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The phenomenon of political corruption may affect the process of vertical accountability. Its effect is connected with influencing three components: the information, evaluation and administrative one. Local authorities may weaken the effects of vertical accountability by affecting its course. In the case of political corruption, the most effective way of disrupting the effectiveness of vertical accountability is to affect the information component. It takes place by means of information asymmetry and the management of communication uncertainty. In the case of evaluation component, the mechanism of weakening accountability assumes the rejection of the model of economic voting in favor of axiological or sociotropic one. The administrative component provides relatively least opportunities to weaken the accountability process. In that case, they involve intentionally changing some elements of the voting system.

The paper presents the results of studies on the estate autonomy and accountability of publicly funded higher education institutions in Poland. An attempt has been made to answer the questions: "Was the level of HEI campus use in recent years the subject of public and administrative control? Were the decisions on significant extension of campuses economically viable?" The questions are of special importance in view of the deepening demographic decline, the lower level of public funding and the growing estate operating costs. An analysis of empirical data shows that when considerable resources, both national and European, were available for HEI infrastructure upgrading and development, Polish HEIs were not under an obligation to show how they manage the assets at their disposal. This may have contributed to a substantial, albeit not always judicious increase in the space available, which in turn may give rise to financial problems of individual HEIs and affect the future of the whole system of higher education. ; W artykule przedstawiono wyniki badań nad autonomią i rozliczalnością polskich uczelni publicznych w zakresie nieruchomości. Starano się w nim odpowiedzieć na pytanie: Czy w ostatnich latach uczelnie podlegały społecznej i administracyjnej kontroli poziomu wykorzystania posiadanych kampusów, a podejmowane przez nie decyzje o znacznej ich rozbudowie były ekonomicznie uzasadnione? Pytanie to ma szczególne znaczenie w dobie pogłębiającego się niżu demograficznego i zmniejszania stopnia finansowania szkolnictwa wyższego ze środków publicznych oraz rosnących kosztów utrzymania budynków. Analiza danych empirycznych pokazuje, że w okresie rozdzielania znacznych krajowych i europejskich środków publicznych na rozbudowę czy modernizację infrastruktury akademickiej uczelnie w Polsce nie były zobligowane do wykazywania, jak gospodarują powierzonym im majątkiem. W konsekwencji mogło przyczynić się to do istotnego (nie zawsze jednak uzasadnionego) wzrostu powierzchni uczelnianych zasobów, który może w kolejnych latach skutkować problemami finansowymi poszczególnych jednostek, a także determinować przyszłość całego systemu szkolnictwa wyższego.

The idea of constitutional accountability of public government officials dates back to the Constitution of May 3, 1791, even though it was only rather briefly adhered to in the political practice in the Duchy of Warsaw, and later in the times of the Second Polish Republic and the Third Polish Republic. On the one hand, the analysis of legislative acts concerning the notion of constitutional accountability in the abovementioned periods of Polish history reveals its constant development with regard to the terms of reference of the positions subject to constitutional accountability and the authorities involved in the process, but, on the other hand, the study also points to the relative lack of efficacy connected with the politicisation of the Parliament, which makes the notion of constitutional accountability a spectacular form of implementation of the principle of political accountability.

One of the aspects of the principle of separation of powers in the state is control of the executive by the legislature. As regards the Polish lands in the early nineteenth century, we can speak about Polish parliamentarism only in the Duchy of Warsaw, the Kingdom of Poland and the Republic of Cracow. Although these states did not recognize the principle of parliamentary accountability, their parliaments voiced criticism of the authorities and there occurred the problem of controlling the executive. Parliament of the Duchy of Warsaw tried to usurp this right itself. Parliament of the Kingdom of Poland claimed the right to charge a civil officer of the government with crimes committed while in office. In that state the ability to control emerged during the November Uprising. In the Republic of Cracow all attempts at obtaining the right of control encountered the objection on the part of three supervising neighbours (Russia, Prussia, and Austria). ; One of the aspects of the principle of separation of powers in the state is control of the executive by the legislature. As regards the Polish lands in the early nineteenth century, we can speak about Polish parliamentarism only in the Duchy of Warsaw, the Kingdom of Poland and the Republic of Cracow. Although these states did not recognize the principle of parliamentary accountability, their parliaments voiced criticism of the authorities and there occurred the problem of controlling the executive. Parliament of the Duchy of Warsaw tried to usurp this right itself. Parliament of the Kingdom of Poland claimed the right to charge a civil officer of the government with crimes committed while in office. In that state the ability to control emerged during the November Uprising. In the Republic of Cracow all attempts at obtaining the right of control encountered the objection on the part of three supervising neighbours (Russia, Prussia, and Austria).

In the article, the distinctive features of the Constitution of the 5th Republic are abalyzed. A brief discussion on some of the constitutional institutions showed the originality and novelty of the political system that was adopted after 1958. Built in the spirit of the French republican tradition, the system was based, on the one hand, on a strong and central constitutional position of the President, a twofold executive, and a parliament limited in its competences, and on the other hand, on parliamentary accountability of the government and well-developed direct democracy institutions. The French example could be considered excellent evidence of how the powerful and historic constitutional institutions could be adopted in a modern democratic state even under a concise constitution of a hybrid charakter. ; Artykuł nie zawiera abstraktu w języku polskim

The article focuses on the national dimensions of the EU communication policy in Sweden, Finland and Denmark. The cornerstone of the EU communication policy is the dialogue with citizens about the policies and the future of the EU. It is based on openness, transparency and accountability which greatly contribute to building citizens' trust in the authorities' activity. EU communication policy is realized through e-governance, language policy and the policy in the sphere of mass media. The aim of the article is to analyze the experience and best practices of top 3 EU countries (Sweden, Finland and Denmark) in terms of the assessment of national policies in the field of ICT and digital skills of citizens in the sphere of communication policy. The hypothesis is that these states being the leaders as to citizens' digital literacy have introduced efficient channels of involving citizens in the decision making process.

The article focuses on the national dimensions of the EU communication policy in Sweden, Finland and Denmark. The cornerstone of the EU communication policy is the dialogue with citizens about the policies and the future of the EU. It is based on openness, transparency and accountability which greatly contribute to building citizens' trust in the authorities' activity. EU communication policy is realized through e-governance, language policy and the policy in the sphere of mass media. The aim of the article is to analyze the experience and best practices of top 3 EU countries (Sweden, Finland and Denmark) in terms of the assessment of national policies in the field of ICT and digital skills of citizens in the sphere of communication policy. The hypothesis is that these states being the leaders as to citizens' digital literacy have introduced efficient channels of involving citizens in the decision making process.

One of the fundamental categories of general sociology concerns power. Regardless of differences in interpretation, power can be defined as the dependence between subordinator and subordinated. This relation is unidirectional. When discussing influence, this property is significant, as otherwise it could be reciprocal, or an influence could be exerted by many other entities that are not bound by the relationship of subordination. The nature of international relations is too specific to allow a simple transfer of power-related phenomena from the realm of domestic relations. One can indicate the presence of delegated power, resulting from the mutual assignment of subordination rights to international decision- making bodies. The processes of international power are divided into procedures of hard power, soft power and smart power, the latter signifying the manifestation of effective power, making use of the mechanisms of the former two. It is also important to take into account the specificity of the legitimization of international power and manifestations of accountability. Also not without significance is the capacity for the implementation of international power, equipped with the relevant enforcement instruments. ; One of the fundamental categories of general sociology concerns power. Regardless of differences in interpretation, power can be defined as the dependence between subordinator and subordinated. This relation is unidirectional. When discussing influence, this property is significant, as otherwise it could be reciprocal, or an influence could be exerted by many other entities that are not bound by the relationship of subordination. The nature of international relations is too specific to allow a simple transfer of power-related phenomena from the realm of domestic relations. One can indicate the presence of delegated power, resulting from the mutual assignment of subordination rights to international decision- making bodies. The processes of international power are divided into procedures of hard power, soft power and smart power, the latter signifying the manifestation of effective power, making use of the mechanisms of the former two. It is also important to take into account the specificity of the legitimization of international power and manifestations of accountability. Also not without significance is the capacity for the implementation of international power, equipped with the relevant enforcement instruments.

The aim of the research is to explore various forms of participation of the EU Member States Parliaments in the political processes of the European Union. The assessment of the intensity of the analyzed participation will be made by applying the concept of classification of the distinguished participation, which includes passive and active participation. This study has a significant impact in the context of participation of citizens, whose direct representatives are elected members of the national Parliaments (NP). The article verifies the hypothesis that the variety of forms of participation of NP in the political processes in the EU strengthens the democratic legitimacy by increasing transparency and accountability of the EU institutions and by improving cross-level communication lines between the EU institutions and national authorities. Active forms of participation increase influence of NP on the EU political processes. However, a wide range of informal participation increases the effectiveness of supranational decision-making processes, in particular, reducing the technocratic nature of the decisions.

The aim of the research is to explore various forms of participation of the EU Member States Parliaments in the political processes of the European Union. The assessment of the intensity of the analyzed participation will be made by applying the concept of classification of the distinguished participation, which includes passive and active participation. This study has a significant impact in the context of participation of citizens, whose direct representatives are elected members of the national Parliaments (NP). The article verifies the hypothesis that the variety of forms of participation of NP in the political processes in the EU strengthens the democratic legitimacy by increasing transparency and accountability of the EU institutions and by improving cross-level communication lines between the EU institutions and national authorities. Active forms of participation increase influence of NP on the EU political processes. However, a wide range of informal participation increases the effectiveness of supranational decision-making processes, in particular, reducing the technocratic nature of the decisions.

The increasing complexity of the academic enterprise in Europe is due to several general factors: globalization and Europeanization, educational expansion and massification of higher education, the economic crisis, reform pressures in the public sector, growing pressures for accountability, and knowledge-driven economic competitiveness of nations and regions. Factors generating change in national higher education policies and in national higher education systems have been multilayered, interrelated and often common throughout the continent. Reforms increasingly, and throughout Europe, lead to further reforms rather than to reformed higher education systems. Higher education has changed substantially in most European economies in the last two or three decades but it is still expected by national and European-level policymakers to change even more. Universities, throughout two centuries of their modern history, change as their environments change, especially in connection with changes in the functioning of nation-states and various forms of welfare states. Different directions of current and projected academic restructuring in different national systems add to the complexity of the picture at a European level.

In this article the attention is paid to other roles of the Prime Minister in governmental institutions as a body subject to Sejm control, to mention only his position within the governmental administration (vis-à-vis deputy prime ministers, ministers outside cabinet, "non-governmental" organizations of state administration); position of the Prime Minister as a sole supreme body of state administration; his relations with other central bodies of state administration (President, Sejm, Supreme Audit Office). The problem of accountability of the Prime Minister to Sejm has also been contemplated.Making an attempt in both parts of the article to evaluate the influence of various factors on legal and governmental status of the Prime Minister as a body subject to Sejm control, the following has been stated: a) The Prime Minister holds a very strong position and plays a leading role within the structures and functioning mechanisms of the Council of Ministers and in relations with "non-governmental" bodies of state administration, b) position of the Prime Minister in managing the Council of Ministers, a body ranking number one within the structures of executive power and wide authority of the Prime Minister including non-legal factors result in an important role played by the Prime Minister within the entire system of the authorities of the Republic of Poland. These factors also confirm how important is Sejm control of the Prime Minister's activity for the proper implementation of the principle of separation and balance of powers. ; Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie innych ról ustrojowych Prezesa Rady Ministrów jako organu podlegającego kontroli sejmowej, takich jak: jego pozycja w strukturach administracji rządowej (wobec wiceprezesów Rady Ministrów, ministrów poza rządem, "pozarządowych" organów rządowej administracji); pozycja Prezesa Rady Ministrów jako jednoosobowego naczelnego organu administracji rządowej; jego relacje z innymi naczelnymi organami państwowymi (Prezydentem, Sejmem, Najwyższą Izbą Kontroli). Rozważono też problem odpowiedzialności parlamentarnej Prezesa Rady Ministrów przed Sejmem.Podejmując próbę generalnej oceny (rozważanego w częściach I i II artykułu) wpływu różnych czynników na status prawnoustrojowy Prezesa Rady Ministrów jako organu podlegającego kontroli sejmowej, stwierdzono między innymi, że: a) Prezes Rady Ministrów zajmuje bardzo silną pozycję i odgrywa wiodącą rolę w strukturach i mechanizmach funkcjonowania Rady Ministrów oraz w stosunkach z "pozarządowymi" organami rządowej administracji, b) pozycja Prezesa Rady Ministrów w kierowanej przez niego Radzie Ministrów (organie usytuowanym na pierwszym miejscu w strukturze władzy wykonawczej) oraz rozległy zakres jego kompetencji powodują, wraz z czynnikami o charakterze pozaprawnym, że to właśnie on odgrywa ważną rolę w całym systemie rządów RP. Te czynniki również przekonują, jak istotne znaczenie dla prawidłowego urzeczywistniania zasady podziału władzy i równowagi władz ma kontrola sejmowa aktywności Prezesa Rady Ministrów.

The purpose of the article is to analyse the role of the public prosecutor's office as an institution that is specifically embedded in between certain elements of the political system, particularly between the executive and judiciary powers. For this reason, the public prosecutor's office can be regarded, together with courts, as an institution that aims to be actively involved in administering justice and an instrument of the executive power to guarantee internal security and to execute internal functions of the state. The public prosecutor's office, given its specific operation area, is expected to prosecute crimes effectively as well as safeguard the rule of law, which may be threatened by the infringing actions of not only individuals and criminal groups but also of officials and state institutions. Hence, with respect to the accountability of the public prosecutor's office, it should be more independent of the executive power which is subject to political rules. It appears, however, that separating it officially from the executive power does not have to lead automatically to the public prosecutor's office independence of political influence when other direct (the Prime Minister's and the Minister of Justice's authority over the Attorney General) and indirect mechanisms of prosecutors' political dependency (clientelism, politicisation and political bonds of prosecutors with politicians) exist.

The paper attempts to address the question of whether the prime ministerial system has already emerged as a separate system of governance that differs from classical systems, and whether it can no longer be treated as a certain sub-class in an extensive range of parliamentary systems, but rather as a new type of system in its own right. The principal issue appears to be whether the inherent properties of the prime ministerial variety of governance are sufficiently distinct, significant and different from the parliamentary system, however broadly understood, to give the former a status of a separate governance system from the methodological point of view. It should be observed that the contemporary British system, which serves as a foundation for our deliberations on the prime ministerial form of governance, has deviated from the classical or typical parliamentary system far enough to actually take the direction of a separate system of governance, namely prime ministerial governance. Firstly, this is evidenced by the removal of the monarch from the political system and establishing executive power as a virtually one-element entity concentrated in the Cabinet, and embodied by its leader. Secondly, the figure of Prime Minister is highly emphasized as he is elected 'under the guise of common elections' and he successfully monopolizes the work of his entire Cabinet, becoming a certain 'trademark' of this Cabinet, which is well supported by the principle of joint accountability of all Cabinet members, a principle that is exceptionally strictly and consistently implemented in the British system. The ongoing politological processes that tend to presidentialize and personalize politics are only accelerating these changes and making them even more apparent. The consequence in Britain is that it is the Prime Minister who accrues the power to govern and he by no means falls under the principle of classical parliamentary systems, where the government leader is only "the first among equals". Thirdly, the House of Commons has practically lost its controlling power over the Cabinet, as primarily evidenced in the absence of a vote of no confidence, which would serve as a tool of political accountability of executive power before the legislative, the essence of any form of parliamentary governance. Fourthly, in a highly specific, deeply endemic party system which entails that various links between government and parliament typical of the parliamentary style of democracy are de facto transferred onto the internal party stage, this to an extent also explains the relevance of the division between government and opposition, a division which is neither as clear, nor as far-reaching as in the case of other parliamentary systems. All this allows us to conclude that the British system is sufficiently different to be deemed new in comparison to a typical or classical parliamentary system. The transformations that have taken place there have gone far beyond the proper, or classical, model of parliamentary governance thus forming not only a sub-class, but a separate type (or model) of governance.