Suchergebnisse

AbstractIt will be politically difficult to liberalize international economic migration without some form of compensation for host-country workers. The paper explores the scope for managing migration using a government-regulated competitive market for work permits (WPs). We propose that host-county workers should be granted the legal option of renting out their WPs for a period of their choice, while foreigners can purchase taxable time-bound WPs. The proposed market is anonymous, with no need for personalized matchings of those on its two sides. The market can have either one price or be differentiated by occupation or region. There would probably be some losers, but potentially large gains, including through enhanced social protection in host countries. Using its power to tax WPs, the host country can achieve any desired floor to labour earnings. The market for WPs can also provide a new instrument for implementing industrial and regional development policies.

We discuss global options for initiatives intended to ameliorate adverse impacts of visa and work permit systems used by national governments around the world. We first describe and document some of their effects, noting the relative lack of other research work on these issues. We then discuss proposals for a new and supplemental global visa structure which have been made as part of the Mode 4 GATS negotiations in the WTO, suggesting that the GATS/WTO may be an imperfect institutional location for negotiating on these matters. We then evaluate other approaches, including what realistically could be possible if a new body specifically created for global negotiation in the area were to be used.

This article investigates the role of deservingness conceptions in the implementation of labour market access policies for migrants with precarious legal status. It explores how immigration officials frame the deservingness of work permit applicants, considering also the political, legal and societal context in which they work. The analysis takes account of the Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity and Need (CARIN) criteria, and uses primary data of semi-structured interviews with senior officials in German municipal immigration offices. It finds that officials frequently employ deservingness frames inbuilt into the relevant parts of the law, but also behavioural norms that go beyond legal requirements. The article makes two main contributions. Providing empirical insight into the migration bureaucracy's part in the implementation of labour market policy, it seeks to help advance understanding of the complex processes of differential in- and exclusion in countries of immigration. Furthermore, the research design allows putting the CARIN criteria to an empirical test.