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The article discusses China's policies in and towards the Arctic and Africa within a comparative perspective. To what extent is China's policy adaptable to different conditions? What does this adaptability tell us about China's ascendant great-power role in the world in general? What is the message to the Arctic and Africa respectively? The article concludes that China's regional strategies aptly reflect the overall grand strategy of a country that is slowly but surely aiming at taking on the role of leading global superpower. In doing so, Chinese foreign policy has demonstrated flexibility and adaptive tactics, through a careful tailoring of its so-called core interests and foreign policy principles, and even identity politics, to regional conditions. This implies that regions seeking autonomy in the context of great power activism and contestation should develop their own strategies not only for benefiting from Chinese investment but also in terms of managing dependency on China and in relation to China and great power competition.

Is the classic diplomat one of globalization's many victims? Has foreign policy become an underutilization of domestic politics? We still have an international state system, based on diplomacy as a tool, where dialogue and negotiation between equal players are the axiom, or is it about to dissolve in their regions and religions? How should foreign policy is organized and managed in order to be optimally equipped for global common challenges? These are some of the issues that the sacking stream of books on international politics, economics and diplomacy takes up. One category sheds new light on the bureaucratic state, the global system and the challenges it faces. The Christian Westphalian order has evolved since the mid-1600s, based on sovereignty, strategy and balance of power, but the world is now moving back to something similar to a pre-modern state system, characterized by system clash, legitimacy struggle and the emergence of new powers who want to transform the ground rules, in the worst case, override them completely. Adapted from the source document.

Climate change has renewed the debate about shipping in the Arctic due to an expected reduction of ice in these sea lanes. Because of the Arctic slowly opening, allowing for more activity, navigational rights for ships have caught the attention of the world once again, including those of warships. Through analysing the navigational regime for warships in the Northwest and Northeast Passages, this article aims to introduce the different rules for navigation and the consequences for maritime operations in the Arctic, including the right to overflight. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides navigational rights for warships and overflight in peace time operations, but the matter of which navigation rules should apply in the passages is under debate. Based on an analysis of the Convention, case law, legal theory and customary law, the article aims to shed light on different interpretations of the legal regimes of navigation in the passages and which rules should apply to warships and overflight in the future.

New uncertainties in international relations have presented several states in the West with important choices regarding their national strategies for the Arctic. This article analyzes security challenges in the Arctic and North Atlantic region, as understood by some key North-Atlantic states, namely: the USA, Canada, Denmark, Norway, the UK, Germany and France. By analyzing how, or to what degree, the colder east-west security landscape since 2014 is reflected in these selected North Atlantic states' Arctic security strategies, this article seeks to improve our understanding of how the security situation in the northernmost part of the world is developing and being understood. Through applying a traditional understanding of security, the article identifies similarities but also significant differences among the Arctic and North-Atlantic states. Most notable when comparing the strategies is the rather unique global perspective laid out in the US security strategy for the region. The British, Norwegian, Danish and Canadian perspectives, on the other hand, stand out as more regional in nature. Germany displays a rather low profile in its approach to international security in the Arctic, considering its economic status in Europe. France reveals a strong concern for Arctic shipping and freedom of navigation, a perspective similar to the USA's, but with less global ambition.

The U.S. Department of the Navy released A Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic on 5 January 2021. The Navy is focused on preparing for an Alaskan and "Blue" Arctic. Recognizing the changing landscape of the Arctic, the US Navy seeks to maintain a competitive edge, freedom of the seas, and deterrent effect. For the Marine Corps, both the 2021 document and the previous Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power, highlight the Marines' mission to assist the Navy in sea control and sea denial. These strategic documents reflect the direction both the Navy and Marine Corps are taking to better engage in the Arctic, and, therefore on NATO's northern flank and elsewhere in the world. The Marine Corps' new concept for warfighting, represented in The Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) presumes that Marines are a "stand-in" force, i.e., they are already in areas within an adversary's weapon's engagement zone (WEZ). However, this is not the case on NATO's northern flank, where Marines conduct training with NATO and under bilateral agreements. In order to better understand how these new concepts and strategic documents influence the USMC's engagement on NATO's northern flank, it is important to relate them to the overall strategic context in this region, as well as the possible gaps that exist down to include operational and some tactical levels implications.

Between the Second World War and the fall of the Berlin Wall Germany showed great aversion towards using military force for other purposes than territorial defense and held a multilateral balance between France and the United States with their respective ambitions EU and NATO. After the Wall fell, the German security policy started to change and German politicians increasingly argued for military use as a legitimate instrument in international politics. Among the driving forces for this process has been the change in European strategic culture as Europe is looking towards an integrated foreign and security policy, which may even go against German interest. L. Pitkaniemi

Comments on "refleksprosjektet"; a Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiative to define Norwegian foreign policy in a new era faced with global changes in the areas of environment, energy, global warming, health, poverty, world security, technology and communication, international migration, religion, the global economy and changes in Norwegian changes in the areas of oil, the petroleum fund, open society, and global economic dependencies. Comments include the relationship between government initiative reports and practical politics, challenges of future planning, and value of plans to increase experience based learning. Concludes that the value of the initiative is increased focus, interest, debate, and understanding of Norwegian foreign policy issues. References. E. Sundby

This article presents the opinion that American exceptionalism has returned post 9/11. It is argued that Ronald Reagan's international relations during the cold war displayed the attitude that power is more important than intellectual, factual, historical, ideological, or moral obligations. The uses of power employed by Americans in international conflicts are compared to the uses of power employed by empires of the past. A historical exploration is included of the development of exceptionalist attitudes from the founding of the US in the 1700's, throughout the continual expansions of the 1800's and into the industrial and military power of the 1900's. It is further argued that American traditions during the early 1900's border on messianism, where the American people are the chosen people, and that Reaganism was a natural extension of these traditions, whereas post Reagan there was no need for American messianism or exceptionalism, and thus American Presidents sought a new world order where the US would participate in integrated global economics and politics in cooperation with other nations. George W. Bush's politics post 9/11 with its war on terror marked the return of American exceptionalism. E. Sundby

The ramifications for Norwegian foreign policy, as a non-member of the European Union, are radically changed since the Cold War. The world has changed from a bipolar order with the US as a conserving superpower, to a unipolar world with the US as a radical superpower. 11 September 2001, & the following war on terrorism, has been a catalyst in this respect. As a result the US is today relating to international institutions as far as they are instrumental in the enhancement of American values & interests. The alliance between the US & Norway today lacks a common denominator. The threat from the east is gone. Still, Norwegian foreign policy & alliance orientation is very much the same as before. Why? Is it because reorientation for foreign policy comes harder in Norway than elsewhere? Historically, foreign policy in Norway has been more a question of administration than one of policy making. Furthermore, broad political consensus on foreign policy is a main political objective in itself. This has left little room for public & political discourse on foreign policy. The benefit is stability. The cost is reduced ability to adapt to radical international changes. A third factor is the ever-lasting question of Norwegian EU membership, which has made interest-based foreign policy more difficult. Norway outside the power blocs of international politics must balance on the interests of other states. Therefore, a clear understanding of Norwegian interests in 2005 -- outside the EU & dc-linked from the reflexes of the Cold War -- is needed. 10 References. Adapted from the source document.