Suchergebnisse

The diplomacy of socialist Yugoslavia paid a lot of attention to the international reputation of the country in the sphere of culture, and thus literature. At the same time, Yugoslav writers in the Writer's Union of Yugoslavia, faithfully supported Yugoslav foreign policy, both individually and institutionally. The most impressive example of collaboration between literature and diplomacy was awarding Ivo Andrić a Nobel Prize. The Writers' Union of Yugoslavia nominated the writer in 1958, and Yugoslav diplomacy lobbied in favor of Andrić for several years. The efforts were successfully crowned in 1961. In socialist Yugoslavia, the existence of a special Macedonian nation and its culture and language was insisted on, so in that sense, the greatest challenge was denying the Macedonian identity that came from Bulgaria. The Yugoslav Writers' Union, consistently pursuing state policy, suspended official co-operation with the Bulgarian Writers' Union in the second half of the 1960s due to Bulgaria's refusal to recognize the Macedonian language. Yugoslav writers also adapted to the state policy of non-alignment. They did not reach the level of cooperation with those countries that existed in the field of politics, economics or science, but they maintained ties with writers from those parts of the world in various ways. Among other things, the twentieth anniversary of the Belgrade Conference of the Non-Aligned Nations in October 1981 was a meeting of writers of non-aligned countries in Belgrade.

The often controversial discussions about the problem of the Jewish refugees from Central European countries since 1938 - held at the level of the Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, but also at different "lower administrative levels" (provinces, districts, and local municipalities), with the participation of various directly or indirectly interested parties, whose numbers grew considerably on the eve of the war in 1941 - including the issue of the status of several categories of persons with foreign citizenship (or with no citizenship at all). Apart from the "real refugees" and immigrants, these discussions also dwelled on the issue of the status of "Jewish tourists" from Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, the neighboring Yugoslav states as well as Palestine. The attempts to find the most favorable solution for the state of Yugoslavia reflected all the dilemmas of the Yugoslav authorities about how to "neutralize the problem" of the Jewish refugees from Germany, who after the National Socialists' rise to power, in 1933, began arriving to the Yugoslav borders, too.

Do proleća 1917. godine, na teritoriji (bivšeg) Ruskog carstva našlo se nekoliko desetina hiljada ratnih zarobljenika Južnih Slovena, od kojih su se mnogi direktno uključili u revolucionarna događanja započeta padom monarhije u februaru. Nakon Oktobarske revolucije, hiljade Bugara, Hrvata, Slovenaca i Srba borile su se na strani boljševika. Od 1918. godine, imali su svoju Južnoslovensku komunističku grupu pri Boljševičkoj partiji, kao i novine Svetska revolucija. Grupa se, međutim, brzo sukobila po pitanju ustrojstva posleratnog projekta. Jedni su se zalagali za stvaranje Jugoslavije kao države Južnih Slovena, dok su drugi smatrali da buduća socijalistička država treba biti Balkanska federacija, stari projekat balkanske socijaldemokratije. Ovo neslaganje dovelo je u konačnici do odvajanja Bugara iz Južnoslovenske komunističke grupe. Iako pitanje buduće radničke federacije na Balkanu nije razrešeno čak ni formiranjem Komunističke internacionale, ova zaboravljena rana debata između tada vodećih južnoslovenskih komunista bila je uvod u kasnije marksističke rasprave o nacionalnom pitanju u Bugarskoj i Kraljevini SHS. Analiza ovih projekata otvara pitanja o prijemu boljševičkih ideja među Južnim Slovenima, kontinuitetu i diskontinuitetu marksističke misli među balkanskim socijalistima pre i posle 1917. godine, kao i o razvoju koncepta lenjinističkog prava na samoopredeljenje u kontekstu političke situacije na Balkanu u posleratnom periodu. ; By the spring of 1917, tens of thousands of South Slavic prisoners of war had found themselves on the territory of the (former) Russian Empire, and many of them took an active part in the revolutionary events which had begun with the collapse of the monarchy in February. After the October Revolution, thousands of Bulgarians, Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs fought on the side of the Bolsheviks. Beginning from 1918, they had their own South Slavic Communist Group of the Bolshevik Party, as well as a newspaper called Svetska revolucija (The World Revolution). However, the Group soon became divided over the question of building a future postwar order. Some communists supported the creation of Yugoslavia as a country of South Slavs, while others thought that the future socialist state must be a Balkan Federation, an old project of Balkan social democracy. The pro-Yugoslav current was composed primarily of people who were radicalized by the world war and the revolution and who fought together in the South Slavic units of the Russian Imperial Army before 1917. The supporters of a Balkan federation were those who were active in the labor movement before 1914. The Bulgarian communists, influenced by the theoretical tradition of "narrow socialism" developed by Dimitar Blagoev, were the standard bearers of the idea of Balkan federalism, while most Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes eventually opted for Yugoslavia, also as a federal state. This disagreement eventually led to the separation of Bulgarians from the South Slavic Communist Group. Even though the question of the future workers' federation in the Balkans was not ultimately resolved even after the creation of the Communist International, this forgotten early debate between the leading South Slavic communists foreshadowed the later Marxist discussions on the national question in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The analysis of these projects raises new questions regarding the reception of Bolshevik ideas among the South Slavs, the continuities and discontinuities of Marxist thought before and after 1917, as well as the development of the concept of the Leninist right to self-determination in the context of the political situation in the Balkans in the post-WWI period.

У овом раду разматрали смо допринос дела функционера најзначајнијег професионалног удружења музичара у међуратној Југославији – Савеза музичара у Краљевини СХС Југославији, спровођењу словенске културне интеграције. Пратећи деловање групе окупљене око званичног гласила организације Jugoslavenski muzičar / Muzičar, у међународним оквирима, издвојили смо кључне подухвате који су покренути у периоду између 1923. и 1929. с циљем зближавања и интеркултурне размене са словенским музичарима и стручњацима. Резултати анализе видова и интензитета колаборације загребачких музичара с музичарима из словенских земаља посматрани су у компарацији с резултатима ранијих истраживања. Циљ тога био је да се размотри да ли су и у којој мери настојања ове групације кореспондирала са сродним тежњама других југословенских и словенских музичара, као и с доминантним ставовима и праксом политичке и интелектуалне елите с ових простора. ; Although many Slavic peoples were given long-awaited political independence after the Great War, it did not suppress their strivings to attain stronger cultural bonds and cultural integration that thrived throughout the 19th century. In the new geopolitical circuimstances, All-Slavism was mostly interpreted as a vehicle to actualize the potentials of Slavs to create cultural forms of universal value through a synthesis of opposing values of Western and Eastern civilizations. Despite the fact that its definitions varied significantly depending on the differences of ideological basis of individuals and groups that promoted it, the common ground represented a belief that Slavs shared the same worldviews, values and spiritual properties and that this similarity needed to be used as an emancipatory tool – for mutual cultual exchange, support, development, and progress. In interwar Yugoslavia of 1920s, All-Slavism was particularly promoted among musicians and music specialists. Among the numerous keen supporters were the representatives of the Association of Musicians of the Kingdom of SCS/Yugoslavia gathered around the periodical Jugoslavenski muzičar/Muzičar (Yugoslav musician). Led by Fran/Franjo Šidak and Jaroslav Šidak, this group contributed to the expansion of All-Slavic tendencies in the Yugoslav public and music spheres. From 1923 to 1929, these musicians settled in Zagreb initiated numerous activities aimed at developing collaboration with Slavic musicians around Europe. Unlike many like-minded groups in different Slavic countries of the time, Zagreb musicians created friendly relations with their Soviet colleagues, specifically with the leaders of the Всесоюзным профессиональным союзом работников искусств, ВСЕРАБИС (All-Soviet Professional Association of Art Workers). During the five years of extensive exchange with other Slavic musicians and specialist, they established fruitful correspondence and coperation with Bulgarian musicians, most of all with the high representatives of Bulgarian musical organizations. As a result of that, series of articles dealing with Bulgarian music history and musical life were published in Jugoslavenski muzičar/Muzičar together with detailed reports, while a number of essays of Yugoslav authors were reprinted in Bulgarian music journals. Results of the analysis of type and extent of collaboration between Zagreb and other Slavic musicians were compared with the results of previous researches. The aim of this paper was to consider whether the efforts of this group corresponded with the related tendencies of Yugoslav and Slavic musicians, as well as with the dominant views and practices of the Yugoslav political and intellectual elite.

У овом раду разматраћемо музичка издања Јована Фрајта и Сергија Страхова која су публикована у периоду од 1921. до 1945. (?) године у Београду. Увидом у сачуване делове колекција Фрајтових и Страховљевих издања, уз њихово допуњавање подацима из дневне штампе и периодике, те мемоарске и архивске грађе могуће је да се начини делимична реконструкција поља популарне музике у Југославији која подразумева издвајање значајних композитора, текстописаца и извођача популарних песама из тог периода, као и жанрова и културних утицаја (САД, Немачка, Аустрија, Мађарска, Италија, Француска, СССР итд.). Поређењем тенденција у овој области на простору Југославије са тенденцијама у другим земљама пружа се основ за изношење претпоставки о својствима домаће популарне музичке продукције. Сврха тога је да се укаже на околности настанка аутономне југословенске популарне музичке продукције, као и да се размотри значај овог сегмента у истраживању југословенског друштва и културе тог доба. ; In the existing research of the cultural phenomena in the region of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia not much attention has been devoted to the issue of the expansion of popular music. The reflections on the rise in the interest in musical accomplishments of commercial character in urban centres across Yugoslavia are rare and insufficiently detailed, which is why data on key agents, institutions, creative tendencies and forms of consummation in the field of popular music are missing, as well as the data on their wider circumstances (social, economical, political, etc.). The majority of data is found in memoirs but these data are not adequately systematized and contextualized. The plethora of data is also found in sources like musical editions that have not been researched until now. Namely, in the period after the First World War there were several private music publishers who dedicated a significant part of their collections to the genre of popular music/Schlager music. This is especially relevant for publishing houses of Jovan Frajt and Sergije Strahov, which were stationed in Belgrade, and publishing houses Akord and Albini from Zagreb. The inspection of the preserved pieces of the collections of editions by Frajt and Strahov, which was completed by the data from printed programmes of Radio Belgrade as well as the archive material, it is possible to partly reconstruct the field of popular music in Yugoslavia. This implies singling out important composers, writers and performers of popular songs from that period, as well as the genres and cultural influence (USA, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, France, USSR, etc.). The comparison of tendencies in this field in the region of Yugoslavia with tendencies in other countries provides a basis for making presuppositions concerning the features of domestic popular music production. The purpose of such a procedure is to indicate the circumstances in which an autonomous Yugoslav popular music production emerged in the period between the two World Wars, as well as to consider the significance of this segment in the research of Yugoslav society and culture of that period.

Yugoslav programme made Serbia eliminate the idea of Great Serbia. By the combination of subsequent events, Russia's withdrawal from the war, and political decisions, Versailles peace conference, such idea would be hardly achieved. Regarding Yugoslav programme 'The allies were not delighted too much about the perspective which would be borne by this plan achievement. They had not even been delighted by the idea of Habsburgs Monarchy overthrow so that they did not approve it until the middle of 1918'. Nevertheless, it may be concluded that the basis of the idea of Great Serbia in the warrior period 1914-1918 makes the 'Annexation of all those areas which were Serbian from ethnical point of view. Parts of Austria-Hungary (Bosnia and Herzegovina, part of southern Adriatic coast, part of Banat, Srem, Bačka, and Slavonia) were primarily in question; later on it is diminished only to Bosnia and Herzegovina and part of the coast, but it is enlarged by annexation of Montenegro'. By combination of historical events, and influence of public and secret centres of world power it was not realized; the creation called The Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenians, that is The Kingdom of Yugoslavia later on was created, where disintegrative factors overcame integrative ones, and the idea of Great Serbia remained any further actual with some political forces inside Serbian people as the unification of all ethnical Serbian areas within Yugoslavia.

As the first festival of contemporary music in socialist Yugoslavia, the Music Biennale Zagreb (founded in 1961) attracted a lot of domestic and foreign media attention. This study discusses the reception of the first Music Biennale in the Belgradian daily newspapers, Politika [Politics], Borba [Struggle] and Večernje Novosti [Evening News], with reference to the characteristics of the editorial policies of these three newspapers. The timely and active reporting of the daily press in Belgrade indicates that the first Music Biennale Zagreb was promptly recognised as an important modernist musical festival for the then cultural life of the whole of Yugoslavia. ; Основан 1961. године, Музички бијенале Загреб, први фестивал савремене музике у социјалистичкој Југославији, од почетка је привлачио велику пажњу домаће и иностране јавности. У раду се анализира одјек првог Музичког бијенала у београдским дневним новинама, Политици, Борби и Вечерњним новостима, при чему се указује и на карактеристике уређивачких политика ових трију листова. Правовремено и активно извештавање београдске дневне штампе о првом загребачком Бијеналу сведочи о промптно препознатом значају ове авангардне манифестације за тадашњи културни живот целокупне Југославије.

This paper will assess the results of transition in the Yugoslav successor states using objective and subjective criteria. Four objective criteria related to economic growth will be used to compare economic performance in Yugoslavia and its successor states; 1. Speed of recovery after war/change in system, 2. Absolute growth rates, 3. Relative growth rates, 4. Place in world development. This will be supplemented by a survey of public opinion conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.All the four objective criteria show that the Yugoslav economy performed much better than the economies of its successor states. The survey shows that only 20 percent of population are happy with the results of transition in South Eastern European countries, while 64 percent are unhappy and 16 percent are undecided. In the former Yugoslavia much less than 20 percent of population are happy with the changes brought by the transition.

Doktorska disertacija Jugoslovenska politika prema zemljama narodne demokratije u susedstvu 1953 – 1958. godine zasnovana je na jugoslovenskim arhivskim izvorima iz Arhiva Srbije i Crne Gore, Diplomatskog arhiva Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije i Vojnog arhiva kao i na relevantnoj domaćoj i stranoj literaturi. Disertacija se bavi jugoslovenskom politikom prema Albaniji, Bugarskoj, Rumuniji i Mađarskoj u periodu normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije sa ovim zemljama posle Staljinove smrti tj. posle petogodišnjeg perioda tokom koga su njihovi odnosi bili u gotovo potpunom prekidu. Ona predstavlja pokušaj da se sagleda odnos Jugoslavije prema neposrednom susedstvu u uslovima hladnog rata i sadejstva jugoslovenskih interesa sa jedne i spoljnih faktora poput uloge Sovjetskog Saveza u procesu normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije sa pomenutim zemljama ili uloge vodećih zapadnih zemalja i njihovih interesa u Jugoslaviji i susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" sa druge strane. U nekoliko faza kroz koje su od marta 1953. do aprila 1958. godine prošli odnosi Jugoslavije sa Albanijom, Bugarskom, Rumunijom i Mađarskom (od Staljinove smrti do potpisivanja Beogradske deklaracije, od potpisivanja Beogradske deklaracije do XX kongresa KPSS-a, od XX kongresa KPSS-a do izbijanja događaja u Mađarskoj 1956. godine i od događaja u Mađarskoj do kritike novog Programa SKJ) jugoslovenska politika se menjala u skladu sa okolnostima zadržavajući kao konstante izražen interes za normalizaciju odnosa i insistiranje na tome da sve susedne zemlje "narodne demokratije" javno osude svoju raniju politiku prema Jugoslaviji i rehabilituju sve koji su na montiranim sudskim procesima osuđeni zbog špijunske delatnost u korist Jugoslavije. Osnovni cilj rada na ovoj dioktorskoj disertaciji je bio da pruži nova znanja o ovoj temi, nove poglede na jugoslovensku spoljnu politiku i ponudi novi ugao gledanja na odnose Jugoslavije sa SSSR-om i Varšavskim paktom u celini. U vezi sa tim definisan je i drugi cilj ovog rada koji se odnosi na rekonstrukciju jugoslovenske politike prema ovim zemljama i na pokušaj da se uoče specifičnosti, metode i ciljevi te politike koji su se razlikovali u odnosu na jugoslovensku politiku prema ostalim istočnoevropskim zemljama. Treći cilj na temu jugoslovenske politike prema susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" od 1953. do 1958. godine bio je i sistematizacija postojećih znanja o ovoj temi i njihova evaluacija s obzirom na veći stepen dostupnosti izvora nego što je to bio slučaj pre više decenija kada su nastali najznačajniji radovi koji su se delimično bavili pojedinim segmentima ove teme. Četvrti cilj istraživanja bio je utvrđivanje hronološki jasno određenih faza kroz koje su prolazili odnosi Jugoslavije sa Mađarskom, Rumunijom, Bugarskom i Albanijom u posmatranom periodu i identifikacija faktora koji su na to uticali. U trenutku Staljinove smrti, susedne zemlje "narodne demokratije" bile su daleko od centra pažnje jugoslovenske spoljne politike jer je , između ostalog, i njihov značaj za nju u uslovima prekida međudržavnih odnosa bio mali. Međutim, promene koje su ubrzo posle Staljinove smrti usledile u Sovjetskom Savezu omogućile su početak normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije i "prve zemlje socijalizma" što je za sobom povuklo i mogućnost da Jugoslavija normalizuje svoje odnose i sa susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije". Kada su u pitanju bile te zemlje, primarni jugoslovenski interes nije se nalazio u sferi politike i ekonomije kao u slučaju Sovjetskog Saveza već u sferi praktičnih međudržavnih pitanja koja su teško opterećivala Jugoslaviju. Na prvom mestu to je bio interes da se što pre otkloni vojna pretnja na granicama i stanje na zajedničkoj "liniji razgraničenja" koje je u godinama posle 1948. iziskivalo velika materijalna i kadrovska ulaganja. Osim toga, Jugoslavija je jasan interes imala i po pitanju poboljšanja položaja pripadnika jugoslovenskih manjina u susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" kao i po pitanju normalizacije saobraćaja. Razlog što Jugoslavija nije pokazivala izražen interes za političku i ekonomsku saradnju sa ovim zemljama ležao je u činjenici da je ona u međuvremenu, u vreme godina sukoba, uspela da pronađe alternativu kako u sferi spoljne politike tako i u sferi ekonomije i na taj način obesmisli blokadu kojoj je bila izložena sa Istoka. Međutim, cena iznalaženja te alternative bila je visoka i pretila je da ugrozi monopol vlasti Saveza komunista Jugoslavije što je za Tita i njegovo najbliže okruženje bilo neprihvatljivo. Iz tog razloga, mogućnost da se nađe zajednički jezik sa Moskvom predstavljao je za Tita priliku da uspostavi ravnotežu kada je u pitanju bio jugoslovenski položaj prema suprotstavljenim blokovima u zaoštrenoj hladnoratovskoj atmosferi. Odnos Jugoslavije prema SSSR-u, i obrnuto, može se smatrati jednim od najznačajnijih faktora koji su uticali na oblikovanje jugoslovenske politike prema susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" sa jedne i na kreiranje politike koje su sve istočnoevropske zemlje vodile prema Jugoslaviji sa druge strane. Drugi značajan faktor koji je uticao na jugoslovensku politiku prema zemljama "narodne demokratije" u susedstvu od 1953. do 1958. godine bio je u tesnoj vezi sa jugoslovensko-sovjetskim odnosima a ticao se prevashodno ideologije i s tim u vezi destaljinizacije. Kreirajući u godinama sukoba sa Informbiroom sopstveni model "samoupravnog" socijalizma, Jugoslavija tokom procesa normalizacije odnosa nije pristajala na "jedinstvo lagera" i povratak u njega što je bio glavni kamen spoticanja u njenim odnosima kakao sa SSSR-om tako i sa drugim istočnoevropskim zemljama pa i susednim kao što su bile Albanija, Bugarska, Mađarska i Rumunija. S tim u vezi je i destaljinizacija, odnosno njen napredak i dubina u susednim "zemljama" narodne demokratije kao i njihova spremnost da se distanciraju od staljinističke ideologije, predstavljala jedan od glavnih faktora koji su uticali na oblikovanje jugoslovenske politike prema tim zemljama. Najzad, važan činilac koji je uticao na jugoslovensku spoljnu politiku uopšte pa i na njenu politiku prema delu ili celini Istočnog bloka bili su i njeni odnosi sa Zapadom, koji su iz pragmatičnih razloga tokom godina sukoba sa Informbiroom bili poboljšani do te mere da su Jugoslaviju, iako nevoljno, doveli na rub uključenja u zapadni vojni savez. Zapad je bio taj kome se nije dopadalo jugoslovensko približavanje SSSR-u i istočnoevropskim zemljama i u periodu normalizacije njihovih odnosa svaki korak koji je vodio približavanju dveju do tada suprotstavljenih strana izazivao je na Zapadu sumnje u iskrenost Jugoslavije i zebnju kada je u pitanju bila budućnost odnosa Zapada i Jugoslavije. Kao rezultat sadejstva nekoliko najvažnijih spoljnih faktora i jugoslovenskih interesa u neposrednom susedstvu iz okvira socijalističkog "lagera" nastajala je jugoslovenska politika prema Istoku uopšte pa i prema Albaniji, Bugarskoj, Rumuniji i Mađarskoj ponaosob, onakva kakva je bila. U periodu od 1953. do 1958. godine ta politika je bila aktivna i pozitivna ali ne i bez ograda. Tih godina, Jugoslavija je bez sumnje pokazivala interes da normalizuje svoje odnose sa susedima sa kojima je osim granice delila i ideologiju ali najčešće nije želela da ona bude ta koja će dati inicijativu za konkretne korake u tom procesu. Smatrajući da su međusobni odnosi narušeni ne njenom već krivicom suseda, ona je strogo poštovala načelo (koje je inače zastupala i kada je u pitanju bila njena politika prema SSSR-u) da prvi korak treba da učini onaj koji je odgovoran za prekid normalnih dobrosusedskih odnosa. Imajući u vidu sve interese, želje i aspiracije koje je Jugoslavija imala kada je u pitanju bio prostor neposredno uz njene granice kao i faktore koji su neminovno uticali na njenu politiku, može se reći da je Jugoslavija prema zemljama "narodne demokratije" u susedstvu u periodu normalizacije međusobnih odnosa od 1953. do 1958. godine vodila politiku mogućeg. Ta politika, međutim, iako osmišljena na isti način, nije uvek bila ista prema svakoj pojedinačnoj zemlji u susedstvu iz prostog razloga što u njima nije nailazila na istovetne uslove i mogućnosti. Tamo gde su mogućnosti bile veće, Jugoslavija je postizala više. Međutim, kako je vreme odmicalo i kako je Jugoslavija bivala sve uspešnija u pronalaženju svog sopstvenog "trećeg puta", čini se da joj je sve manje i manje bilo stalo do sadržajnije saradnje sa većinom suseda od kojih je (budući da su sve bile deo Istočnog bloka), u skladu sa svojom novom spoljnopolitičkom strategijom koja je ekvidistancu prema blokovima predviđala kao imperativ, trebalo da napravi određeni otklon. ; The Ph.D. thesis Yugoslav Policy Towards the Neighboring Countries of People's Democracy 1953-1958 is based on Yugoslav archival sources from the Archives of Yugoslavia, the Diplomatic Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Serbia and the Military Archives, as well as on the relevant domestic and foreign literature. The thesis deals with Yugoslav policy towards Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary during the period of normalization of relations between these countries and Yugoslavia after Stalin's death, i.e. after a five years' period of almost complete interruption in bilateral relations. It is an attempt at a study of the interplay of Yugoslavia's relations with immediate neighborhood during the Cold War and Yugoslav interests on the one hand, and interests of foreign factors, such as the Soviet Union and the leading Western nations in Yugoslavia and in the neighboring countries within the framework of the normalization of Yugoslavia's relations with the above mentioned countries. During the several phases the Yugoslav relations with Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary went through between March 1953 and April 1958 (from Stalin's death until the signing of the Belgrade Declaration, from then to the 20th congress of the CP of the USSSR, from then until the beginning of the events in Hungary in 1956 and from then until the critique of the new Program of the CP of Yugoslavia), the Yugoslav policy changed in accordance with the situation, preserving the interest in normalizing relations and insisting that all neighboring countries of "people's democracy" should condemn their former policy towards Yugoslavia and rehabilitate all those who had been sentenced as Yugoslav spies at show trials. The main goal of this Ph.D. thesis was to provide new knowledge of the topic, new views on Yugoslav foreign policy and to propose a new vantage point on the Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union, and on relations with the Warsaw Pact as a whole. Connected with this was another goal of the thesis that concrens the reconstruction of Yugoslav policy toward these countries and the attempt to pinpoint the characteristics, methods and goals of that policy that were different from those of Yugoslav policy toward other east European countries. The third goal of the topic of Yugoslav policy toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" between 1953 and 1958 was also to systematize the existing knowledge on the subject in view of better accessability of sources as compared with the situation of several decades ago when the most important works touching upon some aspects of this topic were written. The fourth goal of the research was to determin chronologically clearly defined phases that the Yugoslav relations with Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania had gone through during the researched period and to identify the factors that influenced the process. At the time of Stalin's death the countries of "people's democracy" were far from the focus of the Yugoslav foreign policy, because, among other things, their importance was small due to the severed inter-state relations. However, the changes that set in the Soviet Union soon after Stalin's death made the beginning of normalization of relations with the "first country of socialism" possible. This entailed the possibility that Yugoslavia also normalizes its relations with neighboring countries of "people's democracy". When these countries were in question, Yugoslavia's primary interest didn't lie in political or economic spheres as in the case of the Soviet Union, but rather in the sphere of practical inter-state matters weighting heavily on Yugoslavia. Supreme was the interest to do away as soon as possible with the military threat on the borders and to change the situation on the "line of demarcation" that had required much material and human resources in the years after 1948. Furthermore, Yugoslavia had a clear interest in improving the situation of members of Yugoslav minorities in the neighboring countries of "people's democracy", as well as in normalization of trafic. The reason why Yugoslavia showed no great interest in political or economic cooperation with these countries lay in the fact that she had in the meantime, during the years of conflict, found alternative solutions in the spheres of foreign policy and economy, reducing thus to insignifficance the blocade imposed on her from the East. However, the price of that alternative solution was high and it threatened to endanger the power monopoly of the Union of the Communists of Yugoslavia, which was unacceptable for Tito and his innermost circle of collaborators. For that reason, the possibility of finding common grounds with Moscow was for Tito an oportunity to balance Yugoslavia's position between the two competing blocs in a worsened Cold War atmosphere. Yugoslavia's relation to the USSSR and vice versa, can be seen as one of the most important factors influencing Yugoslav policy toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" on the one hand, and on the other, one that was decisively shaping their policy towards Yugoslavia. Another important factor influencing Yugoslav policy toward the countries of "people's democracy" in the vicinity between 1953 and 1958 was closely connected with the Yugoslav-Soviet relations and it concerned primarily ideology and, in that context, destalinization. Having created her own model of "self-managing" socialism during the years of conflict with the Cominform, during the process of normalization Yugoslavia didn't accept the unity of the Eastern Bloc and the matter of her return to it was one of the main stumbling blocks both in her relations with the USSR and with the neighbors such as Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. In that context, destalinisation, i.e. its progress and depth in the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" and their willingnes to distance themselves from the Stalinist ideology was one of the major factors influencing Yugoslavia's policy toward those countries. Finally, the important factor influencing Yugoslav foreign policy in general, including part of the Eastern Block or it as a whole, were Yugoslavia's relations with the West that had been so improved during the years of conflict with the Cominform, that they led Yugoslavia, although unwillingly, to the brink of joining the western military alliance. The West was unhappy with Yugoslav rapprochement with the USSR and eastern European countries and every step that brought closer the two once confonted parties during the process of normalization of their relations, caused the West to doubt Yugoslavia's sincerety and cause fears for the future relations between the West and Yugoslavia. As a result of interplay of several major foreign political factors and Yugoslav interests in the imediate socialist block neighborhood, the Yugoslav policy toward the East in general and toward Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary individually, emerged in the given form. Between 1953 and 1958 that policy was active and positive, but not without restrains. During those years Yugoslavia clearly showed interest in normalizing her relations with the neighboring countries with whom she shared not only borders, but ideology too, but in most cases she was not willing to be the one to initiate concrete steps in that process. Deeming that it had not been her fault but that of her neighbors that the bilateral relations had been spoiled, she observed strictly the principle (that she also championed in her relations with the USSR) that the side that had been responsible for the interruption of normal good neighborly relations should also make the first move. Having in mind all the interests, wishes and aspirations that Yugoslavia had concerning the space imediatly bordering on her territory as well as the factors necessarily infuencing her policy, it can be said that Yugoslavia led the policy of what was possible toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" during tthe period of normalization of bilateral relations 1953-1958. However, that policy wasn't always the same toward all these neighboring countries, for simple reason that it didn't meet with the same conditions and possibilities in them. Where possibilities were greater, Yugoslavia acheived more. However, as the time went by and as Yugoslavia became increasingly more successful in finding her own "third way", it seems she was increasingly less interested in substantial cooperation with most of the neighbors from whom (since they were all members of the Eastern Block) certain distance should be kept – in keeping with the new foreign political strategy that foresaw equidistance towards both blocs as a must.