution. ; Straipsnyje analizuojama konstitucinio teismo veiklos įtaka demokratinei valdymo sistemai. Tai ypač aktualu visuomenėms, neturinčioms demokratinės bendrų reikalų tvarkymo tradicijos. Šiandien pripažįstama, kad konstitucinė justicija yra esminis konstitucinės demokratijos institutas, kad valdžios veiksmai turi būti kontroliuojami konstitucijos, svarbiausio pilietinės tautos gyvenimo akto, požiūriu. Konstitucinio Teismo veiklos vertintojai Lietuvoje ginčijasi: kokia laisvę Konstitucinis Teismas turi interpretuodamas Konstitucijos tekstą, ar Konstitucinio Teismo teisėjai savo jurisprudencijos suformuluota konstitucine doktrina nepakeičia tautos aprobuotos Konstitucijos? Tiesioginis Konstitucijos taikymas neatsiejamas nuo Konstitucijos interpretacijos. Interpretacija visados yra kūrybiškos, o ne mechaninės veiklos rezultatas. "Jurisprudencinės konstitucijos" susiformavimas atspindi konstitucinės praktikos brandumą, konstitucionalizmo, konstitucinės demokratijos būtino elemento, įsitvirtinimą ir stiprėjimą valstybiškai organizuotos visuomenės gyvenime.
Security studies have survived a lot of transformations. Like any other social theory, security studies have gone through a number of consecutive development stages: the dominance of traditional theories (realism/neorealism), the rise of critical & discourse approaches as well as the attempts to modify the traditional theories & methodological frameworks & to search for the synthetic or universal theoretic models. Author reviews how the security studies developed in the last few decades. Further attention is devoted to the attempts of Barry Buzan to provide for a compromised frameworks for security analysis in his works People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (1991), & Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998). The first work was an attempt to sum up the most valuable inputs for a widening security agenda; it includes the new aspects of security (economic, political, social & ecological), acknowledging that a state can be one of the many other subjects in the security studies. The greatest value of this work is a model of sectorization of security studies -- analytical proposition to classify threats by sectors. The second framework for analysis seeks to preserve the use of the security sectors' concept. However B. Buzan, 0. Waever & J. de Wilde propose to include a discursive theory of securitization into the framework. Authors suggest that security is not an objective condition -- it is about presenting issues as existential threats that require emergency measures. Some critiques (eg. J. Eriksson) argue, theories of securitization & sectonzation are incompatible in methodological meaning. The author of this article gives some suggestions that a model of sectorization of security studies should be supplemented by a new sector -- the communication sector. This expansion of the model could help fill some gaps left in the B. Buzan model -- i.e. the way threats emerge, the reason why one threat is considered differently from the other one as well as why they enjoy a specific influence on the other security sectors. 3 Schemas. Adapted from the source document.
Sign Lithuania has joined NATO & the EU. However, one should ask themselves a question whether the integration process has already ended & whether we have become an integral part of Europe. Such doubts appear after taking a closer look at our information space, which contains signs of informational cultural expansion from the East. In the information age the concept of power is changing. Some countries compete for ideological & cultural dominance in the information space of other countries and, consequently, the latter seek to protect their space from such influences. Lithuania has also entered such a battlefield, therefore, the conception of a national information space & information attacks towards that space should be analyzed more thoroughly. At the present moment, the main goal is to make the Lithuanian academic society & especially the general public aware of the problem of the information warfare, its threats as well as the principles of information security in respect of an individual & the whole of society. In Russia, the theoretical level of this issue has been traversed a long time ago & practical actions are being taken today: strategic documents concerning information security were adopted five years ago, concrete institutions responsible for the implementation of a particular information policy in the "near abroad" countries are being established Russia has been aiming & still aims to keep Lithuania in the sphere of its control. Thus, Russia has started to employ new tools of power, namely, information resources, telecommunications & the media. The consequences of such information pressure from the East are evident: the results of a research conducted by RAIT last September show that the majority of Lithuanians prefer watching Russian films with Lithuanian subtitles & English or other Western films dubbed in Lithuanian. In order to change the present situation, an active & independent information policy in the Lithuanian information space is necessary. The article analyses changes in the concept of power in the information age. Soft power, comprised of information & media control, is presented as a significant lever used by major states in informational & geopolitical warfare. The article also discusses a transformed concept of geopolitics & the concept of neocolonialism. The general understanding of information space is presented & measures how to influence it are discussed. The programs broadcast by the Lithuanian television networks are presented as a specific reflection of the Lithuanian information space. An assumption is made based on the analysis of the Russian share of TV broadcasts in Lithuania that there are evident signs of informational-cultural expansion from the East in the Lithuanian information space. Adapted from the source document.
With the so-called war on terror launched by the USA in 2001, a new era started in one of the fields of the propaganda war -- the Internet. Ability to disseminate information to as wide as possible audience due to globality of the Internet has become a powerful mean of influence. Many Muslim politically engaged religiously motivated groups, who perceive themselves to be in the state of such war, create their own elaborate web-sites. "KavkazCenter" is just one of them. "KavkazCenter" declares itself to be a product of the Chechen Independent International Islamic Internet Agency, which was set up in 1999 in Grozny by the Chechen National Center for Strategic Research & Political Technologies. However, its content is somewhat problematic, as the site appears to have been solely a propaganda tool for the Chechen Jihadist group Riyadhu as-Salihin, led by the late Shamil Basayev, who often boasted about his organized bloody attacks, frequently against civilians. Lithuania first noticed the site in early 2003, when it started being serviced by a Lithuanian firm "Microlink Data," which at the time hosted the site on its server. Back then the Lithuanian State Security Department (SSD) declared the site to be free from terrorist propaganda & insisted it did not pose any threat to Lithuania, though it was known that the site had been earlier closed down in the USA & the UK. However, half a year later the very same SSD confiscated the server of the firm "Elneta," which at that time hosted the site, thus shutting down its operations from Lithuania. This launched a long marathon of legal deliberations going all the way up to the Constitutional Court. The case divided the Lithuanian public into two parts -- those, who considered the "KavkazCenter" to be an information agency of independence-seeking Chechen freedom fighters & those, who considered the site to contain terrorist propaganda. The "defenders" group was championed by some MPs, Soviet-era dissidents, while the "accusers" group was led by the SSD. The unfolding of the case revealed that both sides were ill-prepared to meet the challenge the site "KavkazCenter" had caused. One can argue that even state institutions were taken by surprise by it. This first of all applies to the SSD, who showed itself at its worst -- its lack of professionalism was astonishing. At the same time, gaps in legislation & by extension in the work of courts were exposed. Most journalists, who took to bashing of the SSD for presumed persecution of media on the freedom of expression grounds, displayed ignorance & lack of deeper insight into the case. The general public was left puzzled. Moreover, Russia's involvement, though often referred to in the media, has never been fully revealed. The epopee of the "KavkazCenter" in Lithuania sucked both the Lithuanian government & the general society into the whirlpool of the global information wars. And though the experience shows that most of the actors were ill-prepared or not prepared at all, the very experience is very useful -- it allowed for identifying of the weaknesses in political, legal & social life of the country. Learning from its mistakes, the society can progress & improve. It is plausible to hope that in the event of another "kavkazcentr," the Lithuanian government & non-state actors will be better informed & equipped to tackle the issue. Adapted from the source document.
An unambiguous assessment of the results of changes in the post-communist political regime of Ukraine is hardly possible. The political system of this country has experienced both periods of democratic expectations & democratic setbacks during the last fifteen years. For example, in 1990-1994, before the first competitive parliamentary elections, there was a clear fragmentation among the old (communist) political elite in Ukraine; the country's first democratic constitution was adopted in 1996. However, after Leonid Kuchma was elected President in 1994, authoritarian tendencies gradually recrudesced, "oligarchic" clans took hold of the country's political system, & the elections were increasingly blatantly manipulated & rigged to the advantage of the ruling elite. This cycle of political development recurred ten years later. Manipulations of the results of the 2004 presidential election raised a massive protest among the inhabitants of Ukraine, which was symbolically dubbed the "Orange Revolution." A new influx of democratic expectations forced the ruling elite to concede to re-running the second round of Ukraine's presidential election, which was won by the opposition. However, the political crisis which struck the new government in September 2005 & the mutual accusations of corruption raised by the former "revolutionary" comrades-in-arms -- President Viktor Yushchenko & former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko -- raised new questions regarding the vitality of the democratic processes in Ukraine. The main question examined in this article is therefore whether the vacillation of Ukraine's political regime is not a regular, permanent condition. Having two main aims -- (1) to construct a theory of Ukraine's post-soviet political transformation, & (2) to disclose the possibilities of democracy consolidation in this country -- the article starts with making some "corrections" to the transitologist approach to regime change. Firstly, it is argued that political transformation theories should have a shared concept of democracy, irrespective of the number or type of the stages of democratization distinguished. The experience of post-communist countries shows that formal procedural democratic criteria are insufficient in order to characterize a political system as democratic. Secondly, traditional theories of regime change focus mostly on the analysis of the behavior of the main political actors (the political elite) & their decisions (agreements). The structural conditions (eg., the characteristics of socio-economic development) should be also included into theoretical thinking about regime change. Thirdly, the analysis of elites & their agreements is sufficiently developed to explain how & when the transition to democracy occurs. However, the democratic consolidation stage has remained somewhat mystified by 'transitologists.' The article argues that an assumption should probably be made that the behavior of political elite factions competing in the political system is always rational & self-interested, ie., democracy (or any other form of political regime) becomes "the only game in town" only if & when it is mostly advantageous for the political elite functioning in that system. Taking into account the above mentioned "corrections" to the transitologist approach, in the article, there is produced a model for analyzing post-soviet regime transformations. The model consists of three main explanatory variables: (1) the structure of political elite, (2) the 'rules of game' prevalent in the system, & (3) the strategies of political elite aiming at gaining business and/or mass support. Consequently, various interrelations of these variables may produce four possible ideal-type outcomes of regime change -- (1) democracy, (2) 'democracy with adjectives,' (3) zero-sum game (a very unstable option when political regime may be temporarily democratic but is at a huge risk of downfall), (4) authoritarianism. In post-soviet countries, it is not enough to examine the structure of political elite & the institutions in order to predict the consolidation of one or another form of political regime. 'Building politicians' "alliances" with business & (or) mobilizing mass support may negate any such predictions & produce additional (regressive, in terms of democratization) impulses to further regime change. The very possibilities of the political elite to form "alliances" with business & (or) to mobilize the masses are mostly determined by the structural characteristics of the country. Thus, the analysis of the latter may not also be omitted in examining post-soviet transitions. Political regime in Ukraine, which beginning of 1990s started evolving as a probable liberal democracy or at least 'democracy with adjectives,' after 1998 Verkhovna Rada elections moved to the situation of the zero-sum game. Such transition was conditioned by two factors. First, the changes within political elite structure -- the communist camp, which occupied an important, although not the most important place in the pluralist political elite structure in 1994-1998, became an anti-systemic political force after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. For these reasons, only two opposing elite factions (oligarchs-"centrists" vs. national democrats) remained in the political system of Ukraine after the 1998 elections, the ideological confrontation of which was constantly increasing & became particularly acute at the outset of the "Orange Revolution" in 2004. Second, the fact that the business class in Ukraine was forming with the "assistance" of politicians allowed the political elite to build an alliance with business community already in 1994-1996 & maintain these tight clientelist relations even after the privatization period was over. When at the end of 2004 the national democrats gathered mass support & became virtually equal or even more influential than the so-called "centrists," who traditionally draw support from business structures, the zero-sum game in Ukraine became especially acute. Such it remains by now, even after the Orange revolution is over. In more than ten years of independence the business community of Ukraine has consolidated its positions in the Verkhovna Rada & accumulated control over almost all national TV channels & other media outlets, as well as separate industrial regions. Therefore even anti-oligarchically disposed government cannot ignore this power. The ruling elite that cares about its survival & political success is forced to co-ordinate its decisions with the interests of various business clans. On the other hand, since Ukraine's business class consists of several competing clans, any government decisions that seek to limit the political influence of business groups immediately affect the interests of competing business clans. The government cannot remain neutral in principal. Any attempts of the supposed "deoligarchisation" will only result in provoking sharper disagreements between business groups because the curtailment of the positions of one clan will open new prospects for the strengthening of the influence of its competitors. It may be argued that for these reasons there will always be at least one (and, most likely, the strongest one) oligarchic political camp supported by an "alliance" with business. In other words, Ukraine's political regime does not have any chance to be consolidated in the liberal democracy perspective. Another structural characteristic of Ukraine is the politically unorganized working class. At least several competing political forces claim to represent the workers' interests -- the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, & the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine. The internal competition among the left-wing forces encourages at least one of them (the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Progressive Socialist Party) to take a radical, anti-systemic position in order that potential supporters may distinguish it from other leftist parties. Therefore, it is likely that the political system of Ukraine will preserve a left-wing segment that will not wield much power but will propagate an anti-systemic ideology without "communicating" with other political forces. Due to its anti-systemic nature it will not be able to participate in the government of the state & the votes of the left-wing voters (comprising the basis for mass support) will probably be collected by the national democrats. This circumstance enables predicting that the zero-sum game will remain very intensive in Ukraine in the future as well. Thus, the permanent instability of the state & both -- democracy & authoritarianism -- in Ukraine (a zero-sum game) may actually be considered to be its consolidated political regime form. Adapted from the source document.
2003 EU accession referenda results in the 8 East Central European countries (Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, & Latvia) have been analyzed examining regional dimension of their results. Two criteria, active euro-optimism (percentage of YES voters out of all the electorate in particular region), & active euro-skepticism (percentage of NO voters out of all the electorate in the region), have been used. Comparison with two other variables, economic (GDP per capita in the region) & ethnic (percentage of ethnic group other than title one, if remarkable) has been made; Pearson correlations have been calculated. Though there is common agreement on suppositional influence of regional factors (possibly, North-South, East-West, urban-rural, richer-poorer regional cleavages, exceptional case of the capital city, influence of densely inhabited ethnic groups etc.) in previous euro-integration referenda, there were no consistent analyses on it. Examining of 8 East Central European countries has showed both varieties from country to country as well as a number of general trends. In Slovenia, region of its capital city, Ljubljana, is more euro-optimistic compared with eastern Pomurska region (Maribor & Ptuj). Though regional economic irregularities not enough significant, as well as the number of examples too small for generalization, one can suppose West-East cleavage connected with the economic factor here. In Hungary, though voters' turnout was exceptionally low, both factor of higher euro-optimism in the capital city, Budapest, was evident, as well as strong relation between economic factor & voting behavior. However, Hungary has its own specifics: higher economic development of the region increases both active euro-optimism & active euro-skepticism, too. This, in turn, cannot exclude that factor of "passive euro-skepticism" is important here. In Lithuania, strong relations between size of ethnic minorities in the region & both active euro-optimism (negative) & active euro-skepticism (positive) were evident. More complications were, to evaluate influence of the economic factor: present statistics of GDP per capita in apskritys are far not enough to support supposition that voting results in particular Lithuania's territories are related with their economic development, too. In Slovakia, quite strong influence can be found of the size of Hungarian ethnic minority, but the opposite compared to Lithuania: increasing number of ethnic Hungarians do increase active euro-optimism & decrease active euro-skepticism. This is in good accordance with widely known believe of Hungarian ethnic group that EU membership will improve their status. Surprisingly, in Slovakia it was impossibly to evaluate the influence of another ethnic factor: though this country is widely known by the problems connected with Roma ethnic group, official statistics does not even show remarkable percentage of Roma in any region at all. Influence of economic factor, though number of examples is very small, is also present in Slovakia: the higher is GDP per capita, the higher is active euro-optimism, & at the same time the lower active euro-skepticism. In Poland, clear pattern of lower active euro-optimism was shown for its eastern regions, Podlaskie, Lubelskie, & Podkarpackie; they are economically poorest, at the same time, & characterized by specific political culture (bigger number of orthodox, smaller agricultural incomes, dependence on small trans-border trade, etc.). In the Czech Republic, regional economic pattern is also present: increase in regional GDP per capita also increases the active euro-optimism. Capital city, Prague, has exceptional position: it is most economically developed, & most euro-optimistic, too. For Estonia, complicated picture of inter-related influence of both ethnic & economic factors is typical. On one hand, there are no clear correlations between economic & voting variables. On the other, eastern Ida-Virumaa region, densely populated by ethnic Russians & the least economically developed, is described at the same time as mostly active euro-optimistic, & less euro-skeptical. The most reliable explanation would be, economic underdevelopment & ethnicity, complicated by stronger trans-border relations of individuals living near Russian border, may reinforce uncertainty in euro-integration perspective. For Latvia, the ethnic factor is very much evident: Pearson correlation between regional percentage of Russian population & active euro-skepticism is 0.906; reversely, it is connected with active euro-optimism. Eastern regions of Daugavpils & Rezekne affected also by economic underdevelopment were the most euro-skeptical among all 8 East European countries & became only regions where bigger part of inhabitants were actively opposed EU integration than supported. Thus, a number of cleavages can be generalized for majority of the acceding countries examined. "Center-periphery" cleavage is more or less evident for all countries except of Lithuania & Latvia: better socio-economic development seems to be overcomplicated by ethnic factors in two the latter. In Slovenia, Poland, and, especially, the Baltic States, the East-West cleavage is important. This can be explained by specifics of eastern regions: economic underdevelopment, personal & business ties beyond border, especially among Russian ethnic group in the East of the Baltic States, can lead to rational individual arguments against integration into European Union. With reversed relation, ethnic factor is typical for Hungarian ethnic group in Slovakia: support for euro-integration is predominant within it. The universal factor influencing electoral behavior in referenda is economic one, especially remarkable for Visegrad countries & Slovenia. Adapted from the source document.
This article examines the provisions of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Compensation of Damage Resulting from the USSR Occupation (hereinafter -- the Law), which was adopted on 13 June 2000, in the light of customary rules of international law on state responsibility, as codified in the 2001 the UN International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter -- the ILC Draft Articles). The main aim of the article is to deal with the international legal grounds of the responsibility of the Russian Federation for the Soviet occupation of the Republic of Lithuania and, against this background, to identify the role of the Law. The ground of Russia's responsibility is an internationally wrongful act committed as the aggression against the Republic of Lithuania, which was started by the 15 June 1940 incursion by the Soviet armed forces & subsequently continued in the form of the illegal occupation of Lithuania until the restoration of Lithuania's independence on 11 March 1990, however, the illegal presence of the foreign forces on Lithuania's soil ended only in 1993. The fact of the 1940 Soviet aggression & illegal occupation of the Baltic States has been widely recognized by the international community, it was even acknowledged by the USSR & Russia in 1989-1991. Therefore there is no doubt that under international law from 1940-1990 the Republic of Lithuania had been an occupied State. That is why the illegal occupation with its consequences, as the breach of an international obligation not to resort to aggression having a continuing character, constitutes an objective element of an internationally wrongful act being the ground for Russia's responsibility. That also explains why the title of the Law refers to the occupation. Meanwhile the specific feature of subjective element is addressed in the preamble of the Law. That is the continuity of the Russian State & the corresponding identity of its international legal personality with the Soviet Union, which was claimed by Russia & generally recognized by the international community. Therefore under international law the Russian Federation is the State continuing the rights & obligations of the former USSR (ie., it is the same international legal person). Consequently, internationally wrongful acts of the latter, including the Soviet occupation of Lithuania & the other two Baltic States, should be attributable to the Russian Federation. Apart from the ground for Russia's responsibility, the issue of reparation is addressed in the article. In accordance with international law (the ILC Draft Article), the principle of full reparation should be applied to realize responsibility for an internationally wrongful act. The full reparation for the injury can be provided in the form of restitution, compensation & satisfaction, while any financially assessable damage should be covered by compensation when restitution is not practically possible. Responsibility for the Soviet occupation is the latter case. Therefore in this sense the Law concretizes the claim of Lithuania as it lays down the obligations of the Government of Lithuania to calculate the damage & seek its compensation from Russia. In conformity with the principle of full reparation, the provisions of the Law require to calculate the damage for all period of the Soviet occupation as well as to cover all types of financially assessable damage. The third main issue addressed in this article is admissibility of a claim for reparation, ie., the procedural requirements to be observed by the injured State invoking an international responsibility of other State. The main requirement, as follows from Art. 43 of the ILC Draft Articles, is that the injured State should give a timely & proper notice of its claim to the State responsible for an internationally wrongful act; the claim is admissible when it is waived by the injured State or it can be inadmissible when it is not maintained. However, a mere lapse of time without a claim is being resolved, including delay in its prosecution due to refusal of the respondent State, cannot result in loss of the right of the injured State to invoke responsibility. In this regard the Law is a unilateral act of the State of Lithuania which formulates & concretizes the claim for Russia's responsibility. The form of this act was determined by Lithuanian national rather than international law as the former requires that any compulsory rules or instructions for the Government can be laid down by the Seimas (the Parliament) only in the form of (statutory) law. As it is clear from the preamble of the Law, in continuing & consolidating the previous Lithuanian acts invoking Russia's responsibility the Law demonstrates that the claim for responsibility has been raised without any unreasonable delay a long time ago (the first time Lithuania declared about its claim for reparation in 1991) & Russia is aware of that claim from the very beginning. In such a manner the Law also proves a consistent & unchanging position of Lithuania with regard to Russia's responsibility. Therefore, the Law evidences that the claim of Lithuania remains admissible although still being unresolved & notwithstanding that Russia is rejecting it. Under international law the injured State has the right to waive its claim for responsibility of another State. National law may, however, restrict that right in setting up appropriate duties for the authorities of the injured State. In this regard it follows from the preamble of the Law that under Lithuanian constitutional law no State organ or official can declare a waiver of the claim for Russia's responsibility because the Law is based on & aims at implementation of the corresponding decision by the 14 June 1992 national referendum that demanded to seek reparation for the Soviet occupation. Therefore, the waiver can be declared only by other referendum as well as without a referendum the Seimas cannot abolish the provisions of the Law requiring to seek a compensation (such kind of action could amount to the waiver in the sense of Art. 45(a) of the ILC Draft Articles). To keep the claim for responsibility of another State admissible & valid, when it is being unresolved a long time, the injured State should do everything it can reasonably do to maintain the claim. Otherwise it can be questioned, whether the right to invoke responsibility is lost due to conduct of the injured State in the sense of Art. 45(b) of the ILC Draft Articles. Therefore, to avoid similar doubts the Law obliged the Government to seek constantly the compensation for the damage caused by the Soviet occupation. Since Russia used to reject Lithuania's initiatives to conduct negotiations on the matter & any other way of settlement is not available without Russia's consent, it can be stated that as yet, in particular due to the Law, the conduct of Lithuania has not raised any serious doubts with regard to validity of its claim for compensation. Obviously such doubts would be serious if any kind of moratorium on the claim had been announced. To sum it up, it can be concluded that the Law is based on & is consistent with the rules of international law. It also implements the international legal requirements for the proper declaration & maintenance of the claim for reparation. Therefore both under international law & under Lithuanian constitutional law the Law has been necessary to consolidate & consistently maintain the claim to Russia for the compensation of the damages caused by the Soviet occupation. Lastly, it should be noted that a proper settlement of the problem of Russia's responsibility for the Soviet occupation of Lithuania is not a question of self-interest for Lithuania & it should pursue the claim for compensation not only due to the decision by the 14 June 1992 referendum. Not accidentally Art. 1 of the ILC Draft Articles refers that "every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State." It is also not accidentally that the preamble of the 1991 Treaty between Lithuania & Russia states that mutual confidence between the people of both Parties is hard to achieve without elimination of the consequences of the Soviet annexation of Lithuania. Like for national law, rule of law & justice cannot be established without realization & inevitability of responsibility for grave breaches of international law. Therefore the realization of responsibility for the 1940 aggression against the Baltic States & its consequences would undoubtedly contribute to general prevention of such grave breaches as well as would assure that similar tragic events never happen again in the history of Lithuania. Such kind of prevention should be at the focus of attention of the whole international community rather than only Lithuania & the other two Baltic States, since a prohibition of aggression is a long-standing rule of jus cogens character & obligation erga omnes towards international community. Adapted from the source document.
